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Until 1944 U-boats operated as submersible torpedo craft, rather than as true 
submarines. However, growing Allied anti-submarine measures forced the Germans to 
adopt submerged operations, made practicable by the addition of the schnorkel, while 
in parallel they began developing U-boats capable of high speed and long endurance 
underwater. The Royal Navy countered with tactical adaptation and an intensive 
training programme both against the schnorkel-fitted U-boats and the potential threat of 
the fast types, which, though they did not become operational, became the benchmark 
of the post-war Russian submarine challenge. 
Post-war Royal Navy doctrine was developed by three professional anti-submarine 
officers: Burnett, Ormsby and Mosse. They had to deal with a difficult problem, for, by 
remaining continuously submerged and firing at longer ranges, the fast submarines 
were harder to detect and even harder to attack. In 1948-49, the first tactical sea 
exercises against fast submarines confirmed the limitations of existing anti-submarine 
equipment. New anti-submarine technology was a long way off, so immediate remedies 
were tactical. Convoying remained the cornerstone of anti-submarine defence, but was 
combined with offensive measures, which extended from the convoy's boundary to the 
enemy's homeland. Individual actions emphasized rapid, aggressive, co-ordinated and 
persistent responses, however, ships were once more restricted to barrage attacks and 
aircraft lacked any effective submarine-killing weapon. Individual submarines could be 
very dangerous if they attacked a convoy, although they were still plagued with the 
thorny problem of finding the convoys without supporting air reconnaissance. 
This thesis shows that the Royal Navy's response to modern anti-submarine warfare 
was rooted in the tactical concepts developed in the interwar period and the Second 
World War. It saw anti-submarine doctrine as consisting of "defensive" and "offensive" 
tactics, not as alternatives, as they have usually been depicted, but as parts of a 
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Introduction 
Preamble 
As the Second World War came to a close, Korvetten-Kapitan Adalbert Schnee 
took the new Type XXI U-boat U-2511 on its first operational patrol {Plate 2). These 
streamlined boats were capable of high underwater speed and (by use of the schnorkel 
breathing tube) of continuous submerged operations. Operating U-251 1, to the North of 
the Shetlands, Schnee, so the literature relates, found himself in an excellent position 
to attack the cruiser HMS Norfolk, screened by a single destroyer. Some accounts 
suggest that Schnee penetrated the cruiser's destroyer screen and simulated firing a 
torpedo salvo at point-blank range, while others suggest that by making a 301 alteration 
of course and increasing speed to 16 knots he passed well outside the British 
destroyer's detection range and thus avoided contact. ' Commander Richard Compton- 
Hall, MBE, RN, himself an experienced submarine commander, spent some time with 
Schnee to assess his capabilities and concluded that'... without intending (I am sure) to 
brag, 
... 
[he] felt able to run circles round the escorts and attack favourably if he 
wanted. ... He was, I think, way ahead of his contemporaries, and his background 
doubtless enabled him to see the future, and innovation, with unusual clarity. 2 Schnee, 
not a man to camouflage his exploits, felt certain he could have sunk both ships with 
the greatest of ease. However, he had just received the signal from D6nitz ordering the 
cessation of hostilities, so he made for his base at Bergen, leaving the British unaware 
of their narrow escape. 3 
The incident, itself, seems to have made little impact on the Admiralty at the time. 
Indeed, by the end of the war the British already had a firm grasp of the nature of this 
threat and had evolved anti-submarine measures to deal with it. Yet it the subsequent 
literature, Schnee's "attack" is depicted with greater authority than it deserves, for the 
1 Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, tr. R. H. Stevens, intro. Jurgen Rohwer 
(London: Greenhill Books, 1990), p. 429; Kenneth Wynn, U-Boat Operations of the Second 
World War, Vol. 2: Career Histories, U51 1-UIT25 (London: Chatham Publishing, 1998), pp. 256- 
257; Jordan Vause, Wolt U-boat Commanders in World War // (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1997), pp. 
202-203, F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. A. G. Simkins and C. F. G. Ransom, British Intelligence in 
the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. 111, Part 2 (London. 
HMSO, 1988), p. 631. 
2 Richard Compton-Hall, e-mails 20/06/00 11: 27: 31 and 16: 07: 15. 
3 'Bergen, ' in, 'Report on Interrogation of German Naval Staff Officers of the U-Boat Arm at 
Flensburg and Bergen, ' Group Captain Gates, CC/s. 17384 A/U Ops., 6 June 1945, Gretton 
Papers, MSS/93/008, NMM(G). 
Plate 2: Three Type XXIs, includinq U-2511 (centre) 
(Bibliotthek fur Zeitgeschichte: Sleek Type XXI U-boats, 115/11) 
Introduction 
surviving evidence to support the event is nebuloUS. 4 Nevertheless, it has entered the 
folklore of the Battle of the Atlantic as epitomising the power of these new U-boats and 
the deadly threat they posed to British shipping. This view is fuelled both by the 
technological novelty supposed to be incorporated into these new German U-boats, 
and because specimens of these boats were acquired by the Russians at the end of 
the war. Worse still, the portrayal of the uSchnee incident" in the secondary literature is 
symptomatic of a wider historical misunderstanding of the Royal Navy's anti-submarine 
philosophy and doctrine. In essence, the confusions stems from an exaggeration of the 
"new" technical capabilities of the Type XXI, which would have been pitted against the 
"out-of-date", wartime technology of the Royal Navy. Realising this, according to this 
view, the British gradually abandoned their war-winning, but "defensive", convoy 
strategy which was now likely to be ineffective. This was reinforced by the Royal 
Navy's ambivalence about convoy and its institutional bias towards aggressive 
methods. As a corollary, the Royal Navy gravitated towards "offensive" operations, just 
as they had done in the First World War and the opening phase of the Second World 
War. The argument, however, is not supported by the primary evidence. 
The Objectives of the Thesis 
This thesis provides a new interpretation of the Royal Navy's anti-submarine 
philosophy - one that unequivocally shows that the "defensive" and "offensive" 
operations were consistently visualized (in both peace and war) as interdependent, 
symbiotic parts of a holistic anti-submarine strategy and not as alternative strategies. 
This new analysis provides a new basis against which to reassess the British approach 
to anti-submarine warfare in the first half of the twentieth century and, in the process, 
depicts the Royal Navy and, especially, the Admiralty as more subtle and forward- 
thinking organisations than is generally supposed. Moreover, this thesis takes the 
radical approach of treating the "middle management" (that is, the Commanders and 
Captains), of the Admiralty and Royal Navy commands as the main authors of 
development, rather than as puppets reacting to the bidding of senior officers. 
Background and Literature 
The heresy of dividing the tactical application of anti-submarine WS) warfare into 
"defensive" or uoffensive" operations has become widespread and is followed, albeit 
4 Marc Milner, The U-boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive against 
Germany's Submarines (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 254. 
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inconsistently, in the current British Maritime Doctrine Manual. 5 The modern view was 
cemented in place by the post-war work of the Admiralty and Official Historians, and 
has underpinned the analysis of many subsequent historians. In the mid-1950s, the 
Admiralty's Historical Section thought they were witnessing a growing acceptance of 
the "Convoy is Defensive" school of thought within the Service. A section of naval 
opinion, the Historians held, viewed the convoy system as '... the embodiment of the 
defensive, ' but this, they added, '... is not substantiated by the facts of war ascertained 
by rigorous historical research. ' Indeed, their analysis revealed that, in both World 
Wars, '... of all the measures we adopted, the convoy system alone provided the means 
for waging unremitting and highly remunerative offensive action.... 'o They drove home 
their point with a statistical comparison, albeit only up to May 1943, of the effectiveness 
of "convoy" forces in destroying U-boats, as opposed to other operations, such as 
hunting patrols, transit offensives, mining and bombing of bases, that were invariably 
seen as "offensive". The writers claimed that 23% of the U-boats were sunk by 
uoffensive" operations but 65% were destroyed by convoy escorts and their supports, 
with the remainder being lost to various other means. 7 Their subsequent Staff History 
was somewhat more muted but emphasised these same ideas. 3 They were also 
echoed by the Official Historian, who noted that there was a '... widely held but 
fallacious belief that [these] so-called "offensive" measures against the U-boats could 
provide an effective alternative to convoy. '9 The point has been amplified by historians, 
who also point to the concomitant inability of the Admiralty to "learn from history". " 
However, as this thesis unequivocally demonstrates, this is a jaundiced and partial 
view of the Royal Navy's A/S doctrine. 
The weakness of the previous accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic is that they 
concentrate on an apparently endless succession of great convoy battles in 1942-43. 
Although there are several valuable and critical analyses, the depiction of these battles 
5 Naval Staff Directorate, British Maritime Doctrine, 2 Edn., BR1806, (London: HMSO, 1999). A 
correction had been submitted by the author to this manual. 6 'A "New Looko at uOffence" and "Defence": The Anti-U-Boat Campaign, 1939-1945, A Brief 
Statement of Facts, ' F. Barley and D. W. Waters, Historical Section, 15 October 1955, DWW24, 
Box PT1 34, NHB [emphasis supplied]. This paper is reproduced at Appendix 1. 
7 'A ONew Look" at "Offence" and "Defence", ' NHB. a Eric J. Grove (ed. ), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945, revised edn. 
týldershot: Ashgate for The Navy Records Society, 1997), pp. 47-49. 
Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. 1: The Defensive (London: HMSO, 1954), p. 
134. 
10 P. Gretton, Why Don't We Learn From History, ' The Naval Review (January 1958). Gretton 
drew much of his inspiration from the Historical Section. Recent scholarship has begun to 
unpick these ideas, see: Joseph A. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: A 
Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second Worid War (London: Macmillan Press, 
1998) and George Franklin, Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability, 1919-1939 (London: Frank 
Cass, 2003). The latter, however, still contains a number of myth-ridden conclusions. 
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against packs of U-boats operating on the surface at night leads to an exaggeration of 
their overall historical importance, for, in many respects, these battles are perturbations 
in the overall progress of submarine (and hence anti-submarine) warfare. " 
Furthermore, as Professor Zimmerman points out: 
Research on the Battle [of the Atlantic] has tended to focus on either the 
operational or the technological developments. Operational historians have been 
content simply to add new technology to their discussions of convoy actions. These 
historians have provided little or no discussion on why and how the new weapons 
systems were developed, and have ignored any mention of the new tactical 
doctrine and training programmes introduced to make use of them. 12 
This thesis redresses such narrow accounts by examining a number of wider themes 
barely touched in the existing literature. 13 This thesis shows that the inshore campaign 
in 1944-45 against U-boats fifted with the schnorkel and the potential threat of the Type 
XXI each had a much greater impact on post-war A/S doctrine than the earlier battles 
against the wolf-packs. This influence is inadequately covered in most accounts of 
post-war Royal Navy doctrine and, where it is referred to, the conclusion is of a bleak 
outlook for A/S warfare. The most balanced view, albeit from an American perspective, 
is provided by Professor Palmer's Origins of the Maritime Strategy, although his 
account somewhat over-eggs the potential of the new fast submarines. 14 The 
development of post-war doctrine in the Royal Navy has received little critical analysis. 
Dr. Grove's From Vanguard to Trident surveys the evolution of post-war British naval 
policy but the depth of tactical and technical analysis is relatively shallow. 15 The 
11 Jargen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943. The Battle for HX 2291SC. 122 
(London: Ian Allan, 1977); David Syrett The Defeat of the German U-Boats. The Battle of the 
Atlantic (Columbia: South Carolina University Press, 1994) and Michael Gannon, Black May: 
The Epic Story of the Allies'Defeat of the German U-Boats in May 1943 (London: Aurum Press, 
1998); W. A. B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force, Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). 12 David Zimmerman, 'Tactics and Technology, in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds. ), The 
Battle of the Atlantic 1939-194& The 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference (London: 
Greenhill Books, 1994), p. 476 [emphasis supplied]. 13 The exceptions are: Marc Milner, 'The Dawn of Modern Anti-Submarine Warfare: Allied 
responses to the U-boats, 1944-45, ' RUSI Journal (Spring 1989), pp. 61-68; Douglas M. 
McLean, 'Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Antisubmarine Warfare in the 
Last Year of the Battle of the Atlantic', Naval War College Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994), pp. 87- 
104, and, 'The Last Cruel Winter The RCN Support Groups and the U-Boat Schnorkel 
Offensive' (MA, Royal Military College of Canada, March 1992); also M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'Trials 
with HM Submarine Seraph and British Preparations to Defeat the Type XXI U-Boat, 
September-October, 1944, ' The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 86, No. 4 (November 2000), pp. 434-451, 
and, 'The Pursuit of Realism: British Anti-Submarine Tactics and Training to Counter the Fast 
Submarine, ' in, John Reeve and David Stevens (eds. ), The Face of Naval Battle: The Human 
Experience of Modem War at Sea (Crows Nest, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2003), pp. 219- 
239. 
14 Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval 
Strategy, 1945-55 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990). 
15 Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident British Naval Policy since World War 11 (London: The 
Bodley Head, 1987). 
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corresponding developments in A/S warfare for the Royal Air Force are almost entirely 
absent. The series of books by Dr. Friedman are useful for technological issues, the 
principle one being his review of The Postwar Naval Revolution. " This book covers 
anti-submarine technical developments for both air and naval forces, but it cobbles 
together a miscellany of information with little analysis or emphasis. Dr. Hackmann has 
provided a detailed, if occasionally convoluted, study of the development of acoustic 
means of detecting submarines, but is weak on the interrelationship to A/S tactics. 17 
This thesis takes a different standpoint by deliberately analysing the late war 
operations and their influences on post-war doctrine development. This analysis 
exposes the difficult nature of A/S warfare. Submarines are usually hard to locate -a 
factor which submariners try to exploit by optimising their operations to create swift 
attacks from an ambush, after which they endeavour to withdraw from any tactical 
situation in order to re-initiate an attack at a time and place where again they hope to 
enjoy the advantage of initial stealth. Anti-submarine forces, conversely, strive for 
deliberate tactical engagements with submarines so that their superior advantages of 
tactical co-ordination and numbers can be brought to bear. Submarines can somewhat 
emulate the escort advantage of mass by bringing more submarines into the area of a 
specific convoy battle but they can never achieve the same benefit from a concentrated 
mass because of the inherent tension between coordination (and hence the need for 
overt communication) and stealth. These tactical preferences of the opponents in A/S 
warfare therefore provide a basic continuity to these operations. " These aspects are 
crucial to understanding how decisions on A/S warfare doctrine came to be made. 
The small group of officers who undertook this work in the Admiralty after the 
Second World War, certainly understood these issues. These men, Captain P. W. 
Burnett, DSO, DSC, RN, Commander G. A. G. Ormsby, DSO, DSC, RN, and Lieutenant 
Commander J. P. Mosse, DSC, RN, were all career officers with distinguished wartime 
records, and all were anti-submarine specialists (Plate 3). The A/S doctrine they 
championed in 1946-48 drew in large measure on their wartime experiences. That, in 
turn, had been conditioned by their pre-war anti-submarine specialist education on 
16 Norman Friedman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (London: Conway, 1986); Norman 
Friedman, Submarine Design and Development (London: Conway, 1984); Norman Friedman, 
U. S. Submarines Since 1945: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute 
Press, 1994). 
17 Willem Hackmann, Seek & Strike: Sonar, Anti-submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy 1914- 
54 (London: HMSO, 1984). 
18 'Philosophical Ramblings, ' Doug McLean, e-mail, 01/11/03 21: 13: 28 GMT 
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Plate 3: Commanders P. W. Burnett and G. A. G. Ormsbv 
(IWM) 
41 I 
Commander G. A. G. Ormsby (centre), 
Commander P. W. Burneft (centre) 
professional courses and in subsequent appointments during the 1930s. 19 The doctrine 
they were taught was rooted in the operations in the last years of the First World War, 
and modified by the subsequent development of "asdic" (later known as sonar) 
acoustic echo-location of submarines. The progress in the tenets of A/S warfare from 
1917 onwards therefore form the template for this thesis until 1949, when Burnett and 
immediate his successors had laid the foundations of the doctrine which served the 
Royal Navy well for several decades. There was, of course, subsequent modification, 
in part because of the formation of NATO - with its greater emphasis on alliance 
warfare - but also to take account of the improved weapons and sensors that began to 
appear in volume with the rearmament spurred by the Cold War and the potential of the 
Russian submarine threat. 
The change in submarine warfare occurred in 1944 when the Germans began to 
operate U-boats on war patrols during which they remained submerged throughout, 
made possible by the introduction of the schnorkel. In parallel the enemy was 
developing new U-boat types capable of high submerged speed. Thus 1944 marks the 
dawning of modern A/S warfare, though contemporary opinions were divided on 
whether this represented a revolution or simply the evolution of methods used to deal 
with older submarines. Technological remedies, by and large, did not to appear until 
the 1950s and the equipment itself was in part an amalgam of gear initially developed 
to meet a different requirement together with wholly new concepts which, however, did 
not become operationally effective for another decade. This thesis shows that, contrary 
to most expectations, the Royal Navy approached the problem of the fast submarine in 
the post-war era by means of tactical adaptation to optimise existing A/S equipment. 
Their doctrine, presented here, has been derived from an extensive analysis of the 
contemporary tactical manuals and doctrine papers which were written by naval 
officers with considerable A/S experience during or in the immediate aftermath of the 
war. They also benefited from the close interaction between the naval and scientific 
communities in the Admiralty and Commands. As a result the documents tend to be 
more pragmatic than theoretical, and therefore do not present the historian with the 
overly geometric and formulaic vista found in age-of-sail treatise. 20 
Even so, these manuals and papers present analytical challenges. The surviving 
papers are voluminous and have to be condensed so that their often arcane nature 
becomes more easily digestible, but without over-simplification. There is no guarantee 
19 John Mosse, 'Half a Lifetime, ' Part 11, August 1986, IWIVI 90/23/1, pp. 1-2. 
20 N. A. M. Rodger, 'Image and Reality in Eighteenth-Century Naval Tactics, ' The Mariner's 
Mirror, Vol. 89, No. 3 (August 2003), pp. 280-296 
that men at sea actually followed them to the letter - indeed the opposite is clearly the 
case. 2' Furthermore, in the confusion, uncertainty and dynamics of battle, the skill and 
aggression or passivity of leaders, the vagaries of the environment, and so on, mean 
that individual actions are unique. To see the effect, and to test how tactics were 
actually put into effect, a number of wartime operations were examined. There is not 
space here to recount the detail, so the analysis has been used to provide a more 
discerning interpretation of the formal tactical manuals. Peacetime exercises provide 
another challenge because of their "artificiality". As the Admiralty frequently noted, 
exercises gave false impressions of the tactical outcome because of the inhibiting 
effects of safety rules and because the "enemy" was unlikely to respond as he would in 
war - he might even cheat ! 22 Thus when Burnett, and the others, came to set out the 
post-war doctrine they often did so against a background of little hard evidence. The 
threat they had to deal with, if not wholly new, presented itself in ambiguous ways. 
Assumptions and Limitations of Scope 
Certain assumptions have been made. Firstly, that the tactical and technological 
interaction can be discussed for the period of 1944 to 1949 with little reference to 
finance (at least for A/S operations) for two reasons. To begin with, the cost of tactical 
development revolves around the provision of sea and shore-based trials. Whilst these 
were not lavish, there is little evidence to support the contention that tactical 
development was seriously curtailed by lack of resources caused by financial 
restriction. The thesis demonstrates that quite the opposite was the case. Tactical 
development (even post-war) proceeded at a reasonable pace, because much of it was 
a cerebral process. As for the provision of new technology, the sheer complexity of 
some of the developments (especially asdic and acoustic torpedoes) was as much a 
limiting factor as any lack of material or personnel (which was in some important areas 
23 soon rectified). These equipments were deployed, as expected in the early 1950s. Of 
course, post-war financial restrictions did curtail the strategic application of some 
tactical options, notably by limiting the more offensive force levels and deployment 
patterns. But it is easy to forget that there were resource limitations in wartime too. To 
some extent post-war shortcomings were redressed by the rearmament programme of 
the early 1950s which coincided with the availability of new A/S equipment. However, 
21 'HMS Conn, Report of Proceedings, 11 January to 2 February 1945, ' Lieutenant Commander 
Raymond Hart, DSC, RN, Senior Officer 21 st Escort Group, 5 February 1945, ADM 217/755. 
22 Commander Richard Compton-Hall, Interview, 26 February 2000. 
23 'HMUDE Summary of Progress, ' 1 December 1949, NAA(M): MP1049/5,1968/2/800. 
the way the ships and equipment were to be used remained as planned despite 
financial constraints. 
The impact of atomic weapons seems to have had little effect on the way the 
British conceived of their post-war A/S doctrine until the next decade. They maintained 
a keen interest in the likely effects on sea warfare, and whatever the outcome of 
arguments over "broken-backed warfare", if war at sea was protracted, then the 
24 defence of trade remained a central concern of the Royal Navy. British concepts of 
A/S warfare were probably more affected by the demands of the Cold War, than by the 
direct influence of the atomic bomb. There are also other aspects of anti-submarine 
warfare that will not be covered in detail. Mine warfare was employed extensively 
during the war and formed a substantial element of post-war A/S planning, both as an 
offensive weapon in the enemy's own waters, and defensively to protect shipping 
routes and harbours. Mining is a topic which deserves a full treatment in its own right 
but space here precludes more than brief mention of it. Similarly, submarines were 
employed in both world wars on A/S operations, however their use this role bears only 
obliquely on most of the narrative presented here, until between 1947-48 when A/S 
warfare became their primary mission. Lastly, the case for A/S aircraft is more 
awkward. Because aircraft, as will be seen, lost their power to destroy submarines by 
the introduction of the schnorkel, they played a less central role in anti-submarine 
warfare from 1944 onwards and did not begin to recover their primacy until new 
acoustic detection and weapon technology became available towards the end of the 
1950s. For this reason, there is less emphasis in this thesis on airborne tactics than on 
those used by surface forces. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The main thematic strands of this thesis are heavily intertwined and treating them 
separately risks losing the essential complexity of A/S warfare. For this reason, the 
thesis is presented as a chronological narrative that is, unavoidably nuanced, complex 
and dense. Chapter 1 starts with an examination of A/S warfare as practiced in the last 
years of the First World War which laid the foundations of the A/S philosophy taught at 
the professional A/S courses in the 1930s. The existing literature was found to be 
wholly inadequate, and therefore the narrative is based on a reassessment of the 
primary material to examine the interaction between the U-boats' preference for stealth, 
and the A/S forces' tactical schemes, centred around convoys, to force the enemy to 
24 Moore, Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 46-59 and 184-185', Grove, Vanguard to 
Trident, pp. 3-4. 
expose himself to detection and thus destruction. With limited technology, this required 
a combined "defensive" and "offensive" strategy. The Chapter also shows, contrary to 
much of the literature, that A/S doctrine did not stagnate in the inter-war years. In 
particular, convoy remained the central tenet of A/S planning prior the Second World 
War, though it was also realized that the U-boat could not be defeated without A/S 
forces taking the offensive. Furthermore, although some scientific advances had been 
made (particularly asdic echo-location), A/S warfare was still difficult and individual 
tactics remained inefficient. The inter-war "defensive" and "offensive" holistic doctrine 
was validated by operations during the first years of the Second World War. Chapter 2 
continues the analysis up to 1943 with the emphasis on the difficulty U-boats had in 
finding their targets and in defending themselves from the growing power of British 
(and Allied) A/S forces, as well as the complex technical and tactical problem A/S 
forces had in detecting and attacking U-boats. This explains much about the difficulties 
experienced by A/S forces when faced with the prospect of countering fast U-boats 
which the Germans soon began to develop. Together, Chapters 1 and 2 form a 
backdrop for the remainder of the thesis and demonstrate that there is much mythology 
in the existing literature, which warps the historiographic view of the Admiralty's late 
war and early post-war responses. 
Chapter 3 shows that, by 1942, the enemy had been forced to cast about for 
"new" technology to counter A/S aircraft, in particular. The most important device was 
the schnorkel breathing tube, which, for the first time, allowed the U-boats to operate 
continuously submerged throughout a war patrol. The British methods of countering 
these U-boats forms, as it were, the pre-dawn of modern anti-submarine warfare. The 
task fell primarily on the surface escorts, for the schnorkel, by allowing the U-boats to 
remain submerged, had largely put A/S aircraft out of business. This chapter also 
reveals the methods for use of A/S forces were in essence similar to these employed 
during the First World War. It emphasises the fact that in the shallow waters where the 
campaign was now fought, anti-submarine conditions remained difficult. The A/S forces 
(like the U-boats) took some time to become accustomed to the new operating 
environment and procedures. Coastal Command had the most difficult task, especially 
in locating these U-boats, whose elusiveness emphasized the vital need for co- 
ordination of all A/S forces if the schnorkel-fitted U-boats were to be beaten. The 
prospects, as seen from the Admiralty, of a renewed offensive are discussed. Not only 
was the immediate problem to defeat the schnorkel-fitted U-boat, but to formulate 
counters to the enemy's development of new U-boat types, the Type XXI and Walter- 
boats, with high underwater speed, which could overcome the immobility of the 
schnorkel boats. The interaction between the technical and tactical elements of A/S 
warfare against the background of difficult operating conditions has not been 
adequately explored in earlier studies. 
The problem of dealing with the fast U-boats - the dawn of modern A/S warfare - 
and the Royal Navy's comprehensive plans to deal with the threat are examined in 
Chapter 4. The Admiralty's rapid and flexible response was based on wide consultation 
of various staff departments and operational headquarters. The theoretical tactical 
measures were tried at sea with the modified, high-speed British submarine, Seraph. 
This boat, along with other conversions, was subsequently used for training of A/S 
escort groups in the tactical procedures that had been developed from evaluations at 
sea and on the shore-side tactical tables. Further trials were planned with Type XXIs 
captured at the end of the war to confirm this work, but these were all cancelled, 
leaving the British with no first-hand experience of operations against fast U-boats. 
Much of the material presented here is new or substantially revises previously 
published work. 
Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the Admiralty departments dealing 
with A/S matters were reorganized and the resultant new directorate set about a 
preliminary review of A/S policy for the post-war era, which forms a substantial part of 
Chapter 5. It was assumed that the wartime Type XXI threat would now become the 
benchmark of the Soviet maritime challenge. The A/S review concluded that future 
plans should be cast as short-term up to 1950 and long-term problems thereafter. The 
threat was not seen in specific numerical terms and was viewed in a generic form, 
based on the continuing assessment of the Type XXI U-boat capability. Drawing on 
wartime assessments, with additional information provided from captured German 
documents, the Type XXIs were seen individually as potentially dangerous, though 
they would have considerable difficulties in locating targets and concentrating for an 
cooperative attack. Air reconnaissance in support of submarine operations was seen 
as crucial. These assumptions formed the basis of the first tranche of doctrine papers 
produced in 1946-47 and to ensure that these assessments were translated into 
forward policy initiatives, it was seen as vital for A/S warfare to be kept in the forefront 
of Admiralty, and Air Ministry, activity. To this end, the Joint Sea/Air Warfare 
Committee (SAWC) was formed, which then became the conduit for the doctrine 
papers produced (under the Admiralty's leadership) from 1946 onwards. These papers 
reiterated the combination of defensive and offensive measures, that had proved so 
successful during the war, and drew in large measure on the experience of those 
operations, even though now applied to a different threat. 
Chapter 6 traces the subsequent production of the, mainly technical, Admiralty 
papers on the problems of anti-submarine warfare and their proposed remedies. These 
remedies included requirements for improved A/S equipment and also outlined the 
history of the anti-submarine campaigns since the First World War. The difficult 
problems of locating submerged submarines, particularly before they could attack, 
emphasized the value of more offensive, independent operations, known as "attack-at- 
source". The Joint Anti-Submarine School, which had been formed to perpetuate the 
wartime training and trials system, also provided a detailed assessment of offensive 
and defensive tactical measures to deal with the fast submarine. At a more detailed 
level, the first exercises with a fast submarine was carried out in early 1948. These 
were not wholly encouraging. Overlaying these detailed tactical questions was a wider 
debate over A/S policy which is examined in Chapter 7. This is followed by an analysis 
of the concurrent development of the second series of doctrine papers, which were less 
philosophical and more procedural, than their predecessors. These (once more) 
formalized the use of convoy and, in parallel, the need for supporting operations and, 
where intelligence was available, independent hunting offensives, together with the 
idea of attack-at-source. As these papers were being drafted in 1948, the Royal Navy 
was carrying out a year-long series of exercises with a number of fast submarines. 
These confirmed, as expected, that success was possible when the submarine was 
travelling at speeds up to 12 knots but that above this speed A/S performance 
deteriorated substantially. The results corroborated wartime predictions and confirmed 
the need for improved A/S technology. At this time aircraft capability was showing signs 
of some recovery, though much still had to be done. Submarines themselves also 
became anti-submarine vessels, a role which was formalized in 1948. These trials were 
carried out against a background of a hardening political and military threat from the 
Soviet Union and the more obvious entry into the Cold War. Over the year which 
followed, a series of sea exercises did little to further the understanding of the A/S 
problem against fast submarines, largely due to the continuing lack of these vessels. A 
wider analysis of A/S warfare was undertaken in a substantial conference, known as 
Exercise "Trident" in 1949, which confirmed the British thinking of the close relationship 
between defensive and offensive A/S operations. This was an aspect ill understood by 
the Admiralty's historians, which has led to misunderstanding ever since of the Royal 
Navy's anti-submarine philosophy. 
These last three Chapters provide a wholly fresh interpretation of the Admiralty's 
performance and show that it remained a vibrant organisation. They lead to the 
Conclusion which summarises the arguments that have already been presented 
chronologically. It does this by taking a crosswise look through the historical prism, to 
examine the main themes which have emerged from the thesis. These are: an 
examination of the nature of anti-submarine warfare and the pursuit of realism in 
peacetime exercises and trials; an examination of the tactical and technological 
dynamic stretching over the period 1917-49; an examination of the role of tactical 
adaptation and the nature of the threat; and, finally, an examination of the symbiotic 
relationship between the "defensive" and "offensive" in A/S warfare. This last theme - 
the holistic nature of anti-submarine warfare - provides a new interpretation of not only 
how the Royal Navy planned to defeat a future submarine attack but also how the 
doctrine was derived. 
Chapter 1: Echoes from the Past, 1917-1940 
British Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-1940 
The U-boat of the First World War relied on surface travel for tactical mobility and 
for searching for its targets, where using their diesel engines they could achieve 181/2 
knots in good conditions. They would submerge when threatened by anti-submarine 
forces or, sometimes, in rough weather. Once underwater, the U-boats relied on their 
batteries and electric motors for propulsion, which gave them a top speed of about 81/2- 
91/2 knots but only for an hour. At, say 31/2 knots, however, the U-boat's underwater 
endurance was about 24-hours. Charging the batteries could only be done on the 
surface when the diesel engines could be run, so these boats were in every sense 
"submersibles" 
. 
25 While submerged the U-boat's range of vision through the periscope 
was restricted. The type and rough course of a victim could be distinguished at about 6 
or 7 miles (in reasonable visibility by day) but this required a considerable exposure of 
26 the periscope. The periscope was, of course, normally used only intermittently. It is 
not surprising, therefore, as the Naval Intelligence Division (NID) noted, U-boats 
preferred to remain on the surface, unless forced to dive by anti-submarine (A/S) 
patrols. On the surface their visual horizon was much extended, they could keep their 
batteries fully charged, and they were able to manoeuvre into an attacking position 
ahead of a convoy before diving to attack unseen. The search was considerably 
extended when two U-boats operated in concert, spread at right-angles to the convoy's 
track. Such tactics had been noted, although there was no positive evidence of greater 
numbers working together. With the U-boats widely spread, they had to rely on W/T for 
passing sighting information, though, even with this advantage, it was not supposed 
that U-boats could easily deliver simultaneous attacks. The disadvantage of the 
method was that the British were able to intercept the radio transmissions, and by 
applying direction-finding (D/F) techniques, warn the convoy of a U-boat in its vicinity. 
The shore authority (especially when the enemy's signals were decrypted) might also 
be able to direct an A/S patrol vessel to the U-boat's rough location. 
25 'German Navy (Submarines), ' CB1 182S, [NID], April 1918, AL, pp. 35 and 40. 
26 'Remarks on Submarine Warfare, ' Operations Division, CB0259, January 1917, AL, p. 4. 
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The U-boat made frequent use of her periscope to assess the relative movement 
of her target during the final dived approach. Inside about two miles she would be wary 
of over-exposing her periscope, for fear of it being seen by an escort and the U-boat 
counter-attacked. The ideal submerged torpedo attack was aimed at a specific ship in 
27 the convoy at a range of 500-1,000 yards. With her restricted underwater endurance, 
a U-boat could only get into a firing position from a relatively narrow angle ahead of the 
convoy. If the initial sighting was made on the beam or quarter of the convoy, the U- 
boat had to race on the surface around the convoy until she gained a position ahead of 
the convoy where she could dive to make a covert final approach. The further ahead 
she was, the further off the convoy's track the U-boat could afford to be. Subject to the 
restricted underwater speed and endurance of the U-boat, she could therefore start 
from positions within what were known as "limiting lines of submerged approach" 
(LLSuA), which for a 71/2 knot convoy were angled about 400 off each bow of the 
convoy. Dived attacks could only be made in daylight, or on nights were there was 
strong moonlight, for on a dark night, when a U-boat was practically blind, she would at 
risk of being run down by a convoy. However, the Admiralty's Anti-Submarine Division 
noted by October 1917, that on moonlit nights submarines would probably operate on 
the surface with very little buoyancy, which would make them very difficult to see, even 
as close as 400 yards. When night attacks were made, it was thought unlikely that the 
U-boat captain would get between the lines of the convoy, for fear of being run down. 
Ideally, he would fire from the flank, aiming at an individual ship in the convoy. More 
often attacks were made at long-range from outside a strong escort (and known as 
28 "browning" shots fired in the hope of hitting any ship in the convoy). The general 
concept for convoy escort dispositions was, where possible, a line of escorts, spaced a 
mile apart, across the front of the convoy at a distance of 600-800 yards. By zig- 
zagging, these escorts would provide a physical obstruction to U-boats about to fire at 
close range. Escorts would also be stationed on the flanks and, where sufficient forces 
were available, one or more were placed astern where they could respond to a 
torpedoing with a broadcast barrage of depth-charges, as the remainder of the convoy 
cleared the area. An escort astern was also used to deter a shadowing U-boat by 
forcing it to submerge as the convoy made an evasive turn just after dusk. 29 
27 'Tactics of Attack, ' in Appendix I to 'German Navy (Submarines), ' CB1 182S, [NID], April 1918, 
AL p. 88. 
28 'Remarks on Submarine Tactics against Convoys, ' Anti-Submarine Division, Naval Staff, 
Admiralty, CB620, October 1917, in, 'Convoy Orders, 1917-1919, 'AL, pp. 6-8. 
29 , Mercantile Convoys: General Instructions for Port Convoy Officers, Ocean and Destroyer 
Escorts, and Commodores of Convoys, ' CB648(2), 18 October 1918, ADM 186/40. 
Plate 4: Hydrophone Effect 
Generation of Bubbles which cause Cavitation at a Destroyer's Propeller at 15 and 
32 knots. 
'Annual Report of T. A. S. Schools, 1946', Section 11, 'Remarks of H. M. S. Vemon', 
Underwater Weapons Department, Admiralty, UW. 05407/47, C. B. 4486,24 
October 1947, ADM 189/66, Figures 12a and 12b. 
[-- t<, ' ,'ý, 
J-L- Fý i. ý1,, 
28 
Chapter 1 
A/S escorts fitted with hydrophones were able to listen for the Hydrophone Effect 
(HE) from the U-boat's propellers, principally caused by the collapse of the cavitation 
bubbles created by a rapidly spinning propeller, and, to a lesser extent, by the noise 
30 
made by the flow of water past the hull and from internal machinery {Plate 4). 
Listening in the vicinity of surface ships was unproductive, since their HE was likely to 
drown any noise from the U-boat. When a convoy was attacked, escorts had no means 
of detecting submerged submarines other than by sighting their periscopes, the trail of 
oil often left by U-boats, or the water disturbance from a torpedo's discharge and 
subsequent track . 
31 But given a sighting, retaliation could be instant on the part of the 
escort, and had to be if they were to stand any chance of getting a kill because the U- 
boat would inevitably move away from its last reported, or datum, position. Depending 
on the depth of water, the U-boat would either go deep at slow speed, or rest on the 
32 bottom, to avoid A/S forces hunting them with hydrophones. These blind barrage 
attacks by the escorts would not be improved until the introduction of the technique of 
transmitting and receiving a beam of "supersonic" sound pulses from an underwater 
acoustic projector (known as the transducer or oscillator). This equipment was known 
in Britain as "Asdic", and "Sonar" in America {Plate 5). This seemed the most promising 
device of several being experimented with. When the pulses struck the hull of a U-boat 
an echo was returned. By timing the interval between the transmission and reception of 
the sound, an accurate range could be calculated, and by noting the direction of the 
oscillator, a rough bearing was achieved. Experiments with this method had been 
carried out since the middle of 1917, but it was only towards the war's end, that seven 
RN ships were fitted with this gear. In the meantime, several A/S ships working as a 
team, would lay a blind barrage of depth-charges over the suspected position of the U- 
boat . 
33 Initially, escorts were equipped with only four depth-charges, though this outfit 
was later increased, with individual vessels carrying 30 depth-charges. Up to 40 depth- 
charges were expended by hunting groups against individual submarines. Escorts were 
also used on "extended patrols" at, say, eleven miles, specifically designed to interfere 
with U-boats on the surface trying to overhaul the convoy. With their greater range of 
30 Robert J. Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound, 3rd edn. (California: Peninsula Publishing, 
1983), p. 334. 
31 'Remarks on Submarine Tactics against Convoys, Protection of a Convoy by Extended 
Patrols, Instructions for Escorts and Patrols, 1919, ' Convoy Section Division, Naval Staff, 
CB648(2)A, 30 April 1919, in, 'Convoy Orders, 1917-1919, 'AL, p. 19. 32 'Procedure when Hunted with Hydrophones, ' in Appendix 11 to 'German Navy (Submarines), ' 
CB1182S, [NID], April 1918, AL, p. 91. 
33 'Methods Recommended for Carrying out Searches for Hostile Submarines, ' C131238, 
October 1916, ADM 186/373. 
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Plate 5- Asdic Oscillator and Depth-Charqes 
(Admiralty TH9, Fig. 4 and Messimer, pp. 112-113) 




vision and speed, aircraft often replaced surface escorts in this role. 34 Experiments 
were made with the fitting of searchlights and parachute flares to aircraft in order to 
detect U-boats on the surface at night. These searchlights were, however, the primary 
means of detection (not of final attack, as with the later development of the Leigh Light 
in WWII). Use of the light, therefore, was more likely to warn the U-boat, which could 
dive before the aircraft had any chance of making contact. The lethality of aircraft 
attacks, whether by night or day, left much to be desired. 35 Although attacks on 
convoys had occurred when aircraft were present, U-boat operations were seriously 
hampered by the constant fear of being sighted by aircraft, for apart from the U-boat, or 
its periscope being seen, the tracks of its torpedoes were clearly visible from the air. 
With their low underwater mobility, the U-boats might not be able to get away from the 
tell-tale beginning of the track before surface escorts arrived to counter-attack. As a 
result U-boats refrained from attacking convoys with air escort. 
The Admiralty's small Historical Section had only been able to narrate the first six 
months of the main German First World War unrestricted U-boat campaign by 1939. 
Nevertheless, they noted that defeat by the U-boat was averted principally by the 
introduction of convoy. It was expected that delays due to convoy assembly, and 
sailing at the speed of the slowest ships, would reduce the carrying capacity by 12 to 
20%. However, '... if the situation was serious enough to require a convoy system, ' the 
Admiralty realized, after the war, 'no reduction in carrying capacity might be involved, 
compared with other methods of trade protection. v36 Once the decision to institute 
convoy had been made, its implementation was delayed by administrative difficulties. 
By July 1917,90% of the losses continued amongst independent shipping, although 
gradually the "... proportion of ships in convoy was increased until practically the whole 
of the traffic was included. "37 One advantage of convoy that was immediately obvious 
was that ships in convoy '... could be kept in touch with the latest intelligence. '38 Both 
the Official and Staff Histories wondered whether the efficacy of convoy lay '... rather in 
its power of evasion and its greater power of control than in its power of actual 
34 'Remarks on Protection of a Convoy by Extended Patrols, ' Anti-Submarine Division, Naval 
Staff, Admiralty, C13680, November 1917, in, 'Convoy Orders, 1917-1919, 'AL. 
35 'Employment of Aeroplanes for Anti-Submarine Work, ' Colonel Williamson, Commanding No. 
18 Group, RAF, 14 August 1918, AIR 1/642/17/122/252. 
36 Martin Doughty, Merchant Shipping and War A Study in Defence Planning in Twentieth- 
Century Britain (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982), p. 47. 37 Quoted in, 'The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-1945: A Study of Policy and 
Operations, Vol. 113 (Plans and Tables), ' Historical Section, Admiralty, BR1736(51)lB, 
LCB3304(l 13)], 16 April 1957, ADM 2341579, p. 5. 
'Home Waters - Part IX, I May 1917 to 31 July 1917, ' DTSD, Naval Staff Monographs 




protection by escort? '39 The imposition of convoy faced the U-boats with a conundrum. 
By concentrating the shipping into a small area, convoy made it more difficult for the U- 
boats to find their targets. This was accentuated in the open ocean, where individual 
convoy routes could be widely separated, and even if the U-boat made a sighting, 
getting into position to attack without being sighted himself was difficult. Yet if the 
enemy moved inshore, where convoys would be easier to find, the U-boats would be 
faced with heavy air and surface patrols, which forced them to operate submerged for 
considerable periods and thereby lose their mobility and search capability. These 
patrols, especially those by hydrophone-fitted trawlers, would also reinforce convoy 
escorts as they passed through the patrol areas. At least some officers considered that 
these operations should be combined with '... bold measures to strike at the U-boats at 
source. 40 Although evasion by convoys was the priority, it was still the convoys that 
brought about more actions between the contending forces than any other cause. 
Overall, about 250 vessels were employed directly on convoy work, and a further 500 
were intermittently on convoy duties, escort or support work. These vessels 
represented about 15% of the ships in commission in the Royal Navy. 
These lessons were emphasized in post-war histories and staff papers. The inter- 
war years have been portrayed as a period of stagnation in A/S development, both 
tactically and technically. However, recent research has begun to prove that this was 
not the case, especially after 1932 when British A/S policy was reviewed. During this 
period, Germany was not seen as the major threat to British trade. That would come 
later with her development of ocean raiders and finally U-boats . 
41 At the detailed 
tactical level, attention was paid to increasing the weight of depth-charge attacks to 
make them more effective. By 1935 it was also recognised that if aircraft were to be 
effective U-boat killers, they would have to be armed with depth-charges. However the 
post-war Naval Staff History claimed that, as late as 1937, the Admiralty had had no 
intention of introducing 
... A/S bombs larger than 100 lb into the Naval Service, since it is considered that a 
stick of 100 lb bombs is far more likely to sink or damage a submerged submarine 42 than an equal weight of larger bombs.... 
39 'Home Waters - Part VIII, December 1916 to April 1917, ' DTSD, Naval Staff Monographs 
(Historical) - Volume XVIII, Monograph No. 34, CB917Q, [OU 5528(G)], May 1933, NHB, p. 
471. 
4() Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, p. 126. 41 The narrative which follows is, in part, drawn from the many issues of 'Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Anti-Submarine Measures, and Chemical Warfare Defence, ' and 'Progress in Tactics', 
listed in the bibliography. 
42 'The Development of British Naval Aviation, 1919-1945, ' Naval Staff History, Second World 
War, Vol. 1, C133307(1), BR1936(53)(1), 14 July 1954, NHB, p. 89. 
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The key here seems to be the emphasis on attacks on submerged submarines. 
The aircraft of the inter-war period were all slow and were only able to carry relatively 
small bomb-loads, except for Royal Air Force (RAF) Sunderland flying-boats, itself a 
slow aircraft. Speed was important to convert a sighting into an effective attack, 
otherwise an aircraft would not be able to attack before a submarine had submerged 
for long enough to make the aiming point uncertain. It was thought that there was a 
greater chance of one bomb bursting close to the submarine if a large stick straddled 
the aiming point. There seem to have been no rigorous tests of the AIS bombs at sea, 
which might have exposed the poor effectiveness, either when bursting close to a 
submerged target or even from a direct hit. Attacks by escorts could, however, be 
deadly, but these too had to be started as soon as possible after contact was gained, 
normally without waiting for a consort to complete the hunting unit. This was designed 
to throw the U-boat onto the defensive, to avoid it being able to complete an accurate 
torpedo shot. Attacks were then to continue with two ships co-operating until the U-boat 
was destroyed, if this was considered to be expedient. It was recognised at the time 
that lessons drawn from exercises had to be treated with some caution. It was difficult 
to divert merchant ships from trade, so convoy exercises had to use naval and auxiliary 
vessels acting as a convoy. The Admiralty repeatedly noted that the results were also 
devalued by artificialities imposed by peacetime safety rules, and the desire to get 
maximum training benefit, which lead to an unrealistic number of A/S units being 
involved during actions. The analysis of sea exercises was compared with the results 
from strategic board games at the War College at Greenwich. 
Convoys and Striking Forces 
The central role of convoy was firmly established both theoretically and in 
exercises, though the threat from U-boats was not the only, nor even the main, threat. 
Combined attacks by surface raiders and U-boats was seen as the critical threat, and 
was known to be a tactic being explored by the GermanS. 43 If British heavy ships were 
required to be part of the escort, convoys would be sailed infrequently and may have to 
be large, varying between 40 and 90 ships. And as the inter-war years passed, the 
Admiralty also had to consider the increasing threat of air attack on convoys. Here the 
focus will be on measures adopted to counter the U-boat, though it was not treated in 
isolation by the Admiralty during the 1930s. Britain's geographic position vis-d-Vis 
Germany forced commerce raiders to make long, hazardous passages to their hunting 
43 Janet M. Manson, Diplomatic Ramifications of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, 1939-1941 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 109. 
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grounds. The Scandinavian convoys of the First World War showed the danger of an 
enemy able to sortie from the flank of a convoy route (as the German possession of the 
Biscay ports was to demonstrate again in the Second War). Principal among the A/S 
measures was that evasion was the best defence for convoys, particularly if the enemy 
adopted unrestricted U-boat warfare from the outset. Of course, diversion of a convoy 
had its limits, if both elements of the "safe and timely arrival" dictum were to be met. 
From wartime experience, and peacetime exercises, it was 
... not envisaged that the escorting vessels will be able to prevent a submarine attacking the convoy, but it is hoped that they will be able to destroy the submarine 
after it has made its attack. 
Yet, while a successful defence might be the primary consideration, '... in general, ' it 
was thought, 'the most certain means of obtaining security from enemy submarines is 
by carrying out a vigorous offensive against them. ' Furthermore, 
The moral effect of early success against enemy submarines is likely to militate 
heavily against the value of his subsequent operations. It is, therefore, of great 
importance that organisation and training should be such as will allow of the full 
development of offensive A/S measures immediately on the outbreak of war. 44 
Such protestations were not merely the product of bravado, or an overly optimistic view 
of the technical progress in asdic development. During the 1930s (when Burnett, 
Ormsby and Mosse were taking their professional A/S courses) although asdic made 
significant advances in operational capability, its limitations became evident at the most 
senior levels of the Royal Navy. 45 A U-boat could be detected out to 6,000 yards, 
though a more realistic working range was about 2,000-3,000 yards, and once detected 
its position was known to within 20 in bearing and 25 yards in range. Although once in 
contact, the chances of continuing to hold the echo were reasonably assured. 
However, gaining initial detection was by no means certain, especially when water 
condition were difficult (such as during rough weather, or as a result of unwanted 
bottom echoes). 46 
Up to the mid-1930s the practice was to station the few A/S ships available for 
escort on the quarters or astern, where they were best positioned to pounce on a U- 
44 'Progress in Torpedo, Mining, Anti-Submarine Measures, and Chemical Warfare Defence, 
1932, 'CB3002/32,1933, ADM 186/500, p. 34. 
45 Joseph Maiolo, 'Deception and Intelligence Failure: Anglo-German Preparations for U-boat 
Warfare in the 1930s, ' Paper delivered at the Military History Seminar, King's College, London, 
23 February 1999, pp. 15-16; 'Report on Methods of Submarine Location (Draft notes for reply 
to let Sea Lord enquiry dated October 1929), ' [A. B. Woods, Admiralty Research Laboratory], 9 
November 1929, and B. S. Smith, HMS Osprey, to Director, Scientific Research & Experimental 
Department, Admiralty, 14 August 1929, ADM 218/273. The latter papers are reproduced 
verbatim at Appendix 2. 
46 'Defence against Submarine Attack, ' CID Paper 1318-B [Extract], March 1937, ADM 
199/2365. 
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Plate 6: Escort Dispositions. 1938 
('Progress in Tactics, 1938, 'Tactical Division, CB 3016/38 (BR 1876/38), July 
1938, Admiralty Library. ) 
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boat which had attacked the convoy (Plate 6). Now, with increasing numbers of asdic- 
fitted escorts it was planned, initially, to fill the stations on the bows of the convoy, 
where they could hopefully prevent or deter the U-boat from getting into a good firing 
position. As more escort vessels became available, so the quarter and stern stations 
were filled. However, with the emphasis now on stationing ships ahead, the Admiralty 
worried that a U-boat which succeeded in making an attack might then escape 
destruction. Although the dense asdic screens provided for the Fleet at sea, were able 
to detect over two-thirds of submarines in exercises, it was realized that such 
performance would not be mirrored by the relatively sparse coverage afforded to 
wartime convoys. 47 Investigation continued on the use of aircraft on extended patrols 
around a convoy, both to warn off U-boats concentrating on the surface ahead (which 
the convoy might then avoid), and those trailing the convoy astern. Defence of a 
convoy was by no means assured, though the Admiralty were aware of the German 
judgement in their Official History (translated for the Admiralty by 1937) over the 
difficulty U-boats had in closing their targets unless they remained on the surface. 48 
Thus to prevent the weight of U-boat attack increasing, it was felt that a spirited attrition 
of U-boats was necessary from the outset. It was planned for some groups of A/S 
vessels to be stationed round the coast as striking forces, though it was recognised 
that, even with A/S ships capable of 20 knots, they could not be expected to reliably 
detect U-boats reported more than 10 miles distant. A later Naval Staff History later put 
it another way: 
... if AIS vessels take more than two hours to reach the reported position of the submarine, the one thing certain is that by the time they arrive at the spot the U- 
boat will be somewhere else. It is much the same as looking in a dark room for a 
black cat that isn't there. 49 
But unlike the thesis being advanced in the Staff History, striking forces were not 
an alternative to direct convoy protection, for as the Admiralty had already noted 
A thorough investigation into the best methods of employing patrol vessels and 
aircraft, both for protection of trade and for independent A/S operations, which to a 
certain extent are interlinked, is being carried out. 50 
instead of the "defensive" convoy or "offensive" hunting strategies, traditionally 
depicted in the historiography as mutually exclusive alternatives, they are here 
47 'Progress in Torpedo, Mining, Minesweeping Anti-Submarine Measures and Chemical 
Warfare Defence, 1937,1 C133002/37,1937, ADM 186/541, p. 33. 
48 DNI, to Admiralty Librarian, 10 June 1937, and, 'The Naval War, 1914-1918, Submarine War 
on CommerceGerman Official History, Vol. III, Pt. 1, CH. 1-12, AL, pp. 118-119. 
49 'Home Waters and the Atlantic, Volume 1, September 1939 -8 April 1940, ' Naval Staff 
History, Second World War, CB3301(l), 31 December 1954, NHB, p. 71. 
50'Progress in Tactics, 1937, 'Tactical Division, C133016/37, December 1937, AL, p. 115. 
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expressed as a hypostatic relationship, and this forms a major thematic strand of this 
thesis. It was a dual policy, which was criticised by subsequent historians . 
51 This, it 
seems, was the philosophy that formed the basis for teaching on the three-and-a-half 
month long anti-submarine specialist course at HIVIS Osprey during the 1930s which 
produced many of the officers who rose to prominence during the Battle of the Atlantic 
and in staff appointments after the war. The course also taught the specialists how 
difficult A/S warfare could be and how easy it was to miss a submarine. One of these 
officers, (then) Lieutenant C. D. Howard-Johnston, remembered 
The ordinary U-boat had a silent speed of about 1% knots. At this speed there was 
NO hydrophone effect and no sure means of classification if the U-boat laid low. As 
an A/S Specialist (1930) 1 knew only too well that a stationary S/M often was a very 
bad echo target. But once the S/M revved up there was a roar in the water. 52 
These lessons were to become significant towards the end of the coming war. 
Furthermore, the Admiralty noted that all U-boats should be considered as potential 
minelayers. Convoy was to prove to be a weapon against the mine itself, because it 
allowed minesweeping to be co-ordinated with shipping movements to best advantage. 
However, the U-boat culprit would never have to come near the convoy escorts and 
therefore stood little risk of destruction. 
The Naval Staff History later claimed that the Admiralty, when comparing the loss 
of carrying power in war due to convoy, failed to take account of the '... crippling delays 
experienced in war-time by the hold up and routeing of independently routed ships. 953 
But, Captain T. S. V. Phillips, Director of Plans (D of P), drawing on a Ministry of 
Shipping report after the First World War, argued in a Memorandum of early 1938, that 
... it is open to doubt whether the delays due to convoy will be any greater than those caused by evasive routeing and shipping being afraid to sail on account of 
real or imagined dangers. ... Moreover, if, as seems probable, losses in convoy are 
considerably less than losses in independent sailings, then the number of ships 
available to carry cargoes will remain greater under a convoy system. -' '4 
The point was concurred in at the highest level in the Admiralty, and the memorandum 
despatched to all the Commanders-in-Chief, and enshrined in the manual on the 
protection of shipping issued in early 1939.55 Phillips also noted that not only the 
shipping industry, but '... the nation as a whole is "convoy minded". ' The sinking of SS 
Endymion off the coast of Spain in January 1938 provoked questions in the House of 
51 '[Battle of the Atlantic], Chapter V, September 1939, ' [F. Barely and D. W. Waters], n. d., Box 
PT135, NHB, p. 23. 52 C. D. Howard-Johnston to J. D. Brown, NHB, 24 February 1980, CCAC, HWJN. 
53 Grove (ed. ), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, p. 4. 54'Convoy on the Outset of War with Germany, ' Plans Division, 19 February 1938, ADM 1/9501. 
'55 Minute, Admiral Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord, 8 March 1938, ADM 1/9501. 
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Commons and in the press over the use of convoy. So, looking to the future, Phillips 
considered that 
Any attempt the Admiralty might make in war to avoid going into convoy, however 
good the reasons might be, would merely be regarded as short-sighted and pig- 
headed obstruction, which would increase the public agitation for the institution of 
convoy and weaken the public faith in the Admiralty. 56 
The assumption was that the Germans would embark on unrestricted U-boat warfare 
from the outset, and thus it was intended to institute convoy immediately on the 
outbreak of war. This decision was announced in Parliament in 1938.57 It was generally 
accepted, Phillips observed, that convoy could not be started until at least six weeks 
after the outbreak of a war. In the memorandum, Phillips sought ways in which this 
period could be shortened, by ensuring that the earmarked naval control of shipping 
officers and commodores of convoys were in place as soon as possible after the 
commencement of war. Sufficient numbers of cruisers would be available at the 
outbreak, and armed merchant cruisers soon thereafter, to cope with attacks by enemy 
surface raiders, though there were not enough heavy ships to escort all convoys if they 
were needed. Not all the A/S and anti-aircraft (AIA) convoy escorts would be available 
until the reserve fleet was mobilized, but the shortfall was counterbalanced, because 
the first homeward bound ocean convoy would not reach the Western Approaches for 
about two weeks. The Admiralty later noted that some 25% of the available escorts 
would be required to protect the passage of the Army and RAF to the Continent in the 
opening weeks of war. 58 As for trade, during the opening weeks many of the ships 
already at sea would have to complete their passages independently. The question 
was how could protection be afforded to these ships? 
It has been claimed '... that the Royal Navy was as ready to defend against a U- 
boat campaign as the German navy was ready to mount one. 059 It was assumed in 
January 1939, that the enemy would adopt an unrestricted submarine campaign from 
the outset and the best counter was convoy with surface and air A/S escorts in waters 
where submarine attack was likely. Although Germany had only 25 U-boats suitable for 
ocean operations, a force much below that employed during the peak of the 1917-18 
U-boat, the Admiralty warned that 
56'Convoy on the Outset of War with Germany, ' Plans Division, 19 February 1938, ADM 1/950 1. 
57 'Protection British Shipping in the Vicinity of the British Isles during the first 14 days of an 
Emergency, ' Captain F. R Garside, Assistant D of P, 30 August 1938, in, 'Naval War 
Memorandum (Germany), 'Admiraity, 1937-1939, Case 00244, Vol. 11, NHB. 
58 'Movement of Advanced Air Striking Force and Field Force to France, Plan "W4", ' Section 
IXA, 'Naval War Memorandum (European), ' Admiralty Letter, M. 00697/39, January 1939, Case 
00244, Vol. III, NHB. 
59 Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, pp. 120-121. 
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... a few highly skilled German U-boat Captains caused a high percentage of our 
shipping losses and that in 1939 the German submarines will be commanded by 
peace-time trained and presumably efficient CaptainS. 60 
Initially, in-bound trade would be ordered to adopt an approximation to the convoy 
system, with ships rendezvousing in loose groups at selected ocean positions, from 
where escort groups would accompany them to their destination ports. Ships which 
were unable to make the rendezvous were to sail independently on wide diversionary 
routes. 61 The escort groups, when not involved in direct support of trade, would carry 
out offensive patrols in the shipping areas. This system was needed only until all ships 
in threatened areas could be brought into convoy and adequate A/S forces became 
available. Even then, offensive operations were not to be wholly abandoned. 
It should not be supposed that the lessons from the First World War, or inter-war 
exercises, were directly used by those planning future counter-measures, rather the 
experiences were infused by a process Of OSMOSiS. 62 What was well established was a 
holistic doctrine of defensive and offensive measures, which formed the basis of the 
new version of the "Anti-Submarine Warfare Manual", issued in February 1939. This 
Manual confirmed the value of convoy by increasing the difficulty of U-boats in finding 
targets and, where intelligence was available, of diverting shipping clear of U-boat 
concentrations. If U-boats were to get into position to attack convoys, they had to move 
on the surface, where they were vulnerable to detection by wide-ranging aircraft. Even 
if the aircraft were not able to destroy the U-boats, they could home surface escorts to 
the location and this, for the enemy, was far more dangerous. Aircraft were to be used 
to support convoys or Fleet units. The Fleet would normally have sufficient aircraft for 
inner and outer A/S patrols, though convoys would seldom be supported by enough 
aircraft to carry out both types of patrol simultaneously. The priority was for an outer 
patrol to be flown some 15-20 miles ahead of a convoy, where it would cover the area 
in which U-boats would be moving on the surface to get ahead of the convoy. This 
plan, proposed by the Admiralty after wide consultation was agreed by Coastal 
63 Command. 
Convoy also forced U-boats to attack merchant ships where they had to accept 
the risk of counter-attack by the A/S escort. Although asdic-fitted escorts could not 
60 'Review of the Requirements of Trade Protection, ' Section III, 'Naval War Memorandum 
jEuropean), 'Admiraity Letter, M. 00697/39, January 1939, Case 00244, Vol. III, NHB, p. 11. 1 'Trade Protection - Detailed Arrangements, ' Section VII, 'Naval War Memorandum 
jEuropean), ' Admiralty Letter, M. 00697/39, January 1939, Case 00244, Vol. 111, NHB, pp. 49-50. 2 Geoffrey Budd, Telephone Interviews, 23-26 March 2003. 
63 [Principles of Anti-Submarine Patrol by Aircraft], J. Lawson, Admiralty, M/NAD. 398/37,31 
August 1937, AIR 15/38. 
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provide an impenetrable screen ahead of convoys, they were better able (than 
previously) to detect escaping U-boats and exact retribution. The Manual exhorted A/S 
ships to adopt an aggressive posture, for 
It is evident that the destruction of a submarine reduces the risk to subsequent 
convoys. Further, enemy submarine morale must be considerably affected by the 
knowledge that an attack on a convoy is inevitably followed by swift counter- 
measures. 64 
The formal doctrine was thus heavily centred on defensive measures necessary for the 
protection of trade and the Fleet, albeit conducted aggressively. Offensive operations 
were the subject of a draft Memorandum by Captain D. A. Budgen, RN, Director of the 
Tactical Division (D of TD) in the spring of 1938. The Memorandum made slow 
progress around the Naval Staff and Commands afloat. There was general agreement 
with Budgen's proposals that groups of four, or more, asdic-fitted A/S vessels with air 
support, would be disposed to take advantage of intelligence. Ship-air communications 
and accuracy of reporting were crucial to the success of the co-operation. However, 
only a few months before the outbreak of war, the Director of the Naval Air Division 
noted that: 
The training of the RAF in A/S tactics in conjunction with the AIS School at 
Portland is proceeding better than heretofore, but much remains to be done. It is 
hoped that it may be possible to arrange later in the year for FAA aircraft to co- 
65 operate with the A/S School in the investigation of A/S tactics. 
These were serious limitations, though largely organizational in nature. Where 
intelligence was sparse, the chances of the A/S group making contact were slight, but 
where accurate reports were available, or a sighting was within, say, 10 miles of the 
hunting force, there was a good prospect of the ships gaining contact and being able to 
prosecute the U-boat. 66 The tactical concepts were incorporated in the formal A/S 
tactical manual when it was re-issued in 1940. Meanwhile, the Memorandum was 
broadly welcomed, though Captain V. H. Danckwerts, now D of P, cautioned that 
Although it would clearly be desirable to start a vigorous offensive against enemy 
submarine on the outbreak of war, the extent to which we can do this is strictly 
limited by the number of A/S craft which we can afford to keep in commission in 
peace time. 
And to hammer home the point, Danckwerts added that, 
Generally speaking, it is considered that the most profitable and effective method 
for providing this security with limited forces available in the initial stages, is by 
64 'Manual of Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1939, ' Tactical Division, C133044, February 1939, NHB, 
38. 
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'Anti-Submarine Striking Forces, [Revised Form of Draft], ' Memorandum by Tactical Division, 





escorts for all movements most likely to be menaced by submarine 
Realistically, he considered that with all the commitments for direct escort, there would 
be no A/S craft to form striking forces for some time. When he reviewed the Staff 
comments, on the employment of striking forces, Budgen wondered whether he might 
have over-emphasized their tactical importance. But, Budgen added, whether 
protection was provided by escort of striking forces, it would '-fail unless the 
personnel have been, firstly, efficiently trained and, secondly, kept efficient by constant 
practice. "' 
Wartime Experience 
'Except for the first two months of the war, before the convoy system had been 
fully instituted, there have been no destroyers available for A/S Hunting Forces, ' 
Captain A. G Talbot, Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare (DASW), wrote in February 
1940 . 
69 During these two months, 75% of U-boat attacks had been against 
independently routed shipping, which had not yet been brought into conVoy. 70 Initially, 
protection for this shipping was provided by Striking Forces, some of them based 
around aircraft carriers. One of these hunting operations accounted for U-39, the first 
U-boat sunk during the war by three ships of Captain C. S. Daniel's 8th Destroyer Flotilla 
while escorting Ark Royal on an A/S sweep. 71 The carrier had been narrowly missed by 
the U-boat's torpedoes, having unnecessarily exposed herself while flying off aircraft. 
One of the other carriers, Hennes, had an unexciting time, but a few days later the 
Courageous, also on A/S hunting operations, was attacked in similar circumstances 
and sunk. The Staff History later concluded that: 'in the light of events there is no doubt 
that the employment of large aircraft carriers for hunting submarine was a mistake. ' 
However, the History also, rightly noted that: 
At the same time, it is only fair to state that it was no more than a temporary 
measure intended to cover the period before the full convoy system came into 
operation. The risk to a hunting carrier was by no means ignored, and the opinions 
of the Naval staff all emphasised the vital necessity for a full-time, effective A/S 
screen, especially as a carrier was obliged to maintain a steady course during 
periods when aircraft were being flown off and on.... 72 
67 Minute, D of P, 22 March 1939, ADM 1/12141. 
68 Minute, Captain D. A. Budgen, RN, D of TD, 13 April 1939, ADM 1/12141. 
69'Review of Methods of Dealing with the U-boat Menace, ADM 1/10468, p. 42. 70 Jorgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two: German, Italian and 
, ýapanese Submarine Successes, 1939-1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), pp. 1-5. 71 'Anti-Submarine Operations in North Atlantic, 12 to 16 September 1939, ' Pack No. 0556/0, 
BSR 522/1, NHB. 
72 'Home Waters and the Atlantic, Volume L.., ' N HB, p. 69. 
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The loss of Courageous on 17 September 1939 has been portrayed as a 
damning indictment of the Admiralty's offensive policy during the opening months of the 
war, and the direct reason for its abandonment thereafter, for the other two carriers 
were recalled on 18 September and took no further part in A/S operations. Yet the draft 
Naval Staff narrative (which was abandoned) of the Battle of the Atlantic, although 
criticising the Royal Navy's offensive policies, notes a significantly different reason for 
the withdrawal of the carriers. This was that after 
... 
the Courageous was sunk ... 
the Admiralty decided that the Ark Royal should no 
longer be used for hunting submarines as the influx of independent ships had now 
73 diminished . 
These views were echoed a month after the loss of Courageous, as the Naval Staff 
considered Herrnes' A/S patrol in the South-West Approaches, during which one U- 
boat was sighted by aircraft and three contacts gained by the weak force of escorting 
destroyers, but none led to a kill. The Naval Air and the Anti-Submarine Divisions 
warned against exaggerating the power of aircraft to locate and destroy U-boats. 74 
More significantly, Captain Edelsten, in D of P, was '... of the opinion that, since the 
institution of convoy, the results expected from the employment of carriers on A/S 
hunts do not justify the risks involved. ' Crucially, Edelsten added, '... our carriers are 
now urgently required for hunting surface raiders. P75 It was these reasons, and not 
simply the loss of Courageous, which motivated the withdrawal of the carriers from 
these offensive operations: for losses were expected and accepted. Moreover, the 
Admiralty issued further guidance on the use of aircraft carriers in trade protection, 
following considerable discussion within the Naval Staff during the month following the 
loss of Courageous. The view was not that the carriers had been misused, but that the 
tactics of their air and surface striking forces had been inadequate, both in locating and 
destroying U-boats as well as protecting the carrier. 76 
The Home Waters Staff History also claims that the destroyer hunting groups 
were equally a waste of time and curiously suggests that their successes were more 
due to chance than design, and the more detailed Staff History on the A/S war wrongly 
credits some of the U-boat losses to "escorts". 77A detailed examination of the first two 
months of the war shows that, of the 7 U-boats sunk, 3 fell victim to mines, one to A/S 
73 '[Baffle of the Atlantic], Chapter V, September 1939, ' [F. Barely and D. W. Waters], n. d., Box 
PT135, NHB, pp. 29-30. 
74 Minute, G. M. B. Langley, for Director of Naval Air Division, 9 October 1939, ADM 199/137. 
75 Minute, J. H. Edelsten, D of P, 25 October 1939, ADM 199/137. 
76 '[Conduct of Aircraft Carriers and Destroyers when Engaged in Anti-Submarine Operations], ' 
S. H. Phillips, Secretary, Admiralty, M. 015382/39,28 November 1939, ADM 199/124. 
77 'Home Waters and the Atlantic, Volume NHB, pp. 70-71. 
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escorts which were shifting from one convoy to another, and the remaining 3 U-boats 
were destroyed by surface A/S hunting groups. Aircraft, both carrier and land-based, 
although they made plenty of sightings were unable to convert them into lethal attacks, 
78 being too slow and still equipped with the ineffective A/S bomb. Attacks, therefore, 
remained ineffective until the introduction of the airborne depth-charge, a saga which 
would benefit from further research. However, right from the start, and with increasing 
emphasis as the war progressed, considerable weight was placed on the provision of 
support groups of fast escorts, along with land-based aircraft and escort carriers, either 
to reinforce convoys or to operate on independent offensive operations. 79 When 
discussing the relative vulnerability of carriers to conventional weapons, Commander 
G. A. Titterton, Historical Section, later wrote, that 
... briefly the position appears to be this. In the last war, between the outbreak of 
war and VE-day 63 British carriers were commissioned. Of this number, eight were 
sunk by enemy action; five by U-boat; one by internal explosion, one by warships' 
gunfire and one (Hermes) by aircraft bombs. Several ... were damaged and put out 
of action for some months by bombs. 80 
Long before the creation of the Operational Research Division, every avenue to 
improve performance was sought, including the setting up of a committee under Vice 
Admiral T. H. Binney reporting directly to the First Sea Lord. Binney was distanced from 
actual operations and his Committee was to investigate war problems and generate 
ideas which might be of use to the Naval Staff. In his first report Binney considered 
"The Submarine Campaign", and was '... struck by the fact that anti-submarine vessels 
can only be certain of a kill if they are situated within a very short distance of the 
reported position of a submarine. ' It followed, the Committee concluded 
... that the best position for anti-submarine vessels is in company with a convoy. 
... We recommend that for the present every anti-submarine vessel with sufficiently 
good sea-keeping qualities should be employed with convoy rather than being 
dispersed in hunting units when the time factor of reaching the submarine will 
always make success very doubtful. 81 
78 'The Development of British Naval Aviation, 1919-1945, ' Naval Staff History, Second World 
War, Vol. 1, CB3307(l), BR1936(53)(1), 14 July 1954, NHB, p. 92; K. C. Baff, Maritime is 
Number Ten: The Sunderland Era (Privately Published, 1983), p. 35. 
79 W. A. B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational 
History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943, Vol. 11, Part 1 (St. 
Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), p. 115. 
80 Commander G. A. Titterton, Historical Section, Admiralty, to Squadron Leader Mervyn Mills, 
AHB, Air Ministry, 29 March 1959, in, 'Selected Convoys: Mediterranean, 1941-42, Revised 
Battle Summaries, Nos. 18,32, ' Folder, NHB. 
8' 'Vice Admiral Binney's Committee, IDC. 2, ' Vice Admiral T. H. Binney, Imperial Defence 
College, 21 September 1939, ADM 205/1. [emphasis supplied] 
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This, the Naval Staff noted on the report, was'... the principle adopted... ' and no further 
action was needed to amend operational priorities. 
82 Binney's comments were 
83 selectively quoted by the Naval Staff and Official Historians. At least Roskill noted the 
Naval Staffs annotation but he failed to comprehend the need for area operations 
before the full imposition of convoy was possible. Within a few days, Binney's 
committee was exploring the use of "Q" Ships along with supporting A/S vessels, and a 
month later was expressing the idea of A/S ship patrols to deter U-boat minelaying 
operations. By the end of the year, Binney, noting the increased numbers of U-boats 
likely to appear in the immediate future, concluded that '... there is no possibility of 
being able to relax our present measures for the A/S offensive. '84 
Churchill, the First Lord, was also unceasing in his search for offensive 
operations. One of his schemes expressed in a typical minute to the First Sea Lord in 
November 1939, read: 
Nothing can be more important in the anti-submarine war than to try to obtain an 
independent flotilla which could work like a cavalry division on the approaches, 
without worrying about the traffic or U-boat sinkings, but could systematically 
search large areas over a wide front. In this war these areas would become 
untenable to U-boats, and many other advantages would flow from the 
manoeuvre. 85 
Unmoved, Pound passed the note to Captain A. G. Talbot, the new Director of Anti- 
Submarine Warfare, asking for his comments in view of his experiences while 
commanding a striking force. Talbot, an evangelist of offensive operations, replied a 
couple of days later expressing himself to have always been very much in favour of A/S 
striking forces, though he stressed that their success relied on adequate intelligence of 
the U-boat positions. Talbot described the tactics he used. If searching for a surfaced 
U-boat, his four ships could be spread out and able to cover a front of about 35 miles. 
Even this made the search of large areas (often as much as 50,000 square miles) 
problematic. However, if the destroyers could close on a merchant ship being attacked 
they stood a better chance of gaining contact. He found that, with the relative 
navigational uncertainties inherent in these operations, that it was better to steam along 
the D/F bearing than to attempt to close the reported latitude and longitude. Once the 
U-boat had submerged the search front would be very much reduced, to 6 miles at the 
82 Pencil margin note in, Vice Admiral Binney's Committee, IDC. 2, Vice Admiral T. H. Binney, 
Imperial Defence College, 21 September 1939, ADM 205/1, p. 2. 83 'Home Waters and the Atlantic, Volume NHB, pp. 70-71; Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. 1, pp. 
134-135. 
84 'Review of the Situation at Sea, December 1939, Vice Admiral Binney's Committee, ' Vice 
Admiral T. H. Binney, IDC. 38,8 December 1939, ADM 1/9793. 
85 Note, Churchill to First Sea Lord, 20 November 1939, ADM 205/2. 
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most, and possible less when the number of non-sub contacts was high. Talbot thought 
thatthe 
... key to success 
in killing a U-boat by this means is for the Striking Force to be 
able to sight it on the surface. Assuming that this is done and that the U-boat dives 
when the destroyers are 8 miles away, a minimum of three ships is required to 
locate her. 86 
Over the winter of 193940, Captain J. H. Edelsten, Deputy D of P, and Captain 
Talbot, DASW, each considered the progress of the AIS campaign and developed 
ideas for future policy. Edelsten, in a brief but perceptive examination reiterating that 
the 
... pre-war A/S plan was to attack U-boats with hunting groups until it became 
necessary to go into convoy, and then to rely mainly on attacking them at the 
convoys themselves, by allocating most of our A/S craft to escort duties. 
'This convoys system, augmented by other subsidiary measures, ' he observed, 'Was 
sufficient to defeat the U-boat campaign in the last war, and has succeeded in inflicting 
considerable casualties on the U-boats in this war. ' But Edelsten was sure that convoy 
... will not in itself defeat the U-boat campaign ... if the U-boats vary the localities 
and forms of their attacks to such a degree that we are unable to meet them in all 
places and against all forms simultaneously. 
U-boats, he noted, were already using mines in addition to the torpedo. Mines, of 
course, could be laid on the convoy routes without the U-boats coming anywhere near 
the escorts. In the future, Edelsten prophesied the enemy might employ other 
weapons, including 
... a wireless controlled torpedo ... which can 
be brought into contact with our ships 
without serious risk of counter-attack on the submarine herself by our escorting 
Craft. 87 
In addition the U-boats could also vary their geographic areas of operation, probably as 
far afield as Halifax, Nova Scotia. The number of A/S vessels required to provide 
security against all such forms of attack in all possible areas was probably far beyond 
British resources, so, Edelsten concluded, 
... the U-boat will only be successfully mastered once and for all by offensive measures designed to destroy them regardless of the mission on which they are 
engaged. '38 
The offensive measures he envisaged were the planned combination of minefields, 
seabed indicator loops and shore radar sites, that could cue hunting groups of 
88 Captain A. G. Talbot, Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare, to First Sea Lord, [M. 01 3984/39], 23 
November 1939, ADM 205/2. 




destroyers onto transiting U-boats. Radar-fitted aircraft, which were due to start coming 
into service shortly would also be useful. Edelsten, a logical and incisive thinker, was 
persuaded that any shift towards more offensive operations needed to be undertaken 
gradually, and only when the direct protection of convoys by A/S escorts was assured. 
In this he was supported by others on the Naval Staff. "" Characteristically, Talbot was 
broadly in favour of the offensive measures, except for the use of indicator loops in the 
open sea because large numbers of A/S vessels were required to re-locate a loop 
contact. These vessels, he thought, would be better employed elsewhere. 
At the end of February 1940, Captain Talbot completed his own review for the 
Naval Staff of the methods of dealing with U-boats, which echoed much of Edelsten's 
earlier minute. 90 He expected the U-boat commissioning rate would soon accelerate 
and, therefore, unless sinkings by A/S forces could also be increased, the number of 
operational U-boats would escalate dangerously. For operations in the Western 
Approaches, U-boats could best be dealt with by: - 
(a) A continuation of the convoy system coupled with resolute offensive action by 
the convoy escorts should a ship in convoy be attacked. A U-boat, having once 
given away her presence, must be hunted even if this leaves the convoy 
temporarily unescorted; one ship remaining in the vicinity for 24 hours or until 
relieved. 
(b) The provision of a fast A/S Striking Force cruising in the area, operating on 
-I intelligence provided by D/F, and air and surface reports of U-boats. 1 
However, as Edelsten had pointed out, the policy of escort of convoy would do little to 
curb the activities of minelaying U-boats. Taking a leaf from Edelsten's paper, Talbot 
thought it prudent to assume 
... that the enemy will intensify not only their mine-laying campaign in Home Waters but also unrestricted warfare, using the torpedo and gun, in waters further afield 
where there is less likelihood of counter-attack by our A/S forces. 92 
The response to the mine-layer was to try to stop these U-boats reaching their 
operational areas. The measures considered included the blockade of raw materials, 
the bombing of submarine building yards and factories, and training establishments 
(though these measures could not be implemented because of the existing restricted 
air bombardment policy). Talbot also suggested that it would be profitable to repeatedly 
mine U-boat training areas and base exits, and use British submarines off German 
harbours to attack U-boats entering and leaving. He also worried that the enemy might 
change his tactics, by attacking the escorts, which meant they needed to be more 
89 Minute, Captain M. J. Mansergh, DTD, 29 December 1939, ADM 199/124. 
90 Minute, Admiral H. M. Burrough, ACNS, 7 March 1940, ADM 1/10468. 
91 'Review of Methods of Dealing with the U-boat Menace, ADM 1/10468, p. 31. 92 lbid, pp. 14-15. 
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conscious of their own self-protection. In part this was so that escort forces would not 
be whittled down, for Talbot wanted fast Striking Forces as soon as practicable. Their 
effectiveness would rest on every effort being made 
... to improve our supply of information about U-boat sailings. Such information 
would greatly increase the chances of destroying U-boats before their arrival on 
their hunting grounds owing to the added incentive to all A/S forces of knowing that 
a U-boat is on passage. 93 
Air reconnaissance was essential and would be extended at night or in poor visibility by 
the deployment of radar-fitted aircraft already carrying out trials. Air-sea co-operation in 
these conditions would be even more difficult and would require considerable practice 
to perfect. But although exploring these offensive measures, Talbot emphasized 
several times, the first commitment had to be convoy escort. But, while this might 
ensure the safe arrival of shipping, it would not defeat the U-boat. The only way to do 
this, Talbot was sure, was to destroy the U-boats at every opportunity. 
Captain C. S. Daniel, now D of P, noted from personal experience, that the use of 
Striking Forces on a stale scent was a waste of time and wore down personnel and 
equipment unnecessarily. The trick was to get the ships into close proximity of the U- 
boat, when asdic could come into its own. Still he was not against the concept and 
distilled the essence of Talbot's paper into the three constituent, and interrelated, 
methods of countering the U-boat menace, which was broadly agreed by the First Sea 
Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound: - 
(a) Dealing with them at source. 
(b) Restricting their passage to certain areas where small A/S forces can attack 
effectively. 
(c) Makinq4 them face destruction when they reach a position to attack their 
target 
The Admiralty is sometimes seen as espousing a dogmatic approach to A/S 
warfare that leans heavily towards unproductive offensive operations. In reality, the 
Admiralty, and the Commands, had formulated a more subtle and flexible doctrine, 
which was to prove its efficacy throughout the wart and into the post-war years. This 
does not mean that every avenue was covered. The Royal Navy was presented with 
night surface attacks by U-boats about one year into the war. It is not evident that this 
came as a surprise to the Royal Navy. Captain N. A. Prichard a wartime Director of the 
Anti-Submarine Division thought that 
93 'Review of Methods of Dealing with the U-boat Menace, 'ADM 1/10468, p. 16. 94 Minute, Captain C. S. Daniel, D of P, 20 March 1940, ADM 1/10468. See annotation on 
[Captain L. E. Holland], AHO to Firit Sea Lord, 12 March 1940, ADM 1/10468. 
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... it would have been a "long shot" to have foreseen this method of attack in peace time, though ... a few night exercises against submarines on the surface were 
carried out which were abandoned owing to the danger to the submanne. 95 
One British submariner had gone so far as to champion the night surface attack as an 
important, but subsidiary, tactic a few months before war broke out. 96 Although 
experiments had been conducted with flares during the First World War, in reality little 
could be done to counter these tactics until the widespread introduction of radar. 
Overall, the Admiralty's approach was under pinned by a widespread realization 
that anti-submarine warfare was difficult. For example, Captain R. Kerr, Captain (D) of 
the highly efficient Second Destroyer Flotilla, highlighted an issue that was a constant 
concern to the Admiralty and Commands, that '... peacetime restrictions have to be 
observed which unless properly considered are liable to give false conclusions to A/S 
vessels and submarines. ' By way of illustration, Kerr noted that submarines were often 
allowed to remain at periscope depth until they had fired a torpedo during Fleet A/S 
exercises, which '... gives the A/S personnel a wrong impression of how to counter- 
attack as they are not allowed to go within 1,200 yards of a periscope.... ' As a result, 
the submarine's reaction would be unrealistic. Kerr also considered that anti-submarine 
warfare 
... 
is unlike any other form of attack. It is an attempt to sink an invisible enemy by a 
sense which is not in every day use. A/S efficiency depends on the appreciation of 
the quality of a sound. It is very much harder to distinguish between two notes of 
the same pitch played by different instruments, than to appreciate that a note is 
being struck. 97 
Kerr had been the senior instructor at the A/S specialist school at HMS Osprey and 
also had the benefit of a flotilla of new ships whose training had been rigorously 
pursued over the previous three years by a keen staff of A/S specialists, including 
Lieutenant J. P. Mosse. 98 The essential problem was that of differentiating between 
submarine and non-submarine asdic echoes. 'The Asdic operator, ' Kerr wrote, 'has to 
keep in mind what a submarine echo may sound like under all conditions and so 
distinguish it from other almost exactly similar sounds. ' The difficulty was that '... a 
sound is very much more difficult to memorise than something that can be seen or felt. ' 
So, to maintain their ephemeral skill, operators required '... frequent practice at sea ... in 
95 Draft Minute, DASW, 26 July 1945, ADM 1/17659. 
96 'The Offensive Value of the Modern Submarine, ' uSalvon (Lieutenant I. L. M. McGeoch), May 
1939, lWM P347, pp. 8-9; 'Exercise "ZL", Combined Fleets, 7-15 March 1935, ' in, 'Exercises 
and Operations 1935, ' CB1 769/35(l) and (2), September 1937, ADM 186/157, p. 43. 97 'Anti-Submarine Training, ' Captain R. Kerr, Captain (D), Second Destroyer Flotilla, [13 June 
1939], ADM 205/3. See Appendix 2. 
98 'The Evolution of the Osprey, ' Lieutenant Commander F. M. Mason, Summer 1938 (issued 30 
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bad conditions as well as in good. "' At the same time other members of the team 
should rehearse the operation of the asdic range recorder used to indicate the time to 
fire, while the integration of all the tactical information on the asdic plot needed 
practice. The environment, therefore, made A/S warfare difficult even without the 
submarine adopting stealthy anti-escort tactics. These problems would be exacerbated 
by the later development of submarines capable of high underwater speed. 
This Chapter has examined the developmental threads connecting the Royal 
Navy's experiences in the First World War and in the opening phases of the Second 
World War. The relatively low performance of individual A/S methods, the general 
difficulty of A/S warfare, and the vital need to ultimately defeat the U-boat (and not 
merely to protect shipping in the short-term), all impelled the Royal Navy to adopt a 
consistently holistic strategy which combined defensive and offensive tactics. An 
appreciation of AIS tactics and their technical limitations are recounted in the following 
Chapter. These details are crucial to understanding the problems of how the fast 
submarine was to be countered. 
99'Anti-Submarine Training, 'ADM 205/3. 
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Chapter 2: Mastering the Submersible, 1939-1943 
U-boats and their Tactics, 1939-43 
Anti-submarine tactics were designed to exploit the weaknesses in U-boat 
operations. For their part, U-boat commanders made every effort to capitalize on the 
submarine's chief characteristic and strength, which was its invisibility when 
submerged. They hoped to create surprise and attack from an ambush. "O Such 
stealthy methods, however, were not conducive to finding targets, and this conundrum 
was to exercise the enemy throughout the war. For the attack itself, however, the U- 
boat gained great advantage by remaining undetected until the moment of striking. The 
U-boat was not only more likely to make an undisturbed, and therefore more accurate, 
attack but the target stood practically no chance of taking avoiding action. Amidst the 
mayhem created, it was then hoped that the U-boat could withdraw unmolested. The 
U-boat was forced to use such stratagems because advances in technology had made 
A/S forces deadly. There was, Admiral Max Horton, Flag Officer, Submarines, warned, 
,... no margin for mistakes in submarines, you are either alive or dead. "01 The U-boat 
was not a vehicle well adapted to self-defence and the U-boat's use of stealth was a 
matter of necessity for self-preservation, which rather muddied the issue of the legality 
of unrestricted U-boat warfare. "' 
The defensive power of the U-boat was weak. They possessed little reserve of 
buoyancy (to allow rapid submergence) and were therefore sensitive to even minor 
damage during attacks by A/S forces. Initially, their defensive armament was puny, as 
befifted a vessel whose primary power was in her offensive weapons, principally 
salvoes of up to four torpedoes, which by the middle of the war included straight- or 
pattern-running torpedoes. 103 The pattern-runner, or LuT, torpedo carried out a ladder 
pattern which passed across the target's track, theoretically giving more opportunities 
for a hit (Plate 7). The greatest chance of the torpedoes striking their target still 
100 High Command of the Navy, The U-Boat Commander's Handbook, 194Z New Edition 1943 
jGettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1989), p. 17. 
01 W. S. Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western Approaches (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
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102 Manson, Diplomatic Ramifications, pp. 5-6 and 113. 
103 'Progress in Tactics, 1948, ' DTSD, TSD. 108/48, C1303016/48,30 November 1948, ADM 
239/144, p. 14. 
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("Pattern-Running Torpedo Attack, " from 'Future Anti-Submarine and Torpedo 
Policy and Equipment in Submarines (Short Title: F. A. T. S. ), ' Rear Admiral S. M. 
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occurred when firing ranges were short, ideally in the order of 300-800 yards, and fired 
from a position about 600 to 1200 off the bow of the target. Long-range attacks posed 
severe fire control problems for the submarine - even when using LuT - and allowed 
the target time to take avoiding action. 104Thus, the U-boat's ideal firing window was 
relatively small. This limitation was partially removed by the introduction of the German 
Naval Acoustic Torpedo (Gnat), which, it was assessed, could be fired from 5,000 
yards and, being fitted with hydrophones which controlled the rudders, could home 
onto the target's propeller noise. The Gnat was effective against ships travelling 
between 12 and 19 knots, that is, travelling fast enough to produce sufficient HE on 
which the Gnat could home from a reasonable range, but slow enough for the 25 knot 
torpedo to be able to catch its target. Operationally, the weapon was not particularly 
effective in terms of ships sunk. Of the 640 Gnats fired, only 3% hit (though the 
Germans claimed 53% as successful). 105 The weapon was first used against convoys 
ONS18 and ON202 in September 1943, where Commander P. W. Burnett was Senior 
Officer (SO) of one of the Escort Groups. On this occasion, in the face of heavy U-boat 
attack, it was the aggressive tactics of Burnett and the other escort SOs, Horton noted, 
which '... prevented the enemy from gaining the initiative and resulted in comparatively 
light losses in the convoys. "06 The Gnat was soon countered by tactical means and the 
use of a towed noise maker, the Foxer, as predicted by Leon Solomon in the 
Directorate of Naval Operational Research (DNOR) three months before the torpedoes 
were first used. 107 Nevertheless, escort tactics would now have to take account of this 
new weapon. 
The design of the 1939-1943 U-boat was fundamentally the same as the boats 
used during the First World War, although their mechanical reliability and operational 
range had improved. To move at high speed the boat had to be on the surface, when 
the diesel engines could be used. The most common U-boat, the Type VII, was 
capable of 17 knots, though in heavy seas the speed might be reduced to 5-10 knots, 
depending on the relative direction of the sea, especially if the crew was to keep an 
efficient lookout. Once submerged, the British knew from trials with U-570 captured in 
August 1941, that U-boats when propelled by electric motors had a maximum speed of 
104 Compton-Hall, 26 February 2000. 
105 G. J. Kirby, 'A History of the Torpedo: Part 3, ' Joumal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, 
Vol. 27, No. 2 (1972), p. 85. 
106 'Reports of Proceedings - Convoys ONS18 and ON202, ' Admiral Max Horton, Commander- 
in-Chief, Western Approaches, 31 December 1943, Captain M. J. Evans, RN, Papers, IWM 
65/25/1. 
107 'Some Operational Implications of a Homing Torpedo, ' L. Solomon, Report 36/43,1 June 
1943, ADM 219/52. 
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about 7% knots, but this could only be maintained for about 2 hours before the battery 
was exhausted. The greatest submerged endurance and distance travelled could be 
achieved at about 2-2Y2knots. '08UItimately, the U-boats underwater performance was 
limited because it could not re-charge its battery or re-cycle the breathing air while the 
boat was submerged (the latter probably being more of a limitation to the U-boat's 
underwater endurance of its than battery power). For submerged attacks, the U-boat's 
limited underwater mobility, constrained an approach to a narrow sector ahead of a 
convoy. However, a U-boat on the surface could use its high surface speed to attack 
over a much wider angle, theoretically extending all round a convoy, though use of very 
high speed gave escorts a better chance of sighting the incoming U-boat. 
The easiest prey were independent ships or convoy stragglers: attacking convoys 
was an altogether more dangerous occupation, with the attendant risk of being overrun 
by the merchant ships, or attacked by the escort. As the proportion of ships in convoy 
increased, the Germans were faced with little option but to attack convoys. DASW 
noted in 1941 that the more daring U-boat Commanders were picking their targets and 
making individual attacks on each ship, though, the less courageous were content to 
fire spread salvoes from a distance. Although some U-boats had closed inside a 
convoy, this was normally when the columns were disordered, or where ships in the 
columns had fallen badly astern. Few U-boats were prepared to penetrate inside a 
closely formed convoy. 109 British intelligence, echoing German tactical instructions, 
assessed that U-boats would fire long-range salvoes whenever an opportunity arose, 
and were likely to attack the escort too. 110 The U-boat had to be submerged and 
reasonably stable to carry out the cumbersome procedure of manually reloading the 
torpedo tubes, which made multiple salvo attacks impossible. By the autumn of 1942 
as a result of the '... recent rough handling... ' by the escorts, the U-boats had adopted 
more diverse tactical stratagems. Night surface attacks were still preferred and 
attempts were made to lure escorts away from the convoy to give other U-boats a 
chance to attack, but submerged, daytime attacks were also being used more often 
(partly because, as less experienced U-boat captains took command they lacked the 
skill necessary for night surface attacks). This trend continued into 1943.111 By March 
108 'Information on U-Boats, ' Part 13, 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations, ' CB4097(13)(44), 
June 1944, NHB, Paragraphs 1472-1473 and Table 1. 
109'U-boat Tactics, ' in, 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, January 1941, ' DASW, CB04050/41(l), 
IFebruary 1941], NHB, P. 6. 
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Section [GC&CS, Bletchley Park], ZIP/ZG/1 16,10 November 1941, ADM 223/1, pp. 15-16. 
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of that year, the average torpedo firing range was about 3,000 yards, with about two- 
thirds of the attacks launched from about 2,000-4,000 yards. 112 
The extension of convoy had a dual effect on U-boat operations. Firstly, as The 
U-Boat Commander's Handbook noted: 
... the concentration of numerous steamers to 
form convoys, the sea routes lose 
their characteristic peacetime appearance and become desolate, as it is only at 
relatively long intervals that a concentration of steamers passes along them. ' 13 
As British A/S operations improved and were reinforced by the release of A/S ships 
and Coastal Command aircraft from anti-invasion duties, so the U-boats were forced to 
operate further from the focal areas. In the open ocean, convoys could be dispersed to 
a greater extent, so the location of convoys became the most difficult challenge faced 
by the U-boats. 114 This was the second effect of convoy on U-boat operations: it 
induced them to disperse to locate their prey, and then to move at speed to 
concentrate for the attack. Crucially, this could only be achieved if they operated on the 
surface. The method adopted was an extension of the First War practice of several U- 
boats working together in what became the "combined attack" (better known as pack 
tactics). The primary purpose of the pack system was to maximise the number of 
contacts per U-boat by enabling all members of the pack to exploit a sighting made by 
any one of them. The U-boat in contact sent a high-frequency wireless telegraphy (H/F 
Wn) report in naval enigma to Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (BdU, the U-boat High 
Command) ashore. The signal was then re-broadcast to the remainder of the patrol 
line. The ability of the shadower to operate unmolested while other members of the 
pack converged onto the convoy was vital to the success of the operation. Once a 
sufficient number of U-boats had concentrated around the convoy, BdU would order 
the attacks to begin. This control by W/T resulted in considerable radio traffic on H/F, 
as well as short range homing signals on M/F. There was no attempt at close tactical 
ADM 199/1732; 'Hints on Escort Work - Part III, ' A/Captain J. D. Prentice, RCN, Captain (D) 
Halifax, Memorandum D. 0-24-11,21 May 1943, Folder CNA 7-6-5, Vol. 11023, RG 24, NAC. 
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exceptionally long and short ranges are excluded, 2,978 yards (a 1,194 yards). The average 
firing range estimated by the U-boats was 2,152 yards (cr 937 yards). 
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co-ordination within the U-boat pack, but rather a crude attempt to overwhelm the 
escorts with a heavy concentration of U-boats. 1 15 
This system was well understood by the British, who also concluded that a pack 
of 25-30 U-boats might sink some 15-20 ships in a normal sized convoy of, say, 50 
ships. But a pack would not function properly if too many U-boats tried to operate round 
a single convoy, so a typical pack consisted of 15-20 boats, which was in stark 
contrasts to the USN practice of using 3, or at most 4, submarines in co-ordinated 
attacks. 116 As Professor McCrea, DNOR, noted, because the U-boats had to be spread 
out in a search line to locate the convoy, it took some two to three days for the whole 
pack to concentrate round the convoy. The inevitable heavy use of W/T by the enemy 
provided cues for A/S forces. The delay before a strong attack could be mounted also 
allowed time for the threatened convoy escort usually to be reinforced with additional 
air cover and a support group of A/S vessels. Only about 70-80% of the pack normally 
made contact, mainly due to navigational difficulties, and many had difficulty remaining 
in touch with the convoy. About one in three U-boats that made contact were able to 
attack, and one in three of these attacks yielded a torpedo hit. ' 17 By contrast, the 
American submarines in the Pacific, albeit against a far less expert and determined 
defence, proved highly effective operating in small packs, with tactical control exercised 
by a senior officer at sea. Even with these limitations, the German U-boats operating in 
packs probably achieved three times the number of sinkings up to 1943 than would 
have been the case if the U-boats had operated individually. ' 18 The results would have 
been even greater had the U-boats had the benefit of wide-ranging air reconnaissance, 
leaving the U-boats to concentrate on sinking shipping. However, poor co-operation 
between the Luftwaffe and the U-boat arm, lack of sufficient numbers of long-range 
aircraft and ill-trained aircrews, scuppered any chance of the scheme working. In the 
main, U-boats had to provide their own reconnaissance, for which they were singularly 
ill-suited. 119 
115 'U-boat Methods of Combined Attack on Convoys, I February to 31 October 1941, ' Naval 
Section [GC&CS, Bletchley Park], ZI P/ZG/1 16,10 November 1941, ADM 223/1, p. 5. 116 M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'A Clash of Cultures: The Case for Large Convoys, ' in, Peter Hore (ed. ), 
Patrick Blackett. - Sailor, Scientist, Socialist (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 142; 'Pack Tactics by 
Submarines of the United States Navy, ' Section 5, 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, January 
1945, 'Anti-U-Boat Division, CB04050/45(l), 15 February 1945, NHB. 
117 'Effect of High Submerged Speed on U-boat Tactics, ' W. H. McCrea, NORD, Report No. 
20/45,23 April 1945, ADM 219/225, p. 1. 
"a 'Pack Tactics by Submarines (Summary), ' E. J. Williams, JTS-C No. 10,21 February 1944, 
ADM 219/631, p. 1. 
119 'Grand Admiral Donitz on the U-boat War, ' in, 'The Anti-Submarine Report, September, 




Methods of Detecting and Attacking U-boats 
On the Allied side, the level of operational co-operation between the air forces 
and navies was, by and large, excellent and provided one of the main sinews of the 
Allied success in defeating U-boats dependent on surface scouting and movement. 
Although the use of radar by aircraft is usually given the pride of place in their ability to 
detect surfaced U-boats, half of the contacts were made visually. However, binoculars 
were not routinely used until mid-1943, but thereafter some 20% of U-boat sightings 
involved their use (though on two-thirds of these occasions the binoculars were used 
for recognition purposes, rather than initial detection). The low usage was due partly to 
the focus in training on operation of new aircraft types and their increasingly complex 
equipment, and partly on the awkward observation positions in many of the aircraft. 
Although binoculars improved the visual detection range by almost 60%, they were 
heavy and tiring to use for more than 15 minutes at a time. Nevertheless: 
A good visual lookout is of outstanding importance in ... [anti-U-boat] operations. 
... Although luck plays a big part in the sighting of U-boats, there is no doubt that the greatest number of sightings and attacks have gone to those crews with the 
best lookout. It is also a fact that large numbers of U-boats come within visual 
range of aircraft and pass unseen. 120 
At the same time, the Operational Research Section (ORS) at Coastal Command, 
recommended that 
Crews must not get into the habit of relying mainly on radar when the visibility 
conditions are such that visual lookouts are likely to pay bigger dividends. The 
reverse is true when visibility is poor. 121 
The value of radar for detection of surfaced U-boats at night or in low visibility had been 
recognised in early 1939, when experiments were started with radar equipped 
aircraft. 122 Radar also provided a valuable navigation aid, which for aircraft returning 
from long-range missions over the Atlantic could be a '... life saver. 023 Improved 
detection meant that more U-boats were forced to dive (and even if not attacked) lost 
their surface mobility for hours at a time. Aircraft were especially valuable in this regard 
and the operational and psychological effects of constant air surveillance on 
submarines should not be lightly discounted. 124 
120'Coastal Command Manual of Anti-U-Boat Warfare, ' May 1944, AIR 15/294, Article 1. 
121 Visual Sighting of U-Boats, ' Wing Commander T. V. Stokes, RAAF, Overseas Headquarters, 
12 December 1944, AWM 54,81/4/81. [emphasis supplied] 
122 Minute, Wing Commander R. N. Waite, Wing Commander Plans, to SASO, 10 February 
1939, AIR 15/38. 
123 'Outline of Coastal Command's Anti-U-Boat Warfare 1939-August 1944, ' Wing Commander 
T. V. Stokes, [20 September 1944], AWM 54,81/4/81. 
124 R. Compton-Hall to A. Hampshire, [c. 1998]. 
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Perhaps the greatest problem for the aircraft of Coastal Command was that 
... "half of the 
long-range sorties failed to find their designated convoy because of 
bad homing, while inter-communication left much to be desired. " In late 1942 the 
RAF set up a special training groups with Western Approaches, and in 1943 
"remarkable improvements" were registered, with a 90% contact rate being 
achieved. 125 
These direct convoy escort operations were supported by aircraft missions over the 
main transit routes. Thus intensive patrols were flown over the Bay of Biscay, together 
with searches over ocean transit routes based, whenever possible, on intelligence 
cuing. 126 Professor Williams in DNOR, supported by Professor Blackett, noted that 
Coastal Command patrols over the Bay were relatively profitable for purely offensive 
operations in 1942-43 and had "... worked out in great detail the best methods of 
conducting such an offensive by a balanced force of day and night aircraft.... "127The 
Bay, Williams reasoned, presented a small area to search, compared to the total area 
of U-boat operations in the Atlantic. (Williams does not mention that in the area around 
threatened convoys there would also be a relatively high density of U-boats. ) This 
made up for the relatively short time the U-boats spent transiting the Bay, compared to 
the time they spent on operations. The Bay was therefore an area of comparatively 
high U-boat density, as well as being accessible by large numbers of medium range 
A/S aircraft. 128Furthermore, the U-boats could not disengage, for they had to cross the 
Bay if they were to get to their ocean operational areas. These operations, and those 
around convoys, provided aircraft with the opportunity to attack U-boats. Now that they 
were equipped with effective aerial depth-charges, through the work of ORS and 
Coastal Command's Development Unit, aircraft became effective U-boat killers. This 
was starkly illustrated by the proportion of lethal attacks against surfaced U-boats rising 
from 8% to 28% during 1943, with aircraft attacks accounting for some 70% of U-boat 
casualties during the last half of the year. 129 Unfortunately, this lethal capability was not 
to continue, as will be seen. 
The Royal Navy (and its allies) provided surface vessels for the direct protection 
of convoys and, at times, for independent offensive operations. About half the U-boats 
125 H. P. Willmott, 'The Organisations: The Admiralty and the Western Approaches, ' in, Stephen 
Howarth and Derek Law (eds. ), The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945. The 50th Anniversary 
international Naval Conference (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), p. 184. 
126 'Coastal Command Manual of Anti-U-Boat Warfare, ' May 1944, AIR 15/294, Article 21. 
12 " Bernard Lovell, P. M. S. Blackett., A biographical memoir (London: The Royal Society, 1976), 
p. 64; 'Note on Relation Between the Use of Aircraft to Give Cover to Convoys and in the Bay, ' 
P. M. S. Blackett, CAOR, 22 March 1943, ADM 205/30. 
128 'A/S Operations against Snort U-boats Working Inshore, ' E. J. Williams, DNOR, Report No. 
66/44,29 August 1944, ADM 219/148. 
129 See Appendix 4. 
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found by AIS ships were initially on the surface. Just over 40% of these U-boats were 
detected visually and the remainder by radar, which, as with aircraft, was of greatest 
value at night or in poor visibility. 130 However, the earlier, lower frequency, longer wave- 
length, radars suffered from considerable "clutter", caused by unwanted echoes from 
waves, which in rough seas might extend as far as 2,000-3,000 yards from the ship 
and seriously reduced the chance of detecting a U-boat. Even in calm seas, these sets 
could not hold contacts inside about 1,000 yards. Closing to visual range was therefore 
difficult, while at longer ranges the problem was in identifying a contact by radar alone. 
At 4,000 yards, for example, a surfaced U-boat gave an echo practically 
indistinguishable from a destroyer. The means of tentatively identifying a contact was 
by the range of first detection, and if it first appeared in a position not previously 
occupied by an echo. The eventually introduction of the Plan Position Indicator (PPI) 
radar display was invaluable because it gave a continuous view of contacts all-round 
the ship. Even with these limitations, radar allowed escorts to maintain almost 
unbroken coverage of the perimeter against approaching U-boats. It also relieved them 
of the constant worry over station keeping on the convoy, for colliding with merchant 
ships in poor visibility was a constant worry for escorts without radar. It also allowed 
them to co-ordinate their movements during U-boat hunts. Distant escorts could 
maintain touch with the convoy, even in poor weather, and they were themselves less 
likely to be confused with enemy contacts. 131 
If the U-boat was submerged, the escorts used the asdic to gain detection and 
almost half of the initial detections of U-boats were by this meanS. 132 By mid-1942 a 
new asdic, the Type 144, had been introduced into the Fleet which used the same 
oscillator as the earlier sets, but the inboard equipment had been completely 
redesigned to squeeze the last ounce of information out of the underwater sound. 133 
Much of this development was carried out under the supervision of J. Anderson, the 
Superintendent Scientist at HM Anti-Submarine Experimental Establishment, Fairlie 
130'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1949, 'DTASW, TASW. 30/50, CB04050(49), 17 July 1950, 
ADM 239/274, p. 79. 
131 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(2)(44), August 1944, NHB, Article 93. 
132 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1949, ' DTASW, TASW. 30/50, CB04050(49), 17 July 1950, 
ADM 239/274, p. 79. 
133 'The Asdic and its Associated Weapons, ' W. E. Dawson, ER30, HM Underwater Detection 
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(HMA/SEE), who had been involved in asdic development from its earliest days, 134 The 
Type 144 transmitted and received sound over a narrow 160 conical, 11 searchlight" 
beam which could be rotated in the horizontal plane through 3600 but could not be 
depressed {Plate 8}. In the receiving, or listening, mode the set could detect returning 
echoes as well as U-boat (or torpedo) HE. The latter gave a rough bearing but, of 
course, no range, so the primary mode of the asdic was as an echo-ranging set when a 
sound pulse was transmitted, followed by a listening period when echoes, hopefully 
from a U-boat, were received. The asdic could theoretically detect echoes out to 2,500 
yards, but this range was affected by a number of factors. The returning echoes were 
weak because they contained only a fraction of the transmitted power due to spreading 
and absorption losses as the sound passed both ways through the water. The echoes 
also had to be detected against the background noise caused by water flowing around 
the asdic dome, HE from the escort's own propellers, and unwanted asdic echoes, 
known as "reverberations", produced by discontinuities in the water structure, the 
surface and the seabed. As a result, 1,500 yards was a more realistic working range, 
though even then detection was not guaranteed. Such a range was wholly inadequate 
to provide complete asdic coverage around the perimeter of a convoy {Plate 9}. 
For example, if a U-boat was end-on to the asdic, its reflecting area would be 
considerably less than if beam-on, so the echo would be weaker, or possibly masked 
by the U-boat's wake. And, in rough weather severe pitching by the escort would cause 
highly aerated water to surround the asdic, known as "quenching", which interrupted 
the reception of echoes. Furthermore, the vertical temperature structure of the water 
was not constant, and this had the effect of bending the asdic beam. When this was 
severe, shadow zones were created where no pulses from the asdic penetrated. If the 
U-boat was in this zone, it was "invisible". Sometimes definite submarine-like echoes, 
termed "non-subs", were obtained from wrecks, rocks or shoals of fish. Thus 
classification of echoes was important and could be assisted by HE from the target, or, 
when the U-boat was moving, by using an effect known as "doppler", which was an 
apparent frequency increase or decrease in the echo when compared to the 
reverberations and depended on whether the U-boat was moving relatively towards or 
134 A. B. Wood, OBE, IDSc, 'From Board of Invention and Research to Royal Naval Scientific 
Service, ' in, Journal of the Naval Scientific ServIce, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 1965), pp. 16-97, CCAC, 
GOEV 3/7-, 'Anti-Submarine Measures in World War I, ' Commander F. Barely, Historical 
Section, S. 5659, Searches Vol. 29,30 November 1960, NHB. 
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Plate 9- Asclic Coveraqe and Asclic Swee 
"Asdic Coverage for a 45-ship Convoy, " from Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea 
1939-1945, Vol. 1: The Defensive (London: HMSO, 1954), p. 465; Typical Sonar 
Coverage Plan, ' from 'U. S. Fleet, Anti-Submarine and Escort of Convoy 
Instructions (BUSCls), ' FTP 223A, January 1945, File 79/532, Directorate of 
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away from the escort. 135 Perhaps the most important factor in gaining detection was 
whether the operators were alert, and this could be heightened by their knowledge that 
a U-boat was in the vicinity. 
Escorts would normally search using the asdic to sweep over the forward arc 
from 800 off the port bow to 800 off the starboard bow. (i. e. Red 800 to Green 800). The 
arc was covered in 50 steps each consisting of a transmission and listening cycle, 
starting at Red 800 and through to dead ahead. The oscillator was then rotated aft 
without transmitting to Green 800 and the sweep restarted, stepping forward again to 
dead ahead (Plate 9}. A U-boat could pass through the arc while the asdic was 
searching on the other side of the ship, although this was unlikely for escort speeds 
below 14 knots. At higher speeds, or when asdic conditions were bad, the arc was 
reduced. Because of the time taken to complete a full sweep and the movement of the 
escort, the effective width of the lane searched was reduced. So, in round terms, for a 
working range 1,500 yards, the effective lane searched was only 1,100 yards on either 
side for an escort at 12 knots, and 950 yards at 18 knots. 136 
Once a contact was gained, its distance from the escort was available from the 
asdic range recorder but there was no means of directly measuring the bearing of the 
U-boat. Determining where in the beam the target lay and thus calculating its bearing 
relied on the cumbersome "cut-on" procedure. The asdic was trained off to one side of 
the target until contact was lost and then stepped back in 21/20 steps until contact was 
regained. The bearing of the asdic was noted, and the procedure repeated on the other 
side of the echo. This gave two "cut-on" bearings, and midway between them was the 
supposed target's centre bearing but there were inherent errors due to the target's 
movement during the time the procedure took. Moreover, neither of these bearings 
were accurate because the boundaries of the target echo were not sharply defined. For 
practical purposes the "cut-ons" could be measured to within ±51. "' 
In the early stages of the war attacks were made with depth-charges, filled with 
either 290-lb. Amatol or 300-lb. Minol fillings and released from the escort's stern and 
dropped far enough ahead of the U-boat to allow them to sink to the U-boat's depth 
before they exploded. Immediately the escort gained contact, she turned to place the 
135 'The Asdic Beam, ' in 'Asdic Notebook, ' M. Walford, MLJ- H. W. Smith, 'Countering the Fast 
Conventional Submarine, 1946-1956, ' in 'Sonar Systems in tke RCN, 1945-68, ' Partial Draft, 15 
January 1997, DHH1- Commodore (D) Western Approaches to DAUD, 16 July 1944, ADM 
217/90- 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, October 1944, 'ADM 19912061, p. 3. 
136 Ný Screening, ' Part 3, 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations, ' CB4097(3)(44), June 1944, 
NHB, Tables I and 11. 
137 , Type 144. Trials of Operating Procedure, ' HMA/SEE, Fairlie, Internal Report No. 159, 
December 1943, ADM 259/382, p. 7. 
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asdic echo directly on the ship's head, otherwise it was not possible to resolve how 
much of the observed bearing movement was due to the ship's or the U-boat's crossing 
components. Thus, with knowledge of whether the U-boat was moving left or right and 
with an estimate of her movement towards or away, from the echo's doppler, a rough 
course of the U-boat was obtained. Ideally an attack was started from a range of 1,000- 
1,500 yards and at a speed of 12-15 knots. The asclic system could only calculate a 
collision course that would take the escort directly over the U-boat. So a throw-off, 
inspired by guesswork and honed by practice, had to be applied to the attack course to 
take the escort's stern over the aim point ahead of the U-boat. This throw-off might be 
as much as 45* against a deep U-boat travelling at 6 knots. 138 
Trials had demonstrated that the asdic was able to locate a U-boat with an 
average radial error of some 20 yards in the horizontal plane, but, at first there was no 
means of directly measuring the U-boat's depth. Because the asdic could not be 
depressed, a shallow U-boat would pass out of the asdic beam at close range, while a 
deep U-boat would be lost sooner. This effect could be used to provide a rough 
estimation of the depth, so, if contact were lost at 100 yards the target could be 
between 50 and 100 feet, whereas if contact were lost at 400 yards the target depth 
was could be between 200 and 400 feet. 139 However, if contact was lost the estimation 
of the U-boat's position also degraded to a radial error of some 100 yards. This was 
well outside the 7-8 yards lethal range of a single depth-charge. At 13-17 yards they 
could cause enough damage to force the U-boat to surface, while at 27-33 yards range 
a depth-charge would severely shake the U-boat and was sufficient to cause the U- 
boat to break off a torpedo attack. 140 To mitigate the aiming errors, the standard attack 
was made with 10 depth-charges, in two 5-charge patterns roughly coincident in plan 
and, depending on the assessed depth of the U-boat, separated by 90-350 feet in 
depth. It is no wonder that the probability of a kill with depth-charges was about 6% per 
attack on a U-boat at medium depth. 141 If the U-boat were to evade by going very deep, 
in the order of 500-700 feet, the normal depth-charge attack stood little chance of 
success. For this circumstance the "Creeping Attack" was promulgated in the autumn 
138 'Asdic Operating and Control: Supplementary Notes on Procedure and Control, ' 
CB4127(4)(45), ASW 304/45, July 1945, NHB, p- 9. 
139 'Detection, Attacking, Hunting, ' CB4097(2)(41), December 1941, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, 
ý ara raph 77. 
4" 0g The variation of ranges given reflect the alternate explosive fillings of the depth-charges. The 
Mark X depth-charge, fired singly from the torpedo tubes of a few escorts, contained a ton of 
explosive, but no successes were recorded with this weapon. 
141 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations - Part 10 - A/S Weapons, ' DASW, CB4097(10)(44), July 
1944, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, paragraphs 1093 and 1044. 
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Plate 10- Tvpe 144 Asclic Oscillator (with "Q" Attachment) and Squid 
(Asdic & Its Associated Weapons', HM Underwater Detection Establishment, 
Portland, ACSIL/ADM/47/273, February 1947, Records of the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations: Registered Publications Section, U. S. Navy Technical 
Publications, 1901-1960, Box 161, RG 38, National Archives and Records 
Administration 2, College Park, Washington, D. C. ) 
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of 1943, which was controlled by an escort which remained in asdic contact and who 
controlled up to three other ships to fire a barrage of 62 depth-charges at the U-boat. 
The attack took about 3 minutes to complete, but had a 75% kill rate provided the 
enemy remained quiescent until the moment of attack. 142 Holding contact at close 
range was largely solved by the "Q" Attachment, an additional asdic with a narrow 
horizontal but 6011 vertical beam, slaved to the main set {Plate 10). But accurate depth 
measurement had to wait the introduction of the short-range Type 147B asdic, fifted in 
addition to the Type 144 and "Q". It was fixed on the ship's head, and had a 600 
horizontal and 2Y20 vertical beam, which could be depressed to a maximum angle of 
450. By noting the angle of depression and the target's range its depth could be 
calculated. 143 The main error, however, in the attack remained that caused by the 
inexact measurement of the target's bearing. 
Most of the limitations of depth-charge attacks were eliminated by the 
introduction of ahead throwing weapons (ATWs) fired when the escort was still some 
200-300 yards from the U-boat. Contact could normally be held on the main asdic at 
the moment of firing, provided the U-boat was no deeper than about 260 feet, or on "Q" 
down to over 1500 feet depth (which was well over the crush depth of any U-boat). 
There were two types of ATW. The Hedgehog fired 24 contact-fused bombs into a 40 
yard diameter circle centred on the U-boats future position, and the ultimate wartime 
weapon system, the Squid, which fired 3 depth-charge like bombs to form a 40 yard 
sided triangle, timed to explode at the U-boat's depth (Plate 10). A double-Squid fired 
two of these patterns, arranged to explode 60 feet apart in depth. The ATW projectiles 
were also designed to have a high sinking rate, so the time taken for the bombs to 
reach the target's depth was much less than during a depth-charge attack and this 
gave the U-boat less time to evade when compared to Hedgehog or depth-charges 
{Plate 11). Moreover, ATW attacks were normally carried out at slower, deliberate 
speed of 7-12 knots, because there was practically no danger of the attacking ship 
being damaged by the exploding pattern, so the U-boat had no cue as to when the 
attack was launched. 
When attacking with ATW, the escort steered for the centre bearing of the asdic 
contact with alterations made to keep the contact dead ahead. The deflection was then 
obtained from the bearing recorder or by estimation, which gave the angle the weapon 
142 'Creeping Attack, ' Admiralty Message, DTG 181904A August 1943, NAA(M): MP1185/8, 
1932/3/45. 
143'Asdic Notebook, ' MLJ, p. 54. 
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Plate 11 - ATW Attack Method and Comparison of Evasion Time in A/S Weapon 
Attacks 
'Asdic Operating and Control: Supplementary Notes on Procedure and Control, ' 
C. B. 4127(4)(45), MOM 3Q4/45) July 1945, ý2gl Historical Branch, p. 24. 
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had to be aimed off the centre bearing of the asdic contact in order to allow for the time 
of flight and sinking time of the projectiles. This was known as the "Gun Bearing" and 
as soon as reasonably consistent readings were established during the run-in, the 
escort altered course to this bearing. In ships with the latest gear, this was done by 
ordering the helmsman to usteer by asdic" in which case he followed an indicator 
controlled by the settings on the bearing recorder. As the range closed, the escort's 
heading was altered to follow any changes in the Gun Bearing. It took some time for 
the Bearing Recorder to settle down on new settings, so, especially during the last 30 
seconds before firing it was preferable for the escort to remain on the same course. 
Small discrepancies between the Gun Bearing and the ship's heading could be 
eliminated by the ATW mounting, however, the prediction of the target's future position 
was nowhere as sophisticated as contemporary gunnery systems and against an 
evading U-boat it was advisable to delay the moment of attack until the enemy became 
quiescent. 
Exercises showed that against a shallow U-boat, Hedgehog gave a 60% chance 
of success, while a 10-charge depth-charge pattern achieved 20%. 144 Operational 
results, however, gave a more stark comparison. Although Hedgehog initially achieved 
only a 7%% kill rate, this eventually improved to 28Y2%, while depth-charge attacks 
started at 3% and only improved to 6% (largely due to improved explosive content of 
the charges). Squid was a more complex, integrated system whose operational 
performance increased from 21 %% to 60% by the end of the war. Put another way, the 
quantity of explosives required by each of these weapons to sink a U-boat was: depth- 
charges, 23 tons (for the 10-charge pattern); Hedgehog, 2 tons; and Squid 0.7 tons. 
These heavy bombardments proved the resilience of U-boats to withstand attack. 
Squid was the preferred weapon during AIS engagements, for not only was it the most 
lethal weapon, but like depth-charges and unlike the contact-fused Hedgehog, near 
misses had a morale effect and the chance of causing cumulative damage to a U-boat, 
which could force it to the surface where it could be despatched by ramming or 
gunfire. 145 Because the target was not overrun during ATW attacks, it was often 
possible for the attacking ship to remain in contact, and therefore mount another attack 
at short notice. ATWs were thus semi-automated, precision weapons that largely 
eliminated human error. Especially with Squid, attacks against slow wartime U-boats 
144 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations - Part 2- Detection and Action, ' CB4097(2)(44), 
November 1944, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, paragraphs 195 and 200. 
145 'The Asdic and its Associated Weapons, 'DERA, ANA 5971, p. 11. 
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Plate 12- Limiting Lines of Submerged Approach 
'Manual of Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1939, 'Tactical Division, CB 3044, February 
1939, Naval Historical Branch. 
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(This diagram show the calculation for a fleet. For a slower convoy, the TDZ would 
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were comparatively academic affairs. They required a different philosophical approach 
from the AIS teams by emphasizing attention to detail and accuracy and deliberate 
stalking of the U-boat up to the moment of firing. Gone was the "artistry" of the depth- 
charge attack, as A/S warfare became more remote and mechanical. 
Anti-Submarine Screening and Escort Diagrams 
These methods of detection and attack were only of use, however, if the escorts 
could be stationed around fleets and convoys in such a way as to maximise their 
chance counterattacking a U-boat before it fired, or of locating it after a merchant ship 
was struck. The disposition of escorts was laid down in anti-submarine screening and 
escort diagrams. Initially, adequate tactical instructions did not exist to cover the most 
likely event of having to respond after the U-boat had attacked and individual escort 
group Senior Officers initiated their own procedures. Gradually, with the formalization 
of the training and tactical developments organization (especially at the Western 
Approaches Tactical Unit and at sea centred around HMS Philante), the situation 
improved and led to the issue of voluminous tactical manuals. 146The emphasis here 
will be on the protection of convoys which was the more onerous task. Station-keeping 
in an ocean convoy was easier if the merchant ships were arranged in short columns 
on a broad front. Thus, with columns spaced 1,000 yards apart, and the individual 
ships within the columns 400 yards astern of each other, the overall size of a convoy of 
a typical 60-ship convoy was about 1-2 miles in depth and 6 miles in breadth (though 
later in the war, with the increasingly inexperienced merchant officers, the distance 
between columns was doubled to give greater safety) . 
147 U-boats could fire from 5,000 
yards, and this range defined the torpedo danger zone (TDZ) around the perimeter of a 
convoy, the circumference of which was advanced on the convoy's track to allow for 
the torpedo running time. 148The limited underwater speed and endurance of a U-boat 
meant that it could only reach a firing position from a relatively small distance to the left 
or right of the convoy's front. This distance increased if the U-boat was further ahead of 
the convoy. The starting points, therefore, for a U-boat to close to a firing position were 
described by the LLSuA (which were tangents to the TDZ) and angled outwards at 
about 300 for a 9-knot, fast convoy (Plate 12). The angle would be larger for a slow, 7- 
146 Llewellyn-Jones, 'The Pursuit of Realism, ' pp. 219-239. 
U7 Arnold Hague, The Allied Convoy System, 1939-1945., Its Organisation, Defence and 
Operation (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 5,10 and 25-26. 
1" 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(2)(44), August 1944, NHB, Article 35; 'A/S Screening, ' Part 3, 'Conduct 
of Anti-U-Boat Operations, ' CB4097(3)(44), June 1944, NHB, paragraphs 401-403. 
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Plate 13- ACI Convoy Diaqrams for Day and Niqht, 1944 
(Admiralty Convoy Instructions) 
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knot convoy but much smaller against a fleet steaming at 15 knots. 149 The high speed 
of U-boats on the surface meant that, in principle, they could approach from much 
wider angles to an attack position, though the use of high speed could make them 
more visible by creating a large wake. 
The distance across the front of a convoy, from which a U-boat could approach 
submerged was too large for the available escorts to sweep with asdic, even if they zig- 
zagged around their stations. Against a surfaced U-boat better radar cover was 
possible, provided the sea was not too rough. 150 A/S vessels were disposed on "Escort 
Diagrams" optimized to frustrate a U-boat's approach and position the escorts to be 
able to take offensive action against U-boats that had got into a firing position. Thus 
escorts were placed 1Y2-2 miles ahead and on the bows of the convoy to intercept 
approaching U-boats, and 1 mile on the quarters from where they could close the 
position from which the U-boat attacked, or to attack those retreating after a torpedoing 
{Plate 13). These distances gave the best compromise between keeping the escorts as 
close as possible to each other (thereby increasing the chance of detecting a U-boat 
trying to penetrate the defences, and providing mutual support between escorts), and 
the need to maintain as much "fighting room" as possible for offensive action against 
incoming U-boats. It was noted from operations that the great majority of AIS contacts 
were made after a ship had been torpedoed or the attacking U-boat sighted. However, 
experience also showed that it proved more difficult to destroy a U-boat after the 
inevitable dislocation caused by a ship being struck, than if the U-boat was caught 
before it had fired. 151 
These close escorts were deployed in the "red area", which extended to 6 miles 
from the perimeter of the convoy. Outside this was the "white area", an annulus from 6 
to 12 miles, and beyond that was the "blue area". Support groups, just like the 
extended patrols of the First World War, were stationed in the white area where they 
could catch surfaced U-boats attempting to gain bearing on the convoy. Aircraft 
operated in the blue area where they could disrupt the approach of distant U-boats 
attempting to get into position ahead of the convoy. Although use of high definition 
radar, tactical R/T and plotting facilities (and, later, radio navigation aids) in escorts had 
149 'A/S Screening, ' Part 3, 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations, ' CB4097(3)(44), June 1944, 
NHB, paragraphs 401-405 and Figure 1. 
'-'r'o 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(2)(44), August 1944, NHB, Articles 30-34. 
151 'Anti-Submarine Protection of Convoys, ' A/Commander Harvey Newcomb, A/S 1211/11/3,5 
May 1943, NAA(M): MP1049/5,2026/12/537. Newcomb, an interwar AIS specialist, drew his 
information from the Admiralty's Monthly Anti-Submarine Report (as well as personal contact 
with Admiralty staff). 
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dramatically improved during WWII, the integration of the systems was still primitive 
and thus the co-ordination between ships (and aircraft) was still prone to confusion in 
poor weather or at night. Thus with these tactical zones, physical separation was 
enforced which reduced the chance of tactical confusion. Of course, the area 
boundaries could be breached when units were pursuing a U-boat. 152 
Tactics on Gaining Contact 
Allied operational experience showed that a single A/S vessel was capable of 
dealing with a U-boat in good asdic conditions. However, in difficult asdic conditions, or 
when the water was disturbed from attacks a U-boat could easily escape. A second 
A/S vessel could help by maintaining asdic contact on the U-boat and thus resolve 
false echoes from ship's wakes or Squid and depth-charge explosions. Since the asdic 
and attack ranges were relatively short, the whole action took place in a relatively small 
area, any additional escorts served little purpose and tended to get in the way. They 
usually stood off at a short distance, patrolling around the action area and covering the 
U-boat's escape routes. 153 The two close-in ships manoeuvred so that their bearings 
relative to the U-boat were 900 apart. This helped ships avoid putting their wakes (and 
thus confusing asdic echoes) between the U-boat and their consort and, if the U-boat 
tried turn bow or stern on to one escort, it exposed its beam aspect to the other, so at 
least one escort had a good asdic echo. In a heavy sea, the pair would try to maintain 
the weather gauge, which lessened the effect of quenching (to say nothing of the 
fatiguing effect on the crew of the ship's motion), and reduced the danger of the ships 
inadvertently drifting downwind and out of contact. Asdic performance was usually 
better too, because transmitting downwind produced less pronounced surface 
reverberations from the waves. U-boats, for their part, would often try to make ground 
to windward. 
The most modern escorts were fitted with a semi-automatic plotting table on 
which tactical information was mapped out though it did not allow for tidal movement or 
ship's drift due to the wind and sea, and the U-boat would, therefore appear to "drift" 
upwind. Nevertheless, soon after gaining contact, it was possible to calculate an 
estimate of the U-boats course to within ±300 and the speed within a knot or so. 
Because the plot kept a record of the U-boat's movements, if the ship lost contact 
152 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(2)(44), August 1944, NHB, Article 38; 'Remarks on Philante Exercises, 
29 July 1944, 'W. H. McCrea, DOR/44/60,3 August 1944, ADM 219/142. 
153 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations - Part 2- Detection and Action, ' CB4097(2)(44), 
November 1944, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, paragraphs 285-296; 'US Fleet, Anti-Submarine and 
Escort of Convoy Instructions (BUSCls), ' FTP 223A, January 1945, File 79/532, DH H, p. 1-60. 
72 
Chapter 2 
during the final stages of an attack it was possible to estimate the time to fire. The plot 
also gave the Senior Officer (SO) of the Escort an overview of the tactical situation, 
from which he could plan more extensive lost-contact procedures, especially at night or 
in conditions of poor visibility. 154 Even though the U-boats could only travel underwater 
at a relatively slow speed, when contact was lost the area to be searched expanded at 
an exponential rate, being proportional to the square of the U-boat's speed. Given the 
comparatively slow search rate of the asdic, rapid action was needed if the U-boat was 
not to slip away. Immediate lost-contact procedures included "Search Scheme No. 1", 
which consisted of an all-round asdic sweep by each ship steaming at 7 knots on the 
last known mean course of the U-boat. While this was being done the SO would signal 
the action to be taken if contact were not regained. 
Depending on the number of A/S ships present, he could order a "Square 
Search", commonly known as an "Observant", where the escorts were equally spaced 
and followed each other round the square. With more escorts the SO could order a 
"Box Search" where ships steamed in line abreast round the square. The idea of these 
searches was for the A/S ships to pass each point on the square often enough, so that 
the U-boat could not cross the perimeter without coming within asdic range of one of 
the escorts. 155 Alternatively, in "Search Scheme No. 2" the ships swept through the U- 
boat probability area twice in line abreast 2,000-3,000 yards apart. It was possible, in 
average asclic conditions with a working range of, say, 1,500 yards, to search a box 
about 4Y2miles square in 35-45 minutes. To escape the U-boat would have to make a 
speed of at least 3 or 4 knots, at which speed she might betray her presence by 
producing sufficiently loud HE. If contact was still not regained, an expanding "Box 
Search" could be ordered, in which the legs of the search were adjusted so that the 
search would follow a vignot spiral formed from the locus of all the intercept points 
which could be reached by the target and the searching force for various U-boat 
escape headings. 156 This was the search concept favoured by the Americans. 
However, British experience suggested that greater probability of success could be 
achieved if some limits were placed on the likely escape courses. Searching was 
therefore focussed on a relatively narrow sector in the form of a "Gamma Search", 
consisting of escorts sweeping in line abreast at right-angles across the U-boat's 
assumed escape course. The Gamma search was started at a point on the U-boat's 
154 'Detection, Attacking, Hunting, ' CB4097(2)(42), December 1942, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, 
Faragraphs 193 and 308-309. ,5 5 'Air and Surface A/S Searches and Striking Forces, ' Part 4, BR1679(4) [formerly 
CB4097(4)(44)], June 1944, NHB, p. 20. 
156 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations - Part 2- Detection and Action, ' CB4097(2)(44), 
November 1944, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, paragraphs 343-344 and 375-378. 
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anticipated track equal to its "furthest on" predicted position (based on the U-boat's 
expected maximum transit speed) and continued until the "furthest back" position 
(based on a prediction of the slowest U-boat transit speed) passed through the patrol 
line. The zig-zagging escorts were stationed three miles apart in daylight and five miles 
apart at night, when the U-boat was more likely to attempt to escape using its high 
surface speed. Two A/S vessels were required to patrol a lane 10 miles wide, and four 
for a 30 mile lane, though, in practice, the "Gamma Search" never succeeded in 
locating a U-boat. ' 57 This illustrates the difficulty of locating a submarine if A/S ships 
could not arrive at the datum very soon after it was created, and the "Gamma Search" 
was withdrawn from the tactics books in 1945. 
By 1943 with the growing power and numbers of escorts, particularly those in 
support groups, came the freedom to hunt attacking U-boats to destruction. These 
hunts usually took some time and required persistent, deliberate attacks by the A/S 
vessels. However, for actions close in to a convoy, escorts had to rapidly appreciate 
the level of threat to the ships being escorted. If the U-boat was in a position to carry 
out a torpedo attack, the escorts would respond with an immediate counter-attack, 
emphasizing speed rather than accuracy. This was designed to put the U-boat off his 
aim and to seize the initiative so that more deliberate and deadly attacks could be 
mounted. Squid or depth-charges were useful in this regard. If the initial contact was 
more distant, and there was plenty of fighting room, the escort could afford to make the 
first attack a deliberate one. Any of these attacks by escorts always risked the U-boat 
deliberately targeting them with a torpedo, a risk unhesitatingly accepted if the ship 
being screened was a fleet unit or a troopship. Against the conventional straight- 
running weapons, provided the torpedo was detected, the escort could turn towards the 
incoming torpedo which substantially reduced the chance of it hitting. When Captain 
C. D. Howard-Johnston, Director of the Anti-U-Boat Division (DAUD), was asked how 
far a Captain should hazard his own ship when attacking a U-boat, remarked that 
*There is no risk yet The U-boat is out to sink merchantmen ... [and the escorts] are a confounded nuisance to its Captain, not a target. When the first escort vessel is 
torpedoed deliberately you will know that the Hun is beaten and the war is won. 
Everything else after that date is just a mopping up operation. n'58 
Howard-Johnston accurately foretold (as Captain Edelsten had done earlier) the 
introduction in the autumn of 1943 of the Gnat homing torpedo. In fact, the British 
already made a fairly detailed assessment of the way Gnat operated from Special 
"7 'Operation uCW": Analysis for NW Approaches, 25 August - 17 October 1944, ' W. H. McCrea, DNOR, 1 December 1944, ADM 1/17653, p. 16. 
158 Quoted in: D. A. Rayner, Escort. * the Baffle of the Atlantic (London, William Kimber, 1955), p. 155. 
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Plate 14: Foxer and Step-AsigLe 
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Intelligence aided by an understanding the techniques employed in the similar 
American Mk XXIV Mine (an air launched homing torpedo). 159 Countermeasures were 
therefore developed rapidly. Escorts were soon equipped with the towed "Foxer" made 
up of two pipe noise makers (PNMs), each consisting of two pipes connected together 
at their ends but allowed to vibrate against each other as they were towed through the 
water {Plate 14). The resultant noise was some 10-30 times noisier than the ship's 
propellers, and would thus seduce the Gnat away from the ship. So, ships closed the 
U-boat as fast as possible until within asdic range their speed was reduced, the Foxer 
tOpped, and a single depth-charge dropped to "shake-off" any Gnat close astern. The 
remainder of the hunt was then carried out at 8 knots at which speed a Gnat could only 
home from very close range. The problem with these tactics was the time taken to 
close the U-boat. Ships capable of 25 knots, could outrun a Gnat, and could therefore 
make a direct approach to the U-boat, though at high speed their self-noise would limit 
the chance of making a detection. The tactical compromise was the use of the "Step- 
Aside" approach to a U-boat. When the escort reached a range of just under 3 miles 
from the U-boat's estimated position, she altered course 600 to port or starboard, while 
maintaining her best speed. This new heading was held for three minutes which would 
laterally separate the escort from the Gnat's track outside to torpedo's detection range. 
The escort then again altered course to make a direct track towards the U-boat's 
position. 160 The diversion of the "Step-Aside" also slowed the escort's approach to the 
U-boat's datum position and increased the chance of her escape. A contemporary 
assessment was that of the 24 escorts which became Gnat casualties between 
September 1943, when the weapon was introduced, and May 1944, only two were hit 
while taking anti-Gnat counter-measures. "" 
Captain Walker, who was frequently employed on hunter-killer operations, 
disliked use of Foxer because its noise interfered with asdic performance. He directed 
that all ships were immediately to slow to 7 knots if a Gnat threat was imminent and in 
the spring of 1944, had obtained permission to land his Foxer gear prior to carrying out 
independent hunting operations. However, Walker saw the merit in using the Foxer 
while escorting a convoy when the escort would be zig-zagging ahead of the convoy 
and steaming at above the safe speed of 7-8 knots. 162 Gretton, too, disliked the 
159 'Some Operational Implications of a Homing Torpedo, ' L. Solomon, Report 36/43,1 June 
1943, ADM 219/52. 
160 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations - Part 2- Detection and Action, ' CB4097(2)(44), 
November 1944, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, paragraphs 380-381. 
'a' 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, June 1944, 'ADM 199/2061, p. 27. 
162 R. Whinney, The U-boat Peril: An Anti-Submarine Commander's War (Poole: Blandford, 
1986), p. 127; Terrence Robertson, Walker RN (London: White Lion edn., 1975), p. 142. 
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interference with the Asdic the Foxer caused and did not stream it in his destroyer, 
though it was occasionally used by the slower ships of his group. "' Once-in contact, 
escorts in close action could be embarrassed by the trailing Foxers as they 
manoeuvred to attack the U-boat. 164 The primary aim, Walker stated, was'... to destroy 
U-boats, particularly those which menace our convoys. 'This object was amplified in his 
standing orders for the Second Escort Group (EG2): 
Our job is to kill, and all officers must fully develop the spirit of vicious offensive. No 
matter how many convoys we may shepherd through safely, we shall have failed 
unless we can slaughter U-boats. All energies must be bent to this end. 165 
As a result he was willing to take risks with his ships in order maximise the chance of a 
U-boat kill. He was convinced that defence for support groups against the Gnat 
... must lie in tactics and not 
Foxers, which greatly reduced the chance of killing U- 
boats, especially in vile Asdic conditions when echoes were poor and faint. He 
considered that occasional casualties must be accepted, but emphasised that 
Gnats could not home on sloops at low speed. The Commander-in-Chief agreed - 
in the case of experienced groups. 166 
Admiral Horton, Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, understood the dilemma 
for Senior Officers and ships' captains. 'it is a game, this U-boat struggle, ' he 
remarked, 
- the "Gnaf is a nasty snag and delays the approach - all ships hit to date have 
not completely carried out instructions [careful approach to the U-boat], but in the 
heat of the moment the offensive spirit of the escort vessels takes charge, and it is 
hard to blame them severely. 167 
The aggressive spirit amongst A/S practitioners is evident from these views. 
Beating the Submersible 
The foregoing account suggests, at face value, a rather banal tactical pattern. 
Indeed, at a very early stage in the Battle of the Atlantic it was noted that the German 
I ... tactics conform 
to a stereotyped pattern so that counter-measures may be uniformly 
applied. "68 The British counter, however, was the complex interaction of tactics on 
three main fronts. Firstly, convoy made it more difficult to the U-boats to find their 
163 Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander (London: Cassell, 1964), p. 166. 
164 Alan Burn, The Fighting Captain: Frederick John Walker and the Battle of the Atlantic 
JI-ondon: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 113. 
65 'Second Support Group Orders, ' Captain F. J. Walker, CB, DSO, 19 June 1943 (still extant, 
with amendments, 9 March 1944), File PGC 5, IWM P432, p. 2. [emphasis supplied] 
166 Alan Burn, The Fighting Captain: Frederick John Walker and the Battle of the Atlantic 
JI-ondon: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 142. 
67 W. S. Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western Approaches (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1954), p. 212. 
168 'U-boat Methods of Combined Attack on Convoys, 1 February to 31 October 1941, ' Naval 
Section [GC&CS, Bletchley Park], ZIP/ZG/1 16,10 November 1641, ADM 223/1, p. 20-21. 
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targets, and most convoys escaped detection altogether. Secondly, the enemy relied 
on the use of the surface, for searching and tactical mobility (which was severely 
limited when the U-boat submerged). Thus aircraft both on area searches and patrols 
in the vicinity of convoys could locate U-boats, sometimes destroying them, but at least 
forced them to dive. Surface support groups, patrolling at a distance round a convoy, 
did the same. Thirdly, the extensive use of radio by the U-boats gave the British the 
ability to locate U-boats; in the wide expanse of the ocean. Aircraft on area patrols could 
be more effectively tasked, threatened convoys could be reinforced with surface and air 
escorts, and individual U-boats close to convoys could be forced to dive and often 
attacked. The results were adduced by the Government Code and Cypher School, 
Bletchley Park, at the end of the war. They wrote that by May 1943: 
The nature of the problem facing the U-boat Command had... changed. Whereas in 
the first three of four years of the war the effectiveness of the arm was limited by 
inadequate numbers, there was now almost an embarras de riches. The U-boat 
Command found itself in control of a fleet of over four hundred boats, which it was 
unable to deploy fully, as the types of which it was composed were no longer 
suited to contemporary operational conditions. The expectation of life of a U-boat 
joining the operational fleet in the third year of war (September 1941 to September 
1942) had been about eleven and a half months; in the following year, a 500-ton 
169 boat might expect to survive only about eight months.... 
Much of this was achieved by improved use of technology but success also depended 
on the development of appropriate tactics. Nor should the latter be seen as the 
imposition of some dogma in a "one-size-fits-all" formula. Notwithstanding that the 
enemy's tactics were largely stereotyped in concept, the vagaries of individual 
performance, weather and the scale of forces pitted at any one moment, meant that 
particular anti-submarine actions were each unique events and required considerable 
skill on behalf of the proponents. That said, the reinforcement of threatened convoys 
was an idea that had served the Royal Navy well since the eighteenth century in a very 
different technological era. 
It was impossible for every convoy to be given an escort capable of countering 
the heaviest pack attack. If adequate intelligence were available, it ought to be possible 
to reinforce threatened convoys. Aircraft were able to be rapidly re-deployed in this 
manner, but, valuable though they were, they were not the whole answer, for additional 
surface escorts were needed too. The progressive increase in the size of convoys over 
the winter of 1942-43 and the lengthening of the convoy cycle helped to relieve the 
pressure on the direct escort groups, and free vessels to form support groups. These 
169 'The German Navy - The U-Boat Arm, ' Lieutenant H. M. Anderson, RNVR, Lieutenant 
Commander R. J. Goodman, RNVR, and Commander A. M. S. MacKenzie, RNVR (ed. ), GUCS 
Naval History, Vol. XVII, c. December 1945, NHB, pp. 219-220. 
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could then be used to reinforce threatened convoys. The direct linkage between these 
tactical moves is not clear, for the support group requirement had already been 
established in 1942 on tactical grounds, but it was only in February 1943 that Admiral 
Edelsten, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (U-boats & Trade) (ACNS(UT)), was satisfied 
that there were sufficient escort vessels to form support groups on a permanent basis 
(aided by the temporary cessation of the Arctic convoys). The escorts strength for each 
convoy was, in theory, calculated using the formula of three escorts per convoy, plus 
one extra for every ten ships in the convoy, provided air escort was also available. It 
was emphasized by the Naval Staff prior to the Casablanca Conference in early 
January 1943, that: 
Without air escort this provision of escorts is totally inadequate against wolf-pack 
tactics on the scale that we must now expect. In fact, it may be said that, without 
air escorts, convoys attacked need at least one escort for every U-boat attacking - 
and at present "packs" may well consist of up to 15 U-boats. It is therefore 
assumed that all convoys will: - 
either 
be so routed as to be able to receive escort by shore-based aircraft, or, 
be accompanied by an escort carrier. 170 
Initially, the escort carriers, or CVEs, were employed by the British as an integrated 
part of the convoy escort, where they provided not only A/S air cover but also fighter 
protection on some routes closer to enemy controlled coasts. Only later were they 
briefly used on more offensive operations. 171 
The value of the support groups, like air cover, was in harassing and attacking U- 
boats that were attempting to shadow or gain bearing on the convoys, and their ability 
to conduct prolonged hunts of U-boats that made attacks. A/S ships and, especially, 
aircraft could profitably be used in distant patrols around the convoys where U-boats 
were most likely to be on the surface. The analysis of support group operations (and air 
escorts) undertaken in the middle of 1943 illustrate the point. The attacks on U-boats 
by the close escort and the supports for Convoy SC1 30 (the last convoy to be seriously 
threatened by U-boat pack attack in Spring 1943) show that half of the attacks were as 
a result of surface escorts either joining or sweeping at a distance round the convoy. 
Overall, during the 10 hunts by close escorts and support group ships the initial 
detections were, in one instance result of a high-frequency direction finding (HF/D/F) 
contact, two by asdic, two by radar and five were sightings of U-boats. Aircraft contacts 
170 'A/S Warfare in Relation to Future Strategy, Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty, ' 
War Cabinet, Anti-U-Boat Warfare, AU(43)1,5 January 1943, ADM 1/14793, p. 10. 
171 'Instructions for the Operation of Escort Carriers, ' Admiral Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief, 
Western Approaches, Memorandum No. WA. 0756/36,7 February 1943, ADM 1/1308 1. 
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were between 10 and 30 miles from the convoy and in every case the contacts were 
obtained visually. 172 An earlier DNOR study had shown that Groups had spent 31 % of 
their sea time supporting convoys during the period of the last major U-boat campaign 
on the ocean convoy routes between September 1943 and January 1944. They had 
spent 21 % of their sea-time in U-boat probability areas and 48% in transit, as would be 
expected in supporting the widely spaced ocean convoys. 173 The other points which 
emerged from the analysis of these support group operations in May and June 1943, 
was that the groups spent only about one tenth of their time at sea with shadowed 
convoys (though convoys received support for about 40% of the time they were being 
shadowed). Lest these figures seem low, it should also be noted that only about 15% of 
the close escorts' sea time was with shadowed convoys. What is also significant is that 
the support groups spent between 50 and 60% of their time on passage. 174 This rather 
high figure might be viewed alongside the time spent by hunting groups early in the war 
accused by some historians of "fruitlessly" scouring the seas for enemies. The 
operations of the support groups also demonstrated the increasing probability that 
aggressive U-boats would suffer fatal consequences. 
The Admiralty Convoy Instructions (ACI's), reiterated that the primary objective of 
the of convoy escort was: "The safe and timely arrival of the convoy at its 
destination.... " This aim was echoed precisely by the USN instructions. Though the 
British instructions were revised by one of the most aggressive Escort Group 
Commanders, Commander P. Gretton, many contemporary A/S practitioners took the 
usafe and timely arrival" objective as imposing too great an emphasis on the 
defensive. 175 The criticism seemed compounded by the British instructions which went 
on to say that '... attempted evasion may attain the primary object.... ' However, this 
edict was then conflated by 
. Ahe need 
for reducing the time spent in dangerous waters and desirability of 
reaching an area of air cover must be considered when planning evasive 
measures. 176 
172 'Analysis of U-boat Operations in the Vicinity of Convoy SC130,18-21 May 1943, ' Anti-U- 
boat Division, Admiralty, 15 July 1943, ADM 199/2020. 
173 'Notes on Support Group Operations, September, 1943 - January, 1944, ' [Leon Solomon], 
CAOR, OIC/SI. 919,6 April 1944, ADM 223/172. 
174 'An Analysis of the Operation of Support Groups in the North Atlantic (Period 14 April - 11 
May 1943), 'Anti-U-boat Division, Admiralty, 15 June 1943, ADM 199/2020; 'An Analysis of the 
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Those, who in the spring of 1943, condemned these instructions at the height of the 
Atlantic Baffle, did so with little idea of the true nature of the "Nelsonial" aggressive 
spirit. This philosophy of offensive action in the Royal Navy certainly extended back to 
the days of the Elizabethan Navy. But, as Corbett notes (albeit while discussing Fleet 
actions), 
... the maxim of "seeking out" 
for all its moral exhilaration, for all its value as an 
expression of high and sound naval spirit, must not be permitted to displace well- 
reasoned judgement. 177 
The critics also did not see, as many of the more experienced officers did, that 
the lack of sufficient high-performance A/S vessels in relation to the threat and the size 
of the escort task, meant that for much of 1941-42, the Royal Navy was obliged to 
remain on the defensive. Ultimately, the Royal Navy understood that "defensive" and 
soffensive" AIS operations were not alternatives but were combined in a symbiotic 
relationship. Simply carrying out offensive operations randomly, as noted for an earlier 
era, was '... almost bound to end in a blow in the air, which not only would fail to gain 
any offensive result, but would sacrifice the main defensive plank.... ' However, the 
Royal Navy did not follow an "offensive" trait simply because its apparent opposite, the 
"defensive", was a negative form of warfare, or that the offensive was positive and led 
to glory. Only the offensive would, ultimately, lead to victory, but that offensive, 
however, had to be based on a sound defence. Convoy had often been seen as a 
"defensive" strategy. Corbett modified the idea that the defensive was synonymous 
with passivity, in fact it was imbued with '... an attitude of alert expectation. 078 Indeed, 
convoy was described by Admiral Sims, Commander of the US Naval Forces in Europe 
during the First World War as "a purely offensive measure". 17" This is echoed by other 
writers, but although they and Sims rather overstate the case, the point is clear: convoy 
provides for a concentration of A/S assets, well placed to destroy attacking 
submarines, and the aggressive spirit is maintained by offensive action, or at least the 
thirst for it. Howard-Johnston, as an escort group commander early in the war knew 
that, when resources were stretched: "Our business is to bring home the merchantmen. 
The sinking of the enemy is only a secondary consideration at this stage of the war. 
our turn will come later. ""' 
That such criticism should re-emerge in the spring of 1943 is somewhat 
surprising, given the contemporary shore-side teaching at the Western Approaches 
177 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 1972), pp. 172- 
173. 
178 Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 29-30 and 171-172. 
179'A Study of the Philosophy and Conduct of Maritime War..., 'MLJ, p. 20 [emphasis supplied]. 180 D. A. Rayner, Escort., the Battle of the Atlantic (London: William Kimber, 1955), p. 87. 
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Tactical School (WATU), in Liverpool, and the advanced tactical training of formed 
escort groups at sea based around Philante. Captain G. H. Roberts, at WATU found it 
necessary to issue, under the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Max Horton's 
signature, additional guidance on the interpretation of these tactical instructions. In 
essence, Roberts pointed out, the offensive school saw the issue in terms of: 
Failure to destroy the U-boats will enable their numbers to increase to such an 
extent that we shall eventually be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. The 
morale of the crews will remain at a high level unless a reasonable number of 
casualties are inflicted, and as a result their offensive spirit will be sustained at a 
high pitch. 
On the other hand, Roberts noted, the defensive school thought that: 
If trade can be maintained by the continued passage of convoys in comparative 
safety, the war can be won by other means. Furthermore, the continued failure of 
U-boats to achieve any great measure of success will sap their morale and weaken 
their determination. ' 81 
Both sides of the argument contained valid points. As the war turned out, the defensive 
approach was largely forced on the Allies (at least in 1941-42) by the lack of escorts for 
the expanding convoy system. They were simply unable to take the offensive, without 
seriously jeopardising the safety of convoys. Coastal Command had been faced with a 
similar situation as a Cabinet Committee appreciated in 1941 
- Ahe great potential value of aircraft, 
freed from routine patrols on convoys, as a 
harassing force' to take the offensive against U-boats and would welcome the 
provision of such a force in the Western Approaches. But, with our primary object 
of the safe and timely arrival of our shipping in mind, it is believed that such a force 
can only be justifiably instituted when the close protection of our convoys has been 
made reasonably sure. 1132 
On both sides of the Atlantic it was appreciated that the matter was '... largely a 
question of numbers. vI83 The U-boat was very difficult to locate in the open ocean 
unless precise and timely intelligence was available. More effective use could be made 
of A/S forces by deploying them where the enemy also had to concentrate in fairly 
large numbers, that is, off his bases and around convoys. The crux of the philosophy 
was to bring A/S forces into contact with the enemy so he could be destroyed. As the 
Admiralty and Commanders-in-Chief, through ACI's, reminded Escort Commanders, 
` 'Western Approaches Tactical Policy, ' Admiral Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief, Western 
Aproaches, No. WA. 0609/45,27 April 1943, File 307-0, Vol. 11940, RG 24, NAC. 
18 'Report of Committee on the Winter Campaign of 1941-1942 in the Battle of the Atlantic, ' in, 
'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, April 1941, 'DASW, CB04050/41(4), [May 1941], NHB, p. 10. 
183 'Western Approaches Tactical Policy, ' Admiral Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief, Western 
Approaches, No. WA. 0609/45,27 April 1943, File 307-0, Vol. 11940, RG 24, NAC; 'Anti- 
Submarine Measures, ' E. J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval 




it must be bome in mind that if enemy forces are reported or encountered, the 
escort shares with all other fighting units the duty of destroying enemy ships, 
provided this duty can be undertaken without undue prejudice to the safety of the 
convoy .... 
184 
But these instructions were not dogma: WATU taught, 
Senior Officers of Escort Groups have complete freedom to exercise their initiative 
under all circumstances, and it is not desired that they should be rigidly bound to 
comply with any of the diagrams of operation orders laid down in ACI 's. 185 
Not the least reason for adopting such a policy was that, as the British readily 
appreciated, the enemy was bound to react to improved British tactics with changes of 
his own. Senior Officers were encouraged to be on the lookout for new methods 
employed by the enemy and to initiate appropriate countermeasures. As operational 
experience had amply demonstrated, the best insurance was provided by escort 
groups well organized, well trained, and well led by their own Senior Officer (SO). It 
was, ultimately, the SO, who drove the training of his group and created its general 
efficiency. The formal training organization, from the individual work-up base at 
Tobermory to the shore training at base ports and at WATU in particular, as well as the 
sea training with Philante, were valuable in providing the foundations of group 
efficiency. But it was the leadership of the individual Senior Officers who made the 
difference between effective and inefficient groups. 
By the end of 1943 it was recognised by the British that the U-boats were rarely 
to be seen on the surface during the day as a direct result of Allied A/S 
countermeasures. The U-boats were thus able to substantially reduce the chance of 
being located, particularly by aircraft, but were denied the advantages of adequate 
reconnaissance, rapid communications and the ability to shadow convoys, and homing 
consorts onto the target. In particular, as the Western Approaches Command noted, U- 
boats were denied the '... mobility which enabled more distant U-boats to intercept a 
reported convoy. ' These U-boat tactics had '... already greatly promoted the safe and 
timely arrival of the convoys, but they must inevitably give us fewer opportunities to 
destroy the enemy. ' As a result, every opportunity was now to be taken to destroy U- 
boats. Support groups, and even portions of the close escort were to be detached after 
a convoy battle to return to the scene of the engagements '-for mopping up' 
operations. Unless A/S vessels encountered a U-boat in an immediately threatening 
position, when an urgent counter-attack was required, engagements were to be 
184 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(2)(44), August 1944, NHB, Article 1. 
185 'Western Approaches Tactical Policy, ' Admiral Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief, Western 
Approaches, No. WA. 0609/45,27 April 1943, File 307-0, Vol. 11940, RG 24, NAC. 
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deliberate with the object of destroying the U-boat. It was emphasized that standard 
depth-charge attacks provided ample warning to the U-boat of the moment of firing 
(because the attacking ship would pass roughly overhead at high speed). Against a 
deep U-boat, free to manoeuvre, these tactics were ineffective. Western Approaches 
pointed out that in 
... the Hedgehog and in the Squid are combined the two attributes of precision and surprise which ensure its effectiveness in a deliberate attack. For a U-boat which is 
too deep for the Hedgehog, the "Creeping Attack", which has the same attributes, 
has recently proved on three occasions its deadly day accuracy. 186 
Standard depth-charge attacks on a deep U-boat were no longer seen as justified, 
other than for driving the U-boat deeper, so that a "Creeping Attack" could be used. 
The emphasis on the use of ATW would be valuable in the event of the enemy's high- 
speed U-boats becoming operational. On a wider scene the immediate problem of 
dealing with U-boats operating continuously submerged (let alone also capable of high 
underwater speed) was to re-focus British A/S doctrine on the balance between 
defensive and offensive tactics. 
186 'Battle of the Atlantic: Recent Changes in Enemy Tactics,, CSO(M), C-in-C, WA, Hush 
Message, 142141A December 1943, ADM 217/358. See Appendix 3. 
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Chapter 3: Elusive Victory: Countering the Schnorkel, 1944-1945 
Introduction of the Schnorkel and its Effect on British A/S Operations 
As has was observed in the last Chapter, the German Naval High Command 
became increasingly aware that despite the growing numbers of the U-boat fleet, 
individual U-boats were achieving fewer sinkings. Allied air power, particularly in the 
Bay of Biscay, was noted as having a major impact on the effectiveness of U-boats in 
making free use of the surface to move to, and within, their operational areas. Towards 
the end of 1942 the Germans began feverishly searching for ways to redress the 
situation which was becoming critical and their solutions would have a lasting impact 
on the conduct of A/S warfare down to the present day. One solution was to adapt their 
existing U-boats by fitting an extendable air intake to allow them to transit submerged 
at periscope depth, while drawing in air so that they could run their diesel engines and 
ventilate the boat. It was assessed by the Admiralty that this system, known as the 
aschnorkel", could be used in sea states up to 3-4 and would present only a small radar 
target that would be extremely difficult to detect by radar (or by eye) and made the U- 
boat practically invulnerable to air attack (Plate 15). 187 At around this time, the British, 
too, had been considering the adoption of the schnorkel in the design for the "A" Class 
submarine, drawn up in October 1942, to counter the rapid improvement in radar 
performance. However, it was soon decided that the threat to British submarines did 
not warrant the adoption of "submerged dieseling", which brought with it operational 
limitations. 188 This was not the case for the Germans, who began a sporadic 
development of the schnorkel, and by late 1942, U-448, while working up in the Baltic, 
was fitted with an H-shaped, experimental type. Although the equipment achieved 
moderate success, it was removed and further sea trials temporarily abandoned. By 
December 1943 an improved design was being fitted to operational U-boats at St. 
Nazaire, with the first Baltic boats equipped and an instructional programme started in 
the following February. The enemy's priority was fitting U-boats in the Biscay ports as a 
187 Inshore U-Boat Operation, ' Admiralty Message, CASO No. 6, DTG 252307A October 1944, 
NAA(M): MP1 185/8,1932/3/45. 
1813 'Records of Warship Construction, 1939-1945. The History of DNC Department, ' Written 
1945-46. Approved for issue by DSDE, 1981, 'RNSM Box 5, p. 39. 
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means of safely transiting the Bay en route to their Atlantic operational areas. Only 
later did the Germans realize that schnorkel boats would have an advantage in 
operations against an invasion of the Continent. The last boats to be fifted were those 
based in Norway, the first of which only appeared in early September 1944 (though not 
all Biscay boats had been fitted by that date). British interrogation of prisoners-of-war 
(PoW) revealed that by mid-August 1944 about one third of the Type Vlls and most of 
the Type lXs had been fifted. '8" 
By February 1944, the Admiralty were anticipating that the enemy could be 
expected to operate U-boats close inshore, a change of tactics which the escorts had 
to be prepared to repel. That month, the first U-boat (U-264) fitted with schnorkel had 
been sunk in the Atlantic, though she appears to have been operating conventionally. 
By the end of February the Admiralty had deduced the true nature of the schnorkel and 
by May some attacks had been made on schnorkelling boats off the Guernsey coast. 
The first extensive experience with schnorkel boats was during the operations in 
support of the invasion of the Continent in June 1944. Those U-boats not fitted with 
schnorkel that tried to penetrate into the invasion area had been roughly handled and 
further attempts were abandoned. Within a fortnight, Professor Williams and Dr. 
Solomon of DNOR completed a rough analysis of A/S operations against the 
schnorkel-fitted U-boats in the Channel. They concluded that aircraft capability against 
these U-boats was about a fifth of that expected against their non-schnorkel cousins, 
and therefore the onus of dealing with schnorkel U-boats largely fell on surface A/S 
vessels. However, at first, they fared no better. Williams and Solomon calculated that 
escort groups should have made contact with each of the U-boats about 4 times, 
assuming the escorts were each able to sweep a path 3,000 yards wide, which was the 
performance to be expected in the Atlantic. However, actual results suggested that the 
individual escorts were only achieving a swept width of barely 600 yards. From Special 
Intelligence the OIC concluded that, when searching for U-boats using "Gamma" 
patrols, the support groups had probably passed directly over U-boats on about 10 
occasions, but had made only one contact. The enemy, on the other hand, had 
detected 65% of the escorts which passed within about 3 miles. The U-boats were 
using their hydrophones and '... it was the sound of the foxers which was first 
189 'U-boat Situation, Week Ending 11 September 1944, ' Captain Rodger Winn, RNVR, 
OIC/S1.1078, n. d., ADM 223/172; 'Schnorkel, ' Appendix 'A" to 'Report on German and Our 
Strategy and Tactics: Anti-Submarine Warfare (Section C, Sub-Sections 1-4), ' Wing 
Commander T. V. Stokes, RAAF, Overseas Headquarters, London, 61/50/Air, 14 November 
1944, AWM 54,81/4/8 1. 
87 
Chapter 3 
detected. "90 At that range the U-boats stood a good chance of slipping through the 
gaps in the escort groups asdic front, or even passing round the flank of their search. 
The low asdic detection performance was due to the adverse effects of shallow 
water operations including bottom echoes and high reverberations, and because the U- 
boat's tended to bottom when near A/S vessels. Part of the problem was that the 
escorts failed to follow up aircraft sightings, even though some 30% were less than 30 
miles, or 2 hours steaming from a support group. DNOR noted that the "bird in the 
hand" was systematically ignored, and had ships made even '... moderate use of 
aircraft sightings their total chances of contacting U-boats would have been more than 
doubled. "91 Within a month these deficiencies were rectified and the proportion of kills 
rose to a level equivalent to that previously achieved by support groups in ocean 
waters. Now, ships made better use of aircraft sightings, and spent more time 
searching the datum, though DNOR thought that these investigations should last at 
least 24 hours. Trials were also in hand to explore the co-operation of escorts working 
with aircraft using air-dropped omni-directional sonobuoys. Although some USN 
squadrons were using sonobuoys by June 1944, after months of trials, only one British 
squadron had used the equipment on operations. 192 Thereafter, progress was made. 
Sonobuoys have enabled aircraft to track submerged U-boats in calm weather 
once they have been located, but this requires good drill and competent listeners 
and may be rendered much less reliable by the background noises of a breaking 
sea or tidal stream. As a rough guide an aircraft with eight sonobuoys should be 
able to hold contact for 60-90 minutes, and one with twelve sonobuoys for three 
hours. 193 
But, the technology was in its infancy and, for the British at least, unsupported 
classification evidence from sono-buoys was not considered conclusive evidence of the 
presence of a U-boat. 
In August Captain R. Winn in the Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) came to 
the judgement that 
The evolution of the Snort [i. e. schnorkel] U-boat will be found to have affected 
profoundly the balance of power between hunter and hunted.... The U-boat will be 
190'Notes on Two U-boat Cruises in the English Channel, ' DDIC, DAUD, DNOR, OIC/SI/1021, 
24 July 1944, ADM 223/261. 
191 'Detection of U-boats in the English Channel and Approaches (Rough analysis of the period 
D to D+10), 'E. J. Williams and L. Solomon, Report No. 48/44,19 June 1944, ADM 219/131. 
192 'Report on Development in A/S Tactics in the United Kingdom, June 1944, ' AWM 54, 
81/4/81, p. 12. 
193 Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, and Captain N. A. Prichard, DASW, Ref. D. 559 
(Draft), 5 August 1945, ADM 1/17653. 
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able to remain submerged for up to 10 days without presenting any target 
detectable by radar or visually except at short range. 194 
At the same time, Williams and Solomon drew together the available information from 
operations and special intelligence. The weather often precluded schnorkelling in seas 
greater than force 5, though as experience was gained some boats did better. By 
assuming that U-boats maintained a speed of 2 knots while fully submerged, DNOR 
were able to make a direct comparison between the schnorkel and non-schnorkel 
boats on passage: 
Schnorkel Non-Schnorkel 
Hours charging per day 5 hours at schnorkel depth 2 hours surfaced 
Distance made good per day 50 miles 70 miles'95 
However, considering the lower battery usage when in an operational area, the 
average time schnorkelling was thought to be about 3 hours per day. 196 This helps to 
explain why, amongst Coastal Command crews, there was a '... growing frustration of 
failing to sight U-boats known to be in specific areas. 097 Worse, over the months that 
followed many of the claimed sightings were actually incipient waterspouts, or 
"willywaws", misidentified as schnorkels because of the mistaken belief that the 
schnorkel emitted smoke. This may have been culled from a captured German 
document of April 1944, which could have come into NID's possession at this time, and 
described '-puffs of exhaust gas of Schnorchel.... ' The document suggested that 
measures were being taken to redesign the schnorkel head and other measures to 
reduce both this and the wake from the schnorkel. ""' From the number of contacts 
gained by aircraft, the amount of flying done, and the total time assumed to be spent by 
the U-boats schnorkelling, the analysts were able to estimate that the swept width 
achieved by Coastal Command's aircraft was less than 700 yards by day and 100 
yards by night. Even taking account of errors in the data the swept width was unlikely 
to be more than a mile by day and fifth of that by night. This meant that if an aircraft 
was searching a5 mile wide lane, then its effectiveness would be about 4%. By 
comparison the swept width for an aircraft searching for a surfaced U-boat was about 5 
194 'U-boat Situation, Week Ending 28 August 1944,1 Captain Rodger Winn, RNVR, 
OIC/SI. 1062, n. d., ADM 223/172. 
195 'Note on the value of "Snort" to U-boats, ' L. Solomon and E. J. Williams, DNOR, Report No. 
62/44,19 August 1944, ADM 219/144. 
196 'Note on U-boats Fitted with Snort, ' DDIC and LS/EJW, DNOR, OIC/S1.1036,11 August 
1944, ADM 223/172. 
197 'The Schnorkel Smoke Myth, ' Appendix V, in, 'The RAF in Maritime War, Vol. V..., ' AIR 
41 f74, p. 1. 
198 'Detection of Schnorkel Fitted U-Boats, ' Headquarters, Coastal Command, CC/S. 17261 A/U 
Ops., 17 December 1944, AWM 54,81/4/8 1. 
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miles by day and 3-7 miles by night. Williams and Solomon concluded that when U- 
boats were able to charge their batteries by schnorkelling, they were nearly 8 times 
safer than if forced to the surface. "' 
Williams continued to assess A/S operations against the schnorkel-fitted U-boats. 
He deduced that the best opportunities for offensive action against U-boats operating 
inshore were in the shipping areas (and not just with convoys). Williams reasoned that 
the shipping areas were small, compared with the U-boats' extensive transit routes, 
and so it was there that the U-boat density would be highest, and thus the opportunities 
for action greater. Of course, A/S forces in the shipping area also had a direct deterrent 
effect on the U-boats' activities. The question then was, whether the escort groups 
should operate in the close vicinity of the convoys in direct support, or patrol in 
probability areas? The answer depended on the frequency of attacks by the U-boats. If 
attacks were infrequent, it was better for the escorts to search in probability areas, 
since the U-boats would only rarely be encountered around convoys. On the other 
hand, if attacks became more frequent, then 
... the surface groups should 
be close to a convoy, since this would not only 
contribute to the direct defence of the convoy, but also offer the surface groups 
with frequent opportunities for attack. 
Williams suggested alternatives for the stationing of the surface escort. He thought that 
the safety of the convoy 
... would be temporarily best assured if the surface groups formed a screen ahead 
and on the flanks of the convoy, to maximise the chance of forcing the U-boat to 
bottom or of detecting the U-boat before attack. On the other hand opportunities for 
counter-attack would probably be greater if the surface group kept astern of the 
convoy and pounced on any attacking U-boat. 200 
When the escort was weak, ships should tow foxers to deter or confuse approaching U- 
boats, but, Williams reasoned, where the escort was strong the A/S ships should rely 
on zig-zagging for protection against Gnat attacks. The reduction of noise by not towing 
foxers would make it more likely that the escorts would gain contact on a U-boat. If this 
happened, or the U-boat betrayed itself by attacking, then surface forces were to 
concentrate on the area to produce a flooding effect. The search should then be 
maintained for at least 24 hours, particularly in shallow water where the U-boat could 
bottom. Other staff in the Admiralty considered that the search should be continued for 
at least 48 hours. It was also clear that there was not complete agreement over when 
'"'Note on the value of *Snort" to U-boats, ' L. Solomon and E. J. Williams, DNOR, Report No. 
62/44,19 August 1944, ADM 219/144. 
200 1A/S Operations against Snort U-boats Working Inshore, ' E. J. Williams, DNOR, Report No. 
66/44,29 August 1944, ADM 219/148. [emphasis supplied] 
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escorts should tow foxers. From the discussion over the employment of aircraft, it is 
evident that the staff were still of the opinion that in rough weather the U-boats might 
be unable to schnorkel and eventually forced to surface. Williams, in particular, took a 
rather theoretical stance by suggesting that air resources should be husbanded for just 
this circumstance, when they might be used to greatest effect. The DASW staff, on the 
other hand, thought that air cover was best employed attempting to interrupt 
schnorkelling. 201 
British Tactical Countermeasures 
When, in mid-1944, the schnorkel-fitted U-boats began operating in the Channel 
against the invasion forces this yielded poor results, and they soon transferred their 
attention to the North-West Approaches. 202 The British had anticipated such a move 
and were able to implement pre-formed plans when the move was detected by British 
intelligence. The plan called for support groups to be deployed in widespread patrols, 
known as Operation "CW" and later "CE", across threatened trade routes where they 
were at hand to reinforce convoys, oust as had been done with the hydrophone 
trawlers during the First World War as noted in Chapter 1). The A/S groups could also 
carry out offensive sweeps in their areas. This was an extension of the operations of 
support groups, which since the winter of 1943 had been used in the Atlantic on 
offensive sweeps 60 to 120 miles ahead of threatened convoys, as U-boats adopted 
less aggressive tactics of maximum submergence by day. 203 These tactics continued to 
be used in the Arctic, where uhunting" groups were sent out ahead of convoys to keep 
the U-boats down. In each case the greater reluctance of the U-boats to engage in 
convoy baffles, meant that the A/S forces had to operate further afield, if encounters 
were to be forced and U-boats destroyed. The AIS operations in late 1944 were of a 
more static nature, matching the U-boat tactics. Perhaps three escort groups, with air 
support, would be assigned to an area roughly 100 miles square. The groups did not 
operate as a cohesive unit but patrolled the area as directed by their individual Senior 
officers, responding to intelligence cues and aircraft sightings, reinforcing the close 
escort of convoys passing through the area. 204 
Directly supporting convoys accounted for about 20% of the support groups' time 
at sea, the remainder being spent patrolling their area. The object was: 'The safe 
201 Commander E. H. Mann (Ret), DASW, to DAUD, 6 September 1944, ADM 219/148. 
202 Those still without schnorkel were severely handled by A/S forces. 
203 'Periodic Summary of the Anti-U-Boat Campaign, No. 37 -4 December 1943, ' Captain C. D. 
Howard-Johnston, DAUD, 6 December 1943, File D 01 -18-0, Vol. 11575, RG 24, NAC, pp. 2-4. 204 'Standing Orders for U-boat Hunts off Northern Ireland (Short Title: Operation UCW"), ' 
Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, 24 February 1944, ADM 199/468, p. 2. 
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passage of shipping through the focal areas. ' But when no convoys were present, the 
object was '... the destruction of U-boats operating in these areas. v205 DNOR calculated 
that the patrolling support groups would have passed within five miles of a U-boat at 
least once per day, even if the Groups had been disposed at random. 206 Since, they 
were actually deployed on the available intelligence, it was likely that U-boats would 
have been aware of a support group, perhaps two or three times a day. PoW confirmed 
that the U-boats had indeed been swept over frequently without contact being made by 
the A/S ships. Added to which, the U-boats would have been subjected to constant 
over-flights by Coastal Command aircraft. 'Consequently, ' McCrea concluded, 'the U- 
boats lived under a constant threat of detection and it is small wonder that they were 
slow to take the initiative in attacking. ' This assertion was borne out by PoW reports. 
'The weakness of the situation from our point of view, ' McCrea continued, 
... was thoroughly appreciated. 
It required only one or two U-boats a little bolder 
than the rest to demonstrate to their fellows that, deppite the strength of our 
patrols, they could affack with but little fear of retribution. 201 
The U-boats were inexpert in submerged, inshore operations, especially in the 
effective use of the schnorkel. To carry out attacks the enemy were expected to 
operate singly, and to bottom under a shipping lane, waiting for a convoy to approach. 
The U-boat would then rise and attack using periscope observation by day, or in bright 
moonlight. The enemy was also experimenting with attacks using hydrophone bearings 
to fire from deep into the brown of convoy's HE. This method could be used at night, 
but with existing equipment was not successful. Either a single homing torpedo, or a 
salvo of pattern-running torpedoes were fired at the convoy or the escort, often at long 
range and sometimes from astern . 
20'3 The operational timidity of the U-boats had long 
been noted, and in September 1944 they were still not operating in an offensive 
manner, except for the occasional aggressive U-boat commander. They rarely gave the 
escort groups the opportunity to destroy them by attacking convoys. At first the escorts 
were also inexperienced in the subtleties of inshore operations and only exacted 
retribution on about one in eight of the U-boats which attacked. The difficult acoustic 
205 'Orders for Anti-U-boat Operations in Coastal Waters of the Western Approaches Command 
(Short Title: Operation "CE"), 'Admiral Max Horton, C-in-C, WA, WA. 3036/02017, [M. 010815/44], 
11 October 1944, ADM 199/501, p. 358. 
206 'Operation "CW ..... ADM 1/17653. 207 'Survey of A/U Operations in UK Coastal Waters, July 1944 - May 1945, ' [W. H. McCrea], 
DNOR, 13 July 1945, ADM 1/17653, p. 4. 
2m Inshore U-Boat Operation, ' Admiralty Message, CASO No. 6, DTG 252307A October 1944, 
NAA(M): MP1 185/8,1932/3/45. 
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conditions and the tendency of the U-boats to bottom when near A/S ships, reduced 
asdic performance to less than 20% of its normal efficienCy. 209 
Classifying contacts on the bottom was especially difficult, as Commander J. D. 
Prentice, RCN, Senior Officer of EG11, discovered. Echoes from wrecks were often 
better than those obtained from a U-boat which were often woolly. There was no 
doppler and no wake echo both of which helped in classification in deep water. And in 
a strong tidal stream, trying to plot the movement of the target could be deceptive, and 
it was easy to shift target inadvertently from the initial contact to an adjacent non-sub, 
without the use of radar or radio aids (such as QH) to accurately fix the ship's 
position . 
210 Although the numbers of U-boats destroyed was low, they still lost one U- 
boat for every two ships sunk in the convoys . 
21 1 Thus there was a kind of stalemate, as 
Captain Howard-Johnston, DAUD, noted. The problem of dealing with the schnorkel- 
fitted U-boat was very different from the open ocean operations of 1941-43, in 
particular the U-boat was practically immune from location by aircraft. 212 However, with 
the imminent loss of the Biscay ports, the U-boats would find it very difficult to renew 
ocean operations against convoys that could be spread across a greater swath of 
water making them more difficult to find. It seemed certain that the U-boats would 
confine their operations to inshore waters, however, Howard-Johnston thought, 
... the enemy will 
[not] gain any further marked advantage from his operations until 
the advent of the fast U-boat either inshore or in deep waters, when our future 
asdic successes may be seriously reduced by the enemy's power to evade the 
individual attack. 213 
Whether on patrol, or when searching for a U-boat that had betrayed its 
presence, escort groups had to laboriously attack every suspect contact to try to bring 
up evidence of a U-boat. The problem, as Commodore G. W. G. Simpson, Commodore 
(D), Western Approaches, himself a renowned submariner, noted, '... the disintegration 
of the hull cannot reasonably be expected however many charges are dropped on it: 214 
During attacks about four out of five brought up only oil or nothing at all - not enough to 
209 'Inshore Operations, ' Appendix (ii), to, 'Type XXI U-boat (A Provisional Appreciation), ' E. J. 
Williams, DOR/44/68,4 September 1944, ADM 219/150. 
210 'Submarine Warfare in the Channel, ' Commander J. D. Prentice, RCN, Senior Officer EG1 1, 
HMCS Ottawa, to Commodore (D), Western Approaches, 17 July 1944, Folder CNA 7-6-1, Vol. 
11022, RG 24, NAC. 
211 See Appendix 4. 
212 'Anti-U-boat Operations Inshore, ' Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, Ref: D. 218,11 
September 1944, ADM 223/20. 
213 'Anti-U-Boat results inshore in Western Approaches Command for the period 1 September 
1944 to 31 January 1945, ' C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, D. 353,4 February 1945, ADM 
205/44. 
214 Minute, Commodore G. W. G. Simpson, RN, Commodore (D), Western Approaches, 
No. DW. 40/603. OP, 26 July 1944, File D 01-18-0, Vol. 11575, RG 24, NAC. 
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differentiate between a U-boat and a wreck. 215 Moreover, attacking an indifferent asdic 
contact posed problems. A series of trials were carried out to determine in which 
direction the U-boat was lying, and several of the escort groups developed attack 
methods based on the use of the echo-sounder so that the ship could pass directly 
overhead of the U-boat and accurately place a small number of depth-charges on the 
216 target. Escorts often persevered with these attacks against individual contacts 
continuously for up to 48 hours. 'it is most strongly emphasised, ' Howard-Johnston 
remarked, 'that persistence in the search or hunt is of the greatest importance until 
clear evidence of destruction is obtained. j217 Such persistence was equally vital in other 
operational areas, such as the Indian Ocean, where environmental conditions were 
very different. For example, Commander G. A. G. Ormsby, SO of EG60 in company with 
two CVEs of Force 66, hunted for U-198 for a week before she was sunk in August 
1944.218 Some months later, Lieutenant Commander J. P. Mosse in command of HMS 
Mermaid, was instrumental in the destruction of two U-boats in the Arctic after long 
hunts. The convoy escorts were arranged in depth, with Mermaid and others forming 
advanced striking forces. They carried out a '... a vigorous defensive [that] resulted in 
hard blows being struck at the enemy. 3219 
Maintaining this level of aggressive searching was not easy for tired escort group 
commanders. 220 It was in any case very time consuming, and some escort 
commanders sought for methods to catch an attacking U-boat before she managed to 
reach the bottom. Commander P. W. Burnett, one of the best U-boat killers and now 
Senior Officer of the EG10, for example, complained about the difficulty of getting 
contact on a bottomed U-boat. 221 There were days, he wrote 'when one gets no echoes 
from a known wreck.... ' He reasoned that '... there must be about 20 minutes when a 
U-boat attacking a convoy is clear of the bottom and not manoeuvring to avoid 
215 'Choice of Weapons for "Opening-Up" U-boats, ' Section V, 'The Anti-Submarine Report, 
September, October, November and December 1945, ' DTASW, CB04050/45(7), 19 December 
1945, NHB. 
218 'U-Boat Tactics, ' Secretary, Navy Board, Melbourne, 22 September 1944, NAA(M): 
MP1185/8,1932/3/45. 
21"'Experience Gained during Anti-U-boat Inshore Operations, ' Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, 
DAUD, Ref. D. 218,11 September 1944, ADM 223/20, p. 2. [emphasis supplied] 
218 'A Model Anti-U-Boat Operation in the Indian Ocean - 5-14 August 1944, ' Section 6, 
'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, July 1944, ' DAUD, CB04050/44(7), 15 August 1944, NHB; 
'Abstract 24, AHH, 'TSD/Historical Section, Abstract Volume 24, A. H. Haggard, n. d., NHB. 219 'Operation "Victual" Passage of Convoys JW59 and RA59A to and from North Russia, ' 
Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, 15 November 1944, ADM 199/351. 
220 Michael Whitby, 'The Strain on the Bridge, ' in, John Reeve and David Stevens (eds. ), The 
Face of Naval Battle: The Human Expetience of Modem War at Sea (Crows Nest, NSW, 
Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2003), pp. 200-218. 




detection. ' By stationing his support group in a dense screen ahead and astern (and 
even inside) of the convoy, his idea was '... to have an escort within Asdic range of him 
when he fires. ' This, Burnett thought, was '... much more important than a tidy 
organized sweep which gets there half an hour later when he is back on the bottom. 9222 
Here, indeed was a conundrum. The key was to get as many as possible of the 
escorts within asdic range of the U-boat. Speed, as Burnett and others highlighted, was 
crucial. But so was an organized search, which ensured that as much of the U-boat 
probability area was covered as possible. When this was not achieved the U-boat 
would often escape. Burnett commented in early 1945, that 
In coastal waters if one obtains no contacts it may be concluded that detection 
conditions are bad, and a bottomed U-boat is likely to be swept over undetected. If 
conditions are good, on the other hand, thorough investigation of all contacts 
delays a search so long that a reported U-boat has a good chance of escaping. 223 
The Admiralty promulgated a search plan called Operation "Scabbard" designed to 
locate a U-boat which had retreated to the bottom after attacking a convoy (Plate 16). 
The most probable area where the U-boat was likely to be was within an annulus 2,500 
yards to 4,000 yards around the torpedoed vessel. It was assumed that the U-boat 
would lie on the bottom head to tide. One escort was to close the position of the 
torpedoed ship to obtain information from survivors and establish the datum. Meantime, 
all other available escorts were to immediately form up 5,000 yards from wreck and 
search across the U-boat probability area, sweeping across the tide so that the ships 
would, hopefully, approach the bottomed U-boat on its beam, where its asdic echo was 
most pronounced. The search was then repeated in the opposite direction. After that 
the ships reverted to a square search around the perimeter of the "Scabbard" area. The 
plan, though not formally included in the tactical manual until the end of 1945, was 
soon being practiced by escort groups in their continuation training between convoy 
operationS. 224 
Operation "Artichokes was another organized plan designed to search for a U- 
boat which had attacked a convoy in daylight (or bright moonlight) and was either still 
under the convoy, or had escaped on the quarters or astern of the convoy. The escorts 
in the van turned onto a reciprocal course to the convoy and search back through the 
222 Commander P. W. Burnett to Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, 12 November 1944, ADM 
199/501. Burnett was referring to the operations of his Escort Group in mid-September 1944. 
223 'Report of Proceedings, Tenth Escort Group, 26 December 1944 to 3 January 1945,1 
Commander P. W. Burnett, RN, No. I A/8,4 January 1945, ADM 217/373. 
224 Admiralty Message to AIG #2 359AZ, Repeated to Commander 12t, Fleet, 26 August 1944, 
Folder CNA 7-6-1, Vol. 11022, RG 24, NAC. 
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Plate 1& "Observant" and "Scabbard" Search 
'Summary of U-Boat Searches (SUBS), 1945, ' CBCN. 7402, NSHQ 75-599/500, 
n. d., Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Registered 
Publications Section, Foreign Navy and Related Foreign Military Publications, 
1913-1960, Box 345, RG 38, National Archives and Records Administration 2, 
College Park, Maryland, pp. 25 and 45. 
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convoy columns until they came abreast of the rear escorts, these, too, would turn and 
join in the search until the ships were 6,000 yards astern of the convoy. All ships would 
then about-turn and sweep back towards the rear of the convoy. Only the escort vessel 
in position "S" directly astern of the convoy acted differently. She was to close the 
wreck, taking anti-Gnat precautions, and try to determine on which side that ship had 
been torpedoed (not easy if the ship had been hit by a Gnat or LuT torpedo), before 
carrying out an "Observant" around the position of the torpedoing {Plate 16). If 
"Artichoke" failed, the support group could continuously cover the 6-mile square 
centred about the position of the torpedoing for at least 48 hours, depth-charging every 
likely contact in the area. Even if these tactics failed to find the U-boat, it was assumed 
they would force the U-boat to continue its anti-asdic tactics until finally forced to move 
when the air in the boat ran out. The escort's asdic then had a chance of detecting it. If 
there were escorts which could be spared from this "inner search", or if reinforcements 
arrived, they were to be employed on an "outer search" as directed by the Senior 
Officer on the spot. This search was to extend from the boundary of the inner search to 
the U-boat's likely furthest-on position, assuming she was tying to escape at a speed of 
21/2knots. 225 
The operating authority would, '... issue tracking appreciations of the most likely 
movement of the U-boat to assist the SO present in disposing his patrols on the Outer 
Search. 226 In addition, the whole area was to be flooded with aircraft to prevent the U- 
boat from surfacing and making good its escape outside radar range of the A/S 
vessels. Any possible Schnorkel sightings by the aircraft were to be followed up 
immediately. The SO was able to establish new datums based on these sightings if he 
considered they warranted it and to detach ships from the outer searching force to 
carry out investigations along the lines of the original inner search. This inner search, 
however, was to be maintained until cancelled by the operating authority who would 
also decide whether a new datum was to replace the initial one. This control by the 
shore authority, with its better access to intelligence, was a feature of the inshore 
campaign, but occurred without too often interfering with the SO's tactical initiative, so 
assiduously developed during escort group training sessions . 
22' And the intensive 
training had its effect. During the later stages, one in four of the U-boats' attacks 
225 , Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(44)(2), August 1944, NHB, Article 56. 
226 . DAUD 081734B to C-in-C, Wk in, 'Friday, 8 September 1944, War Diary (Naval), 1-14 
September 1944, 'NHB. 
227 'C-in-C, WA, 092035 to Admiralty, ' in, 'Saturday, 9 September 1944, War Diary (Naval), 1-14 
September 1944, ' NHB; 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, October 1944, ' DAUD, 
CB04050/44(10), 15 November 1944, NHB. 
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resulted in their own destruction. But the big increase in U-boat sinkings was not in 
those associated with torpedoings. Ships and aircraft on patrol also began to take a 
heavy toll. This suggested to McCrea, who had no access to special intelligence, that 
the improved results had more to do with increased experience amongst the A/S forces 
and not merely to the changes in dispositions. Thus, when the U-boats made their final 
spurt, their days of comparative immunity had vanished. Nor was the risk to the escorts 
minimal. Professor W. H. McCrea, DNOR concluded that on average 40 escort vessels 
had been at sea with the support groups between July 1944 and March 1945. These 
ships had destroyed 37 U-boats, but the U-boats had, in return sunk 10 of the anti- 
submarine escorts . 
228 Nevertheless, the tactical use of anti-Gnat material 
countermeasures, Howard-Johnston realized, 'must be left to the Commanding 
Officer's discretion. 229 
These searches were used principally in the vicinity of convoys after an attack 
had occurred. The detailed convoy instructions for the conduct of the close escort and 
support groups, were contained in Horton's Operation "Gooseberry", which was 
'... designed to cover the probable actions by a U-boat Commander when operating in 
an area where his evasive measures may include bottoming. ' To meet this kind of 
attack by a U-boat, the success of counter-measures would depend largely 
... on escorts reaching the scene without 
delay. Broadly speaking, the plan allows 
for close escorts in positions astern of the convoy to search for the U-boat should 
he bottom in the immediate vicinity; an inner patrol to contain him to the limits of 
exhaustion, and an outer patrol to catch him should he by chance have evaded the 
net thrown round h iM 230 
The dispositions furthest from the convoy were made up of air patrols, designed to 
force the U-boat to approach submerged and, if there were enough aircraft available, to 
have some chance of detecting an unwary U-boat using schnorkel or periscope. The 
air escort for convoys in the focal areas was normally to consist of four box patrols 
parallel to the convoy track, and moving to keep pace with the convoy's progress. The 
path ahead of the convoy that would be swept was to a distance of 28 miles either side 
of its mean line of advance out to approximately 60 miles ahead of the convoy. A close 
air escort was sometimes provided in addition to the box patrols, which, in the absence 
of other instruction from the Senior Officer of the Escort, was to carry out a continuous 
228 'Survey of A/U Operations..., ' ADM 1/17653. 
229 'Experience Gained during Anti-U-boat Inshore Operations, ' Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, 
DAUD, Ref: D. 218,11 September 1944, ADM 223/20, p. 4. 
230 'On a Ship in Convoy being Torpedoed in an Area where the U-boat can Bottom, ' Appendix 
IV (7 April 1945) to, 'Orders for Anti-U-boat Operations in Coastal Waters of the Western 
Approaches Command (Short Title: Operation "CE"), ' Admiral Max Horton, C-in-C, WA, 
WA. 3036/020/7, [M. 010815/441,11 October 1944, ADM 199/501, pp. 371-374. 
patrol round the convoy at a distance of 5 miles, where it might be able to detect a U- 
231 boat using its periscope as it worked itself in a firing position on the convoy. 
The planned dispositions of the surface escort around, and supporting, a convoy 
were designed to maximise the chance of locating and destroying an attacking U-boat. 
Thus, for an ocean convoy formed on a broad front and approaching one of the focal 
areas, the close escort was to be stationed in accordance with Admiralty Convoy 
Instructions, if no support group was available. At the time this close escort was 
expected to consist of between five and eight escorts. These would be disposed 
roughly equidistant around the convoy with the emphasis on ships stationed on the 
wings and astern of the convoy. 232 If a support group was present by day the best way 
of disposing it was, firstly, to augment the close escort so that an A/S screen could be 
formed, with the support group ships normally occupying the wing positions. This 
screen, with ships spaced [3,000] yards apart was designed to catch a U-boat which 
had risen from the bottom on hearing the approaching convoys, and was now 
manoeuvring into an attack position. With this screen ahead formed, any spare escorts 
were to be stationed astern and on the quarters of the convoys to act as "pouncers", 
able to rapidly react to a torpedoing. By night, except in bright moonlight, it was unlikely 
that a U-boat would be manoeuvring to make a torpedo attack from periscope depth. 
The priorities for stationing the support group were therefore reversed. Its ships were, 
firstly, to fill the "pouncer" positions, where they might catch a U-boat which had fired a 
long-range "browning" shot, possibly from astern of the convoy. Any spare ships of the 
support group were to augment the close escort on the forward screen, preferably 
taking the wing positions. Once the convoy entered the cleared channels through the 
defensive minefields it would reform with a narrow front (thus resembling a long 
column). The close escort was then to be evenly disposed round the convoy, with the 
support group disposed on both sides, and nearer the rear than the front of the convoy. 
Horton emphasized that if a U-boat was detected by the screen or revealed its 
presence by attacking the greatest chance of killing 
... 
is whilst the scent is fresh. Any delay in closing the datum point reduces the 
chance of a kill. The situation calls for the utmost rapidity of decision, combined 
231 'Air Operations, ' in Appendix VII to, 'Orders for Anti-U-boat Operations in Coastal Waters of 
the Western Approaches Command (Short Title: Operation "CE"), ' Admiral Max Horton, C-in-C, 
WA, WA. 3036/020/7, [M. 010815/44], 11 October 1944, ADM 199/501, pp. 377-379. 
232 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts: General - Operation of Surface Escorts, ' Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04234(44)(2), August 1944, NHB, Articles 34 and 35. 
with speed and clarity of communications, as well as the efficiency of weapons, 
instruments and their operators. 233 
When such an attack took place, A/S forces were to carry out an asclic sweep of the 
immediate area surrounding suspected position of the U-boat. Numbers of escorts 
permitting, this was best achieved if at least two A/S ships were stationed close astern 
of the convoy to act as pouncers. Of course, these neat "textbook" tactics were more 
difficult to carry out in practice. Even in daylight when the ship torpedoed could be seen 
and the side of the attack ascertained, it was not easy to identify the correct position of 
the datum. The result, said Lieutenant Commander Raymond Hart, Senior Officer 
EG21, in early February 1945 was that a hunt commenced '... along the lines of 
"Gooseberry". ' The many non-subs in the coastal waters prolonged the search, but 
supported by EG5, Hart's persistence, probably resulted in the destruction of one U- 
boat and heavy damage to another. 234 
Tactics Refined from Experience 
By February 1945 the Admiralty had refined its advice of the previous autumn on 
convoy protection in Inshore waters for the Escort Groups. They once more pointed out 
that on ocean routes the U-boats normally had had considerable distances to cover if 
they were to reach favourable attacking positions. Allied air cover and distant screens 
of A/S ships were able to prevent U-boats moving freely on the surface. However, the 
introduction of the schnorkel by the Germans required considerable changes in the 
employment of anti-submarine forces for convoy protection. In coastal waters U-boats 
were able to operate in areas where shipping was easy to locate on the well 
established convoy routes. As a consequence the U-boats did not have to move over 
large distances, and with the adoption of continuous submerged operations (made 
possible by the use of the schnorkel), Allied air patrols and distant screens of A/S ships 
were rendered largely incapable of detecting any U-boats lurking in the path of a 
convoy. By the early spring of 1945 the U-boats were becoming more adept in 
exploiting the difficult environmental conditions and the A/S forces limitations. They 
surfaced very rarely in areas of heavy air reconnaissance and normally charged their 
batteries by schnorkelling at night in quiet areas. Attacks were generally made from 
periscope depth during the day or by moonlight. McCrea's estimate of the effectiveness 
233 'Orders for Anti-U-boat Operations in Coastal Waters of the Western Approaches Command 
(Short Titleý Operation TE"), ' Admiral Max Horton, C-in-C, WA, WA. 3036/020/7, [M. 010815/44], 
11 October 1944, ADM 199/501, pp. 359-360. 
234 , HMS Conn, Report of Proceedings, 11 January to 2 February 1945, ' Lieutenant Commander 
Raymond Hart, DSC, RN, Senior Officer 21s' Escort Group, 5 February 1945, ADM 217/755, '5th 
Escort Group Narrative: 21 January - 12 March 1945, ' NHB. 
of escorts in detecting U-boats in inshore waters was rather pessimistic. The data 
suggested that the escorts had only about an 8% chance of detecting a U-boat as it 
approached to attack a convoy . 
23' There was little new in this discovery. A/S 
practitioners, like Howard-Johnston and Burnett, would have remembered the results of 
tactical screening exercises in the late 1920s which had shown that at least 45% of 
submarines passed through a screen without being detected. And this in exercise 
conditions, with the operators fully alert to the presence of a submarine. 
Accepting the low probability of detection, British tactical countermeasures 
nevertheless were based on the policy of providing maximum asclic protection and 
immediate counter-attack after a U-boat had attacked. Protection was afforded by 
deploying a strong asclic screen two miles ahead when a convoy in ocean waters was 
formed on a broad front. For coastal convoys the escort was to be maintained both 
ahead and alongside the flanks when convoy was formed on a narrow front. This 
concept was not new. Earlier tactical instructions had suggested the use of a closely 
spaced, line abreast escort screen ahead of the convoy when it was assessed that 
submerged U-boats were lying in wait ahead of the convoy. If a support group was 
available it was deployed to reinforce the close escort by extending the screen ahead 
of the convoy. Meanwhile, at least one escort was stationed within a mile of the rear of 
the convoy to act as a "pouncer", which was well placed to close the wreck and start 
the search in the likely area where the attacking U-boat could be, while the scent 
remained strong. When a support group was present at least one ship was to be used 
to reinforce the "pouncer". If a second support group was available, the whole Group 
was to be deployed astern of the convoy to act as a powerful "pouncer" force to exact 
retribution on a U-boat that had attacked. The key was to start the search without delay 
and before the U-boat could have moved far away, or ensconced itself on the bottom. 
The A/S tactics recommended were designed, firstly, to rapidly concentrate practically 
the whole of the escort, including any support groups, in the likely area where the 
enemy could be, and secondly, to seal off that area while the search continued until 
destruction of the U-boat was achieved. Minimal protection of the convoy was accepted 
(because these schnorkel-fitted U-boats were operating singly, rather than in packs, so 
another U-boat was unlikely to be found close-by). 
As soon as a ship in the convoy was torpedoed, one, or ideally two, "pouncers" 
were to close the wreck from the rear of convoy and carry out a standard Operation 
"Observant", with sides two miles long. Remaining escorts initially stationed in the rear 
235 'Survey of A/U Operations..., ' ADM 1/17653, p. 7. 
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of the convoy were to establish a "Square" Search outside the "Observant". The size of 
the "Square" Search was recommended to be a six-mile sides, unless in the prevailing 
circumstances the Senior Officer present decided on a different size. Meanwhile, the 
ships in the van were to contribute to the asdic search most effectively by executing an 
Operation "Artichoke", during which the escorts would sweep back through the columns 
of the convoy. Once clear of the rear of the convoy, these ships were to take up 
positions on the "Square" Search, with any ship left over after filling the "Square" 
Search used outside it to search on the U-boats most probable escape course. Once 
these immediate countermeasures were in place, at least one ship of the close escort 
should be detached to rejoin the convoy. When one or more support groups were with 
the convoy, the whole convoy close escort was to re-establish the forward screen after 
236 Operation "Artichoke". 
The action recommended on completion of the immediate searches appeared in 
an amendment to the "Atlantic Convoy Instructions", issued in April 1945.237 If the 
"Observant" and "Square" searches did not yield a contact, the force was to carry out 
two sweeps through the area at right angles to the tide and with the ships in line 
abreast and spaced 3,000 yards apart. Subsequent searches, it was suggested, might 
be carried out down tide of the original datum. 238 Recent experience of inshore 
operations indicated that after U-boats had attacked and especially when escorts were 
close by, they would immediately bottom or drift with the tide. Any movement by the U- 
boat was likely to be at silent speed of 3 knots or less, though the enemy might accept 
the risk of using higher speed if the U-boat could make enough ground to outflank a 
searching force, or to make a withdrawal up wind. To make it more difficult for the U- 
boat to get round the flank of an approaching search force, the searching ships should 
be stationed 2 miles apart and they should carry out a wide 301-501 zig-zag to broaden 
the search front even further, accepting that the speed of progress would be 
diminished. The U-boat would therefore be faced with a difficult and changing problem. 
Professor McCrea's analysis of Operation "CW" supported this policy. He 
deduced that to make the search as difficult as possible for the U-boat to evade, the 
ships should be widely spaced and should carry out a broad zig-zag. The alternative of 
a narrower front and a less drastic zig-zag would '.. -invite the U-boat to attempt to 
236 'Convoy Protection in Inshore Waters, ' Admiralty Message, CASO No. 7, DTG 131737Z 
February 1945, NAA(M): MP1 185/8,1932/3/45. 
237 'inshore operations, ' in, 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts (Short Title ACI), General 
Sections 1-6, ' Part XII, DAUD, CB04234(44), April 1945, ADM 239/345. 
238 'Admiralty Convoy Instructions to Escorts (Short Title ACI), 1944, ' Part XII, 'Inshore 
Operations, ' Anti U-Boat Division, August 1944, ADM 239/345, Article 163. 
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evade the group as a whole. ' Although wide spacing might tempt the U-boat to try to 
pick his way between the ships, the broad zig-zag would tend to confuse his 
assessments of the positions of the "holes" in the escort line. 239 Where no direction 
could be decided, the area to be searched would be bounded by an expanding 
"furthest-on circle". The size of this circle would be dictated by the time elapsed since 
the U-boat attack. The recommended figures were: three miles for the first half hour-, 
ten miles for the first two hours; and three miles for every subsequent hour. 240 When 
the new, faster Type XXI U-boats appeared, the Admiralty warned, the enemy might 
attempt to make more positive attempts to escape at higher speed, but in doing so they 
would have to accept the risk of exposing their HE to detection by the escorts. But the 
higher speed and longer endurance of these U-boats meant the area to be searched by 
the escort forces would expand much more rapidly, than in the case of a conventional, 
schnorkel-fitted U-boat. In February 1945, however, there was no indication that Type 
XXI U-boats were ready for operations. 
Coastal Command's Response 
Coastal Command had also been devising new search tactics against the 
schnorkel-fitted U-boats. These were briefed and discussed at the bi-annual Squadron 
Commanders' Meeting held at Coastal Command Headquarters at the end of 
November 1944. At the meeting Captain Peyton-Ward, the Senior Naval Staff Officer at 
Coastal Command, observed that since the last meeting in March of that year the U- 
boats had completely revised their operational stance. Those which were not fitted with 
the schnorkel were unable to operate effectively because of the growing power and 
ubiquity of Allied air patrols. These boats were, therefore, forced to spend the majority 
of their time submerged where they were unable to re-charge their batteries and could 
make little progress on passage. Only with the introduction of the schnorkel, could U- 
boats survive under the intense air cover. 241 
Trials had recently been conducted by Coastal Command on aircraft detection 
capability against the schnorkel. When there was no sea clutter, radar could detect a 
snort at 4-8 miles. However, at night operational experience showed that when aircraft 
passed within four miles of a snort they had about a one in 50 chance of achieving a 
detection followed by a sighting with illumination. Sea returns probably played a major 
239 'Operation "CW": Analysis for NW Approaches, 25 August - 17 October 1944, ' W. H. 
McCrea, DNOR, 1 December 1944, ADM 1/17653, p. 16. 
240 'Air and Surface A/S Searches and Striking Forces, ' Part 4, BR1679(4) [formerly 
CB4097(4)(44)], June 1944, NHB, pp. 14-15. 
241 'Minutes of Squadron Commanders' Conference held at Headquarters, Costal Command on 
29 November 1944, 'AWM 54,81/4/81, p. 2. 
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part in this poor performance, as did homing failures, and the snort diving on detecting 
the radar or illumination. Further trials were needed to identify the factors which 
contributed to success or failure. 242 At the November meeting Air Vice Marshal A. B. 
Ellwood, CB, DSC, Coastal Command's Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO), explained that 
the introduction of the schnorkel had made 
... the 
U-boat so difficult to detect that... (the Command] had partially to abandon 
the offensive in the Northern Transit Area, and allocate the forces to the protection 
of our convoys. For the schnorkel enable the U-boats to slip through the transit 
areas almost undetected, and will similarly enable them to get to their operating 
areas without too much interference from the air. 
Coastal Command's first call, Ellwood went on, was the protection of threatened 
convoys. This now meant that '-we are not able to be, as we should like, completely 
offensive in our policy. ' The Command had, '... in fact been driven on the defensive to a 
certain extent. 'To overcome this problem it was proposed 
... to adopt an offensive method 
to apply a defensive policy. The future method of 
looking after convoys will not be by putting on a single aircraft at a time, but will 
consist in flooding an area ahead of the convoy in the same way and to the same 
frequency of cover as we flooded areas through which the U-boats had to pass 
during "Overlord". 
These patrols were '... designed to sweep out an area along the path of the 
convoy in force to prevent the ... 
[U-boats] getting at the convoys. ' 243 It was expected 
that, once the Germans were comfortable with the operation of the schnorkel-fitted U- 
boats, they would start another major offensive in the near future, making use of the 
tactical advantage bestowed by the schnorkel. Since the enemy had not yet reached 
this stage, Ellwood stated that Coastal Command was taking advantage of the lull in U- 
boat activity to concentrate on squadron training before the battle re-started. The 
training would be focussed on the new tactics of "flooding" sweeps ahead of the 
convoys. Group Captain Taylor explained these tactics to the Meeting. He began by 
referring to SASO's explanation of the factors which had led the Command to adopt an 
offensive-defensive policy. The tactics to be adopted consisted of "offensive" patrols 
concentrated into a relatively small area ahead of each convoy. Each patrol would be 
designed so that an aircraft would pass over each part of the patrol area every half an 
hour. This, it was hoped, would ensure the detection of any U-boat which attempted to 
intercept the convoy. These patrols were in the form of four parallel boxes, each 
containing two aircraft and flown to keep pace with, and ahead of the convoy. 
Assuming that the radar detection range on a schnorkel was 31/2 miles, this allowed the 
242 'Anti-Snort Trials, ' E. J. Williams, DNOR, Report No. 70/44,5 October 1944, ADM 219/152. 
243 'Minutes of Squadron Commanders' Conference held at Headquarters, Costal Command on 
29 November 1944, 'AWM 54,81/4/81, p. 3. 
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total area swept each side of the convoy's track to be 28 miles. The total width of the 
patrol area ahead of the convoy would therefore be 56 miles. 
The patrol would normally be flown to a distance of about 60 miles, though the 
performance of each type of aircraft would dictate the precise range. So that the 
spacing of the two aircraft assigned to each box was maintained, the intention was that, 
whatever the aircraft type, each should spend exactly one hour on each circuit of the 
box. Clearly, the faster types of aircraft would have to fly further ahead of the convoy 
than the slower. To maintain the accuracy of the patrols, each aircraft was to check its 
position relative to the convoy by taking a radar bearing and range, before setting out 
on the next circuit. This was, Group Captain Taylor pointed out, '... a new departure in 
navigation technique, and no part of the standard drill. ' Curiously, Taylor announced 
that this relative navigation technique would reduce the need for '... the numbers of 
winds found, drifts, and positions fixed by other means would be tolerated while the 
, 244 aircraft remained with the convoy.... How accurate aircraft positioning during the 
rest of the patrol was to be maintained, without accurate wind-finding, was not 
explained, though there was some concentration on transit navigation. 
Results of the Anti-Schnorkel Campaign 
According to a DNOR report, less than 20% of the schnorkel-fitted U-boats were 
destroyed at sea by air attack . 
245 However, ubiquitous Allied air patrols compelled the 
enemy to remain submerged, and rely on their schnorkel, which restricted their tactical 
mobility. Airpower also put the U-boats under constant fear of detection. The log for U- 
247, for example, contains almost daily reference to sightings of Allied aircraft. There 
was the possibility that the aircraft would home A/S vessels onto the U-boat's 
246 position. An escort group summoned by an aircraft had a good chance of relocating 
the U-boat, but success relied on speedy communications and accurate navigation. 
These factors also highlighted one major difference between the ocean and inshore 
operations. Howard-Johnston noted that 
In the former, any action by the operational authority is unlikely to be of immediate 
assistance due to the distances reinforcements must travel. In the latter, air or 
surface reinforcements can usually be sent in a very short time and intelligence is 
247 likely to be more detailed and accurate . 
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Howard-Johnston's allusion to more detailed and accurate intelligence was, of course, 
based on the Admiralty and Command's access to high-grade special intelligence. The 
U-boats rarely transmitted at sea, though when they did it often led to intensive air and 
sea searches and the destruction of the boat. 248 What was more valuable was the 
decryption of messages from U-boat Commands to their U-boats, giving approximate 
details of routes and operational areas. Although more research is needed to 
understand this aspect, it is clear that the British shore authorities were making great 
use of this source to deploy escort groups and air patrols in areas where U-boat activity 
was likely to be greatest. 249 Support groups could therefore be deployed into relatively 
small patrol areas, where they could search for U-boats and reinforce transiting 
convoys most easily. Greater numbers of support groups were formed from the faster 
escorts released from ocean groups, once the convoy cycle was amended and the size 
of convoys substantially reduced in late 1944, the retention of escorts originally 
destined for the Far East as well as appealing to Canada for the transfer of even more 
support groups to British waters. A similar reorganization of shore-based aircraft (both 
Coastal Command and FAA) was undertaken, though in the sort of operations 
envisaged CVEs were of less value. 250 Command boundaries were also amended to 
provide more cohesive direction of the operations centred on Horton's Western 
Approaches Command . 
251 These measures were made more effective by another 
significant difference between the ocean and inshore campaigns. This was the 
adoption by the U-boats of static tactics in place of the mobile tactics which had been a 
feature of ocean operations. This might be temporary, for when the new high-speed U- 
boats under development became operational, the enemy could return to more mobile 
tactics, albeit operating submerged. 252 
McCrea's analysis of the employment of the Support Groups showed that about 
20% of their time at sea was spent supporting convoys. Since the patrol areas were 
close to the bases, most of the remaining 80% of the time was spent on A/S patrol. All 
told there were about 50 escorts in the support groups in November and December 
1944. This figure rose to about 60 during 1945. These ships were responsible for 
248 See, for example: '25 June 1944, ' in, 'Translation of PG/30349, BdUs War Log, 16-30 June 
1944, 'FDS, NHB. 
249 See, for example, the series of papers in ADM 223/20, ADM 223/172, ADM 223/198, ADM 
223/203, DEFE 3/732, DEFE 3/735 and HW 1/3191. 
250 'C-in-C, WA 031805B to Admiralty, ' in, 'Sunday, 3 September 1944, War Diary (Naval), 1-14 
September 1944, 'NHB- 
251 'Admiralty, 021511 B to C-in-C, WA..., ' in, 'Saturday, 2 September 1944, War Diary (Naval), 
1-14 September 1944, 'NHB. 
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sinking most of the 37 U-boats destroyed, which equated to about 1 U-boat per ship- 
year spent on operations. McCrea compared this to the results of a Canadian study 
which concluded that RCN ships had sunk 1 U-boat per 19 ship-years. 'This 
comparison, ' McCrea asserted, 'has nothing to do with efficiency. ' He quoted it 
... merely to contrast two sets of experiences and to indicate that the operations in 
coastal waters did provide any individual ship with an exceptionally favourable 253 
chance of destroying a U-boat . 
McCrea's analysis showed that very nearly 50% of the U-boats were sunk by 
patrolling support groups. Why such a high proportion should have fallen to support 
groups on apparently "random" patrols is unexplained, but may be due to searches 
actually being focussed by special intelligence assessments. The support groups 
(which did most of the killing) spent only 20% of their time with the convoys, but it was 
during these periods that almost 30% of the U-boats were sunk, just over half of them 
after a ship in the convoy had been torpedoed. This was, McCrea noted, confirmation 
of the obvious fact that a ship had the best chance of avenging an attack if it is already 
present at the scene. The number of U-boats killed before they were able to attack was 
roughly proportionate to the time spent by the support groups with the convoys. 
McCrea also noted that the aggressive tactics of the support groups in attacking Gnat- 
armed U-boats led to one escort being torpedoed in each of the ten months of the 
254 campaign . To minimize the 
danger it was important that at least two escorts should 
engage a U-boat. The pair also had a greater chance of holding contact and avoiding 
the confusion caused by non-subs, especially if they made use of their A/S plots and 
accurate fixing aids, like QH. 
Amidst the non-sub infested inshore waters two chief lessons Howard-Johnston 
and Prichard highlighted in relation to searches were- 
(a) that it is better to search meticulously a comparatively modest furthest-on area 
(e. g., speed of U-boat two to three knots) than to dissipate the effort by 
allowing for an improbably high speed of retirement, and 
(b) that a concerted search dependent on accurate station-keeping soon becomes 
disorganised as each ship in turn attaches herself to a doubtful asdic contact. 
They also perceived that. - 
When there are insufficient A/S vessels to cover even a modest furthest-on area, it 
is advisable to endeavour to forecast the U-boat's most probable movements and 
commit the forces available to the best appreciation that can be made. Such tactics 
253 'Survey of A/U Operations-, ' ADM 1/17653, p. 6. 
254 See Appendix 4. 
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should, however, be limited to cases of necessity, and the temptation to "plunge on 
a guess" should be resisted whenever a systematic search is possible. 255 
Strictly, as Professor McCrea earlier pointed out, a "random" search was just as likely 
to gain contact as "systematic" searches, such as "Gamma", Wignot", "Observant", etc. 
McCrea also noted that a systematic search might be easier for a U-boat to avoid. 
Theoretically, this was possible but it relied on the U-boat being able to determine from 
its sensors where the escorts were and what they were doing. This was far from easy. 
The great advantage of a systematic search, McCrea acknowledged, and as Howard- 
Johnston and Prichard realized, was '... that it can quickly and easily be put into 
, 256 257 operation. Not all escort groups got it right . 
Furthermore, even with faultless 
tactics it seemed that more U-boats had been missed by poor classification than by 
searching in the wrong place. 
The Allies were faced with what seemed to be the dawn of a revolutionary "new" 
U-boat war ushered in by the schnorkel-fitted U-boat. However, this threat bore many 
similarities to those encountered during the First World War and the submarine tactics 
practiced in the inter-war period. That the gloomy forecasts of the outcome of the 
campaign were not matched by the actual results was, in part, because the enemy's 
tactics were quickly understood, but was also in large measure due to the British and 
Canadian crews of anti-submarine aircraft and ships. Their training had imbued them 
with confidence, initiative and a flexibility capable of coping with the new tactical 
situation brought about by the new German technology. The British were able to rapidly 
institute rigorous training for aircrews and escort groups. This was vital, since early on 
in the campaign: 
The standard of operational efficiency responsible for the defeat of the U-boat in 
the Atlantic, is now lacking due to absence of training in the last three months 
(during operations in support of "Overlord"]. This will be particularly applicable to 
new groups about to be formed. It is therefore essential that a proper group training 
cycle be instituted at once for all A/S forces operating in the focal areas 258 
Two of the aspects in which training was shown to be necessary were: - 
(a) Senior and Commanding Officers needed to practice to realise the differences 
between asdic and radar screens or searches; the effects on the U-boats 
movements of the possibility of bottoming and the concentration of traffic-, and 
the difficulties of thorough search in an area where non-subs are prevalent. 
255 Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, and Captain N. A. Prichard, DASW, Refý D. 559 
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(b) A/S teams required practice to realise the effect of tide on the plotted 
movements of bottomed contact, and on the problems of holding contact and 
attacking them. They also required practice in the techniques of classification 
by echo sounder. 259 
In some ways these were the easier aspects to correct. Professor McCrea, having 
analysed the A/S operations from the beginning of September up to the end of 1944, 
thought it was also vital that training be given in the greatest problem of A/S operations 
in inshore waters which was that of initial detection. Howard-Johnston agreed that this 
was a weak spot in the training and undertook to discuss it with DASW and then 
Western Approaches. "O Yet, even with these shortfalls the British position was unlike 
the period at the beginning of the war. Now the British commanded an adequate level 
of combat strength and a training machine able to instil the necessary skills to counter 
the German onslaught. During the last weeks of the war, the enemy was beginning to 
find the losses unacceptable and had withdrawn most of his U-boats from British 
coastal waters, except off the East Coast, and was trying to operate them in the more 
distant South-West Approaches. In McCrea's opinion, the campaign ended in a victory 
for British forces. Overall it had been one of a great deal of improvisation on both sides, 
though the Allies were more adept at responding to German initiatives . 
261 But McCrea 
warned that such an optimistic view needed to be balanced against the future threat of 
the new, fast U-boats. Of course, much of the focus of the British planning effort was in 
preparing for a U-boat campaign in which the Type XXI and Walter high-speed U-boats 
would have played a prominent part. In the event these boats were not ready in time. 
Prospects of the U-boat War 
There was general agreement with Captain Winn's view that the prospects in the 
anti-submarine war were heavily dependent on the character and ability of individual U- 
boat commanders. 262 Horton, for one, saw that his task was 
... to destroy as many as possible of the existing U-boats, thus preventing experienced officers and men from manning the new types. He also hoped to 
damp their enthusiasm by continually hammering at morale. 263 
259 Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, and Captain N. A. Prichard, DASW, Ref: D. 559 
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Principal among these new U-boats was the ocean-going, schnorkel equipped Type 
XXI. Their streamlined hulls would make them hard to detect, especially end-on, and 
with their high underwater speed, thought to be in the order of 13-15 knots, they would 
be difficult to attack with existing equipment. If they were also commanded by 
experienced men they could pose a substantially greater threat than the existing 
schnorkel-fitted U-boats, both in the ocean and in inshore waters. Large numbers of 
these boats were known to be working-up in the Baltic, with some 15 expected to be 
operational by the end of 1944 and perhaps 95 by April 1945. Trials were being carried 
out to investigate tactics to counter these fast U-boats, as will be described in the next 
chapter. Meanwhile, as Horton pointed out, the immediate issue facing the anti- 
submarine forces was the normal schnorkel-fifted U-boat. The challenge was to devise 
counter-measures that would combat this threat, and at the same time delay or dilute 
the forthcoming problem of the Type XXI. 
Certain material measures were readily adopted, including the formation of more 
escort groups. Other, more innovative but more complex, developments were 
undertaken. For example, it was hoped that a new scheme to reduce the ship's 
propeller noise and the use of off-board, expendable noise-makers to deflect Gnat 
attacks, would both lead to improved asdic performance in shallow waters. Asymmetric 
A/S measures were also taken. These included use of concrete-piercing bombs for 
attacks on U-boat pens, increased defensive A/S mining off convoy routes and 
offensive mining of U-boat training areas, the use of US Magnetic Anomaly Detection 
equipment and better means of marking the position of wrecks were all considered at 
an early stage. 264 At the end of November 1944, Professor E. J. Williams in DNOR 
produced a '... tentative and provisional... ' paper, which drew on earlier work and the 
shape of which, he thought, might be useful for the next Cabinet Anti-U-boat 
Committee. Williams calculated that the schnorkel was probably 20 times more difficult 
to detect and attack by aircraft than a surfaced U-boat, especially by night and 
estimated that '... asdic search (as distinct from attack) has only been about 20% of its 
value in average ocean conditions. ' Nevertheless, Williams noted, experience had 
shown that once found, the chance of killing a U-boat exceeded earlier figures for open 
ocean hunts. This, Williams thought, was because shallow water reduced the 
264 'Minutes of the 
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uncertainty in depth estimation, and, more importantly reduced the dead time between 
firing and explosion of the A/S projectiles. 265 
The bulk of Williams' paper, approved by IDNOR, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, was 
incorporated into a note by Howard-Johnston which he drafted at the end of November 
in consultation with Winn and IDASW. They concluded that the enemy had sunk one 
ship for every three U-boat cruises, and had lost a U-boat for every two ships sunk. 
This dismal performance was, however, expected to be overtaken in a renewed 
offensive in the New Year, which would include the new U-boat types. Howard- 
Johnston concluded that as many as 160-200 ships could be sunk during the first three 
months of 1945, half of them by the Type XXIs. The countermeasures identified 
reinforced those already being developed, that is, the concentration of more escort 
groups in inshore waters along with intensive training, the extensive use of A/S mining, 
and bombing attacks on U-boat construction yards and oil supplies. 266 Howard- 
Johnston's note was reviewed by ACNS(UT), Rear Admiral J. H. Edelsten. The losses 
attributed to the Type XXI were reduced by half, perhaps because there was more 
awareness of the difficulties of operating the Type XXI effectively in submerged pack 
operations because of communications difficulties and the encouraging results 
obtained during the recent trials with a fast British submarine which confirmed that the 
problems of detection and attack were tractable. 267 The total casualties anticipated 
were therefore some 120 ships during the first three months of 1945, a number, 
Edelsten remarked, which could be heavily influenced by the degree of offensive spirit 
268 exhibited by the U-boats, which remained the unknown factor. Although the forecast 
figures were altered Edelsten's paper was broadly accepted and formed the basis for 
subsequent appreciations by the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet A. B. Cunningham, 
in his submissions to the other Chiefs of Staff, and the Cabinet Anti-U-Boat Warfare 
Committee. 269 
In addition to his discussion with Williams, Winn and Prichard, Howard-Johnston 
had also asked a former colleague in DAUD, Commander H. W. Fawcett, RN (Retd), to 
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offer his views on the coming U-boat offensive. Fawcett was an A/S specialist, with 
experience of the First World War and who had served in DASW and then for a year in 
DAUD, where he had been involved in tactical appreciations, along with Leon Solomon 
of DNOR. Solomon, and it seems Fawcett, was indoctrinated into Special Intelligence. 
Fawcett was now attached to Captain Peyton-Ward's staff at Coastal Command and, 
Howard-Johnston thought, was a man not only of ideas but'... willing [and] able to back 
them up with statistics. 270 Unfortunately, Fawcett's ideas arrived too late to affect 
Howard-Johnston's paper, but echoed the concepts abroad in the Naval Staff. Wider 
opportunities for destroying U-boats had to be found Fawcett thought, because the 
schnorkel had reduced the overall killing power of aircraft and escorts to a tenth of their 
former value. Concentration on purely "defensive" measures would mean that too many 
merchant ships would be sunk for every U-boat that was destroyed, and this would not 
be enough to "get their tails down". Offensive action was needed, too, especially 
against the new fast U-boats. This, he hoped would be possible due to the excellent U- 
boat tracking from intelligence, even if this was not as accurate as formerly because U- 
boat traffic was now not so voluminous. In any case his ideas did not depend on 
precision targeting of U-boats. Instead what he had in mind was an "obstacle race" 
consisting of the whole gamut of action ranging from bombing of building yards and 
factories, bombing and mining of bases (including attacking enemy minesweepers to 
prevent mine clearance), attacking enemy supply shipping serving the U-boats bases, 
use of Allied submarines off those bases, continuous anti-submarine air cover over U- 
boat transit routes and intercept them with A/S vessels, and, of course, surface and air 
escort of Allied convoys. Fawcett analogy was: 'If we put 100 horses over a 
steeplechase course consisting of six jumps each of which is cleared by 96% of the 
horses, then only 78 horses finish the course. This concept, as Fawcett pointed out, 
had a resonance with the strategy employed in the First World War . 
271 The key was 
that defensive and offensive measures were not seen as alternatives. Instead they 
were mutually interactive. 
In reviewing the 1944-45 inshore campaign against the schnorkel-fitted U-boats 
Professor McCrea noted the poor asdic performance of the escorts but concluded that 
it was '... the high U-boat density which permitted a satisfactory outcome despite this 
low efficiency. ' This was demonstrated by the statistics. Of the 37 U-boats sunk by A/S 
ships, only 2 were detected in the first place by radar and 2 visually. The rest were 
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initially detected by asdic. Only about six of the U-boats were detected at night, which 
'-probably was connected with the fact that the U-boats wanted to attack by day and 
so were more likely to be in the patrolled areas then. 272 Commander P. W. Burnett, 
Senior Officer of EG10, wrote in early 1945: 
The five confirmed U-boats with which I have been in contact in the last year have 
all been detected by asdic, without any pervious warning of their immediate 
presence. Although several others must have been swept over, these five have all 
been detected by day. 273 
McCrea also realized that to understand how factors such as the weather affected U- 
boat operations '... as regards schnorkelling, sighting, attacking, etc. would require a 
big investigation. ' It does not appear that this was done, nor did McCrea have time 
before the war ended to assess whether the disposition of the escorts was the best to 
take advantage of opportunities to detect U-boats approaching a convoy to attack. 
Once the Admiralty took possession of the German records, McCrea thought it entirely 
possible for a detailed analyses to be done, which would identify dispositions around 
convoys which would ensure that the most probable positions from which the U-boat 
fired were swept over by as many escorts as possible. Howard-Johnston was of a like 
mind. He asked '... for three months with my Division to analyse every U-boat incident 
when the U-boat got away. ... But my Division was closed down immediately after VJ- 
Day and the analysis was never done. 274 The Admiralty drafted a short paper intended 
for consumption by the British and Americans in the Pacific preparing for the invasion 
of Japan. It contained the main lessons from the inshore campaign Howard-Johnston in 
conjunction with Captain N. A. Prichard, DASW, emphasized 
The marked deterrent effect of strong patrols which attack all suspicious contacts 
without undue regard to conservation of ammunition is apparent from German 
records now available- In particular the value of aircraft patrols may be out of all 
proportion to the number of U-boats they sink. 
The Directors jointly recommended that 
... aircraft should patrol 
in order to detect U-boats charging, rather than fly close 
escort duties. If there are any spare after the area in which the U-boats must 
charge has been saturated (i. e. each point is swept over at least every hour) they 
are better used as extended escorts by night rather than as close escort trying to 
detect submerged U-boats by day. 
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However, direct convoy protection by surface escorts remained their central concern. 
'The necessity, ' Howard-Johnston and Prichard wrote 
of guarding against submerged attack by a U-boat which remains bottomed until 
the last moment, and of investigating innumerable asdic contacts, has resulted in 
changes in [convoy] Screening Diagrams. 
These changes were briefly stated: 
An advanced screen has not time to differentiate between the many non-sub 
contacts and a U-boat lying "doggo", though there is a good chance of detection if 
the U-boat is manoeuvring to attack. A/S vessels should, therefore, be formed into 
a comparatively dense screen closer ahead than has been usual. When this 
requirement has been met any remaining vessels may be disposed astern ready to 
deliver quick counter-attacks after a torpedoing, or be placed in-Positions on the 
275 bow or beam which would be suitable firing positions for a U-boat . 
In the event the abrupt end of the war in the Far East forestalled the despatch of the 
paper. The lessons were not forgotten, for when Burnett was later appointed to the 
Admiralty, he was to use his wartime experiences and long-term professional 
knowledge when re-assessing A/S warfare doctrine. However, before covering these 
events, the way the Admiralty dealt with the incipient threat of the fast submarine is 
examined in the following Chapter. 
275 Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, DAUD, and Captain N. A. Prichard, DASW, Ref. D. 559 
(Draft), 5 August 1945, ADM 1/17653. 
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Chapter 4: The Dawn of Modern Anti-Submarine Warfare, 19"-1946 
The Problem of the Fast U-boat 
By mid-1942, the ubiquity and increasing effectiveness of Allied anti-submarine 
counter-measures had impelled D6nitz to press for the technical means to employ 
submerged U-boat operations for the remainder of the war. Conversion of existing 
types with the schnorkel was only a short-term palliative because of their low 
underwater mobility. What was needed was a U-boat with high underwater speed and 
endurance. This, it seemed, could be achieved by accelerating the development of 
novel submarine types powered by the Walter turbine, which could be run submerged, 
powered by the decomposition of oxygen-bearing hydrogen-peroxide fuel. High 
submerged speed was achieved by sacrificing surface performance and optimizing the 
streamlined hull for underwater travel. However, as the technical difficulties with the 
system became more apparent, it was soon realized that they would prevent this type 
becoming operational in the near-term. Development was therefore started on a hybrid 
U-boat, combining the Walter-boat's streamlined hull, with a powerful, but conventional, 
diesel-electric propulsion train and a very large battery, capable of being recharged 
while submerged by using the schnorkel. This was the Type XXI U-boat. 276 
During the winter of 1943-44 NID suspected that the Germans were developing 
new U-boat types, although their exact nature remained obscure until Spring 1944, 
when the Type XXI U-boat was identified. 277 Captain Prichard, DASW, rapidly drew on 
the existing Admiralty expertise to define the measures necessary to counter this new 
threat. Prichard quickly concluded that such a U-boat, which was assessed to have an 
extreme diving depth, long endurance and high underwater speed, would be able to 
make long submerged approaches to convoys from any direction, making all-round 
convoy protection necessary at greater distances than previously. The Type XXI could 
also operate stealthily at slow speed, but be able to use high speed to evade A/S 
vessels. A single escort was unlikely to be able to hold contact and would need the 
help of a consort. Even so, attacks would be difficult, given the U-boat's high 
manoeuvrability. Depth-charge attacks were likely to be ineffective and, although ATWs 
276 Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 265. 
277 M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'British Responses to the U-boat, Winter 1943 to Spring 1945' (MA, 
London, King's College, December 1997), pp. 7-11. 
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offered the best chance of success, their short range, combined with high-speed 
evasion by the U-boat, would make attacks highly dynamic, and accurate aiming 
difficult because the rate of change in the target's bearing would be close to the 
maximum turning rate of the attacking ship. During an approach, A/S ships would have 
to be wary of counter-attacks by the U-boat with the Gnat. Counter-measures, such as 
the "Step Aside" tactics, or reducing speed, would delay the approach and give the 
Type XXI ample time to avoid the escort. A high speed approach degraded asdic 
performance and the escort risked overrunning the U-boat. 2713 
A brief, provisional appreciation of the Type XXI U-boat was issued to the Fleet in 
September 1944 by Captain Howard-Johnston, DAUD, in the Monthly Anti-Submarine 
Report . 
279 The article was based on a more detailed analysis by Professor E. J. 
Williams, of DNOR, who was one of the Special Intelligence confidants. His paper was 
therefore based on recent Ultra material . 
2"0 This intelligence revealed that the Type XXI 
U-boat was about 245 feet in length, with a displacement of 1,600 tons, a submerged 
speed of 17 knots and long endurance from its abnormally large battery. Not only did 
this information allow the earlier assessment of the Type XXI to be refined, but it 
undoubtedly provided the impetus for potential counter-measures to be analysed and 
exercised on the tactical table at the Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU) in 
Liverpool under the guidance of Captain G. H. Roberts and, on occasion, with DNOR 
scientists . 
281 As Captain Howard-Johnston later recalled the convoy system would still 
have been the most effective means of defeating the Type XXI U-boat, especially as it 
could have benefited more from independent routing of trade than the ordinary U- 
boats. 282 Essentially, these theoretical and practical investigations suggested that the 
Type XXI's higher speed meant that the area into which it could escape would increase 
exponentially and this, in turn, would substantially reduce the effectiveness of the 
escorts' asdic searches, unless they could arrive at, and cover, the area quickly. 
However, at high speed, the Type XXI might make enough HE noise to give the escorts 
a chance of detecting the U-boat. There remained the problem of attacking the Type 
XXI, for it could use its high submerged speed and rapid acceleration to prevent an 
278 'Deep and/or Fast U-boats, ' Captain HMA/SEE, Fairlie to DASW, 10 April 1944, ADM 
1/16495. 
279 'The Type XXI U-boat -A Provisional Appreciation, ' in, 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, 
August 1944, ' 15 September 1944, ADM 199/2061, pp. 17-19. 
280 'Type XXI U-boat (A Provisional Appreciation), ' E. J. Williams, DOR/44/68,4 September 
1944, ADM 219/150. 
281 Professor Sir William McCrea, FRS, Interview, 17 April 1998-1 'Tactics against Fast 
Submerged U-Boats, 'A/Commander J. Plomer, RCNVR, Director of the Combined Tactical Unit 
to Captain (D), Halifax, 25 November 1944, Folder CNA 7-6-1, Vol. 11022, RG 24, NAC. 
282 C. D. Howard-Johnston to J. D. Brown, NHB, 24 February 1980, CCAC, HWJN. 
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escort settling in on the asdic echo. What was needed were new HE tracking tactics, 
and greater reliance on ahead throwing weapons. 
HM Submarine Seraph Tria IS 283 
In October 1943, when the prospect of a German U-boat with high underwater 
speed was emerging, NID requested Charles Lillicrap, Director of Naval Construction 
(DNC), to investigate the possibility of providing a British fast underwater target. 
Lillicrap had concluded that by streamlining the hull and removing all the appendages 
required for fighting, including the deck gun, a British submarine could achieve a 
submerged speed of 13 knots for about 20 minutes. 284 So, when Dr. Goodeve, the 
Assistant Controller (Research and Development), convened a meeting on 6 June 
1944 to discuss the Type XXI threat, Lillicrap was ready with outline proposals for a 
fast underwater target that could be used to test existing British A/S equipment and 
tactics. HM Submarine Seraph, awaiting repairs after a diving accident, was the boat 
selected and thereafter events moved rapidly. At the Deputy Controller's Meeting a 
week later it was agreed, anticipating formal approval, that conversion work was to 
start immediately, with completion due at the end of August. The modifications fell into 
three parts. Firstly, her main electric motors were up-rated and propellers with coarser 
pitch were fitted, so that Seraph could develop greater propulsive power. Secondly, her 
hull was streamlined by the removal of guns, the fairing off of apertures and a reduction 
in the size of the hydroplanes and conning tower. These modifications reduced the 
hydrodynamic drag by 55%, while the propulsion power was increased by 13% {Plate 
17). Thirdly, a high capacity battery was installed to extend her underwater endurance. 
The results were impressive, for when Seraph began her high-speed trials towards the 
end of September the speed and endurance figures showed a significant improvement, 
especially in her endurance at medium speeds: - 
Speed Seraph's Endurance 
Before conversion After conversion 
4 knots 14 hrs. 35 hrs. 
6 knots 4h rs. 8 hrs. 
10 knots - 2h rs. 
12 knots '/4 hr. 285 
2133 Llewellyn -Jones, 'Trials with HM Submarine Seraph', passim. 284 'Underwater Internal Combustion Propulsion - General Considerations, ' n. d., RNSM 
A 1948/009. 
2135 'The Trend of Submarine Design, ' Lecture by RN Newton, RCNC, DNC Department, 
November 1945, RNSM A1991/058, p. 5, 'HMS Seraph (P. 219) First of Class Trials, September 
1944, 'Office of Admiral (S/M), RNSM A1691/250, p. 8. 
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Plate 1T HMS/m Seraph Before and After Conversion 
(IWM A. 21104 and'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, November 1944', 15 
December 1944, ADM 199/2061, Opposite p. 20. ) 
Seraph Before Conversion 
Seraph After Conversion 
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Of course, these figures are slightly misleading, since lacking a schnorkel, Seraph had 
no method of replenishing the air inside the boat. It was realized that the crew's 
concentration would deteriorate after about 12 hours dived, though classic symptoms 
of carbon dioxide poisoning and oxygen lack would not become evident for another five 
hours. The greatest problem was that Seraph could not recharge her battery at sea, 
and this limited her value in tactical exercises. 
At the end of September 1944 Seraph carried out a series of asdic and tactical 
trials, the first with HMS Kingrisher and the latter with the EG19. The trials' teams 
included Professor W. M. McCrea from DNOR in the Admiralty and J. A. Hakes, a 
scientist from the nearby HMA/SEE, Fairlie . 
286The tactical trials were organized by 
Admiral Horton, Comm ander-in-Chief, Western Approaches' Headquarters in co- 
operation with representatives of Commander US Forces in Europe, RAF Coastal 
Command and Naval Aviation, Flag Officer (Submarines), and the Directors of the Anti- 
U-boat, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Operational Research 
Divisions, as well as training and experimental establishments. At sea, the trials were 
controlled by Lieutenant Commander D. R. Mitchell, DSO, DSC, who was now part of 
the training staff onboard Philante. For the tactical trials Mitchell assumed the title of 
Training Commander, "Rockabill", denoting the area of the Irish Sea where the trials 
took place. 287 It was intended that the tactical settings for the trials reflect the work 
done at WATU and pre-trial practice was carried out ashore in the HMA/SEE attack 
teacher. It can be seen, then, that these trials brought together the full weight of the 
Admiralty, the operational commands (including their training organization), and the 
scientific community. The modifications to Seraph were started on 16 June, just one 
month after the first Type XXI, U-2501, was launched. Subsequent trials with Seraph 
were run some seven months before the first operational cruise by a Type XXI, U- 
251 1.288 
With the asdic trials lasting only a week and in changeable acoustic conditions, it 
was difficult to correlate the results. They were, at best, only able to give rough 
indications of echo and HE strengths. Nevertheless, the data were adequate to provide 
more realistic information for the continuing tactical table trials. These trials showed 
that, while Seraph's beam-on asdic echo was little changed, at fine inclinations it was 
286 Interview, Professor Sir William McCrea FIRS, 17 April 1998; 'Monthly Log of HM Submarine 
Seraph, Month of September 1944, 'ADM 173/18701. 
287 'Western Approaches Monthly News Bulletin, November 1944, ' 18 December 1944, Box 396, 
RG 38, NARA2. 
288 David Syreft (ed. ), The Battle of the Atlantic and Signals Intelligence: U-Boat Situations and 
Trends, 1941-1945 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 423 fn. 624. 
119 
Chapter 4 
much smaller and, consequently, asdic ranges on these bearings were reduced by 
three-quarters or more. It is likely at this stage of scientific understanding that asdic 
echoes were thought to be returned from the outer surfaces of the submarine. 289 1n fact 
the sound also penetrated to the inner (pressure) hull and reflections could occur from 
"internal" structures. These additional reflected highlights probably contributed to the 
uneven echo pattern observed. At fine inclinations, when Seraph was travelling at high 
speed, the echo's doppler allowed the operators to distinguish even the weak echo 
against the background noise and other interfering echoes. For example, although 
Seraph at 12 knots had been held on the asdic recorder at only 750 yards stern-on, her 
echo, picked out by the doppler, was heard out to 2,700 yards. It was also discovered 
that the streamlined Seraph's HE was weaker when compared to her pre-converted 
state. This was because less power was needed to turn her propellers and they turned 
at a slower rate, to propel her at any given speed. They were therefore less likely to 
cavitate and gave her a higher "silent" speed . 
290 Thus when Seraph was travelling at 6 
knots, or less, Kingfisher could not detect any HE from her; even at ranges as short as 
500 yards. But, as Seraph's speed rose above 6 knots, her HE became easily 
detectable. The HE rapidly increased in intensity, reaching a peak at 9 knots and 
remaining at this level even as Seraph's speed increased to 12 knots. At these speeds 
the submarine's HE could be detected by Kingfisher at up to 5,000 yards, though 
because there was no transmission-echo elapse time range could not be measured, 
and only a bearing found. Unfortunately, for an escort to keep up with a fast submarine, 
her own speed would create a great deal of self-noise, so that for speeds above 16 
knots the asdic range might be reduced by 45% and HE detection range by 50-60%. 
There were thus complex interactions between submarine and ship speeds, and 
relative orientation, and the resultant detection range that could be achieved. 
Nevertheless, the HE ranges seemed remarkably constant and unaffected either by 
water conditions (which caused wild fluctuations in echo ranges), or the submarine's 
depth, though McCrea wondered whether this would hold true for the Type XXI, which 
was assessed to be able to dive to great depths. For, it was thought that while HE 
ranges would increase with target speed, as the submarine went deeper the HE range 
was likely to decrease markedly because the greater pressure at depth would inhibit 
the onset of propeller cavitation. This finding was consistent with the experiments by 
Directorate of Scientific Research and the Admiralty Research Laboratory, at 
Teddington. Seraph had only operated down to 200 feet (the limitation possibly 
289 See Appendix 2. 
m D. C. R. Webb, Letter, 6 August 1997; Peter Evans, E-mail, 22 December 1998. 
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imposed by structural weakness caused during her accidental dive in May 1944). 
However, the interaction between speed and depth was by no means linear. Post-war 
trials with a Type XXI showed HE levels at 6 knots reducing significantly between 50 
and 150ft, while at 10 knots they remained unchanged, and at 15 knots the HE level 
increased marginally. 291 Thus, while target HE could not be guaranteed, its use was 
important for two reasons. Firstly, the HE was sometimes loud enough to mask the 
asdic echo, not only on the recorder but aurally too, so that HE might be the only 
means of holding contact. Secondly, with an asdic that transmitted a narrow 
usearchlight" beam, there was little margin of error when holding contact on a high- 
speed submarine. The submarine could rapidly move outside the asdic beam and 
escorts '... could easily be thrown off the scent, ' especially if operating singly. 292 
However, the asdic could be used to sweep for HE about 10 times more rapidly than 
probing for an echo over a wide angle. Once the target's bearing was established the 
asdic could transmit once again to obtain an echo. 
Subsequent tactics would depend on whether the escort was able to gain asdic 
contact, or had to rely only on HE bearings. The problem here was that the speed at 
which an escort was likely to hear HE would probably be less than the speed at which 
the U-boat was travelling. So, in order to close, the escort would have to employ bursts 
of high speed interspersed with periods of slow speed to listen for the HE. If the 
proportion of slow speed was kept to a minimum (typically 25%) it was found possible 
to close a conventional U-boat. However, especially when deep it was found that the U- 
boat's wake would mask the HE from its propeller if the escort was within 20* of directly 
astern. Care had to be taken during the periods of high speed not to overrun the U- 
boat, should it slow down, or to mistake own ship HE for that of the submarine. It was 
recommended, therefore, that the escort's speed should be reduced to carry out a 
listening sweep at least every 5 minutes. There was also the danger of the U-boat 
counter-attacking with a Gnat. In any case it was desirable for asdic contact to be 
gained as soon as possible. 293 
These features concentrate on the high maximum speed of the new submarines 
and is emphasized in nearly all the post-war literature on the Type XXI. However, both 
to conserve battery power, and to reduce the chance of its HE being detected, a high- 
291 'Dependence of Submarine Propeller Noise on Depth of Submarine, ' Director of Scientific 
Research, SREISMMO, 19 June 1944, ADM 283/13; Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound, p. 
338. 
292 Telephone Interview, Rear Admiral J. H. Adams, CB, LVO, 2 March 1999. 
293 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations - Part 2- Detection and Action, ' CB4097(2)(44), 
November 1944, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, paragraphs 188-189. 
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speed U-boat was likely to make use of its long endurance at higher "silenf speed to 
avoid contact by escorts. 294 Initial tactical planning of counter-measures had to take 
account of both the potential of a U-boat making off (at least initially) at high speed, 
before carrying out its main evasion at silent speed. The key was to get the escorts 
near to the submarine's datum position as quickly as possible. This was complicated by 
the need to take anti-Gnat precautions. Most ships could not approach at high enough 
speed to be safe, and using Foxers made so much noise that the chance of gaining 
contact was greatly reduced. To this end existing procedures were adapted, with the 
nearest ship executing an immediate reaction "Delta" search, bringing her over the 
datum, while making allowance for the threat of a Gnat counter-attack (by the "step- 
aside" manoeuvre). The next ship to join was to start a "Double Observant" square 
search, four miles out from the submarine's diving position. She was to be joined by the 
first ship on completion of the Plan "Delta". Thus the Plan "Delta" would cover the 
possibility of the U-boat remaining in the vicinity of the datum, while the "Double 
Observant" was designed to catch the submarine if it evaded at 12 knots. However, it 
proved impracticable to play out these tactics at sea because of Seraph's limited high 
speed endurance. Instead tactical investigations continued ashore using a tactical 
table, while the sea trials concentrated on attack procedures. 
The main trials effort by the EG19 was therefore directed towards exploring the 
problems involved in attacking a fast U-boat. It was assumed that ahead throwing 
weapons gave the highest probability of success but it was necessary to establish 
whether the Type 144 asdic-fifted escorts could apply the necessary deflection at the 
instant of firing to allow for the submarine's movement during the flight of the 
projectiles. The ship's anti-submarine teams had practiced the procedures ashore in 
HMA/SEE's attack-teacher and had achieved successful attacks, though there were 
many practical operating difficulties, as well as random errors, that were likely to 
reduce the overall accuracy of attacks. Howard-Johnston, quoting Lieutenant 
Commander Mitchell, warned that 
6 ... the difficulty in attacking [was] primarily due, not to the unsuitability of ships or instruments ... but to the very reduced margin or error which [Seraph's] high speed 
permits the hunting shipS., 295 
Even so, when Seraph took modest avoiding action attacks were possible, provided a 
recordable echo was received. Up to submarine speeds of 12 knots it seemed that, 
with adequate training, asdic teams could operate the cumbersome "cut-on" procedure 
294 Hessler, The U-boat War, Vol. 111, p. 86. 
295 Quoted in 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, November 1944, ' 15 December 1944, ADM 
199/2061, p. 21. 
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Mallet's Notebook showing disposition of EG19 against Seraph (which is not 
depicted but would be top-left where picture is annotated with "Co330") 
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to determine the target's bearing and generate adequate fire-control solutions for an 
ATW attack. Professor McCrea sounded a prescient note of caution. The Type XXI U- 
boat's higher assessed speed of some 15-17 knots might just be enough to tip the 
dynamic tactical balance in favour of the submarine, and perhaps make countering the 
Type XXI an insurmountable problem. 296 
Admiral Horton reported to the Cabinet Anti-U-Boat Committee after the trials, 
that EG19, a '... particulady experienced group had had no success during the first 
week of such exercises, but had rapidly improved thereafter. 9297 Initially, Seraph proved 
to be elusive and difficult to attack. However, such was the level of training amongst 
the escorts, that by the end of the period, the ships were able to achieve almost 
continuous contact on Seraph for two hours and execute five attacks, even though 
Seraph was at 9 knots for nearly 40% of the time. The tactics, partly developed by the 
Group, used the HE to hold contact whenever Seraph went fast, while waiting for her to 
slow down before delivering an attack . 
298 The Group adopted a loose diamond-shaped 
formation which conformed to the movements of the attacking ship and covered the 
likely evasion courses of the submarine {Plate 18). The formation tended to gravitate 
towards the stern arcs of the submarine due to the dynamics of the engagements . 
299 
When teams were worked up, Mitchell considered that a fast U-boat was unlikely to 
escape from two hunting ships, unless the asdic conditions were exceptionally poor. 
This positive note was struck when Captain Prichard, DASW, held the first meeting of 
the sub-committee of ACNS(UT)'s U-boat Warfare Committee at the end of November 
1944. Pritchard reported the conclusions reached by Mitchell. He concluded that a U- 
boat could successfully use high speed to evade ships only in rough weather and, 
although a U-boat with high submerged speed would be difficult to attack, highly 
trained ship's teams should have good chances of success. Commander-in-Chief, 
Western Approaches' representative, added that 
... further exercises 
had proved that training in attacks on a fast submarine was 90 
per cent of the battle. It had also been proved that ships fifted with the bearing 
m 'Notes on A/S Trials with a Fast Submarine, ' W. H. McCrea, Report No. 72/44,9 October 
1944, ADM 219/154; 'Notes on AIS Trials with a Fast Submarine, "Rockabill", 10-30 October 
1944, ' [W. H. McCrea], Report No. 80/44,11 November 1944, ADM 219/160; 'Asdic Trials with 
HM S/M Seraph as Target, ' J. A. Hakes, Research Note No. 53, HMAISEE Fairlie, November 
1944. DERA, AN 28144. 
297 'Minutes of the Meeting..., ' AU(44) 3rd Meeting, CAB 86/6, p. 24. 
29'3 'The Use of Squid against the 25 knot U-Boat' [Captain N. A. Prichard], DASW, [ASW 
945/45], 30 June 1945, ADM 1/17591, p. 3. 
299 Paul Malleft, Letter, 7 July 1999; 'EG2: D-Day to VE, ' Ron Curtis, June 1997, MLJ. 
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recorder and helmsman's indicator (Asdic Type 144) had a tremendous advantage 
over ships not so fitted. " 
In Mitchell's view, there were no grounds for changing established pair-ship tactics. 
More ships would simply get in the way and should carry out a containing *Box" search 
round the close A/S action. A contemporary American report summarised the issues, 
by noting that: 
The appearance of the new German XXI submarine does not seem to present any 
radical new i 
implications, but merely a more difficult presentation of already existing 
problems. 30 
DASW ended the discussion by saying that the exercises with Seraph showed 
that minor modification to asdic operating procedures were necessary. The principle 
one being the combining of two successive asdic sweeps from 800 left to 800 right of 
the ship's head, taking about 6 minutes, with two all-round HE sweeps, lasting about 40 
seconds. This combined echo and listening procedure marginally reduced the asdic 
search efficiency, but gave a better chance of gaining HE contact if the U-boat was 
travelling at speed. In addition, the tactical trials with Seraph showed that two escorts, 
by exchanging simultaneously recorded HE bearings, could plot the intersection of the 
bearings and thereby locate the submarine, as had been suggested by an earlier 
DNOR theoretical study. The procedure relied heavily upon the efficiency of the plotting 
organization, and of rapid inter-ship communications. After the trials with Seraph a 
number of improvements to the asdic control were put in hand, designed to restore the 
efficiency of operation to that experienced with normal U-boats by providing automatic 
training of the sound beam to compensate for the relative movement of both ship and 
target, and devices to improve the use of the attack instruments. 302 Only in the longer 
term did improved detection gear and weapons become available. In the meantime, 
tactical adaptation could exploit the potential, and mitigate the limitations, of existing 
technology. 
While considering the results of the trials with Seraph, McCrea thought that there 
might be some value in countering fast submarine with sonobuoys. These expendable 
radio sonobuoys consisted of a hydrophone suspended below a buoyant cylindrical 
case about 3 feet 5 inches long by 4Y2 inches in diameter. The sonobuoy was dropped 
'w 'Minutes of the First Meeting of DASWs Sub-Committee of ACNS(UT)'s U-boat Warfare 
Committee held at the Admiralty on Thursday, 30 November 1944, (Copy)' Folder NSS 1271- 
22, Vol. 8080, RG 24, NAC. 
" 'Memorandum for the File, ' 28 November 1944, Enclosure (S) to 'High Speed Submarines - 
Report of Tests Against (Project No. 103), ' T. A. Turner Commander Anti-Submarine 
Development Detachment, United States Atlantic Fleet, ASDD/A5-7 Serial: 0024,6 April 1945, 
Box 4476, RG 313, NARA2. 
302 'The Asdic and its Associated Weapons, ' DERA, AN. 15971, p. 8. 
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near a suspected U-boat contact and any sounds picked up on the hydrophone were 
transmitted by a radio set to the aircraft. The sonobuoys had a nominal life of about 4 
hours, after which they self-scuttled. However, because of the acoustic frequencies at 
which these sonobuoys listened, their performance was likely to rapidly deteriorate as 
the target's depth increased. 303 It had originally been intended to follow the EG19's 
exercises with Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm trials but these were delayed 
and eventually flown spasmodically between November 1944 and April 1945 by 
Coastal Command's Air Sea Warfare Development Unit (ASWDU). 304 The sonobuoys 
used were American AN/CRT-1A types. The ASWDU concluded that the average 
detection range showed a tendency to increase as Seraph's speed rose above 5 knots, 
with ranges in the order of 7-8,000 yards at speeds in the order of 12 knots. The 
results, however, were very dependent on the weather, so that when the sea state was 
greater than four the equipment ceased to be of much operational value. Although 
these results were encouraging, the trial contained no tactical element. Seraph was 
constrained to run in a straight line between pairs of sonobuoys at the prescribed 
speed and depth for the serial and the sonobuoys had to be launched by a range 
vessel, to avoid at least one-third of the buoys failing if they were launched from an 
aircraft. Even then, their performance deteriorated as the battery ran down. The 
sonobuoy technology, introduced '... prematurely, in 1943 after inadequate trials and 
with over-optimistic ideas of its performance'was not sufficiently mature until the 1950s 
for open ocean searches. 305 
Further Assessment of the Type XXI 
The details of the Seraph trials had been passed to the Americans and during the 
spring of 1945 the USN repeated the Seraph trials with LISS R-1, which had also been 
streamlined (though with no other structural or propulsive changes). R-1, like Seraph 
for the British, was then used for training at the USN Fleet Sonar School, Key West, 
Florida. In Britain, too, further studies were initiated, training programmes started at 
WATU and a programme of sea training with Seraph begun for British and Canadian 
303 'Notes on A/S Trials with a Fast Submarine, "Rockabill", 10-30 October 1944, ' [W. H. 
McCrea], Report No. 80/44,11 November 1944, ADM 219/160, p. 4. 304'Minutes of a Meeting held at ACHQ Liverpool on 3rd October 1944 to discuss a Programme 
of Schnorkel and other Trials and Practices, ' Admiral Horton, 4 October 1944, ADM 1/16121, p. 
4. 
305 Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force 
(London: HMSO, 1963), p. 96; ' 61-ligh Tea" Range Tests with a Fast Submarine,, ASWDU 
Report No. 45/16,25 May 1945, AIR 65/175; 'Sonobuoy Range Tests, ' 15 July 1944, AIR 
65/115; 'The Use of Sonobuoy Equipment, ' HQ Coastal Command Training Instruction No 28, 
dated 9 June 1944, AIR 15/584. 
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escort groups. " Some of the groups found the problem a difficult one, even when 
carrying out searches with five escorts on the tactical table, or attacking during sea 
practices. 307 The Type XXI would not always use high speed. The British thought that it 
would be used by the enemy to evade an aircraft or a ship (which the U-boat suspected 
had reported her position), to avoid an imminent attack during an A/S action, or to 
reach a favourable attacking position when approaching a convoy. 3013 
For the time being, the British had to make the best of the equipment they had to 
hand and to optimize its performance by adapting existing tactics and procedures. 
Considerable work was done at the research establishments on the effects of the new 
U-boats' speed and manoeuvrability on A/S weapon performance, even though based 
on inadequate information. The trials with HMS Seraph had provided only a partial 
answer to the problem, because of the very limited time available to test equipment and 
tactics in all environmental conditions and against varying submarine tactics. The latter 
would, of course, be circumscribed by safety rules (though not to the same extent as in 
peacetime exercises). 309 Nevertheless, the trial results were seen by Captain R. J. R. 
, 310 Dendy, the Captain of HMA/SEE, to have been '... on the whole reassuring. Indeed 
the subsequent experience of high speed exercises with Seraph, and other converted 
S-class boats, suggested that certain factors weighted an engagement with a fast U- 
boat in favour of the hunting forces. While it was true that A/S attacks had occasionally 
to be broken off, the prominent HE had proved to be '... an aid to contact keeping, the 
prolongation of hunts and the provision of further opportunities for attack. ' Also, due to 
the U-boat's relatively limited endurance at high speed the escorts could afford to wait 
until the U-boat slowed down before attempting an attack. Dendy was also comforted 
by the greater size of Type XXI, as against Seraph, or the captured Type VII, HMS 
Graph, so that the new U-boats would give stronger asdic returns and make them an 
easier target. The Mine Warfare Department produced a somewhat more cautious 
assessment that aligned more accurately with existing intelligence. They observed that 
the plan area of the Type XXI was only 20% greater than Graph, which was not crucial 
3m 'Western Approaches Tactical Unit Annual Report - 1944, ' Captain Gilbert Roberts, 18 
December 1944, ADM 1/17557; Milner, U-boat Hunters, p. 215; McLean, 'The Last Cruel 
Winter, p. 99. 
307 Commander A. F. C. Layard, Diary, 3-6 February 1945, RNM. 
308 'HE Listening versus Transmitting by Asdic - Operational Considerations, ' The Captain, 
HMS Osprey, to DASW, No. 636/86, dated 26 January 1945, ADM 1/17569. 
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to success with either Squid or Hedgehog. This was more dependent on the U-boat's 
speed, depth and subsequent manoeuvres. 311 
As the European war drew to a close McCrea produced a somewhat bleak but 
perceptive analysis of the effects of high submerged speed and endurance on 
submarine tactics and their consequences for anti-submarine forces. Up to the middle 
of 1943, U-boats had operated in packs and, by remaining largely on the surface, had 
maximized the chance of one member of the pack sighting a convoy. The mobility 
conferred by surface operations meant that some 70-80% of the pack would intercept 
the convoy though, largely because of navigational difficulties, this would normally take 
two or three days. Without radar, the U-boats also had difficulty in remaining in contact, 
especially if forced to dive while the convoy executed an evasive turn. But it was the 
growing ubiquity of Allied air cover, which by 1944 forced the U-boat to spend two- 
thirds of their time submerged, that finally defeated the ability of the U-boat packs to 
locate and concentrate against convoys . 
312 When aircraft were absent, the U-boats had 
normally been able to make an average transit speed of about 12 knots. Since most of 
the U-boat pack was able to make contact with the convoy within the first two days, the 
furthest U-boats would have converged from a range of some 500 miles. Assuming that 
navigation was no more difficult and that communications difficulties could be 
overcome, McCrea thought that a submarine operating entirely submerged, capable of 
an equivalent speed and endurance, that is, 12 knots for 48 hours, would achieve 
similar results. While beyond the capability of the Type XXI U-boat, McCrea thought 
that such performance could be developed within the next ten years. 
The Germans had also tried to use pack tactics to overwhelm a convoy's 
defences by concentrating a large number of U-boats around a convoy and attacking 
simultaneously. This objective proved elusive. Indeed so great were 
... 
his difficulties in bringing the majority of members of a pack into contact with the 
convoy sometime within the two or three days following an initial sighting, that the 
attainment of this primary objective represented about the limit of his capabilities. 
once any particular U-boat gained contact it had to make the best of its individual 
opportunity and no attempt could be made to concert its action with that of another 
member of the pack. 313 
311 Captain R. J. R. Dendy, RN, Captain HMAISEE, Fairlie, to Director of Miscellaneous 
Weapons, Admiralty, No. D. 1802,12 March 1945, ADM 1/17583; 'Hedgehog and Squid 
Probabilities, ' J. R. Thompson, DMWD/20/61,19 April 1945, ADM 1/17583; 'Hedgehog and 
Squid Probabilities (Addendum to DMWD/20/61), ' J. R. Thompson, DMWD/20/61A, 16 May 
1945, ADM 1/17583. 
312 Llewellyn-Jones, 'British Responses to the U-boat..., ' p. 7. 
313 'Effect of High Submerged Speed on U-boat Tactics, ' W. H. McCrea, NORD, Report No. 
20/45,23 April 1945, ADM 219/225, p. 2. 
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McCrea pointed out that during the period of surface operations by U-boats, roughly 
one-third of contacts led to an attack, and about a third of these attacks resulted in a 
torpedo hit. Most of the failed approaches were due to interceptions by the convoy 
escorts. Some of the failures were due to the navigational problem of achieving a firing 
position, given the relatively limited engagement envelope of the torpedoes then in use. 
For the future, the situation would be different because a fast deep U-boat would be 
very difficult to intercept, unless there were revolutionary developments in escorts. 
Moreover, with pattern-running and homing torpedoes there was '-practically no 
problem of reaching a firing position other than merely getting within range. ' In addition 
these torpedoes could be fired without use of the periscope and each salvo fired was 
expected to claim a greater number of casualties. In the future torpedoes were likely, 
McCrea thought, to have a much longer range, so that, together with improved 
underwater performance, future U-boats were not expected to have much difficulty in 
converting contacts into attacks. 
McCrea noted that US submarines, '... admittedly against a moderately ineffective 
defence, ' had been able to use their high surface speed to regain attacking positions, 
so that they could deliver an average of two (and sometimes as many as six) attacks 
during a single convoy engagement. The Type XXI, with its rapid re-loading torpedo 
system, ought to be able to achieve as much. Indeed, he gloomily predicted, if these 
boats could attack in packs, they might be able to create such confusion that there 
seemed little reason why, with a total load of 400 torpedoes, their attack might not 
annihilate a1 00-ship convoy. McCrea thought this offered a challenge, for 
... the U-boat pack of the future (say about 10 years hence) could be more dangerous than the typical pack of the present war by a factor that might be of the 
order 100. This is not to say that its achievements would be measured by such a 
factor, but the figure is some index of the very big advances required in AIS 
measurels]. 
But, he went on to say, the 
... primary objective of the pack would be rendered unnecessary if the U-boats could be informed of the position and movements of shipping from other sources 
than their own reconnaissance. If the enemy could maintain adequate air 
reconnaissance (or some system of radar relays) combined with adequate 
navigational aids, he might choose to dispense with the pack system. In certain 
circumstances he might thereby achieve a dispersal of our A/S forces and more 
immunity for his U-boats. 314 
At first sight McCrea's paper seems to offer a rather gloomy prognosis for the future, 
and was quite out of character with his numerous other analyses. But his paper, with 
314 'Effect of High Submerged Speed on U-boat Tactics, ' W. H. McCrea, NORD, Report No. 
20/45,23 April 1945, ADM 219/225, p. 2. 
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remarkable insight, captures the nature of the problems and neatly encapsulates the 
challenge to be faced by anti-submarine forces for the future. There is no doubt that the 
wartime Admiralty would have confronted the issue and focussed the necessary 
resources of manpower and technical development on seeking solutions. However, just 
as the threat became a reality, the war in Europe ended, and with it the resources 
rapidly began to diminish with the demobilization of many of the wartime experts. 
McCrea, for one, soon left the Admiralty. Nevertheless, it was clear to everyone that 
the Type XXI technology would set the future standard of submarine capability. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the British (and the Americans) put a great deal of effort into 
extracting as much information as possible from their former enemies once the war 
was over. 
Captain Roberts' Interrogation of German U-boat Officers 
Barely a fortnight after the European war ended, Captain G. H. Roberts of WATU 
led an Allied team of experts on a week-long visit to the Continent to interrogate 
German U-boat officers. He was accompanied by Commander P. W. Gretton, an 
experienced Escort Group commander, Group Captain Gates and representatives from 
DNI, DNOR and the USN. 315 There were no surprises from the interrogations. Roberts' 
visit largely confirmed British assessments of German tactics and also revealed the 
enormous gulf between the two navies in their ability to co-ordinate all the operational, 
technical and training aspects of the campaign. The agenda for the visit, however, 
illuminates the main British concerns over future anti-submarine warfare. Roberts 
clearly wished to interrogate as many German officers as possible but was limited in 
his subjects by the poor state of communications, the general dispersal of personnel 
(many of them were PoWs in Russian hands) and the chaos following Germany's 
defeat. Nevertheless he was able to interview a number of key personnel, including 
Rear Admiral Godt, who had taken operational control of the U-boat arm after Donitz 
became C-in-C of the German Navy. Other key witnesses were Commanders Hessler, 
Cremer and Schnee. The former, a successful U-boat commander before becoming 
Staff Officer Operations at the U-boat headquarters, had helped plan for the first Type 
XXI operations and clearly had a detailed, if somewhat uncritical, knowledge of their 
capability. Cremer and Schnee were also experienced U-boat commanders and had 
commanded the first two Type XXI U-boats, U-2519 and U-251 1. (A third veteran U- 
boat commander, Erich Topp, was appointed to U-2513. ) Cremer's boat was, however, 
315 'Life and Letters of Gilbert Howland Roberts, ' Book 1,111 October 1900 -4 August 1945' [c. 
mid-60s], Captain G. H. Roberts RN, Papers, IWM 66/28/1, p. 144. 
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heavily damaged in an Allied air raid but Schnee, after a faltering start (due to serious 
technical defects), made one short operational sortie. 316 
Roberts concluded that the German plan was to continue the inshore campaign 
with the coastal Type XXIII, gradually replacing the Type VII schnorkel-fitted U-boats in 
this role, which had been a stop-gap solution. The Type XXI, itself a stop-gap until the 
Walter Type XXVI was available, was to re-establish ocean anti-convoy warfare. 317 
Both Godt and Hessler affirmed that it was planned to resume U-boat pack operations 
in deep water with the Type XXI, although they admitted that '... the projected methods 
of attack in Packs by Type XXI had not yet been worked out... ' in detail. Hessler, 
however, later mentioned that the 
... final "Battle Instructions for Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats" were compiled from the evaluation of extensive sea trials carried out in one boat of each type, 
commanded by two well-trained officers, Korvettenkapitan Topp and 
Kapitanleutnant Emmermann. 318 
Consequently, the Germans had planned to operate Type XXIs individually in ocean 
operations until their capabilities were fully understood. They might then be used in 
shallow waters, though this large U-boat presented a strong asdic target and would be 
difficult to bottom safely. Furthermore, being a more complicated boat, it would be less 
resistant to depth-charge attack. Overall, the Germans thought, Type XXI was better 
adapted to open ocean operations. It became clear during the interrogations that the 
Germans had not developed a coherent concept of operations for the Type XXI and 
this impression was reinforced by subsequent questioning of U-boat personnel which 
became available to DAUD and DASW by the end of June 1945 . 
31" There was much 
faith that the "new" technology would overcome operational problems, though for these 
to achieve their full operational capability would not be possible until their crews had 
gained experience. This would have taken time, which would have given the British the 
breathing space to hone their tactical counter-measures. 
The Germans were pressed on their concepts for using these U-boats in ocean 
attacks. Ultimately, they wanted to use pack tactics after the crews had gained 
316 Captain G. H. Roberts, RN, Western Approaches Tactical Unit, to C-in-C, WA, 30 May 1945, 
ADM 1/17561, passim; Erich Topp, Letter, 7 July 1997; Peter Cremer, U333: The Story of a U- 
boat Ace, tr. Lawrence Wilson (London: The Bodley Head, 1984), p. 202. 
317 The following narrative is based on the interrogations of Rear Admiral Godt, Commanders 
Cremer and Hessler, and Lieutenant Commander Mehl, in: Captain G. H. Roberts, 30 May 1945, 
ADM 1/17561. 
31'3 Hessler, The U-boat War, Vol. 111, p. 86; 'Kampfanweisungen fur Typ XXIII (Battle 
Instructions for Type XXIII), ' M. G. Saunders (tr. ), DNI, NID. 24, Ref. TR/PG/28986/NID, 24 April 
1946, Box 270, FDS, NHB. 
"I 'Summary of Statements made by German Naval and Technical Personnel, ' NO 1/PW, 
Summary No. 133 for week ending 22 June 1945, 'P/W Summaries, 121-136'Vol. VII, NHB. 
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experience during solo operations. The intention was for pack tactics to be carried out 
submerged, which raised the tricky problem of communications, essential for co- 
ordinating the concentration of the pack and avoiding mutual interference during 
attacks. The Germans thought that the difficulties would have been overcome, perhaps 
by use of the new "burst" radio transmitter system. '" Cremer was of the opinion that 
submerged pack attacks could be made by using the good hydrophones and Niebelung 
(Asdic) of the Type XXI, combined with the use of periscope observations either by 
day, or at night with a good moon. The great advantage conferred on the Type XXI by 
its high submerged speed was that it could close convoys from much wider angles than 
earlier boats, as Schnee remarked to Group Captain Gates. Closing at a speed of 10- 
11 knots was economical in battery usage, and left sufficient capacity for subsequent 
evasion. Once contact was made the Germans would soon have the option of firing 
from outside the screen using long-range torpedoes. The balance of opinion was that 
the final screen penetration would be made at silent speed, about 5 knots, with the 
submarine bow-on to the convoy, so that she would present the smallest asdic echo. 
Even at 8 or 9 knots the Type XXI was no noisier than a Type VI I at 3 or 4 knots. Once 
through the screen, the Type XXI's speed and endurance would allow her to get under 
the convoy where, in relative safety, she could fire torpedoes from deep. The most 
difficult problem, once under the convoy, was to maintain station there. It was easy, 
Roberts deduced, for the U-boat to fail to appreciate an alteration of course by the 
convoy, though he did not press the questioning for fear of revealing that this was in 
the current British inventory of counter-measures against a U-boat sheltering under a 
convoy. The Type XXI's high speed and great manoeuvrability was best reserved for 
avoiding attacks by AIS vessels. However, Gates, drawing together the opinions of the 
other interrogators considered 
... that generally speaking, we had given ... [the Germans] more credit than was their due. We were about 3 months ahead in anticipating the effects of the Type 
XXI U-boats and that we were inclined to give more credit than their tactical ability 
would really warrant321 
The potential threat posed by the Walter-boats, however, seemed altogether 
more formidable, and was at the forefront of Admiralty and Roberts' thinking. Roberts 
spent a fifth of his time in Germany specifically locating the positions where the 
Germans had scuttled the prototype Type XVII Walter-boats. He also questioned the 
German officers on the tactical use of the Type XXVI Walter-boats. These boats, 
Admiral Godt stated, were to have been large, ocean-going submarines, similar in size 
320 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
321 'Bergen, ' Gretton Papers, NMM(G). 
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to the Type XXI, though construction had not yet started. The Type XXVI was planned 
to be capable of sustaining 23 knots for 6 hours, using its Walter-turbine propulsion 
system, after which it would have expended all of its hydrogen-peroxide fuel. The high, 
but limited endurance, sprint speed of the Type XXVI could be used to gain bearing to 
get into a good firing position and to avoid being attacked. These U-boats were also 
equipped with a conventional diesel-battery system, though of much lower capacity 
than that fitted in the Type XXI and little better than that of the Type VII. During the 
interrogation Admiral Godt exposed his technical ignorance of the Type XVII's 
capabilities, which he confused with those of the much more ambitious Type MVI 
311 design. 
Horton succinctly summarised the situation. "We must be prepared, " he observed 
0 ... for a definite increase in underwater speed with a new type of self-contained submerged propulsion ... and the U-boat virtually need never surface. 
But hand in 
hand with high underwater speed goes an increase in underwater noise. Hence, if 
the future U-boat decides to use its speed at an inopportune moment, it may well 
give away her presence at a considerable distance. It may, therefore, be deduced 
that if such high speed is to be available, it will be used mainly for withdrawal from 
being attacked by an escort vessel or withdrawal to safety after firing torpedoes. I 
believe that the actual method of attack in the future will still be slow, stealthy, and 
silent 
*This new propulsion may also affect torpedo design, and we may find long-range 
fast torpedoes fired at convoys from outside the screen. Yet I believe that the 
skilled torpedoman will prefer to get to short range in order to obtain maximum hits. 
This again implies close range and stealthy infiltration of the screen by the U-boat 
*New tactics for attacking the fast U-boat must be devised, new types of faster 
escort vessels and new types of weapons are very early and pressing 
requirements. 
R3 
The Thrall of the Walter-Boat 
At the end of February 1945 DNI reported on the German development of the 
small Type XVIIB and the large Type XXVI U-boats, both incorporating the Walter gas 
turbine propulsion unit for very high speed submerged. DNI's report confirmed that the 
Germans had completed at least three Type XVIIB and were building five more. DNI 
also thought that the Germans would start producing the Type XXVI shortly. 324 These 
boats potentially posed a dangerous threat and one that concerned the Admiralty. 
Perhaps the mesmerising quality of high underwater speeds and technological novelty 
overwhelmed the objective review of their serious operational limitations, particularly 
their poor endurance. Nevertheless, Roberts paid a great deal of attention to these 
322 See Appendix 7. 
323 W. S. Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western Approaches (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1954). p. 228. 
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boats during his visit to Germany. When his report arrived in the Admiralty it was 
undoubtedly noted amongst the senior members of the Staff dealing with A/S matters. 
Roberts' assessment emphasized the lack of any coherent German doctrine for the use 
of the Walter boats, but this did little to ameliorate the Admiralty's concern over the 
ability of existing weapons to deal with this 25-knot submarine. 325 Prichard immediately 
wrote to the Captains of HMS Osprey and HMA/SEE, enclosing a paper on the *Use of 
Squid against the 25 Knot U-boat" and asking for comments as well as trials on the 
attack teachers. The problem, Prichard suggested, was a complex one, because the 
analysis would have to consider the '... efficiency of the asdic set and the manoeuvring 
qualities of the ship... ' in order to arrive at an estimate of the effectiveness of the 
weapon. It was also necessary to consider the modifications already planned to the 
weapon and asdic gear, which would be forthcoming in about five years'time. 
In his paper, Prichard proposed to deal with the problem, firstly, over the next five 
years and, then, for the longer term. Squid, he noted, had been designed to destroy 
,... a slow-moving U-boat whose maximum diving depth was about 800 ft. ' Because of 
the high sink rate of the Squid bombs, it was unlikely that a U-boat, even at great 
depth, would be able to avoid the pattern by an alteration of course, unless he used 
speeds in excess of three knots, or had ample warning of the moment of firing by the 
A/S ship. Wartime experience suggested that conventional U-boats achieved neither of 
these criteria. Consequently, during the last months of the war, Squid-fifted ships were 
achieving a 60% kill rate, double that of Hedgehog and 12 times higher than depth- 
charges. However, against a submarine capable of up to 25 knots the probability of 
s326 success would be '-wholly different.... Prichard cited several reasons for this. In 
any deliberate hunt against a fast submarine, attacks tended to delivered from the stern 
of the submarine, as the trials with Seraph had shown. At this aspect, accurate asdic 
ranging on the target would be made more difficult by the interference caused by the 
submarine's wake. Errors would, therefore, be introduced in the calculation of the 
moment to fire, and this, in turn, would degrade the accuracy of the attack. It was also 
possible that the HE from the target would be so loud as to obliterate the echoes in the 
operator's headphones and on the asdic recorder, making it impossible to fire at all. 
Even if contact could be maintained, the submarine could make much greater use of 
the weapon's dead time, that is the time between the moment of firing and the arrival of 
325 'The Use of Squid against the 25 knot U-Boat, ' Captain N. A. Prichard, DASW, to Captain 
HMS Osprey and Captain HMA/SEE, ASW 945/45,2 July 1945, ADM 1/17591. 
326 'The Use of Squid against the 25 knot U-Boat, ' [Captain N. A. Prichard], DASW, [ASW 
945/45], 30 June 1945, ADM 1/17591, p. 2. 
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the bombs at the preset target depth, to avoid damage from the pattern. The situation 
was equivalent to attacks with depth-charges against slow submersibles. 
It might not be possible to set sufficient deflection on the Squid mounting to hit a 
submarine on a crossing course when it was taking avoiding action. The firing bearing 
would, therefore, have to be estimated by the ship's team. Similarly, in a counter- 
attack, when the submarine might be closing the A/S ship at high speed the accuracy 
of the attack could be compromised by the high dynamics. 'In fact, ' Prichard concluded, 
the difficulties of attack with present asdic and Squid gear are so numerous that 
nothing other than a Osnap* attack could reasonably be attempted against a U-boat 
travelling at 25 knots. 327 
At 25 knots, however, the HE from a submarine, Prichard thought, would be very loud, 
making it possible for the A/S ships to hold contact fairly easily, as least for a time. 
However, this presupposed that the asdic would function as a hydrophone at the high 
speeds necessary for the escorts to remain close to the target. This might be a 
particular problem if the submarine chose to evade at high speed and up sea. A/S 
ships might not be able to keep up and '... loss of contact might well be the rule.... ' 
Prichard observed that a new dome to house the asdic was being produced at the 
highest priority, which, he hoped, would allow asdics to be operated at 25-30 knots, by 
reducing effects of flow noise round the dome. In all this he was ignoring the possibility 
that, if the submarine were able to evade at great depth, then the HE from its propellers 
328 
might be much reduced, as DNOR and ASWORG had noted in earlier analyses. 
Beyond the next five years, Prichard hoped that certain modifications would improve 
the situation. Squid, as had been foreseen a year earlier, needed to be'... adapted ... for 
use as an A/S gun. ' In such a form the weapon would be used to fire salvoes of bombs 
'... with a fair degree of accuracy... ', either in a counter-attack or in a series of firings to 
achieve a kill. But this could only be attained '... in conjunction with improvements to the 
asdic gear.... ' These improvements were the adoption of the asdic split-beam 
technique (which eliminated the need for the "cut-on' procedure) and PPI displays, 
which would allow a high speed contact to be held accurately. To hold contact, the 
asdic domes would have to be modified to allow operation '... in any seaway in which 
high speed is possible. ' The asdic amplifiers, too, had to be modified '... to overcome 
327 'The Use of Squid against the 25 knot U-Boat, ' [Captain N. A. Prichard], DASW, [ASW 
945/45], 30 June 1945, ADM 1/17591, p. 3. 
328 'Surface Craft Tactical Countermeasures to Type XXI U-Boats, ' Research Report No. 93, 
ASWORG/206 (LO)1380-45,4 May 1945, ADM 1/17588. 
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the heavy masking of the echo by the HE of the target, thus enabling a succession of 
attacks to be delivered on a fast moving target. 9329 
In this paper, Prichard had not quite defined the ultimate requirement for this type 
of weapon: the capability to fire on any bearing and at a variable range. He did, 
however, think that a weapon of the A/S gun type held one major advantage over a 
homing torpedo, which could only hit or miss, and, therefore, was of little use in a 
counter-attack. Prichard hoped, too, that a submarine approaching a convoy at very 
high speed would produce so much noise that ample warning would be achieved, 
allowing the convoy to manoeuvre out of the U-boat's path. This tactic might be 
successful, he thought, since the U-boat itself would be deaf at these high speeds and 
would not appreciate the convoy's evasive turn until it slowed down to fire, when it 
might be too late. Prichard, however, was not taking into account the possibility 
mentioned elsewhere, that future submarines would be able to fire long-range 
torpedoes from well outside the detection range of escorts. At the time of writing the 
paper Prichard still anticipated that a partial answer to this problem would be deduced 
from the forthcoming trials with the captured Type XXI U-boats. 
Over the next month both Osprey and the HMA/SEE wrote appreciations and 
carried out trials on the asdic attack tables to determine whether Squid would be able 
to cope with a submarine travelling at 20-25 knots. Their conclusion was that it would 
not. HMA/SEE considered the problem further in August but returned to the same 
conclusion. He also considered the relative merits of rocket-propelled and Squid-type 
weapons in dealing with these very fast submarines and concluded that the Squid-type 
seemed the more promising of the two. A few months later, in October and November 
1945, Commander J. Grant, Commander (D), Londonderry, and HMA/SEE used the 
Londonderry Flotilla for trials against a high speed motor torpedo craft, simulating 
Walter-boats, to investigate the requirements for a future Squid-type weapon. These 
trials concluded that the current Squid and A/S gear were inadequate and what was 
needed was a weapon capable of firing at a variable range and over an increased arc 
of training. This idea would eventually be the basis for the "Limbo" A/S mortar Staff 
Requirement issued in the following year. Meanwhile, Osprey and HMA/SEE 
investigated the ability of a '... striking force of five 35-knot escorts with air co-operation' 
to chase a 25-knot submarine. Their reports concluded that: 
AIS vessels could maintain contact provided surface weather conditions allowed 
them their full speed, but [the escorts] would have difficulty in attacking. Aircraft co- 
329 'The Use of Squid against the 25 knot U-Boat, ' [Captain N. A. Prichard], DASW, [ASW 
945/45], 30 June 1945, ADM 1/17591, pp. 4-5. 
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operation with sono-buoys would help but [it was HMA/SEE's] view that sono- 
buoys would have to be super-sonic and directional. 330 
Osprey and Londonderry undertook only one investigation into attacks on a convoy by 
a single Type XXI U-boat, which had to be cleared out from under the convoy. The 
emphasis in the first few months after the German war ended was clearly on 
investigations to counter the potential threat of the Walter-boat. At the end of the war 
... our 
Assault Teams entered Germany, and the secret of the German 
accomplishment was revealed. The importance of this discovery was appreciated 
at once and steps taken ... to control the establishment where this research was being carried out and to hold the German personnel employed there. 331 
These activities were a closely guarded Anglo-American secret. 332 This interest 
was reflected in the extraordinary measures taken by both Britain and the US to secure 
specimens of the existing Walter-boats, the Type XVIls U-1406 and U-1407, whose 
locations were confirmed and reported by Captain Roberts in May 1945. These boat 
had been scuttled, contrary to the surrender terms at the end of the war. The British 
were so irritated by this action that the German officer responsible was tried and 
imprisoned. So important was this acquisition that the British delegation negotiating the 
division of the German fleet with the Russians in August 1945 were told that the 
hydrogen peroxide fuel (known as high test peroxide, or HTP) facilities, needed to 
support these boats, should not be discussed with the Russians. The British had raised 
U-1407 in June, and at first intended to re-fit her in Kiel. But in mid-July, the Controller 
called a meeting to discuss the Admiralty's policy on the future of submarine design, 
taking into account the information then being discovered in Germany. Considering the 
high potential of the Walter propulsion system, the meeting decided that U-1407 should 
be brought over to Britain along with the higher powered Type 18X Walter-turbine (after 
it had been bench tested in Germany), with the project to be supported by Professor 
Walter's technical team. So, in August, U-1407 was hurriedly sealed up and taken 
under tow to Barrow-in-Furness, followed shortly by much of the German personnel 
and test plant from the Walterwerke in Kiel. (By this time the USN had transported U- 
1406 to America) 
. 
333 As HMS Meteorite, U-1407, became the only running Walter- 
330 'Summary of DTASW`s Investigation on A/S Warfare, ' Annex C to TASW. 021/46, Revised 
Edition, 4 May 1946, ADM 1/20960, p. 4; 'Progress Report: Shipbome A/S Weapons, ' 
TASW. 038146, [5 September 1946], ADM 1/20960, pp. 6-8. 
331 Minute, Engineer-in-Chief, 30 January 1946, ADM 1/27774. 
332 'Monday, 7 May 1945, War Diary (Naval), 1-15 May 1945, ' NHB. 
333 'Search for three experimental U-boats, Type XVII, May 2e, ' Appendix X to Captain G. H. 
Roberts, 30 May 1945, ADM 1/17561; Chris Madsen, The Royal Navy and German Naval 
Disannament, 1942-1947 (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 112-113,124 n. 64 and 180. 
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powered submarine in 1949 . 
334 A Russian-built version of the Type XXVI was used for 
trials between 1955 and 1959 but, following an explosion during a submerged run, she 
was decommissioned. By then the British were successfully running HM Submarines 
Explorer and Excalibur both with improved HTP turbine designs. 335 
Planning U-boats Trials 
In the autumn of 1944, while the trials with Seraph were still underway, Rear 
Admiral G. E. Creasy, Flag Officer (Submarines), proposed that some U-boats should 
be taken over at the German surrender for technical investigation and sea trials. Thus, 
naval trials were planned with Type VIIs U-1105 (covered with rubber anti-asdic 
coating, "Albrecht') and U-1171, as well as Gnat and LuT torpedo firings. Radar trials 
. 
336 (I of schnorkel detection were also planned for Coastal Command Most of these t [a s 
were completed by the end of 1945.337 Both Creasy and DNI thought that trials with the 
Type XXI were of '... the greatest importance. e338 At first sight the captured Type XXIs 
appeared impressive. They were large submarines with a sleek hull form, as had been 
noted by Captain Gilbert Roberts during his inspection of two Type XXIs during his visit 
to Germany in late May 1945. Captain Ashbourne, the Captain (S/M), Third Submarine 
Flotilla, conceded, that the Germans were '... streets ahead of [the British] ... in hull 
forms both as regards surface and dived speeds and deep diving depths. ' But on closer 
inspection the '... general impression is one of admiral [sic] conception, but poor 
execution. ' Overall, he added, 
... these German submarines [were] ... a queer mixture of very good and very bad points. The acute shortage of non-ferrous metals is evident everywhere. Wiring 
and switch gear copper is cut to the barest minimum, and there is continual trouble 
with seizure of steel valve spindles and similar gear. There is lavish use of 
synthetic rubber for silent and anti-shock mountings and even deck mats. 339 
In a post-war lecture A. J. Sims of DNC's department, doubted the claim that 
German submarines were structurally any better than the British types. Sims thought 
'... that there have been many exaggerated statements concerning the actual 
334 'Submarine Development, ' DTASW, TASW. 330/47, November 1947, ADM 1/27215, p. 4; 
'HMS Meteorite Trials Report 17 March to 30 April, 1949, 'RNSM A1994/097. 
335 Jorgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov, Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet Soviet Naval Strategy 
and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935-1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 205. 3m 'Minutes of a Meeting held at Northways on 25 June 1945: Trials to be carried out in, and 
with, U-boats, 'n. d., ADM 1/18557. 
337 Minute, G. B. H. Fawkes forAdmiral (Submarines), 16 November 1945, ADM 116/5500. 
338 'Type of German U-boats Required for Post War Experiments and Tests, ' Admiral 
ýSubmarines), Northways, to Secretary of the Admiralty, 15 October 1944, ADM 1/16384. S 'Third Submarine Flotilla Monthly General Letter - July 1945, ' Captain (S/M), Third 




achievements of the Germans. The type XXI class is a very good example.... ' The 
Germans hoped to achieve a collapse depth of 300 metres (975 feet) - slightly deeper 
than the British OX class. In fact due to design weaknesses the boat could only go to 
180 metres - and even at this depth '... local structural weaknesses were observed. ' 
There was, he claimed, '... no evidence of abnormal structural strength of German hulls 
compared with our latest standards. ' They had achieved greater diving depths not by 
improvements to the hull designs but by reducing the safety factor applied to the 
operating depths permitted. 340 
In July 1945, as America, Russia and Britain were haggling over the fate of the 
surrendered German fleet, and especially the remaining U-boats, Creasy was 
preparing to start the trials with a Type XXI, in advance of any formal allocation of U- 
boats to Britain. British planning was already well advanced and by mid July 1945, 
Admiral Creasy wanted to start the trials with a Type XXIII, U-2326, followed by the 
Type XXI, U-2502, after completion of her essential docking. Consideration was being 
given to experiments with the more radical design Walter-boats. The Admiralty 
approved the proposed trials programme at the end of August, even though manpower 
to crew captured U-boats was scarce. It is easy to see why the British were so keen to 
undertake trials with a Type XXI U-boat, since it was the only existing submarine 
capable of 15 knots submerged, as well as with the even faster Walter-boats. But it is 
more problematic to understand why they continued with the trials with the Type XXIII. 
Probably sheer habit and curiosity played their part and the organizations simply 
wanted to know whether their assessments during the autumn of 1944 had been 
accurate. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the British knew at the time that 
Type XXIII U-boats had made at least three cruises in British waters, and that none had 
been sunk. 341 And these trials were being planned while the war against Japan was still 
in progress, and while British forces were faced with the prospect of invading the 
Japanese homeland. 
There was a desire to apply British experience to forthcoming operations in 
Japanese coastal waters. Interrogation of German PoW had established that details 
had been passed to the Japanese on U-boat designs, including the schnorkel, as well 
342 as new torpedoes, communications, radar, and GSR equipment. The British did not 
rate the Japanese submarine force as highly as the defeated German U-boats, but it 
m 'Submarine Development: Lecture given to Senior Officers' Technical Course on Tuesday 6 
May 1947, '[A. J. Sims], RNSM A1990/083, pp. 4 and 9. 341 'Survey of A/U Operations-, ' ADM 1/17653, p. 2; Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence, Vol. III, 
Part 2, p. 633. 
342 NID L. C. Report No. 999, H. Clanchy, DDNI(H), 16 June 1945, ADM 1/17653. 
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seemed logical that British developments should be measured against the technical 
capability of the Germans, even though it was assessed that the Japanese were 
unlikely to adopt all the German technology. 343 The Captain, HMS Osprey, Dunoon, 
had been kept informed. He had formed a new tactical unit at Christmas 1944 to deal 
with training for Far East operations. 344 Notwithstanding the effort being devoted to 
forecasting countermeasures to fast U-boats, the main operational focus remained on 
dealing with existing U-boat types. Pritchard, for example, made it clear that fast U- 
boats were to be expected in any future wars, and investigation of the tactics involved 
was to be prominent in the instruction of A/S specialist officers. But, for officers 
earmarked for operations against the Japanese the emphasis should be on inshore 
operations against conventional U-boats, and he 
... considered that to give undue prominence to 
fast U-boats would not only be a 
waste of time but might lead to the employment of wrong tactics against the U- 
boats more likely to be encountered. 345 
In mid-June 1945, Captain Howard-Johnston, DAUD, instructed his staff to 
prepare a paper encapsulating the experience of inshore operations against German 
U-boats, which might have application to the Allied operations in coastal waters during 
the planned landings on the Japanese mainland. 346 Over the next few weeks, the 
British inshore A/S experience was drawn together during a series of weekly meetings, 
in co-operation with Captain Prichard. A joint draft paper was issued to other interested 
staff divisions on 5 August with comment requested within 10 days. They clearly had 
no knowledge of the imminence of the atomic bomb attacks, although the uncertainty 
over the effects these weapons would have may have not deterred Howard-Johnston 
and Pritchard. The paper was then to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 
and to Admiral Nimitz. In the event, the Japanese surrendered after the dropping of the 
two atom bombs on 6 and 9 August 1945 and the joint paper was withdrawn. 347 
Prichard emphasized that the Admiralty's assessment of the future threat in 
Japanese waters was more focussed on an inshore campaign, rather than the start of 
ocean pack tactics. As a result information was being collated from PoW and captured 
German papers. 348 Against this background, the British were keen to pursue the trials 
343 'Submarine Warfare in the Pacific, ' Secretary, Naval Board, NSS. 11270-53 Vol. I (Staff), 13 
June 1945, Folder CNA 7-5-9, Vol. 11022, RG 24, NAC. 
3" Memoir, Mrs D. Coyne, [early 1990s], IWM 93/22/1, pp. 170-172 and 183. 
345 'Osprey Tactical Unit - Policy, ' [Captain] N. A. Prichard, DASW, to The Captain, HMS 
Osprey, ASW1044/45,25 July 1945, ADM 1/17591. 
3" 'Planning, ' [C. D. Howard-Johnston], 12 June [1945], ADM 1/17653. 
347 DASW, to The Captain HMS Osprey, ASW/AUD. 2018/45,27 August 1945, ADM 1/17653. 




with the captured German Type XXIII, U-2326. In any case the British hand was forced 
by the series of defects with the Type XXIs which meant, DASW pointed out, that 
'... only the Type XXIII coastal U-boat, U-2326, was now available as a target. 3411 But U- 
2326 also had her share of engine and schnorkel defects and it was not until July that 
she successfully completed her first dive, followed by First of Class trials at the end of 
August 1945 during which U-2326 only achieved 9.7 knots submerged. This, Admiral 
Creasy pointed out, was below her'... reputed speed of 13 to 13%knots..., ' though her 
endurance was just under 2 hours . 
350 A higher speed of just over 11 knots was 
eventually attained, but only at the expense of overloading (and damaging) the main 
motor . 
351 Then under the control of Commander J. Grant, Commander (D) of the 
Londonderry Flotilla, in HMS Fame, she was used for a repeat of the earlier Seraph 
tactical serials. One key element of these trials was to determine which was the best 
weapon and attack procedure against the U-boat. The A/S ships were to stream 
Unifoxer continuously, which would allow any tactical disadvantage during high speed 
avoiding action by the submarine to be noted. During the trials the escorts were using 
the now routine combined 800-800 echo and HE sweep. It had also been planned to 
investigate sonobuoy tracking of the Type XXIII but Grant reported that Coastal 
Command had cancelled these trials, which were, instead, to be completed against a 
British S-Class fast submarine. 
In the opinion of Captain Lord Ashbourne, Captain, Third Submarine Flotilla, 
there was '... little to commend this cheap submarine. v352 Nor, during the tactical trials, 
was naval opinion greatly improved. Grant reported that'... the Type XXIII U-boat does 
not appear to be of particularly robust construction nor can it dive to great depths or 
proceed at very high speed. 9353 Although, Captain W. J. W. Woods, who had relieved 
Ashboume in September 1944, later admitted that U-2326 had proved to be '... a small 
and handy submarine' that had advantages in both attack and evasion, it was difficult, 
he thought, for a Type XXIII to remain under a convoy as an evasive tactic. He also 
emphasized that, given her small size, U-2326 offered a surprisingly good asdic target, 
which made it unwise to bottom to evade modern A/S vessels. However, the trials did 
3497actical Trials with Captured German U-boats, ' DASW, [28] August 1945, ADM 1/18557. 
350 'Appendix. Remarks on First of Class Trials and Deep Dive of U-2326, ' Enclosure No. 3 to 
Admiral (Submarines') letter No. 1681/SM. 3530 of 24 November, 1945. ADM 1/18557. 
351 'First of Class Trials - Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats, ' Admiral (Submarines) to the 
Secretary of the Admiralty, No. 131 I/SM. 3530,7 September 1945, ADM 1/18328. 
352 'Third Submarine Flotilla Monthly General Letter - July 1945, ' Captain (S/M), Third 
Submarine Flotilla, HMS Forth, to Admiral (Submarines), No. TSF. 1230/3714,8 August 1945, 
RNSM Al 944/007. 
353 'Trials with Captured German U-boat - Type XXIII', Commander John Grant, Commander 
(D), Londonderry Flotilla, HMS Fame, D. 14/21/1,18 October 1945, ADM 1/18557, p. 2. 
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Plate 19: U-2326 Track Chart 






not go as well as these comments might suggest. U-2326 operated at various speeds 
between 3 and 7% knots, and occasionally bottomed, but as a result of peacetime 
safety rules, A/S ships were not to counter-attack during the tactical serials until five 
minutes after a ship in the convoy was "torpedoed", by which time U-2326 would have 
cleared the immediate area unhindered . 
354 Of course, as her Captain noted, the U-boat 
was not put under realistic pressure by the A/S ships, because they could not actually 
drop depth-charges, and consequently, neither the submarine nor the escorts behaved 
as they would in war. Although Grant conformed to tactical doctrine by ordering 
"Artichoke", "Square" and "Scabbard" searches, he failed to find U-2326 because, as 
was normal for shallow water operations, interfering echoes and non-subs delayed the 
full implementation of each plan. The subsequent analysis of the serial also showed 
how untidy tactics could be in practice, when compared to the geometrical neatness of 
the tactical manual (Plate 19). 355 This was well understood by experienced practitioners 
and helps to explain the emphasis placed on initiative by the wartime training 
organization. As the exercise played out, Grant was faced with an impossible dilemma: 
whether to try to cover the furthest extent of the U-boat's possible evasion, or to 
assume that she had bottomed near the position of original torpedo attack. He did not 
have the assets to cover both possibilities, and in any case did not have the strength to 
cast the wider search. And this against a U-boat capable of only 11 knotsl 
Type XXI Trials and Tribulations 
As the summer of 1945 wore on, two factors started to have a great influence on 
future planning, one imagined and one real. Firstly, the Type XXIII trials, although 
reasonably successful in their own right, highlighted the shortfall in the submarine's 
performance when compared to its design speed. When the Type XXIs in British hands 
started to experience a series of major defects (some of them dangerous to submarine 
safety) and inspections revealed the poor build quality of these boats, doubts were 
fostered that the low performance of the Type XXIII would apply to the Type XXI. At the 
time it seemed reasonable to suppose that the Type XXI would be little faster than the 
existing British modified S-class submarines. There was no immediate threat to 
counter, for the Japanese were thought unlikely to be able to make use of such 
technology. The prime purpose of using the Type XXI boats was to establish the 
capability of existing A/S gear in dealing with a 15-knot target. If this speed could not 
be obtained, there was little advantage in persevering with the German boats and 
354'Enclosure C to Commander (D), Londonderry Flotilla, HMS Flame's No: D. 14/21/1 dated 18 
October 1945, 'ADM 1/18557. 
355 A similar point is made in Rodger, 'Image and Reality'. 
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having to cope with the endless defects. The British S-class would do. Furthermore, 
towards the end of the year the problems surrounding the Walter types became 
apparent. A meeting was held by DNC at Bath on 27 November 1945 where future 
submarine design was discussed. 
It quickly became apparent that a fast submarine target for A/S detection and 
weapon development would not be available for some years and U-1407 would not be 
available until late 1948 at the earliest. Other possibilities, such as new construction, 
were even more remote. The meeting concluded that a more extensively modified S- 
class submarine would be able to achieve speeds of up to 16 knots and, given the 
urgency of providing a fast target, plans for such a conversion should be pressed 
forward as soon as possible . 
356 The problems with the Walter-boats were largely 
technical in nature. U-1407, considering her dilapidated state when she arrived in 
Britain, needed a substantial amount of work before she would be ready for sea trials. 
The Walter-turbines also needed further development, and there was the major task of 
supplying and storing adequate quantities of the hydrogen peroxide fuel (as well as 
specialised diesel fuel). All this entailed major expense . 
357This lack of a high-speed 
target was becoming critical if adequate testing was to be carried out of the new, 
improved A/S gear and weapons which would be ready at the beginning of the 1950s. 
Once the trials with U-2326 were completed, Admiral Creasy, Flag Officer 
(Submarines), reduced her to care and maintenance at Lisahally and, after a long 
delay, the Admiralty approved her loan to the French Navy in early 1946 . 
358 While the 
trials with U-2326 were underway, it had been hoped to run the Type XXI, U-2502, but 
she proved to be an even bigger headache. She suffered a depressing series of 
defects, which required the U-boat to be docked, but while on passage to the shipyard 
at Cammell Lairds she suffered a main motor breakdown '... in a big way.... ' The 
repairs to U-2502 would be a complicated and expensive operation and there was no 
guarantee that she would not break down again. All in all, she was becoming a project 
the British could ill afford. 'It has therefore been decided, ' Ashbourne wryly commented, 
'to return this model to Lisahally and draw another one ., 
35" This boat, U-3017, was in 
356 IHMS Scotsman: Conversion to Fast A/S Target, ' Section 27, DNC Department, October 
1948, RNSM A1991/098. 
357 Ingolin (Hydrogen Peroxide). Underwater Propulsion Development, ' 1945-1946, ADM 
1/27774; IHMS Meteorite Trials Report, 17 March to 30 April, 1949, 'RNSM A1994/097. 
m David J. Lees, 'Report of Operation "Thankful", ' German Naval Group, World Ship Society, 1 
December 1991. 
" 'Third Submarine Flotilla Monthly General Letter - July 1945, ' Captain (S/M), Third 
Submarine Flotilla, HMS Forth, to Admiral (Submarines), No. TSF. 1230/3714,8 August 1945, 
RNSM All 944/007. 
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little better state, but it was still a heavy blow when she suffered a battery explosion in 
August 1945 that caused extensive damage and put her out of commission. 3r'o 
The explosion damaged U-3017 and injured to one officer and seven ratings. The 
Board of Inquiry found that the accident was due to the abandonment of British 
procedures in favour of those used by the Germans. The Board suggested the German 
practices had caused a number of battery explosions in other Type XXIs, and had 
possibly led to their loss. 361 These rumours were supported by the interrogation of an 
experienced German Engineer Officer who recalled four battery explosions in Type 
XXIs. He stated that the main electrical cables ran in the bilges under the battery 
compartment, and that low insulation and the presence of bilge water caused arcing. 
With poor ventilation when the battery was freely exuding hydrogen (during charging), 
the likelihood of an explosion was high. This was a problem that also exercised the 
designers of the "Guppy" conversions of US Navy fleet submarines to achieve high 
underwater speed. At least one, USS Cochino, suffered a battery explosion and 
sank. 362 This dangerous design fault, along with other defects, meant, in Creasy's 
opinion, that 
... before U-3017 or any other Type 
XXI U-boat could be considered suitable for 
trials of a prolonged nature.... a complete and extensive refit and survey would be 
necessary. 363 
A despondent Ashbourne realized that they were virtually back where they 
started and it looked as though the working up of this type would be a protracted 
business. These engineering problems with the Type XXIs in British hands showed that 
if any of them were to be made fit for trials they would need substantial dockyard work. 
This would strain the existing British submarine refit facilities desperately needed for 
work on war-worn British submarines. These boats if they were to be more than 75% 
effective also needed to be fitted with the latest periscope radar equipment. ' 
360 'First of Class Trials - Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats, ' Admiral (Submarines) to the 
Secretaryof theAdmiralty, No. 1311/SM. 3530,7 September 1945, ADM 1/18328. 
361 Enclosure to Admiral (Submarines) Letter No. 1415/SM. 3577,4 October 1945, covering the 
Report by Lieutenant J. S. Launders, DSO, DSC, RN, Commanding Officer of ex-German U- 
3017,30 August 1945, ADM 1/18949; Board of Inquiry Report, HMS Amphion at Barrow-in- 
Furness, 3 September 1945, ADM 1/18949. No record of the loss of a Type XXI due to a battery 
explosion has been discovered. 362 Gary E. Weir, Forged in War The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine 
Construction, 1940-1961 (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1993), 
RP., 104 and 114. 3 3 Board of Inquiry to Investigate the Explosion Onboard U-3017 on 29 August 1945 (Captain 
(Slm), Third Submarine Flotilla's No. 6306/3739 of 13 July 1945), ' G. E. Creasy, Rear Admiral 
(Submarines), 1415/SM. 3577,4 October 1945, ADM 1/18949. 
' 'Meeting held by VCNS on 28 December, 1945, to consider the number of submarines that 
could be kept in service in the Post-War Fleet, ' Head of Military Branch 11,5 February 1946, 
ADM 1/19301; 'Meeting held by Vice Controller at 1430 on 24 January 1946 to consider further 
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Moreover, as Creasy observed, the Germans had not succeeded in getting these 
submarines into an operational state. He also had in mind the preliminary results of the 
speed trials with the Type XXIII, U-2326, which had failed to achieve its design speed 
by over 2 knots, when he pessimistically questioned whether the Type XXIs would 
achieve a submerged speed much in excess of the converted "S" claSS. 365 This proved 
to be a crucial, though in hindsight, wrong assessment. 30 Still, at the time, Creasy's 
judgement made sense and he therefore recommended that the trials of a type XXI U- 
boat should be cancelled. He consoled himself, and the Admiralty with the knowledge 
that the US were intending to carry out trials with two Type XXIs, the results of which, it 
was hoped, would be shared with the British. In the meantime, a complete report of the 
type XXIII trials were forwarded to the USN. 367 On 14 October 1945, the same day as 
the tactical convoy exercise with U-2326, the Admiralty accepted Admiral Creasy's 
recommendation and cancelled the trials with the Type XXI's, U-3017 and U-2518, 
remaining in British hands. These two U-boats were to receive "Care and 
Maintenance", though the Admiralty accepted, they would both require a substantial 
amount of work before they could be made ready for any future trials. There was, 
however, little prospect that they would ever be brought forward. It was against this 
background that the decision was taken to loan the Type XXI, U-2518, (along with a 
Type XXIII, U-2326) to France. Thus, until a British 15-knot underwater target was 
available, the British remained reliant on the results of the US Type XXI trials, further 
trials with the 12-knot Seraph-types, and on theoretical assessments. 
The decision, sound though it seemed at the time, provoked considerable 
concern amongst many departments. The wide interest in the planned trials the Type 
XXI highlighted the importance attached to investigations with a submarine capable of 
speeds in the order of 15 knots, both to test existing A/S equipment and tactics, and 
also to provide data from which new weapons and tactics could be developed. The 
cancellation of the trials with the Type XXI was, therefore, a serious blow to these 
development programmes. Leon Solomon of DNOR suggested that the Americans 
should be asked to confirm their intention to continue with the trials, for if they too were 
to cancel it would leave both nations with a lack of information on fast submarines, until 
the number of Submarines that could be kept in the Post-War fleet, ' M. 023/46, M. Platt, Head of 
M. 11,18 February 1946, ADM 1/1930 1. 
365 'First of Class Trials - Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats, ' Admiral (Submarines) to the 
Secretaryof theAdmiralty, No. 1311/SM. 3530,7 September 1945, ADM 1/18328. 
m 'Proposal to refit and re-commission U-2518 on return by the French Navy, ' [Captain] 
Ashbourne, DTASW, TASW. 44/47,7 February 1947, ADM 116/5500. 
36'r 'First of Class Trials - Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats, ' Admiral (Submarines), 
No. 1311 /SM-3530,7 September 1945, ADM 1/18328. 
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data was available from the captured Walter-boat, U-1407.368 The Director of the 
Operations Division replied that he had ascertained, unofficially, from a submarine 
officer on the US Navy staff in London that the Type XXIs in America were being 
refitted, after which it appeared that the Americans planned to continue with sea 
tdals. 369The British decision to abandon the Type XXI trials was made just as the anti- 
submarine warfare divisions were undergoing a major reorganization. The streamlining 
of the A/S divisions, in particular, was to help focus attention on the review of A/S 
doctrine as will now be recounted. 
' Minute, L. Solomon, DNOR, 1 November 1945, ADM 1/18328. 
369 Minute, Director of Operations Division, 2 November 1945, ADM 1/18328. 
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Chapter 5: Short-Term Problems, Long-Term Solutions, 1946-1947 
New Organization and Old Timers at the Admiralty 
First, some myths have to be disposed of. The Admiralty has been characterised 
as an organization where there was 
... discomfort with new ideas, a preference for "wait and see", gradual acceptance 
of initiative if and when established by senior or political decision, much referral to 
committees, much consultation, much anxiety to involve every one with an 
intereSt370 
There is some truth in these assertions, and may reflect what the Admiralty eventually 
became, but during the period under consideration here, the Admiralty proved to be a 
very different animal. When Admiral of the Fleet A. B. Cunningham joined the Admiralty 
as First Sea Lord in October 1943, he was shocked by the number of departments and 
people who had to be consulted before decisions were possible. Cunningham had 
been used to a small operational staff in the Mediterranean, but he soon realized that 
the Admiralty actually a well lubricated organisation. By 1944 it had developed into a 
supple and creative agency, well able to meet the challenges of tactical and technical 
changes by the enemy, though to outsiders, like Cunningham, who were unused to the 
changes of pace brought about by the war, it treated most complex problems as 
matters of daily routine. 371 It was, unlike the War Office and Air Ministry, staffed by 
relatively few service officers, so delegation was commonplace. 372 Nevertheless, by the 
end of the war it had become a massive bureaucracy with parts of the organization 
spread across the country. The Naval Staff alone, consisted of 17 Divisions, compared 
to six in April 1939.373 Work had been in hand for some time to rationalise this 
structure, and in particular to bring together many of the aspects of underwater warfare. 
As a result of the conclusions of the Phillips and, later, Middleton Committees, it had 
been decided to amalgamate the Torpedo and the Anti-Submarine Branches and this 
decision resulted in the formation of a single division of the Naval Staff whose U ... prime 
concern ... was the more effective integration of A/S training and weapon 
370 Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, p. 19. 
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development. "374 This new Division, responsible to Assistant Chief of Naval Staff 
(Warfare), subsumed the wartime DASW and DAUD, and elements of four other 
divisions. It was known as the Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Division 
(DTASW), and formed in September 1945. DTASW included a submarine qualified 
staff officer, though Flag Officer, Submarines, continued to provide detailed advice in 
his sphere of expertise. 375 
The first Director of the TASW Division was Captain Lord Ashboume, who had 
specialized in submarines in 1925 and had served as Chief Staff Officer to Flag Officer, 
Submarines, between 1940 and 1942. He had also been the Captain of the Third 
Submarine Squadron during the planning of the trials with the captured German Type 
XXI I I, U-2326 in the autumn of 1945. The section of DTASW which is most important to 
the events being described here was the A/S section under Captain P. W. Burnett, 
DSO, DSC, and included Commander G. A. G Ormsby, DSO, DSC, and Lieutenant 
Commander J. P. Mosse, DSC. It took some six months for the vast Admiralty machine 
to slow down, and during that time the Staff Divisions still worked seven days a 
week . 
376 Initially there was much to do and DTASW's responsibilities were legion . 
377 
Those which pertain to A/S warfare included policy, planning, tactics (of ships and 
aircraft), dispositions, staff requirements for new sensors and weapons, and training. 
He was also responsible for publications dealing with these topics, documenting their 
history, and attending various committees. 
It was Burnett, as Assistant Director (A/S), with his team, who shouldered most of 
this burden. All of them were A/S specialists. Burnett had completed the long A/S 
course in 1933, when Howard-Johnston was a course officer, and at the time when A/S 
warfare was undergoing a major review which emphasized the problems of direct 
convoy defence (even though asdic was at last becoming effective), and the need for 
vigorous offensive measures . 
378 The other two, Ormsby and Mosse had completed 
their courses in 1935 and 1936. In DTASW Burnett and Ormsby appear to have 
worked closely together on the staff papers. The former was noted as a man with "a 
374 Hackmann, Seek & Stfike, p. 327; 'Report on Torpedo, Anti-Submarine, Ordnance and 
Electrical Branches by Rear Admiral H. C. Phillips, ' March 1944, ADM 116/5692; 'The Middleton 
Steering Committee: Report on the Torpedo Anti-Submarine Branch,, Rear Admiral G. B. 
Middleton, CBE, Captain C. L. Robertson, John G. Lang, PAS(NP) and K. W. Matthews, 
Secretary, 22 December 1945, ADM 1/20207. 
375 'Joint Paper on Sea and Air Aspects of Search and Convoy Defence, ' P. W. Burnett, for 
DTASW, and F. J. Finnigan, Director of Operations, Sub-SAWC/11 C. 30414/1) of Ops, [July 
1946], Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 10. 
376 Mosse, 'Half a Lifetime, ' pp. 76-77. 
377 See Appendix 5. 
378 '[Battle of the Atlantic], Chapter III, Between the Wars, ' [F. Barely and D. W. Waters], n. d., 
Box PT135, NHB- 
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fresh analytical approach to AS warfare. "379 Both men had passed out of Dartmouth in 
the top half dozen of their course. Mosse had been indoctrinated into Ultra during the 
war, while in a staff appointment. All three had had considerable experience in 
command at sea, where both Burnett and Ormsby had been Senior Officers of Escort 
Groups in the Atlantic, Arctic and Indian Oceans, and all three had been instrumental in 
the destruction of several U-boats . 
380 Most of the early high-scoring U-boat killers had 
been non-A/S specialists or "salt horse" officers. Captain F. J. Walker had been 
something of the exception, though many of the regular A/S specialists had, perforce, 
been employed in the early stages in training and staff appointments, for at the 
beginning of the war there were only 60 A/S specialists available for appointment . 
38' 
Burnett was one of the A/S specialists who was very successful when he went back to 
sea in 1943.382 It was these men, under Ashbourne, all of whom had risen through 
merit and not through peacetime patronage, who set to work to produce a 
comprehensive review of anti-submarine warfare. 
Policy Review of Methods of Attacking Submerged Submarines 
Surprisingly, Ashbourne had not been party to the discussions over the 
cancellation of the Type XXI trials until November, when Solomon in DNOR included 
him on the distribution of the relevant files. Co-ordination at this time was not helped by 
considerable turmoil in the Naval and Scientific Staffs as the organization was 
streamlined. 3133 Ashbourne caustically complained that he was acutely interested in the 
prospect of tactical trials with the Type XXI. 'The absence of a 15 knot target for A/S 
Trials, ' he pointed out, 'will greatly handicap long-term development work on a weapon 
to counter 20 knot or faster U-boats. '384Ashbourne, partly from first hand experience of 
these boats, reluctantly accepted the situation and, in turn, added other departments to 
the file's distribution. DNC noted that a great deal of technical data was available on 
the Type XXI from German sources and this would be distributed in due course. He 
added that investigations were underway into a further increase to the underwater 
379 E. Maurice Chadwick, 'The Night the Gnats Bit, ' in Starshell, Vol. V1, No. 7 (Fall 1997), pp. 
11-12. 
380 These included: Burnett - U-744, U-989, U-1278, U-1279 (and probably two others); Ormsby 
- U-198, U-386, U-406; and Mosse - U-354, U-394. 381 'Asdic Trough the Ages, ' Section 6, 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, January 1945, 'Anti-U- 
Boat Division, CB04050/45(l), 15 February 1945, NHB, p. 18. 
382 Gretton to Howard-Johnston, 15 September 1980, 'H-J' File, Gretton Papers, MSS/93/008, 
NMM(G). 
383 'Formation and Organisation of Naval Operational Research Department, ' CE. 60648/1946, 
1941-1946, ADM 1/20113. 
' Minute, DTASW, 10 November 1945, ADM 1/18328; 'Proposal to refit and re-commission U- 
2518..., 'ADM 116/5500. 
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speed of the converted S-Class, so that the control of submarines at these high speeds 
could be explored. Such plans were also supported by the Director of Scientific 
Research (DSR), and the Director of Torpedoes and Mining (DTM), who was pursuing 
weapons to counter the fast submarine, and who was firmly of the opinion that 
essential trials should be carried out with a British fast target. "' 
As soon as they were in post, Ashbourne's Anti-Submarine Section under Burnett 
began work on the policy and doctrine papers to guide A/S tactical and technical 
development during the immediate post-war years. They first surveyed the methods of 
attacking submerged submarines by surface vessels and aircraft. The paper, which 
was ready for Admiralty Board approval in March 1946, divided the future into two 
periods, separated by the year 1950 . 
386 For the near-term, up to 1950, A/S forces 
would be pitted against submarines of the capability of the German Type XXI and Type 
XXIII U-boats, which probably represented the best submerged performance currently 
available in an operational-type submarine. The anticipated performance of the various 
types was tabulated by Ashbourne . 
387 The trials carried out by the Londonderry Flotilla 
with the Type XXIII, U-2326, in the autumn of 1945 had confirmed that against a 
submarine capable of submerged speeds up to 11-12 knots, the existing Squid and 
asdic gear were able '... to ensure a reasonable chance of success in an affack. '388The 
urgent requirement, then, was to establish whether existing ship A/S gear was capable 
of competing with submarines with a submerged speed of 15-18 knots. However, with 
no fast targets available, and the prospect of one a distant hope, Ashbourne had to 
settle for comprehensive sea trials with Sceptre, one of the modified 12-knot "S" Class 
submarines. He hoped it would be possible to extrapolate the results to be expected 
against a 15-knots submarine. Sceptre, which only seemed to be capable of 11 knots, 
exercised for two days with HM Ships Fame and Hotspur of the Londonderry Flotilla 
and the results merely confirmed those discovered with Seraph two years before that, 
I ... the factor which 
limits a ship's success with a fast submarine [was] the skill of the 
attack team rather than the capabilities of the instruments. '389 Nevertheless, training 
was seen as crucial to success and further trials were planned with the Portland 
385 Minute, E. W. Pratt, for Director of Scientific Research, 18 December 1945, ADM 1/18328; 
Minute, R. C Boyle, for DTM, 4 January 1946, ADM 1/18328. 
386 'The Development of A/S Warfare, ' TASW. 021/46, Revised Edition, 4 May 1946, ADM 
1/20960, p. I and Annex B. 387 See Appendix 7. 
388 'Policy Review of Methods of Attacking Submerged Submarines by Surface Vessels and 
(Appendix) by Aircraft', Annex B to TASW. 021/46, Revised Edition, 4 May 1946, ADM 1/20960, 
991; 
Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1946, ' DTASW, TASW. 1453/46, CB04050(46), March 
1947, ADM 239/420, p. 35. 
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Flotilla. The trial area was roughly uniform in depth at about 200 feet and free of wrecks 
- hardly operationally representative, but chosen for safety reasons . 
3911 
Lacking practical sea-based data, the DTASW paper concluded that Squid was 
the only in-service weapon adequate for attacking the modern submarine. The intention 
was to fit a Squid double mounting in specialized A/S types and a single weapon in 
other escorts, which, in the case of fleet destroyers, would entail mounting the weapon 
on the quarterdeck, so that the ships' normal anti-surface, and anti-aircraft armament 
would not have to be reduced. As for Hedgehog, it was, by now, considered to be an 
obsolescent weapon. The alternative had, for some time, been seen as the 
development of a ship-launched target seeking weapon, such as the passive acoustic 
homing torpedo "Bidder". 391 However, these weapons were limited by their own self- 
noise (and hence the speed of homing) as well as their reliance on the submarine 
making sufficient noise (and therefore travelling at speed). Against the latest fast 
submarines, "Bidder", in its present form, was too slow and too limited in its 
applications to be worth putting into production, but might prove to be the stepping- 
stone to a more effective weapon. 392 But in the face of these technical difficulties, there 
seemed to be some optimism, for the tactical investigations already carried out by 
Osprey in the early part of 1946 suggested that the basic plan of defending a slow 
convoy with a limited number of surface escorts remained '... unaltered and largely 
unalterable. 9393 The A/S School at Londonderry, however, found that it was possible to 
dispose a limited number of escorts in depth to give reasonable protection, at least 
against a 'single' submarine. More work had to be done to see if sea-air co-operation 
could be improved. Further work was to be included in the investigation programmes at 
the Osprey and Londonderry A/S Schools, and the Greenwich Tactical School. 
Turning to the period beyond 1950, Ashbourne thought it likely that in the more 
distant future, the Royal Navy would have to be reckoned with a "true submarine" 
capable of a submerged speed of 25-knots and of diving to 1,500 feet. To improve the 
search rate of asdic an "all-round scanning" set was being developed. Initial detection 
would be made easier, if ship's self noise, particularly from its propellers, could be 
reduced. Searching would then be possible at higher speeds, and the A/S ship would 
be less vulnerable to anti-escort homing torpedoes. To increase the accuracy of 
weapon aiming against fast submarines, a new attack asdic, the Type 170, was well 
390 'Annual Report of TAS Schools, 1946, ' UWD, C134486, UW. 05407/47,24 October 1947, 
ADM 189/66, p. 37. 
391 Minute, DASW, 2 April 1944, ADM 1/16495. 
392 'Policy Review of Methods of Attacking Submerged Submarines... ', ADM 1/20960, p. 2. 393 'Summary of DTASW's Investigation..., 'ADM 1/20960. 
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advanced. This was based on the "split-beam" principle, which had been under 
development since 1941.394 It allowed both azimuth and depth data to be measured 
instantaneously, thus avoiding the laborious "cut-on" procedure of the searchlight 
asdics. The resultant fire control solution could be applied to a relatively short-range 
"A/S Gun", the three-barrelled uLimbo" mortar, firing Squid-type projectiles all-round 
and at infinitely variable ranges from 300 to 1,000 yards which was also under 
395 development. To extend the firing range further, it would be necessary to use a 
rocket projectile (as was being explored in America), due to weight considerations of 
the mounting. 396 However, it was difficult to find an accurate method controlling the 
propellant (and therefore the range), and it seemed that the "gun" method was likely to 
be the more promising of the two. Simultaneously, investigation was underway into a 
proximity doppler fuse for the weapon. Research was also in hand into a homing 
weapon, called "Zeta", which would benefit from data from the trials on the interim 
"Bidder' and uDealer' weapons, which could be fired on the longer range data from the 
new asdiCS. 397 The testing and refining of these weapons was hampered by the lack of 
a 15-knot target. 
The DTASW paper also considered the operation of A/S aircraft. In the near term, 
aircraft possessed four means of detecting submarines. Firstly, visual means were 
practically useless against fully submerged submarines, but in favourable weather 
conditions it was possible to spot periscopes, schnorkels and oil slicks, albeit at very 
short range. Secondly, radar could only detect a periscope or schnorkel at short range, 
and then only in calm weather. Thirdly, sonobuoys were able to detect fully submerged 
submarines, but ranges were highly dependent on submarine speed, while rough 
weather would render the equipment useless. Moreover, the size and weight of these 
sonobuoys meant that relatively few could be carried by an aircraft and when dropped 
they suffered poor serviceability. Current stocks were American types and were limited 
in numbers, until a British version was available. Fourthly, the Magnetic Anomaly 
Detector (MAD), was an American device able to detect a submarine at very short 
394 Unmarked Paper of Detailed Comments on Problems at HMA/SEE, [August 1942], 'Papers 
Re Resignation from HMA/SEE, Fairlie in 1942, ' KEYN 1, Correspondence: World War 11 and 
Radar, Acc. 23/667/669 (Keynes), Box 1, CCAC, KEYN; 'Example C: The Spit Beam Asdic, ' 
Draft, n. d., CCAC, GOEV 3/11; 'Half-Yearly Scientific and Technical Progress Report,, HM 
Underwater Detection Establishment, Portland, 1946 (2), ADM 213/362. 
395 'Progress Report: Shipborne AIS Weapons, ' TASW. 038/46, [5 September 1946], ADM 
1/20960, pp. 6-9. 
396 'Fourth Anti-Submarine Conference, ' J. D. Price, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, OP 312F/rh 
Al 9 Serial 00296P31,18 August 1949, File 8100.5, Vol. 3734, RG 24, NAC. 
397 'policy Review of Methods of Attacking Submerged Submarines... ', ADM 1/20960, p. 3. 
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range but, although a version of this equipment had originally been developed in Britain 
3118 in 1940, it was not used operationally by British aircraft. 
None of these methods offered a reliable method of detecting submerged 
submarines, so that aircraft remained constrained by chance detections, and operated 
on the optimistic hope that submarines might make occasional use of the surface. The 
p6mary aircraft A/S weapons were the wartime shallow-exploding depth-charge and 
the rocket projectile (RIP), but these were useless against dived submarines. Although 
a new, variable-depth bomb was nearing the completion of its development, it was only 
effective if the position and depth of the target were accurately known at the moment of 
attack. "Dealer', a 15-knot passive homing torpedo, was in experimental production, 
but it was only effective against a submarine travelling at between 2-12 knots. Nor, in 
the longer term, was the outlook optimistic. It was hoped that directional passive 
sonobuoy types would help to mitigate the interfering noise from nearby convoys or co- 
operating A/S vessels, but they would still be critically dependent on the noise levels 
from the submarine and this could be reduced by technical advances, or by the 
submarines operating at slow speed. Active sonobuoys were also being considered, 
but these would be expensive, heavy and of short endurance. There were no 
immediate plans to adopt a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) and until some novel 
means of detecting submerged submarines from aircraft appeared the most promising 
developments were in the use of helicopters with a towed asdic. Although high priority 
was accorded to '... an air-launched anti-submarine target seeking weapon capable of 
carriage by Naval aircraft... ' (known as "Zeta"), there remained many difficulties before 
an operational system was likely to appear. 399 
Developments in AIS Warfare 
Following on from Ashbourne's review his A/S team embarked on a wider 
analysis of developments in A/S warfare in early spring 1946 which restated the 
problems but also looked forward to methods for their solution. The paper was passed 
round the Naval and Air Staff divisions in May before being sent to RN and RAF C-in- 
C's in September 1946. It was clear, the paper observed, that since June 1944 anti- 
submarine warfare had undergone considerable changes, first with the deployment of 
schnorkel-fitted U-boats, followed by the imminent introduction of fast submarines, 
398 'A Review of the Methods of Attacking Submerged Submarines by Aircraft' Appendix to 
Annex B to TASW. 021/46, Revised Edition, 4 May 1946, ADM 1/20960; 'Magnetic Submarine 
Detector (MAD), ' Admiralty. 134/1942,1942, ADM 1/11741; P. M. S. Blackett, 'Evan James 
Williams. 1903-1945, ' in Obituary Notices of Fellows of The Royal Socielyý 1945-1948, Voi. V 
ýLondon: Morrison & Gibb for The Royal Society, 1945-1948), p. 396. "g'A Review of the Methods of Attacking Submerged Submarines by Aircraft, 'ADM 1/20960. 
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such as the battery-powered Type XXI and the more exotic Walter-powered, very fast 
Type XXVI. The submersible was successfully countered and stalemate had been 
reached against their schnorkel-fitted cousins as the war ended. A/S warfare was now 
presented with a threat that was rapidly progressing towards the "true submarine", 
which would not rely on any surface exposure. "' Ashbourne and his team formalised 
these developments in two phases: the "Short-Term Problem" up to 1950; and the 
ul-ong-Term Problem" after 1950.401 
The short-term counter-measures had to be developed against the 15-knot, 
schnorkel-fitted submarine, equivalent to the German Type XXIs. It was Ashbourne's 
hope was that it would be possible, in line with current Admiralty policy, to rely on 
existing gear with no major modifications, until completely new and much improved 
equipment became available after 1950, when the long-term problem of the Walter- 
boats would have to be countered. The outlook for aircraft, as has been noted, was 
less optimistic. The focus in the short-term was on tactical development and training of 
escort forces. Beyond 1950, the threat was more challenging and the emphasis would 
be on basic research to support the formulation of new ship and aircraft equipment 
requirements. The strength of these future submarine types, based on the German 
design for the Type XXVI, was their very high underwater speed, which might allow 
them to penetrate the A/S screen and get into a firing position, even if detected. They 
would also be able to outpace surface escorts under most circumstances, but their 
endurance at high speed was ultimately limited by the quantity of HTP fuel carried and 
the submarines left an observable trail at depths less than 60 feet. Their maximum 
operating depth on Walter propulsion was also limited. Future British designs for HTP 
submarines were intended to overcome the worst of these shortcomings. In the more 
distant future, Ashbourne conceived of a "true" submarine powered by atomic energy 
and at this point, 
The submarine of the future, then, can be expected to remain submerged 
continuously, using Schnorkel for short periods. It is probable, however, that they 
will sacrifice their surface performance entirely. It will be capable of high speed and 
endurance submerged and of detecting any transmissions made by the enemy. 
These submarines will attack with greatly improved weapons in close tactical packs 
assisted by accurate instruments. Finally they will be difficult to detect by echo, 
noise or magnetic field and they will be difficult to destroy due to their high 
402 submerged speed . 
400 For the contemporary submarine nomenclatures see Appendix 9. 
401 'The Development of A/S Warfare, ADM 1/20960, p. 2. 
402 'Development of the Submarine, ' Annex A to TASW. 021/46, Revised Edition, 4 May 1946, 
ADM 1/20960, p. 6. 
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Overall tactical development would have to take note of surface vessel and 
aircraft (both RN and RAF) requirements and was to progress through three stages, 
starting with theoretical studies, followed by simulations (using shore-side training 
equipment) to better understand the dynamics of proposed tactics. However, 
conclusions derived from these investigations would still be tentative and unreliable, 
until they were confirmed by sea trials against a fast target. Creating the opportunities 
for "realistic" sea trials, as always in peacetime, was to prove problematic. Firstly, there 
were no major exercises planned for 1946. Secondly, there would be no high-speed 
submarines available until late 1947, when the extensively modified HIVIS Scotsman 
(designed to achieve 16 knots) and the captured U-1407, would be ready for trials as 
HIVIS Meteorite (and capable of 17-191/2 knots). It would not be until the early 1950s 
that British designed 25-knot HTP submarines and new 21-knot conventional diesel- 
electric submarines would be available. In the meantime the British would have to rely 
on exercises with the existing 12-knot "S"-class conversions, though these remained ill- 
suited for tactical work. 403 Peacetime safety rules, too, would limit realism so precluding 
the recreation of wartime "blood and guts" testing. Tactical solutions would never 
become fixed, for they were bound to be in a constant state of flux because of the 
interrelated advances in, on the one hand, submarine technology and operational 
methods, and on the other hand, developments in A/S countermeasures and tactics. 
Ashbourne emphasized that the conclusions from these investigations would '... be 
guess-work based on the tentative results of other investigations.... ' It was vital, he 
thought, that all the departments involved in these investigations should pool their 
information. 404 
As a fall-back, it was hoped that data would be gained from the US trials with two 
captured Type XXIs, U-2513 and U-3008. These were in the hands of a combination of 
naval and civilian organizations who started sea tests only after a substantial period of 
docking for repairs (for which the Americans had greater capacity). Even then, the US 
trials proceeded at a pedestrian pace, with no tactical data emerging for some two 
years. Initially U-2513 appears to have been used for sea trials, which showed that she 
was capable of maintaining 17 knots submerged for one hour. During the following year 
the U-boats only achieved a maximum speed of 15-15Y2 knots, and also revealed a 
number of defects in the Type XXI design. 405 These results, however, did not begin to 
403'Progress in Tactics, 1948, 'ADM 239/144, p. 24. 
404'The Development of AIS Warfare,, ADM 1/20960, p. 3. 
405 'Submerged Performance Tests on German Type XXI Submarines', William E. Schevill and 
Allyn C, Vine, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 17 March 1947, File 3, 
Submarine/Undersea Warfare Division, Series 111, Box 12, OA, NHC; 'Special Submarine Group 
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filter through to the British until the spring of 1947 in a summary produced by 
Commander R. G. C. Haines, the Staff Anti-Submarine Officer on the British Admiralty 
Delegation in Washington. It was hoped that a complete report might be available at a 
later date. The letter from Haines summarised a report from the American Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution, which had carried out technical performance tests with two 
Type XXIs. It was the lower maximum speed of 15-15Y2knots that were passed to the 
Admiralty. The British staff in Washington hoped to send the full US report at a later 
date. 406The Americans were hardly better informed, for as late as spring 1948, one 
American submanne squadron commander complained that there was insufficient data 
on the Type XXI '... upon which to base even a preliminary analysis of its full 
potentialities or weaknesses. "" 
No documentary evidence was discovered which described the German plans for 
operation of the Type XXVI Walter-boat, so the Admiralty constructed its own tactical 
concept based on their own earlier operational and technical analysis, and the results 
of interrogations of German U-boat officers. Ashbourne was, however, in possession of 
a captured German document which described their plans for operation of the Type 
XXI. 408 It is not entirely clear why Ashbourne chose to use a pr6cis of this paper as a 
template, given the more balanced analyses produced by DNOR, and others, during 
the war. Perhaps, because it came from an enemy who had kept A/S forces engaged 
for the whole of the war and required considerable effort to defeat, the threat of the 
Type XXI (which would now be in Russian hands) was given greater gravitas by citing 
the paper. The German paper contains many contradictions. It is also vague on many 
of the important issues, such as how convoys were to be located and how they could 
be attacked using Type XXIs in packs. Much was made of the greater underwater 
performance of these U-boats, especially in their ability to close targets by underwater 
travel from considerable distances, even though this might consume 80% of the battery 
power. This seems rather profligate, compared with the views of one ex-Type XXI 
captain, Erich Topp, who compiled the "Battle Instructions for the Type XXI and Type 
XXIII U-boats", and thought that battery capacity ought to be maintained at a minimum 
- Prospective Operations Schedule (Revised), ' W. R. Laughton, The Commander Special 
Submarine Group, FC5-2/S8,1 March 1946, File 1, Submanne/Undersea Warfare Division, 
Series III, Box 12, OA, NHC. 
' 'Submerged Performance Tests on Type XXI U-Boats', Staff Officer (Anti-Submarine) to 
Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare, Admiralty, A/S 230-1,14 April 1947, 
RNSMA1991/076. 
11 'Proposed Evaluation of Present Guppy Submarine Conversion and Equipment, ' L. R. Daspit, 
Commander Submarine Squadron Four, to Commander Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet, 
FC5-4/S1,24 March 1948, Box 98, RG 313, NARA2. 
408 See Appendices 5 and 8. 
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level of 60-70%, unless in an emergenCy. 409 Such problems would be overcome if the 
submarine operated in focal areas, where shipping targets would be more plentiful, but 
where A/S forces would also be stronger. 
The Germans considered that the overall defensive fighting power of the Type 
XXI was still weak, for the paper - echoing D6nitz' long-held philosophy - emphasized 
that the key to success was to remain unobserved before an attack so that the enemy 
would not take evasive action. Although the Type XXI had a much improved acoustic 
suite, greater emphasis was placed on the use of the periscope, which would inevitably 
restrict attacks largely to daylight hours. The Germans realized that attacking in packs 
was the most effective method of achieving substantial numbers of sinkings. However, 
it was apparent that the Type XXI was not well-suited to working tactically in close 
company with other boats. (This seemed to contradict some of the views expressed in 
Roberts' interrogations. ) To compensate, the Type XXI could fire a larger salvo size of 
six LuT torpedoes and, with its rapid reloading system, could fire a second salvo five 
minutes later, and a third salvo after another 20 minutes. The recommended tactics for 
the attack were for a submerged approach to a convoy from forward of the beam. The 
screen would be penetrated at slow speed, either deep or at periscope depth, and then 
to fire salvoes of LuT torpedoes in rapid succession. The Germans calculated that 
there was a '... theoretical possibility of 95 to 99 per cent hits in an average 
convoy.... '410 After firing the Type XXI would dive under the convoy to reload, where 
the "Nibelung" asdic set and "Balkon" hydrophones were used to detect any alterations 
in the course of the convoy and, via a specially designed plotting-table, to allow further 
torpedoes to be fired from deep. After the third salvo the U-boat was supposed to 
remain deep under the convoy for a couple of hours and then escape at slow speed. 
This was not so easy as it seemed. 411 
Had the enemy been able to employ these submarines in the manner proposed, 
Ashbourne concluded, they would have been able to defeat the most effective British 
counter-measures and, since the Type XXI did not need to use the surface, except to 
schnorkel for short periods, aircraft would be virtually powerless to sink them while in 
transit, except on rare occasions. The Type XXI's weakness, was reconnaissance, so 
support by aircraft would be especially valuable in locating targets. An advantage was 
the use of the "Squash" or "Kurier", pulsed radio system, which allowed short, 
formatted messages to be cleared in less than one-half of a second. Existing ship- 
409 Erich Topp, Letter, 17 August 1997. 
410 Hessler, The U-boat War, Vol. 111, p. 86. 
411 'Development of the Submarine, 'ADM 1/20960, p. 2. 
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borne D/F equipment could not exploit these signals, though this might be possible 
from shore stations within the next few years. It had been assessed that had the 
Germans possessed this system during 1943 that convoy losses might have increased 
412 by 30-50%. In summary, Ashbourne wrote: 
The Type XXI has therefore neutralised air, shore and shipbome radar and D/F, 
but this type can still, with patience, be destroyed after detection by asdics. 
However, the power of asdics to prevent an attack is probably diminished. The 
larger salvo, rapid reloading gear and ability to keep station under the convoy, 
enormously increases the damage that can be done by any U-boat that penetrates 
the screen. The price of these advantages is the inability to concentrate and 
intercept convoys or to carry out effective pack tactics. 413 
There were chinks in the Type XXI's armour, but it would have posed a serious threat, 
and one that was in Russian hands if they were capable of converting the potential of 
this German technology into an effective weapon. 
Assessments of the Russian Threat 
During the Second World War the submarine threat had been obvious and 
immediate and had a direct impact on the direction of A/S development. That had not 
always been so in the interwar period, which '-was initially driven by a general 
awareness of the potential threat posed by submarines. 414 In the same way, after the 
Second World War A/S measures were directed towards countering a generic threat 
imprinted on the Naval Staff s consciousness by six years of war experience, and 
because a Russian submarine threat against our trade or military operations was 
largely discounted in 1945.415 Of course, account was taken of Russia as the only 
possible enemy, assuming that there would not be a resurgence of the threat from 
Germany. In spring 1946, the JIC assessed that Russia possessed 
... about 210 submarines, 
including 10 ex-German. She takes a great interest in 
submarine warfare and in this particular arm of the Naval Service she has shown 
herself to be more proficient than in any other. She is, however, still inexperienced 
in attack tactics. So far as the building of submarines is concerned, Soviet Russia 
has already carried out one large programme with success. German assistance 
and methods, particularly in connection with pre-fabricated [Type XXIs and the like] 
412 'Notes on the "Kurier" System, ' Enclosure (A), in, ' "Kurier" System of U-boat 
Communication, ' 7 July 1945, Report No. 187-45, NavTecMisEu, Series III, Letter Reports 
#180-45 thru #205-45, Box 14, OA, NHC; 'On the Value of Squash in Pack Attacks, ' [Leon 
Solomon], DNOR, OIC/SI1254, [19 March 1945], ADM 223/261. 
413 'Development of the Submarine, 'ADM 1/20960, p. 3. 
414 Franklin, Britain's Anti-Submarine Capabifilyý p. 190. 
415 -operation "Unthinkable", Report by the Joint Planning Staff, ' G. Grantham, G. S. Thompson, 
W. L. Dawson, Offices of the War Cabinet, Final, 22 May 1945, CAB 1201691. 
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submarines, would enable her to construct a formidable Submarine Force in a 416 
comparatively short time. 
These assessments were reflected in the departmental calculations. Numbers alone, 
however, did not tell the story. Many of these boats were obsolete submersibles and 
most of the Russian ocean-going submarines were similar to the wartime German Type 
VII but without the schnorkel. The Russians had captured the plans of the later German 
Type XXIs and the Type XXVI Walter-boats, though it was thought unlikely that they 
could produce a home-grown version of this latter type until 1949 at the earliest. (It was 
not known until recently that the Russians used their three allocated Type XXI boats for 
trials until 1958, though the remaining Type XXIs which they captured in varying states 
of completion were all scrapped or scuttled by early 1948. ) 
In late 1946, NID assessed that: 
... The Russians are far from being a nation of seamen, and this weakness is 
reflected in the operation of their submarines, however technically good these 
boats may be. Their attack technique is amateurish to a degree.... The submarines 
themselves are probably capable of carrying heavy armament a long way with 
reliability, but are by no means certain of hitting the target when they get there. 
Unless their evasive tactics have been much improved in the last year or so, they 
would stand little chance against our escort groups, and we have no information 
that attack-training has been carried out by them to any degree. This particularly 
applies to the large Russian submarineS. 417 
This was a common theme for most of the immediate post-war period. Similar 
assessments appear in many of the Joint Intelligence Committee papers. For example 
the JIC did not believe 
... that 
by 1957 ... [the Russians] will think themselves capable of co-ordinated pack 
attacks on escorted convoys; we consider that their methods are far more likely to 
be comparable to those used by the Germans in World War 1; but they may hope 
that such devices as homing torpedoes will at least partially offset their tactical 
shortcomings. 418 
When DNI circulated its paper in October 1947 on "Russian Naval Tactics" round 
the Naval Staff, DCNS '-directed that an argument was to be developed as to the 
number of escort vessels we would require to meet this threat... . 
41 9 The detail of this 
debate is not covered here, but the way in which these vessels were to be used is. No 
very great opinion was entertained of the Russian submarine operational capability, 
which was drawn together from the experiences of British and American liaison officers 
416 'Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions, ' Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 
JIC(46)1(0) Final (Revise), 1 March 1946, CAB 81/132. 
417 'Russian Naval Tactics, ' NI D/1 6,10 October 1946, ADM 1/20030. 
418 'Scale and Nature of Attack against Sea Communications, ' Joint Intelligence Committee, 
JI C(48)69(0) Final, 11 August 1948, CAB 158/4. 
419 Minute, Philip Currey, for DTSD, 29 April 1947, ADM 1/20030. 
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during the war, and information from the interrogation of German prisoners who had 
operated against the Russians. Captain Mackenzie, who made at least one war patrol 
in a Soviet submarine, later echoed the general impression, that since '... their A/S 
training is so backward is it not likely that their submarine tactics, particularly in attacks 
may be backward also? ' His belief was that Russian submarine Commanding Officers' 
attacks were, at best, amateurish . 
420 These views, the Historical Section later pointed 
out, had to be considered in the context of the difficult environmental conditions in 
which many Russian submarines had operated. 421 
Within the Admiralty, then, there seems to have been no direct pressure from an 
impending threat to drive A/S development, because the Russian threat was not yet 
well developed and would not be so until, say, 1955-60 . 
422There was, as the Chiefs of 
Staff noted in May 1947, a need for a state of preparedness. 423 The wise counsel of 
staff officers, like Ashbourne and Burnett, was that unless work was done now and the 
issue kept in the forefront of the naval agenda, it would be too late to improvise 
counters to the fast submarine, when the Russians finally realized their potential. Over 
the next two years the Admiralty repeatedly asked the JIC to assess 
... the capabilities and intention of the Russians and to 
forecast the probable scale 
and nature of attack in various possible theatres of war both in the near future and 
in some years ahead. 
The appreciations were, generally, accurate in terms of actual strength of the Russian 
forces, but, the Admiralty were concerned that the JIC '... tended to exaggerate 
Russian potentialities. ' This was serious, because, the Admiralty pointed out 
... not only our present plans 
but also the future disposition of forces and the build 
up of military strength depends so greatly on what we estimate to be the Russian 
plans.... 424 
Financial considerations would heavily influence the outcome of these deliberations, 
but at least a start was being made on the development of the doctrine for how these 
forces were to be operated. These implicitly assumed the ultimate state of British 
strength which could be achieved some years into another World War. These were the 
420 'Eleventh TAS Liaison Meeting: Minutes, ' Part 13, 'Paper I- Review of Soviet Naval and Air 
Forces and their TAS Roles; Paper 11 - Soviet Underwater Weapons: Discussion,, 9-11 
September 1952, ADM 189/235, pp. 152-157. 
421 'Russian Submarines in the Second World War: An Estimate of their Efficiency (Reference: 
NATO (Secret) ID 0940/1 of 4 January 1955), 'Histodcal Section, Admiralty, Box PT135, NHB. 
422 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities - General, ' Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub- 
Committee, JIC(47)7(Final), 6 August 1947, CAB 158/1. 
423 'The Overall Strategic Plan, May 1947 (DO(47)44 (Also COS(47)102(0)) (Retained - Cab 
Off)), ' Appendix 7, in, J. Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war 
strategic Defence, 1942-1947 (London: The Sherwood Press, 1988), p. 372. 
424 'Appreciation of Russian Intentions: Memorandum by the First Sea Lord, ' Fraser [7], 
COS(49)161,5 May 1949, DEFE 5/14. 
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conditions which officers, like Ashbourne and Burnett had been accustomed to for 
much of their seagoing wartime experience. Compromises would have to be made at 
the beginning of a future war, as had been the case at the start of the Second World 
War. 
The First Tranche of Doctrine Papers 
The post-war continuation of formed escort groups, the restructuring of the A/S 
Branch, and the maintenance of a large reserve of trained men for future wartime A/S 
operations were all seen as vital if the lessons of the war were not to be squandered. 
Ashbourne was determined that advanced operational training would be enhanced by 
the temporary continuation of a Joint A/S School at Londonderry. 425This organisation 
was, eventually, formalized by the creation of the permanent Joint Anti-Submarine 
School (JASS). When the general issue of post-war training was being discussed in the 
Admiralty, the Director of Naval Air Warfare voice a common concern that 
... 
in spite of all that has been done and is being said to the contrary, there remains 
a very grave danger of our sliding back once more in the coming "peace" into 
errors in Naval training similar to those of the last one. The temptation to 
concentrate on the more amusing and spectacular attack on the Fleet rather than 
the dull and difficult (but much more important) defence of trade is desperately 
strong. 426 
Captain G. French, RN, Deputy Director of Plans, went further when he observed that: 
... the root of this matter is a question of outlook and of the importance... attached to the adequacy of our A/S training and of trade protection exercises. ... It is improbable that these will be given full weight unless there is a sufficiently powerful 
body of thought in the Admiralty organisation to insist upon it. 427 
Ashbourne agreed and proposed the establishment of a Joint Sea/Air Warfare 
Committee with both Royal Navy and RAF membership and chaired at the Vice Chief 
of the Naval and Air Staff level. The Committee, and eventually its sub-committees, 
would hammer out joint policy on all matters connected with A/S warfare and make 
policy recommendations to the Board of Admiralty and Air Council. This was to be done 
via the normal working of the relevant staffs of the Admiralty and Air Ministry. At their 
first meeting in May 1946 the committee discussed Ashbourne's paper on the 
implications of the schnorkel-fitted, fast U-boat. Thereafter a steady stream of papers 
were presented to the SAWC for approval. Furthermore, the Admiralty set up a series 
425 Minute, Captain Lord Ashbourne, DTASW, TASW. 214445], 18 October 1945, ADM 
116/5853. 
426 Minute, DNAW, 25 July 1946, ADM 1/20045. 
427 Minute by D of P, 26 August 1945, PRO: ADM 1/20045. 
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of "TAS Liaison Meetings" at which often 250 officers of the A/S community were 
present, and including representatives from the Commonwealth and the USA. 428 
The first meeting of the SAWC's Tactical and Training Sub-Committee on 7 May 
1946, was chaired by Rear Admiral R. D. Oliver. The committee spent some time 
discussing the problems laid out in DTASW's paper on "The Development of A/S 
Warfare". It was agreed that solutions should be developed, in the first place, by the 
directorates responsible in the relevant areas, incorporating advice from the operational 
research departments where appropriate. Thus surface search and escort, air search 
and patrol related to trade defence were to be jointly examined by DTASW for the 
Admiralty and the Director of Operations (D of Ops) for the Air Ministry. Once these 
directorates had drafted the joint paper it would then be considered by the Sub- 
Committee. So, during the later part of the spring of 1946 DTASW and D of Ops 
worked together to produce a "Joint Paper on Sea and Air Aspects of Search and 
Convoy Defence" . 
429 This was followed by a complementary "Joint Paper on Sea and 
Air Aspects of Fleet Defence against Submarines", which was drafted under the 
leadership of Captain G. Willoughby, the Admiralty's Director of Air Warfare (DAW), 
though he, too, consulted with other Admiralty and Air Ministry directorates . 
430 Deputy 
Director of Operations (Maritime) (DDOps(M)), Group Captain V. C. Darling, as 
Burnett's opposite number seems to have had a hand in the drafting, though there is no 
doubt that DTASW provided the lead for both papers. 431 
There was, of course, no specific and immediate threat from a maritime power 
possessing submarines, similar to the German fast Type XXI U-boat. The only potential 
enemy, Russian, did not yet possess such a submarine fleet. Thus the counter- 
measures proposed were pitted against an amalgam of the threat that had been 
developed by the Germans towards the end of the Second World War, together with 
improvements that might be assumed from German mistakes. 432 The two papers were, 
therefore, based on countering a generic threat. Thus it is not surprising that the 
solutions proposed in the two papers were essentially similar. Indeed, many of the 
paragraphs are directly transposed from one paper to the other. However, the papers 
42a 'Third A/S Tactical Liaison Meeting held in HMS Vemon on lat and 2nd May 1947, ' 
A. 198/3/47,17 May 1947, distributed by Op-32-F-45, n. d., Box 102, RG 313, NARA2. 
4-'9 'Joint Paper on ... Convoy Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2. 430 'Minutes of the lt Meeting of the Tactical and Training Sub-Committee and the lot Meeting of 
the Technical Investigation Sub-Commiftee..., ' Cdr G. R. Carver and W/Cdr J. L. Crosbie, Sub- 
SAWC/11/2/46 and Sub-SAWC/111/2/46,13 May 1946, AIR 15f786. 
431 Minute, Group Captain V. C. Darling, RAF, DDOps(M), 30 September 1946, AIR 2/5950. 
432 'German U-boat Strategy in the War, ' Appendix XVIII, to 'Some Weaknesses in German 
strategy and Organisation, 1933-1945, ' Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 
JIC(46)33(Final), 20 October 1946, NHB. 
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differ in two important aspects. Firstly, the "Fleet Defences paper assumes that a naval 
force would proceed at 15 knots or more. 433 If the naval force were steaming at a lower 
speed, then the principles established in the paper on convoy defence were to apply. 
Secondly, the paper on "Search and Convoy Defence" also covers the use of anti- 
submarine forces for offensive search operations. These forces are not mentioned in 
the paper on "Fleet Defence". The significance of this exclusion will become apparent 
shortly. 
The drafting of the papers went on throughout the summer of 1946, and by July 
Captain P. W. Burnett, DSO, DSC, RN, the Assistant Director in DTASW responsible for 
anti-submarine warfare as AD(A/S) had a draft ready of a paper on the sea and air 
aspects of anti-submarine search and convoy defence. The complementary paper on 
aspects of fleet defence followed shortly afterwards. The papers were drafted in co- 
operation with Group Captain F. J. Finnigan, D of Ops, in the Air Ministry. After a 
detailed description of the anti-submarine situation at the end of the war, based heavily 
on Burnett's own experiences (and those of Ormsby and Mosse in his team), the 
papers moved on to explain the effect of the submarine's improved performance on 
post-war anti-submarine warfare. 434They were intended as statements of how, over the 
next five years, A/S forces equipped with existing weapons and sensors, could deal 
with submarines whose performance equated to the 15-knot wartime German Type 
XXI. The papers were therefore to be the basis for training and exercise planning for 
the immediate future. This was the most pressing issue. The longer term problem of 
the 25-knot submarine was to be explored in detail once the urgent tactical problems 
against the 15-knot submarine were worked out. There was some pressure to consider 
this long-term problem sooner, for'... the escort vessels, A/S aircraft and carriers being 
designed now which will have to be used initially against the long-term (25 knot) 
submarine. '43' These longer term investigations would also have to take into account 
other equipment, not currently in use in British forces, such as MAD and the Airborne 
Search (radio) Receiver. 
The "Search and Convoy Defence' paper, unlike that on "Fleet Defence", began 
by surveying offensive A/S search in ocean waters before considering the problems of 
convoy defence. This ordering reflected the inherent desire for offensive operations (as 
433 'Joint Paper on Sea and Air Aspects of Fleet Defence against Submarines, ' F. J. Finnigan, 
Director of Operations, Air Ministry, Captain G. Willoughby, DNAW and Captain Lord 
Ashbourne, DTASW, Admiralty, TASW. 4261/46, [1 November 1946], ADM 1/20936, Covering 
Letter. 
434 'Joint Paper on ... Convoy Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2. 41 'General Implications of Improved Submarine Performance, ' Section 11, 'Joint Paper 
on ... Convoy 
Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 5. 
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likely to lead to decisive results), but did not mark a shift in the policy which remained 
firmly rooted in the idea that convoy was the bedrock of A/S operations. Indeed, when 
the draft paper was discussed at the fourth meeting of the Tactical and Training Sub- 
Committee of the Sea/Air Warfare Committee it was decided that, should a conflict 
arise between investigations of offensive and defensive operations, the latter was to 
take priority. 436 The pre-war analysis of the limitations of striking forces had been 
confirmed by wartime experience as was outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Even when the 
U-boats' submerged speed was relatively limited, there might not be sufficient ships to 
search the whole of the area in which an evading submarine could be, especially when 
the ships arrived at the datum after some considerable delay. It was usually necessary 
to limit the search to an area covering the submarines most likely escape course. A U- 
boat evading at only 5 knots required at least two ships to achieve a 50% chance of 
detection, and then only if the escorts were able to close an accurate datum position 
from no more than five miles away. 437 The increased submerged speed and endurance 
of modern submarines forced Senior Officers to assess even narrower limits than 
before on the submarine's probable action in order to achieve any reasonably prospect 
of detection. The keys to the problem were, firstly, to improve the accuracy of datum 
position reporting relative to the AIS ships and, secondly, to ensure that the ships 
arrived at the datum as quickly as possible, so that the area to be searched would be a 
small as possible. The means of fixing the datum relative to the ships depended on the 
source of the locating information. An aircraft, for example, might be able to report the 
datum accurately if, simultaneously, it held the approaching ships on radar. 
Alternatively, if the datum was reported geographically (assuming this report was 
accurate), then the ships needed a means of establishing their own position exactly, 
say by the use of a radio navigation aid. Of course, the ships themselves might provide 
the datum position, perhaps from a number of ship-borne D/F bearings, though this 
would be limited if the submarines used "Squash". There was also the idea that the 
datum could be marked by a radio beacon, perhaps fitted to a ship that had been 
torpedoed. The ships, of course, could home onto the radio transmissions made by an 
aircraft circling the datum. But the AIS ships not only needed accurately to know were 
they were going, but also had to arrive as expeditiously as possible. Poor 
communications was a major contributor to errors in establishing accurate and timely 
436 'Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Tactical and Training Sub-Committee of the Joint 
Sea/Air Warfare Committee..., ' J. L. Crosbie and G. R. Carver, Joint Secretaries, Sub- 
SAWC/11/9/46,19 July 1946, ADM 116/5614. 
437 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations: Part IV, Air and Surface A/S Searches and Striking 
Forces' DASW, ASW 3078/43, BR1 679(4), June 1944, ADM 234/293. 
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datum positions, as well as delays in getting ships moving in the right direction. Given 
that speed was of the essence, the captains of AIS ships needed to use their initiative 
in following up contact reports, and this could be stifled by an inflexible command 
organisation. Unavoidably, ships unfavourably positioned in the first place would take 
longer to arrive at the datum. 438 
Preliminary investigations using tactical tables had been going on at Osprey and 
Londonderry for some time . 
439 Doubtless these confirmed that a submarine capable of 
high underwater speed would be able to evade '... the normal unit of 4 to 6 ships 
provided she can estimate its line of advance accurately and in time to use her high 
submerged speed without fear of Hydrophone detection. 44" A/S ships approaching a 
datum, therefore, had to try to camouflage their mean course by apparently random 
zig-zags. For a single ship within 10 miles of a datum, the indirect approach used in the 
wartime "Beta" search could be adapted. 441 If more ships were involved, they should 
approach the datum using independent zig zags while trying to maintain a coherent 
search front. But even such artifice would not guarantee that the submarine would be 
detected on the first pass through the datum. Nor would it then be possible to search 
the whole area into which the submarine could have evaded. Some guess of the likely 
evasion course had to be made and the search concentrated around this assumption. 
The paper recommended that for longer range searches an "Observant" search should 
be used to contain the target, while for shorter range searches, where the A/S ships 
arrived at the datum quicker, a search based on the "Vignot' principle could be used so 
that the search spiralled (normally) outwards keeping pace with the submarine's 
furthest-on position. In US parlance these were known as "Retiring Search" plans, 
which approximated to an outward spiral track starting at the datum and designed to 
intercept the expanding furthest-on position of the U-boat. 442 
The ability of aircraft to locate and destroy submarines had not improved since 
the end of the war and it was expected that they would not regain the effectiveness 
enjoyed in 1943 until new or improved initial detecting equipment was in use. It was the 
long detection ranges achieved against surfaced U-boats, combined with the aircraft's 
high speed which gave the A/S aircraft a high search rate and its greatest potency 
438 'Joint Paper on... Convoy Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 5. 
439'Summary of DTASWs Investigation-, ' ADM 1/20960. 
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442 'Joint Paper on ... Convoy Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, pp. 5-6; 'US Fleet, Anti- Submarine and Escort of Convoy Instructions (BUSCls), ' FTP 223A, January 1945, File 79/532, 
DHH, p. 1-5. 
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against U-boats by denying them security on the surface and hence the mobility 
needed to close their targets. Even before aircraft had developed a high lethality in 
attacks, U-boats had preferred to submerge on sighting an aircraft to avoid the chance 
of even minor damage. But from 1944 onwards this had changed for the worse, from 
Coastal Command's point of view. It had been the introduction of the schnorkel, and 
the consequent continuous submerged operations by the U-boats that had denied 
Coastal Command aircraft of their wide area search capability. The advent of this 
device had reduced the aircraft's detection range against submarines from some 16 
miles to three quarters of a mile, or less in poor weather conditionS. 443 Without a visible 
point of aim aircraft attacks with depth-charges or RPs would have very little chance of 
success. 
During the war Coastal Command aircraft had been equipped with sonobuoys 
which could be dropped in the vicinity of a U-boat that had already been detected by 
some other means. Contact could be maintained on a submerged submarine, provided 
it was travelling at a speed and depth conducive to propeller cavitation. These 
sonobuoys, however, were not suited to wide area search because of their low 
performance which would require very large numbers to be used. Nor could these 
sonobuoys be used in the vicinity of a convoy because the noise of the convoy at a 
range, say, of five miles, would drown the HE signature of a submarine only one mile 
from a buoy. It was thought that directional sonobuoys would enjoy greater 
effectiveness in this situation. No British specimens of these types existed in 1946, 
though a few US buoys were due to arnve in Britain for evaluation. British directional 
sonobuoys were unlikely to be well advanced until 1948.444AIso during the war the 
Americans had used MAD equipment with some success. Its detection range, however, 
was extremely short, so that the use of this equipment was limited to small area 
searches. An early version had been developed by the British but had never been 
adopted by the RAF. 445 The prospects for aircraft were not good, for aircraft had little 
chance of detecting submarines that were in transit or on patrol. However, they could at 
443 'Joint Paper on ... Convoy Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 3. 444 'Report by DOR(E) on Sonobuoys - British/American Standardisation, 'Air Commodore G. W. 
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"s MAD, Question of Fitting in our A/S Aircraft, ' DACD, ACD-33/42,12 September 1942, ADM 
1/11741; 'Test of MAD Equipment for Detecting the Presence of Submerged Submarines from 
the Air, ' Coastal Command Development Unit, RAF Tain, Ross-shire, Report No. 87, 
CCDU/20/122/AIR, 3 December 1942, File S-28-1-4, Vol. 5271, RG 24, NAC; P. M. S. Blackett, 
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least keep the submarines submerged and, there was the possibility of submarines 
being badly handled, giving the A/S aircraft an opportunity for attack. Overall, however, 
is seemed that aircraft would '-probably not again prove as effective as they did in 
1943 until a new initial detecting device is in use. '446 
It seemed likely, therefore, that the main burden of searching would fall principally 
on the A/S ships. However, it was hoped that aircraft would provide positive assistance 
by accurately fixing a datum and homing the hunting ships onto its location. It would be 
especially helpful if the aircraft was able to report the position relative to the ships, say 
by using radar, and thereby eliminating the navigational errors inherent in geographic 
reporting. The A/S aircraft would also be able to confirm that the U-boat had not 
attempted to escape on the surface and if a suitable pattern of sonobuoys were used, it 
would also be able to assess whether the submarine had used high underwater speed 
to evade. The presence of the aircraft would also deter the submarine from using its 
periscope to ascertain the approach of the hunting ships. These measures would assist 
the ships in their search by refining the area to be searched, either by confirming the U- 
boat had not used high speed, or providing some idea of the direction of escape if it 
had. At the same time, if the enemy submarine was not able to freely use its periscope, 
it would have less knowledge with which to assess the best course for evasion. For 
such sea/air co-operative tactics to work effectively, good communications and mutual 
understanding would be even more important than they had been in the past. This 
would be assured by the induction and continuation training courses being set up by 
the Joint Anti-Submarine School at Londonderry. 
Having dealt with offensive operations, Burnett and his team moved on to 
consider the problems of trade protection and later Fleet defence against submarines 
with high underwater speed and endurance. The counter-measures in both cases show 
a congruence, though the high speed expected of the Fleet on passage and the higher 
degree of protection made significant differences in the mode of anti-submarine 
operation. In both cases, the Limiting Lines of Submerged Approach would now 
describe a much larger sector from which a modem high-speed, schnorkel-fitted 
submarine could approach. The distance between the Lines would be longer and would 
require more A/S ships to cover it. In addition, if escorts were to have a chance of 
destroying an attacking U-boat, they would need more "fighting room' than had been 
needed against the older, slower U-boat during the war, when it had been practice for 
escorts to be stationed at ranges of 1 Y2-2 miles from the convoy during the day, and 
446 'Joint Paper on ... Convoy Defence, 
' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 6. 
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2Y2miles by night (when surface, and hence higher speed, attack by U-boats was more 
likely). 447 Now some of the escorts would have to be stationed further out from a 
convoy, perhaps as far as 3-4 miles. 
The same principle was established for the screen ahead of Fleet units, which 
was advanced to some 3 miles, instead of the wartime 2 miles. So that a least two 
escorts could concentrate against an approaching U-boat, their overall dispositions 
would need to be arranged to provide "defence in depth". This was especially important 
in Fleet defence, for the detecting ship might not have time to turn to counter-attack, 
given the high relative closing speed of the submarine and the main body of the Fleet. 
Of course, there was still no idea that a convoy's escort could provide an interlocking 
asdic front, as was expected for Fleet protection. In both cases, however, if escorts 
were to be disposed further out, then larger numbers of AIS ships would be needed to 
provide the same degree of cover as given to wartime convoys or the Fleet. It was felt 
that the submarines would still favour firing torpedoes at close range from a position 
broad on the bow of their target. However, improvements in torpedo firing ranges and 
the use of homing or pattern-running programmes, would give submannes the option of 
firing, not only from longer ranges, but from all compass bearings. Such shots had 
been practiced during the late war, though not with great success, for long range 
attacks posed severe fire control problems for the submarine. 448 Escorts would, 
therefore, have to provide cover on bearings abaft the beam of a convoy or Fleet. In 
the latter case, account would also have to be taken of the requirement for aircraft 
carriers to turn into wind for extended periods to launch and recover aircraft. Since this 
heading was unlikely to be the same as the mean line of advance, it was likely that A/S 
escorts would have to form a "circular" screen around the Fleet. This was reminiscent 
of the screens formed to cover convoys and Fleet units in the Arctic and Mediterranean 
during the war. 
Support groups had been formed early on in the war and had been used to 
reinforce threatened convoys, though not Fleet units. During the later phase of the U- 
boat campaign in inshore waters, relatively weak close escorts had been provided, 
while support groups were stationed in geographic areas where U-boat activity was 
expected either from attacks or intelligence. For a future A/S campaign, Burnett 
thought, the majority of escorts would, once more, be more effectively deployed in 
support groups, provided there was sufficient intelligence of the enemy's patrol areas. 
"' 'Convoy A/S Escort, ' in, 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations, 1940, ' DASW, ASW. 2191/40, 
CB4097(11)(42), November 1940 [with amendments to 25 April 19451, Box 468, RG 38, 
NARA2, Plates 4-7. 
' Compton-Hall, 26 February 2000. 
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Burnett considered it more likely that these support groups would be used directly to 
augment the convoy's close escort, just as they had done in the latter stages of the 
war. Earlier in the war it appears that the support groups tended to patrol at a distance 
around the convoys to deter surfaced U-boats from using their high speed to gain 
ground so that they could make an attack. Now, with submarines likely to remain 
submerged distant patrols would have less effect, and A/S escorts would be better 
placed close to the convoy from where they could either detect submarines as they 
manoeuvred into a firing position, or counter-attack them if they had penetrated the 
escort line. Of course, if the total escort force was sufficiently powerful, it might still be 
possible to detach some A/S ships to patrol further afield where they might be able to 
harass submarines concentrating against the convoy. These ships could also be used 
to follow up contacts made, say by aircraft, at a distance from the convoy. This could 
also apply to Fleet screens, though here the problem was that the detached vessels 
would have to steam at very high speed to catch up the main body, which would cause 
a heavy expenditure of fuel. 
As for air support, the paper reiterated that the chance of aircraft detecting 
submarines travelling deep or at slow speed was small. The best that aircraft could 
achieve was, by the use of sonobuoys, radar and visual search, to deter submarines 
from using the surface to snort or use their periscopes and radar aerials with impunity. 
If a submarine were detected and its position known within reasonable limits, it was 
possible for an aircraft to track it with sonobuoys for a limited period of time, provided 
the submarine was travelling at speed. Burnett, who had experience of this type of 
ship-air co-operation, thought that the absence of contact should lead to the 
assumption that the submarine was evading at low speed. The A/S vessels would then 
have to search a smaller area. Even relatively sparse air patrols would make it 
extremely hazardous for submarines to travel on the surface to close a convoy or gain 
bearing once in contact. During the war U-boats attacking submerged had to get into a 
relatively small sector ahead of the convoy or Fleet. Aircraft had not paid a great deal 
of attention to this sector because of their ineffectiveness in detecting submerged U- 
boats. Now, however, with their greatly increased submerged speed and endurance, 
submarines were able to close to a firing position from a much broader sector. The 
aircrafts' ability to detect the submarine were little better than during the war, so it was 
now felt that they could be most useful when patrolling this sector immediately ahead of 
the convoy's or Fleet's escort. Here, in what became known as the "look zone", a 
submarine might wish to make last minute, high speed adjustments to get into a firing 
position, or to use their periscope or radar mast to confirm the point at which to 
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penetrate the A/S escort, or to refine the submarine's fire control solution. A submarine 
with the characteristics of the Type XXI would be able to intercept a convoy from great 
distance off track, if it were ahead of the convoy, but would be unable to close from far 
astern without surfacing. If air patrols were therefore extended to cover the aft sectors 
they would provide a considerable degree of protection. This would, in turn, allow the 
surface escorts to concentrate on the most dangerous sectors forward of the convoy's 
beam. 
This system of air and surface escort, the papers emphasized, would benefit from 
close co-operation between all the forces involved. There was a need to resolve the 
division of responsibilities when both carrier-borne and land-based aircraft were 
operating in support of an individual convoy. But this apart, the co-operation of the air 
force and naval forces was already being fostered by the work of the Admiralty and Air 
Ministry Joint Sea/Air Warfare Committee, the Area Combined Headquarters (AHOs), 
and the teaching of the Joint Anti-Submanne School at Londonderry. As far as the 
latter was concerned, a crucial function would be the development of A/S tactics, 
especially '... to specify more definitely than has been done in the past the immediate 
action which should be taken if a submarine gets in its attack undetected. ' This was, 
marginally, already better covered for convoy defence from wartime experience, though 
not against fast submarines. In any case, the tactical instruction now needed to 
combine surface and air actions, and which would be applicable world-wide. 449 
The joint papers made a number of recommendations. So that the Admiralty's 
and Air Ministry's '-present trend of thought in these matters... ' was understood, the 
papers were to be forwarded to the British Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief, and 
the relevant training and experimental establishments, as well as the Dominion Naval 
and Air Headquarters. As for future progress the key was to establish the best methods 
of search in open ocean operations and for trade defence using combined air and sea 
A/S forces. Of these, trade protection was seen as the first priority. The Joint Anti- 
Submarine School at Londonderry, which was already investigating the convoy 
problems, was, in consultation with Headquarters Coastal Command, to propose 
tactical schemes, given current equipment. These schemes were to 
... then be considered 
by the operational and research departments on purely 
mathematical lines and then returned to the Command and the School so that 
449 'Joint Paper on ... 
Fleet Defence-, ' ADM 1/20936, passim; 'Joint Paper on ... 
Convoy 
Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, passim. 
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investigations could be started, first on the tactical table and subsequently in 
practical sea trials. 4-r'o 
Similar requests were made to Cs-in-C, Home Fleet and Coastal Command on the air 
and surface screening requirements for the Fleet. Initially all these investigations were 
to concentrate on the "short-term" problem of submarines with performance 
comparable to the German Type XXI and employing current AIS equipment. Thereafter 
thought would be needed on how to counter the future "long-term" problem of the 25 
knot, Walter-type submarine. 451 
The Ability of Future Submarines to Make Contact 
DTASW was concerned with developing a realistic basis for a review of the A/S 
doctrine to deal with the modern schnorkel-fitted, high-speed submarine. These 
submarines would, of course, operate underwater, which gave them a certain degree of 
immunity, particularly from air attack but these tactics also inhibited the submarine's 
ability to find its targets, without the help of air reconnaissance or accurate intelligence. 
This issue had been discussed at a Tactical Staff Meeting in the Admiralty, presided 
over by DCNS, in December 1946 and resulted in Admiral G. N. Oliver, ACNS, calling 
452 for a joint appreciation on the matter from DTASW and DAW. Ashbourne opened the 
process by considering each of the methods a submarine could use to detect its prey. 
The periscope was the primary method and in good weather the following table shows 
the ranges to be expected, compared with those from the bridge of a surfaced 
submarine: 
By periscope 
On bridge on the surface 
Lame Warshivs Merchant Ships Escorts 
14 miles 12 miles 10 miles 
18 miles 15 miles 13 miles 
However, periscope observation was, by its nature, intermittent, so that the maximum 
ranges would not always be achieved. Poor visibility and rough weather would also 
substantially reduce these ranges. In a 15-foot sea, for instance, the visual distance 
through the periscope would be practically zero, while at night, with the existing 
technology, ranges were extremely limited in any sea state. At high speed no periscope 
observation could be made. Ashbourne estimated, taking all these factors into account, 
that average ranges would be roughly: 
4-50 'Joint Paper on ... Convoy Defence, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 10. 451 'Joint Paper on ... Fleet Defence..., 'ADM 1/20936, p. 6. 452 Memorandum by G. N. Oliver, ACNS, 31 December 1946, ADM 1/20384. 
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Larqe Warships Merchant Ships Escorts 
By periscope 10 miles 9 miles 7 miles 
The Germans had made great use of hydrophone detections, and it was 
assumed that the Russians would learn these techniques. Acoustic ranges vary 
significantly, depending, amongst other things on, the depth of water, and the speed 
and size of the target. The noisiest targets (high speed Fleet units or convoys) might be 
detected at 20 miles, provided the submarine itself was travelling at slow speed. The 
British and Americans were making use of radar in submarines, though detections from 
periscope depth were unlikely to be at a range greater than that obtained by visual 
means unless the visibility was poor. As with normal periscope observation the 
submarine would be unable to use radar when travelling at high speed. In addition, use 
of radar by the submarine exposed it to counter-detection by escorts fitted with suitable 
search receivers. The reverse of this was also true, that is, submarines could make use 
of detections of radar (or W/T) transmissions from escorts. Lastly, the enemy 
submarine might be fed intelligence information from its operational headquarters 
ashore. 
Ashbourne concluded that the submarine of the future, limited to its own 
resources, would have less opportunity of detecting its targets than had the 
submersible of the late war. 'It will be practically blind when proceeding at high speed, ' 
Ashbourne noted, and harking back to the debilitating problem faced by the Germans 
throughout the war, he deduced '... that if the submarine of the future is to make use of 
its strategic mobility, it will require reconnaissance of its targets and accurate direction 
onto them. ' From this Ashbourne concluded that if the modern submarine could be 
denied air reconnaissance, then a proportion of the operational submarine force would 
have to be used passively in the reconnaissance role. 453 
The convoy strategy continued to influence the enemy's approach: 
in February 1943, when D6nitz had just become C-in-C of the German Navy, a 
memorandum from the German Naval Staff to the Air Force Command Staff 
contained these words: 
00ur submarines are operating in steadily increasing numbers without 
positive results.... All efforts of the Naval Staff to maintain contact with 
enemy convoys by assigning more submarines or by repeatedly changing 
the operational areas, are limited by the vast distances of the Atlantic and by 
the resulting difficulty of establishing contacts with convoys far away from 
their point of assembly or port of destination. We must continue to gain a 
maximum of information about the course of the enemy convoys if the Battle 
of the Atlantic is to remain successful. This can be done only by means of air 
40 'Ability of the Submarine of the Future to Make Contacts, ' [Captain Lord Ashbourne, DTASW, 
28 January 1947], ADM 1/20384. 
173 
Chapter 5 
reconnaissance. Aircraft must penetrate to mid-Atlantic; aircraft must locate 
the convoys; aircraft must keep contact with these convoys; and aircraft 
must lead the submarines to the targets. ' 
A Naval Staff comment some months later said: 
"The new submarines, even more so that the earlier types, depend on 
aircraft for observation at sea. "454 
At the end of January 1947, having received Ashbourne's input, Captain E. H. 
Shattock, the Director of Air Warfare, produced his appreciation to answer the 
question: 'Can we prevent this air reconnaissance, or make it too expensive for the 
enemy to keep Up? '455 There were, in fact, two problems to solve, Shattock realized: 
preventing the enemy's searching and, separately, denying him the ability to shadow 
located targets. He thought that searching, particularly for slow-moving convoys, would 
require only a few fixes per day in the Western Approaches for the enemy to have a 
good idea of the shipping movements. There were three broad possible types of search 
the enemy could adopt. He could sweep the area with fast, high-flying aircraft fitted with 
ASV capable of detecting a convoy at a range of about 80 miles. This would employ, 
perhaps 20 aircraft per day and these flights would rely on their height and speed to 
avoid interception by fighters. It ought to be possible, Shattock thought, to detect these 
aircraft at long range. This meant that high-performance fighters could operate from 
deck-alert, thus obviating the need for standing air patrols, which were expensive in 
aircraft numbers. Deck-alert would probably require only 6 high-performance fighters to 
protect each convoy, but these could only be operated from modernized carriers. it 
seemed, he conjectured, unlikely that there would be sufficient numbers of modernized 
carriers to undertake the task, making the chances of stopping this type of 
reconnaissance remote. 
The Russians could use slower aircraft carrying high-powered Airborne Early 
Warning (AEW) radar that could detect convoys at about 200 miles. Clearly, far fewer 
aircraft would be needed for this method, but their lower performance would make 
them vulnerable to fighters. However, even if ship's radars could be improved to allow 
direction of the interception at these long ranges, the fighters may not have enough 
endurance, added to which, if the AEW aircraft were handled intelligently, the fighter 
directors task might be impossible. The last method, Shattock considered, was the use 
of low-flying aircraft, which relied on remaining below radar coverage of the convoy for 
their own safety. This flight altitude, however, would reduce their performance 
454 'Proposed Paper for Policy and Plans Sub-Committee [Air Reconnaissance for Submarines 
of the Future], ' [Captain A. N. C. Bingley, DNAW, 26 June 1947], ADM 1/20384. 
455 'Prevention of Enemy Air Reconnaissance Co-operating with Submarines: Appreciation, ' 
[Captain E. H. Shattock, DNAW, 5 February 1947], ADM 1/20384. 
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(especially if jet-powered) and limit their individual search capability. Although their 
performance was relatively limited, the warning given of their approach would mean 
that fighters would have to be kept on airborne patrol to stand a chance of intercepting. 
This would mean that there would have to be about 6 aircraft on the carrier for every 
one aloft on patrol, and this would, in turn, exclude the carrying of any A/S aircraft. Only 
by such measures would it be possible to shoot down these low-flying reconnaissance 
aircraft. On the other hand, the enemy would have to use large numbers of aircraft to 
complete his task. 
For the Russians, the shadowing task was more difficult. Aircraft would have to 
remain in contact, while the submarines were concentrating on the target. AEW aircraft 
might be able to achieve this, relying on their long range from the convoy for safety. 
However, these types were more open to radar deception and their reports might not 
be sufficiently accurate for the submarines due to the technical limitations of the AEW 
sets. For the other types of enemy aircraft, the close shadowing which they would have 
to contemplate could be made expensive, Shattock thought, since there were likely to 
be repeated opportunities for the defence to intercept them. Efficient shadowing was 
probably preventable, Shattock concluded, provided threatened convoys could be 
given carrier-borne fighter protection. He did consider the use of RAF shore-based 
long-range fighters, but the obstacles seemed to be overwhelming, given the problems 
of fighter endurance versus performance and the need for long-range control of the 
interceptions. As a result of this appreciation, Shattock considered that it was unlikely 
that the enemy could be denied reconnaissance of the convoy routes without a huge 
deployment of modernized aircraft carriers and this seemed '... a most unlikely 
9456 proviso.... It seemed reasonable to suppose that fighter cover could be provided to 
threatened convoys, and therefore, there appeared to be a good prospect of 
preventing, or at least discouraging, the enemy's efficient shadowing of convoys. 
Shattock felt that the whole problem needed to be explored further in a series of tactical 
table games and large scale exercises at sea. 
In the spring of 1947 the NID circulated a US Office of Naval Intelligence report 
based on German Naval Staff documents which reinforced the issue of air 
reconnaissance support for U-boat operations. 'The lesson for us is clear, ' ACNS 
minuted, 
4-56 'Prevention of Enemy Air Reconnaissance Co-operating with Submarines: Appreciation, ' 
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The interception and destruction of enemy long distance over-sea reconnaissance 
aircraft must go hand-in-hand with the attack and destruction of the U-boats 
themselves. 457 
He proposed that the Sea/Air Warfare Committee should review the problem to 
encourage work in this area. In June DAW forwarded the final version of the 
appreciation on the prevention of enemy air reconnaissance co-operating with enemy 
submarines, which took account of staff comments within the Admiralty and Air 
Ministry, and by Flag Officer, Submarines, as well as incorporating the historical 
perspective from the German experience. 458 
In the spring of 1947, E. M. Gollin, the young and brilliant new Director of 
Operational Research (DOR) at the Admiralty, minuted some thoughts on a future anti- 
submarine campaign . 
4591-le had worked in NID and now began by noting that: 
From the purely economic viewpoint, shipping should sail in convoy rather than 
independently if more imports would thus be obtained over the total period of a war 
at sea, i. e., if the gain in imports arising from the reduction of casualties exceeded 
the loss in imports arising from the delays of the convoy system. Very roughly, it is 
estimated that against an enemy effort represented by about 15 (or more) U-boats 
continuously ongtrol ... convoys should be instituted in a war at sea lasting 6 
month or longer. 
But, Gollin explained, just sailing of ships in convoy, instead of independently, would 
not appreciably reduce the submarines' ability to make contact in focal areas. Each 
convoy in the focal areas would have to be given a full escort capable of preventing the 
attack by most of the U-boats making contact, or, at least, inflicting a severe loss-rate 
upon them. At least eight escorts per convoy would be required. The primary aim of 
future A/S operations was, therefore, to initially drive enemy submarines out of the 
focal areas and into the open ocean, where they would have to rely on intelligence for 
knowledge of shipping movements. Outside the focal areas shipping sailed in convoys, 
even with a token escort, would, Gollin reasoned, probably greatly reduce submarines' 
ability to locate convoys, unless Russian Intelligence was extremely good. Even then, 
the Russians would need the tactical and technical skill to conduct pack operations. 
The complementary tactics of reconnaissance and pack operations were necessary if 
the scale of attack against individual convoys was to be increased. It followed, Gollin 
deduced, that 
... the escort 
force required to keep losses at an acceptable level depends primarily 
on the scale of attack which can be mounted against an individual convoy, rather 
457 Minute, G. N. Oliver, ACNS, 18 April 1947, ADM 1/20384. 
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than on the total size of the U-boat fleet; the nature of this dependence is complex, 
and the present knowledge of tactics, weapons and efficiency of a future enemy is 
insufficient to define it. 461 
He also noted that the effect of an increased enemy attack could also be 
mitigated by alterations to the convoy system itself. Perhaps drawing on the wartime 
work on convoy size, Gollin thought, 
if the number of U-boats at sea increased, the total imports over a period might 
well be maintained by sailing few but larger convoys; the slower turn-round being 
offset by the greater safety of an individual ship in a larger convoy, by the greater 
number of escorts per convoy made possible by the new cycle, and - outside focal 
areas - by a smaller number of convoy attacked. This last factor would arise if U- 
boats were denied good intelligence. 462 
Of course, if the scale of attack (and therefore losses in convoy) were contained, then 
the convoy cycle could be adjusted to run greater numbers of smaller convoys, which 
would improve the overall delivery rate. 
In Gollin's view the ability of the Russian's to gather the necessary intelligence of 
shipping movements from use of AEW aircraft was overrated. Even the British, he 
thought, with their superior radar research capability could not produce an aircraft of 
this type within the next 5 years and it seemed very unlikely that the Russians could 
better this timescale. Nevertheless, in terms of counter-measures to submarine attack 
on convoys, Gollin noted that hitherto the prime function of the escort had been to 
prevent U-boats from carrying out a torpedo attack. Now, however, directly countering 
submarines which fired at long range would require a prohibitively large escort force. 
Might it not be more realistic, he wondered, to plan for future escorts avenging attacks 
rather than trying to prevent them -a tactic frequently used in the difficult 
circumstances of the interwar years and during the inshore campaign of 1944-45. 
Gollin thought that escort might be armed with long-range A/S torpedoes which could 
be counter-fired against attacking submarines whose position would be estimated from 
the detection of their torpedoes. The escorts would also have to be able to cope with 
submarines which attempted to hide beneath the convoy. In either case, two escorts 
might be detached to hunt the submarine in co-operation with aircraft or helicopters. 
Sonobuoys would be used to detect the submarine if it tried to escape at high speed, 
thus giving the escorts the chance to gain asdic contact. Otherwise, if the submarine 
461 Minute, E. M. Gollin, Director of Operational Research, I April 1947, ADM 1/20030. 
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used slow speed, the area to be searched by the escorts would be relatively small, 
giving them a better chance of success. 463 
Captain P. G. Cazalet, in D of P, made some comments on Gollin's minute. He 
expressed the common view, when he pointed out that, in a future war, most of the 
Atlantic coast-line would probably fall into Russian hands at an early stage. Clearly, this 
would repeat the strategic problems posed in 1940 by the German occupation of the 
Biscay ports. He also thought that, because of '... the lowly place occupied by the 
Russian Navy vis-d-vis the other Services, its inexperience, and its difficult training 
conditions ... they will [amongst other things] exploit maritime Air Forces. v464 The 
requirement to provide A/A support for convoys would place an additional heavy strain 
on British escort forces. Cazalet also observed that Gollin had not taken into account 
the use of fast, high-flying ASV-fifted aircraft in the reconnaissance role, which had 
been considered by DAW. This was a theme developed further by Captain H. P. Currey 
in the Tactical and Staff Duties Division (DTSD), who pointed out that Exercise 
aSpearhead", a combined exercise involving all three services, that had been held at 
Camberley in late 1946, had shown up the enormous numbers that would be required 
in the future, not only of A/S escorts, but A/A and air-direction (A/D) types as well to 
cope with the anticipated Russian air threat against shipping. A second exercise 
followed in early May 1947 which again emphasized the problems of defending 
seaborne military and trade shipping against modern combined air and submarine 
attack. 465 Currey observed that, with a Russian occupation of the Atlantic coast, '... the 
striking range of enemy submarine and aircraft will be greatly extended and our 
defences stretched to a point which we have never known in the past. ' His assessment 
from this exercise, as well as other staff comments, was that the British had probably 
reached the point where the number of escorts required for the protection of vital 
shipping in war was prohibitive and beyond both manpower and building capacity. It 
seemed to Currey that 
... the time has now come when we must face the fact that the purely defensive policy of endeavouring to surround each of our many convoys with an effective A/S 
and AIA screen is no longer practicable and that we must turn our attention and 
efforts more towards offensive measures rather than defensive measures. 466 
He thought the most obvious methods were the direct affack-at-source on the enemy's 
submarine bases and airfields, his communications and industrial capacity. Currey did 
463 Minute, E. M. Gollin, Director of Operational Research, I April 1947, ADM 1/20030. 
4" Minute, Peter Cazalet, for D of P, 22 April 1947, ADM 1/2.0030. 
465 'Exercise "Spearhead", ' in, 'Progress in Tactics: 1947, ' DTSD, C1303016/47,17 October 
1947, ADM 239/143, pp. 45-46. 
' Minute, Philip Currey, for DTSD, 29 April 1947, ADM 1/20030. 
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not contemplate the use of atomic weapons, but did note that the effort with 
conventional bombing would require substantial resources, and that in the early stages 
of a war these assets were unlikely to be available. He considered, therefore, that other 
means would be needed, including the use of mines, small battle units directly against 
submarine bases, and a blockade by submarines in the A/S role. Even so, he pointed 
out that defensive measures around convoys would still be needed. Finally, to reduce 
the onerous nature of this task, Currey suggested that means should be explored of 
shifting a proportion of the extensive British coastal seaborne trade to inland routes. 
The ACNS, Oliver agreed with the staff comments and passed the docket on to Vice 
Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS), for information. 467 
McGrigor considered the large numbers of escorts forecast to deal with the Russian 
threat was wildly optimistic. 'We need, ' he thought, 
... a lot of clear thinking on the subject of the future escort, and when considering 
staff requirements, the need for speed, killing power, specialised duty, and so on, 
the over-riding problems of numbers must be kept clearly in mind, which means 
mass production, simplicity, and sacrifices of many desirable qualities. 468 
Although the Naval Staff recognised the importance of enhancing methods of attack-at- 
source, there remained a clear commitment to "defensivem convoy operations. It was 
also established during this period, after a protracted and, at times, obscure debate, 
that the risk of major war was to be taken as low over the five years from 1947, though 
the risk would progressively increase over the subsequent five years . 
4" in the 
meantime McGrigor directed that " ... a lot of clear thinking" was required. Burnett was 
already drafting a major paper on the technical and tactical problems which had to be 
resolved over the next few years. The process was one in which the Americans also 
took a close interest, as the extended visit of the US Assistant Chief of Naval 
operations (Operations), Rear Admiral CW Styer, USN, was to show. 
467 Minute, G. N. Oliver, ACNS, 5 May 1947, ADM 1/20030. 
468 Minute, [Vice Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, VCNS], 7 May [1947], ADM 1/20030. 
"9 Minute, D of P, 20 August 1947, ADM 116/5966; Minute, USS, 23 October 1947, ADM 
116/5966; Eric J. Grove, 'The Post War "Ten Year Rule" - Myth and Reality, ' Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 129, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 48-53. 
179 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6: New Problems, Old Recipes, 1947-1948 
Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future and Attack-at-Source 
Admiral Styer's visit was timely. During 1946 the Americans were concerned, as 
they put it, to provide'... a more sharply headed up organization... ' to deal with the anti- 
submarine aspects of Operational Readiness and Fleet Operations. As a result, Rear 
Admiral C. W. Styer, USN, was assigned additional duty as the "Coordinator of Under- 
sea Warfare" throughout the USK 470 Styer, a submariner by profession, and a team of 
USN officers visited every British anti-submarine establishment, and all the command 
and staff division in early 1947. The visit impressed Styer and he left with the firm 
conviction that the British anti-submarine warfare planning system '... is excellent, well 
organized, and is worth consideration for our adoption either in toto or a suitable 
modified form. Wi While in Britain he was given a series of briefings by the Admiralty, 
including one by Ashbourne outlining an Admiralty and Air Ministry "Review of the 
Problems of Future A/S Warfare". Dealing only with the "Short-Term Problem", 
Ashbourne outlined the technical and tactical issues for Styer from both the naval and 
air force perspective. 'Two major factors, ' he said, 
.. will influence our 
defensive dispositions round convoys or Fleet units: - 
(a) Submarines are less likely to be on the surface when concentrating or 
shadowing, so that the presence of our forces in the deep field is less likely to 
provide warning of the submarine's approach, and will be less hindrance to the 
submarines. 
(b) Submarines will probably fire their torpedoes from longer ranges and the 
screening vessels will find them more slippery customers to detect and attack. 
From these propositions, Ashbourne concluded that: 
470 'Proceedings of Anti-Submarine Warfare Conference, 17 June 1946,1 Op-34H: jn (SC) A16- 
3(17) Serial: 00012P34, Forrest Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, 25 June 1946, 
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... all available surface escorts will be used in the screen and that this screen will be more a deep zone of escorts two to five miles round the convoy or Fleet [rather] 
than the wartime single line. 472 
He also suggested to Styer that in the future the navies should be prepared for a 
fundamental change in enemy submarine tactics. During the early part of the war it was 
rare for U-boats deliberately to target escorts, unless they posed a direct and 
immediate threat. That changed in late 1943, and during the last months of the war, 
one escort was lost for every two U-boats destroyed. In a future war, further 
improvements in acoustic homing torpedoes could persuade the enemy to intentionally 
sink escorts from the outset. At a time when escorts would be scarce, and production 
capacity not fully developed, such a strategy could soon leave convoys bereft of 
protection. 
Apart from convoy, Ashbourne only mentioned one other strategic measure to 
Styer, that of deep minefields under the most important coastal routes. Doubtless this 
focus was due to Ashbourne's own wartime experience in minelaying operations. It was 
realized that these minefields, being sparsely laid, would not cause many casualties 
but would produce a constant worry for U-boat crews while on operations. Regarding 
air operations, the briefing given to Styer centred around the air escort of convoys. 
There was some discussion over the use of helicopters, fitted with a towed or dunking 
sonar but the main issue was the lack of progress in re-establishing the anti-submarine 
aircraft's ability to search large areas (which had been so important with radar-fitted 
aircraft against surfaced U-boats during the war). Although high priority was attached to 
developing an airborne A/S homing torpedo, deploying an operational version was a 
long way off. Aircraft, therefore, were relegated to the "scarecrove role to ensure that 
enemy submarines operated submerged, thus limiting their strategic and tactical 
mobility and their ability to locate targets. Fighter aircraft would, it was thought, also be 
needed to shoot down enemy reconnaissance aircraft working with U-boats to locate 
convoys (though this, too, was to prove a difficult problem before the advent of high 
performance jet aircraft). 473 This was a regurgitation of the ideas outlined in Burnett's 
doctrine papers. Clearly, though, the British were already considering other 
alternatives, for when Styer visited Air Chief Marshal L. H. Slatter, AOC-in-C, Coastal 
Command, at Northwood the conversation turned to the co-ordinated use of air and 
surface craft in offensive anti-submarine operations in ocean waters. 
472 'Review of the Problems of Future A/S Warfare, ' TASW. 2014/47, [December 1946], in, 
'Report of Coordinator of Undersea Warfare and Assistants' Visit to British Naval Activities, Jan. 
19 - Feb. 12 1947, ' Forrest Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), Op- 
31 B: ch (SC) Al 6-3(17) Serial 003P31,30 April 1947, Box 90, RG 313, NARA2, p. 5. 473 'Review ... Future 
A/S Warfare, ' Box 90, RG 313, NARA2, pp. 6-8. 
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In late April 1947 Captain R. S. Warne, CBE, another submariner, relieved 
Ashbourne as DTASW. For the time being Burnett remained as AD(AIS) and, along 
with Ormsby and Mosse, expanded on the assessment of anti-submarine problems 
presented to Styer. The draft they produced was also used as a briefing paper to 
support Sir Henry Tizard's scientific liaison visit to America in August 1947. In the 
paper Burnett wrote that, 
... the submarine and anti-submarine war at sea has depended on the ability of the submarine to remain invisible while improving its striking power, and the ability of 
the anti-submarine forces to locate the submarine, and neutralize its attack. At the 
moment the submarine is in the ascendent [sic] in the absence of any major 
improvement in the range of detection by existing apparatus, or in the absence of 
any new counter to its present "invisibiliy. 474 
When comparing own and enemy capabilities, Burnett thought it advisable to pitch 
existing British A/S capability against an assessment of an enemy's submarine 
potential of, say, 15 years hence. For the foreseeable future, there was no A/S 
detection system which offered a higher search rate to cope with the elusiveness of 
modem high-speed, long-endurance submarines. Furthermore, on being detected, 
these submarines could prove difficult to attack because of their great powers of 
evasion. It was hoped that by 1955 the new Limbo A/S mortar and Type 170 Asdic 
would largely overcome this disability, though it would take time for the equipment to be 
fitted fleet-wide and for the development of tactics as well as training in its use to be 
achieved. On the air side the picture was far gloomier. The development of effective 
sensors and weapons for aircraft would take much longer, and there remained many 
technical problems for which no solution was in sight. A more difficult dilemma, though 
outside the scope of Burnett's paper, was the provision of adequate numbers of 
escorts. It had been provisionally estimated that 500, or more, A/S vessels would be 
required, yet by the mid-1 950s barely half this number would be available. 
These difficulties had already persuaded Captain H. P. Currey, DTSD, that 
... 
the time has now come when we must face the fact that the purely defensive 
policy of endeavouring to surround each of our convoys with an effective A/S and 
A/A screen is no longer practical and that we must turn our attention and efforts 
475 more towards offensive measures.... 
Burnett agreed and pointed out that the history of British A/S warfare clearly showed 
that solely defensive measures had never been relied upon. During the First World War 
U-boats had to spend some 25% of each day on the surface, simply to charge their 
batteries. Convoy escorts and hunting patrols had no means of accurately locating U- 
474 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, ' TASW. 4666/47, P. W. Burned, for DTASW, 16 
August 1947, AIR 20/6381, Summary. 
475 Minute, Philip Currey, for DTSD, 29 April 1947, ADM 1/20030. 
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boats unless they were on the surface, yet convoy escorts accounted for 24 U-boats 
between July 1917 (when ocean convoy was introduced) and October 1918. Over the 
same period patrols destroyed 16 U-boats, 10 were sunk by submarines and 35 were 
lost in offensive and defensive minefieldS. 476 The work being carried out in the 
Historical Section on the Second World War was showing that while convoy escorts 
were, once again, the highest single means of killing U-boats, it was also true that 
roughly half of all the U-boats sunk were destroyed by the broad range of "offensive" 
A/S measures. 477 
At the beginning of the Second World War Burnett recalled that the British had 
not had enough patrols to prevent U-boats surfacing to charge their batteries. With 
growing numbers, tactical efficiency and the fitting of radar, the escorts and air patrols 
eventually made it too dangerous for the U-boats to operate in these strategically 
important focal shipping areas. The Germans were then forced into the wide ocean 
areas where, to find convoys, they had to rely even more on the high surface speed of 
their U-boats now operating in packs and controlled by wireless from the shore HQ. Air 
escorts made it difficult for U-boats to concentrate around convoys, usually enabling 
the surface escorts to drive off the limited numbers of U-boats that made contact. 
Initially, U-boats avoided asdic-fitted escorts by attacking at night on the surface but the 
widespread fitting of high-definition radar in escorts soon defeated this tactic. The 
intercept and D/F of enemy radio traffic - aided occasionally by the timely decryption of 
messages - also allowed support groups to reinforce threatened convoys. Tactically 
HF/DF permitted A/S escorts to disrupt individual U-boat attacks and often to destroy 
them. By 1944 the U-boats had been fitted with the schnorkel, which allowed them to 
charge their batteries submerged and remain largely immune to detection by aircraft. 
This heralded '... a new era of A/S warfare... ' as the U-boats were able, once more, to 
return to the focal areas in UK waters. Here it was easier for them to find targets, 
which, in turn greatly reduced their reliance on the use wireless to find or attack 
convoys. Opportunities for exploiting U-boat transmissions were therefore limited, 
though the gradual disintegration of the German command structure with the advance 
of the Allied armies forced the enemy to make greater use of radio for shore-side 
coordination. These messages undoubtedly provided useful information to the 
Admiralty and Coastal Command who were able to deploy A/S forces more effectively. 
Nevertheless, at a tactical level, U-boats approaching and attacking submerged put 
476 Grove (ed. ), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, Plan 4. 
477 'Cause of U-boat Sinkings - 2"d World War, ' Diagram 20 in, 'Exercise 'Trident% Volume ll, ' 
C13004521. April 1949 (issued 23 January 1950), ADM 239/490. 
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greater emphasis on the surface escorts use of asdic. Initially, the asdic teams were 
inexperienced in the shallow, inshore water operations but soon efficiency improved, so 
that by May 1945 the escorts were sinking a very high proportion of the U-boats which 
tried to attack convoys . 
478 As for offensive patrols, Burnett, drawing on personal 
experience, realised that these were protracted affairs though often crowned with 
success. 
The Germans had realized that the schnorkel-fitted U-boats lacked the mobility 
necessary for operations in the open ocean. The Germans therefore, somewhat 
belatedly, put high priority on developing U-boats with a high submerged speed and 
endurance. These new types were epitomised by the 15-knot baftery-driven Type XXI 
and the 25-knots hydrogen-peroxide, or HTP, driven Walter Type XXVI. Thinking to the 
future, Burnett cautioned that the results of this German research were known to the 
Russians and it was therefore reasonable to assume that in another war the Royal 
Navy would be faced with submarines built along these lines . 
479 Further developments 
in submarine technology over the next 5-10 years presaged an increase in the 
maximum underwater speed and diving depth. The actual endurance that could be 
assumed for a particular baftery-driven submarine was extremely difficult to predict for 
it would depend not only on the remaining charge in the battery, but also on the recent 
battery discharge and charging profile. Essentially, Burnett noted, their endurance at 
the higher speeds would be limited, so it was doubtful that the new submarines had the 
speed and endurance to overtake and concentrate round convoys, especially if denied 
supporting air reconnaissance. However, with improved homing or pattern-running 
torpedoes, Burnett expected them to be fired from wider angels and at ranges of five or 
six miles, without hitting power being diminished. Submarines could therefore stay 
outside the reach of normal escort stations. Consequently, if a submarine did not 
betray its presence, other than by the impact of its torpedoes, the area that A/S forces 
would have to search would be considerably larger than for wartime U-boats. For A/S 
vessels which did approach these submarine not only was there the problem of 
improved anti-escort homing torpedoes, but they might also be equipped with short- 
range anti-escort rockets based on the German wartime mUrsel" project under 
development at the end of the war. 480 Overall, it seemed that 
478 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 2. 
479 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 2. 
480 'German Underwater Rockets, ' US Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 
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The rate at which-AIS vessels will be sunk may well be several times that at 
which they sink submarines. It is unlikely to be less than one escort vessel per 
submarine sunk .... 
481 
The problem of diluting anti-escort counter-attacks, together with the challenge of 
maintaining contact and attacking submarines when close-in, meant that engagements 
would have to involve at least two A/S vessels, and this put additional pressure on the 
overall numbers of escorts. To avoid prohibitive costs and to expand numbers quickly 
in time of war, escorts would have to be simple and economical to build and man. This 
implied a small ship, which conflicted with the requirement for the A/S ships to be 
capable of at least 25 knots in moderate weather if they were to stand any chance of 
catching and attacking a fast submarine. This requirement would tend to drive up the 
ship's displacement, as would the growing demands of weight and space for asdic, 
radar and radio equipment, as well as weapons. The asdic system envisaged 
comprised a search set capable of detecting at longer range and with a higher rate of 
angular coverage, with another set capable of providing instantaneous range, bearing 
and depth information to the weapon system. This combination, it was hoped, would 
allow the ships to search at a higher rate (provided the classification and self-noise 
problems could also be solved), and to hold contact despite the dynamics of high- 
speed manoeuvres of the fast submarine and A/S ship. Sinking a submarine with an 
aimed weapon, would mean replacing the existing ATW with the *Limbo" mortar 
capable of engaging the target on any bearing and variable range, thus leaving the ship 
free to manoeuvre as required to keep contact. Fine resolution radar and a good Action 
Information Organization (AIO) system would be essential for ships to manoeuvre in 
close company without mutual interference or collision. The AIO would also be used to 
combine D/F information from a submarine's use of radio, radar or acoustic 
transmissions. The resultant fix could be used to target long-range A/S homing 
torpedoes fired from the escorts. Four Weapon class destroyers, of the Sixth Destroyer 
Flotilla (6DF) were being converted and would be used for trials to establish the 
requirements for specialized A/S destroyers. The more extensive conversion of an 
older destroyer, integrating the improved AIO, new asdic and A/S weapons, was being 
considered for inclusion in the next year's programme. If the modifications proved to be 
successful, there were 35 older destroyers which were thought to be suitable for this 
"Type 15 Frigate" modernisation (Plate 20). 
The high speed and long endurance of aircraft gave them an inherent advantage 
in patrolling large sea areas. Their high speed also made aircraft ideal for patrolling 
" 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 3. 
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Plate 20: Tvpe 15 Friqate - HMS Relentless 
Leo Marriott, Royal Navy Frigates since 1945,2nd edn. (London: Ian Allan, 1990), 
P. 37. 




round convoys or quickly following up fleeting submarine contacts. This had been very 
valuable when U-boats relied on the surface for search and mobility. However, with 
modem submarines operating perpetually submerged, aircraft needed a reliable 
system to detect submarines when snorting, or, ideally, when fully submerged. During 
the war aircraft were equipped with only one weapon, the US Mk 24 homing torpedo, 
which could be used against a fully submerged submarine. Colloquially known as 
uFido" or "Wandering Annie", the weapon homed on its target's HE, like a three- 
dimensional version of the Gnat. The weapon had a speed of only 12 knots and an 
endurance of 10 minutes. Its small (92 lb. ) contact-fused warhead was designed to 
achieve at least "mission kill". 482 It had to be aimed accurately, ideally on the swirl 
created by a U-boat which had just dived, though the weapon could also be dropped on 
the U-boat's position derived from a sonobuoy pattern. Passive homing was technically 
the simplest system, but relied on low self-noise from the torpedo and (like sonobuoys) 
on adequate noise from the target. So, if the submarine was travelling at slow speed 
(less than 6-9 knots), or the torpedo travelled too fast (above 20-25 knots), the homing 
range would be severely compromised. Passive homing torpedoes were also 
vulnerable to fairly simple submarine-launched acoustic counter-measures. 
An active torpedo, on the other hand, was unaffected by a submarine's noise 
output and less distracted by its own noise. Consequently, this form of torpedo was 
able to home at a higher speed and, while less susceptible to submarine-launched 
countermeasures, the target was also more likely to be aware of its presence. The 
active torpedo's performance, however, could be drastically reduced if the enemy were 
able to coat their submarines with a suitable anti-asdic covering, such as the German 
"Alberich" rubber coating. The British, unlike the Americans, were convinced that'... the 
homing of torpedoes will not be effective in shallow water with which they are deeply 
concerned . 9483 'Owing to its comparatively narrow transducer [beam] pattern, which is 
necessary to achieve a reasonable homing range, ' the paper continued, 
the inifial location of the submarine by the torpedo presents a serious problem and 
this will be even more marked in the case of aircraft launched torpedoes where 
accurate aiming is difficult to attain. The chief difficulty likely to be experienced with 
active acoustic homing, especially in shallow water, is the likelihood of the weapon 
homing on "non-sub" echoes .... 
484 
Forecasts of the likely performance of homing torpedoes were uncertain. At best it was 
concluded that, for torpedo speeds greater than 35-40 knots, homing ranges of 
between 1,000 and 1,500 yards would be possible, though not '-for some years yet. ' 
482 'Torpedo Mine Mk 24, ' Bernard Stephens, 30 April 1998. 
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Under less favourable operational conditions, these ranges might easily be less than 
half these values. One solution suggested was the use of a human operator to guide 
the torpedo via a trailing wire connection. This system could be applied to aircraft if the 
weapon trailed the wire from a floating buoy fitted with a radio link to the aircraft. 'The 
main advantage of this arrangement, ' the paper suggested, was 
... that the discriminatory power of the human ear [was] retained until the last possible moment, which may permit decoys and spurious signals to be 
distinguished and disregarded. This method may also render possible some small 
increase in homing range and/or speed. '85 
The only sonobuoys in service with the British were those ornni-directional types 
left over from wartime stock supplied by the US and these would all be expended 
during training and in exercises by 1949. The British were developing a new sonobuoy, 
based on the American design. The improvements incorporated in the design were 
limited to those necessary to make it compatible with the RAF and RN aircraft currently 
in service. Against a large modem submerged submarine at 10 knots at periscope 
depth, or 15 knots at 200 feet, it was calculated that the new British buoy would 
achieve a range of 8 miles in sea state 1. This was the maximum performance. If the 
submarine travelled slower, or the sea state increased, the detection range 
deteriorated significantly. For example, against the submarine at 10 knots at 200 feet in 
sea states 4-5, the range was only 1% miles. To overcome these limitations it was 
theoretically possible for aircraft to carry expendable active sonobuoys, or an asdic in a 
body towed below the aircraft at a maximum speed of perhaps 40 knots. No research 
was being undertaken in Britain, but the Americans were thought to be experimenting 
with helicopters which would hover while deploying the asdic body. Airships, Burnett 
thought, offered more promise than the low-performance helicopters then available. 
MAD had not been used in British aircraft, and its limited detection range meant 
that the swath swept during a search was very narrow, especially against a deep 
target. It was, therefore, only really effective against relatively shallow submarines. The 
British, therefore, considered its operational value confined to narrow channels and in 
some tactical situations. It was totally unsuitable for large area searches. The British 
were not carrying out any technical development of an airborne radar for long range 
detection of snorts, though they were closely following the results being obtained by the 
Americans, and were studying the operational potentialities of the method . 
4" As for 
submarine radar or "Squash" radio transmissions, it was not yet known what equipment 
485'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 4. 
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would be needed for an aircraft to make detections. It was thought a possibility for 
aircraft to home onto a submarine radar transmission, provided it was of long enough 
duration. Burnett was doubtful of the operational value of such equipment to aircraft, as 
comparable with its essential worth to ships. He then briefly examined of the use of 
submarines as A/S vessels. Working in the same environment as the enemy, Burnett 
thought A/S submarines might be less affected than surface ships by adverse 
environmental conditions. However, submarines employed in the A/S role would also 
need an asdic capable of detecting and localising enemy submarines. Even if 
submarines proved to be more efficient asdic platforms (compared to surface ships) the 
asdic would remain a short-range sensor, limiting the usefulness of submarines as A/S 
vessels. Moreover, the greatest hurdle was the provision of effective recognition 
equipment if submarines were not to be attacked by friendly forces. Nevertheless, the 
development of an A/S "fighter" submarine for use in co-operation with surface forces 
and of patrol submarines for A/S operations in enemy controlled water were under 
considerationS. 487 
Burnett did not envisage any substantial increase in the detection range of A/S 
sensors in the foreseeable future. Some additional performance might be squeezed out 
of existing asdics by measures to quieten the ship, thus causing less interfering noise, 
by silencing the ship's propellers through better designs and masking techniques. 
Other limitations were due to the fundamental properties of sound and to the 
environment were extremely difficult to overcome with existing technology. These 
included the effects of temperature gradients, background noise and reverberations. 
Substantial improvement in asdic performance was only possible if lower acoustic 
frequencies were used, because the attenuation of the transmitted energy was less as 
it passed through the water. However, lower frequencies demanded a larger transducer 
if the transmitted was not to be dissipated over too wide an acoustic beam. Many of 
these issues had been investigated in the 1920s and 1930s. Design features of the 
submarine could also adversely affect asdic performance. For example, streamlining 
the hull to achieve high speed reduced the asdic echo, especially on ahead and astern 
aspects. Submarines could also be covered in asdic-absorbing material, similar to the 
"Albedch' rubber coating applied to a few U-boats during the war, which could reduce 
the reflected energy by about 15% . 
488 A captured U-boat (U-1105) with this covering 
had been the subject of British trials in the immediate post-war period. As for asdic 
W 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 5. 
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listening, this method was critically reliant on the noise output of the submarine. It 
seemed that, with existing technology, operationally useful ranges could only be 
achieved against a submarine travelling at about one-third of its maximum speed, or 
faster, and at relatively shallow depths. Other, more novel, methods, such as wake, 
magnetic and electrical detection, were seen as likely to produce operational results 
only in the distant future. "' 
To achieve all these technical solutions the scientific effort required would be 
considerably in excess of that normally accorded in time of peace. Furthermore, the 
stock of fundamental research had been exploited during the war and now needed to 
be replenished. The research resources thereby diverted would diminish Britain's 
capacity to develop weapons and sensors . 
490 The Admiralty also had to face the 
limitations of scientific manpower, for apart from those released to civilian projects, 
many departments were not affording sufficient priority to military developments, and a 
proportion of the remaining stock of scientists were also to be transferred to atomic 
work . 
491 The efficient tactical use of new equipment rested on adequate training in its 
use, but this would always lag behind the provision of the new gear. The perception 
was that equipment would also be introduced into service at a slower rate in 
peacetime, due to '-financial stringency, ' though delays were probably more to do with 
the sheer complexity of the new technology and a shortage of electronic engineers. 492 
In addition the effective use of the new equipment would rely on the establishment of 
appropriate authorities '... to direct A/S operations, to analyse recent operations and 
intelligence and to organise and supervise A/S training. P493 
The basic strategic assumption was that an enemy would use his submarines to 
attack British trade, though some units might be used for operations against the Fleet, 
or, with the use of rockets, against British territory, including ports. The attack on trade 
would be most dangerous if the enemy operated in the inshore focal areas where 
shipping was most concentrated. This might be supported by a relatively small number 
of submarines deployed on more distant operations to force the British to disperse their 
A/S effort and to adopt a comprehensive convoy system, which would reduce the 
effective volume of British shipping. If A/S measures could be concentrated in these 
inshore areas and achieve a sufficiently high attrition rate of enemy submarines, they 
489 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 9. 
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might adopt a policy of directly attacking escorts (if they had not done so from the 
outset). As a last resort the enemy were likely to re-deploy into open ocean areas, 
where, still operating submerged, it would be much more difficult for them to find their 
targets without strong air reconnaissance -a lesson that had been graphically 
demonstrated by the German failure in this regard . 
494 Burnett thought that a future 
enemy would have much greater difficulty in locating and closing in on targets, than 
had the U-boats in the war and the reconnaissance aircraft might prove to be 
vulnerable targets themselves. The enemy might also develop methods of co- 
ordinating attacks by submarines so as to oppose the escort of a selected convoy with 
a tactical concentration of submarines. Once in contact, the new submarine types 
would pose a much more serious menace. 495 
The A/S measures proposed bear a strong resemblance to those conceived in 
the Admiralty during, and formalised immediately after, the war (as covered in Chapters 
3-5). The basic strategic and tactical countermeasure remained the institution of 
convoy, which made it harder for the enemy to find their targets and forced submarines 
to move if they were to close their targets (and hence expose themselves to counter- 
detection). The enemy's task would be made more difficult if their use of airborne 
reconnaissance could be curtailed and if convoys sailed at high speed. Ultimately, 
escorts were needed to attack submarines approaching or reaching a firing position. To 
reduce the number of submarines able to operate against trade, it was planned to carry 
out attacks on the enemy's submarine building potential (through direct bombing and 
indirectly through economic warfare). At least half the operational Russian submarine 
force was expected to be in harbour at any one time for maintenance and to rest 
personnel. Thus, taking into account transit times, about 15% of the total could be 
maintained on patrol in UK waters. Attacks on their bases and training areas were 
496 therefore envisaged, either by direct bombing, or with mines. Submarines on 
passage or in their operational areas would also be subjected to offensive operations 
by A/S forces and the constant worry of defensively laid mines. 
With the draft of his paper completed, Burnett was relieved in August 1947 by 
Captain C. E. E. Paterson, another wartime escort group commander. Paterson steered 
the draft though the Joint Sea/Air Warfare Committee where it was approved in spring 
1948 as an accurate statement of the state of A/S warfare. Paterson also broadened 
the discussion in the original paper, for Burnett's object had been to consider the 
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Elek Science, 1973), p. 37. 
495 'Anti-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Summary and Part 1. 416 Minute, [Captain] Ashbourne, DTASW, 1 November 1946, ADM 1/20030. 
191 
Chapter 6 
present A/S measures and the avenues for research and development to counter the 
likely threat from potential enemy submarines. His paper had covered measures such 
as mining, but only skirted the wider issues of attack-at-source, that is, attacks on 
industry, building yards and bases. So, when Burnett's draft was discussed by the sub- 
committees of the SAWC, the RAF complained that it did not take sufficient account of 
'-what would probably be the RAF's major contribution to this form of warfare: 
strategic attack on factories, building yards, and bases. A97 Paterson, took action to 
remedy the situation. A memorandum was issued, under ACNS's signature, in early 
December 1947 in which the question of "Attack-at-Source" was discussed. It 
recognised the contribution which could be made by bombing of the enemy's 
submarine support infrastructure, but concentrated on the naval contribution, which 
needed further detailed study. 'it is evident, ' Admiral G. N. Oliver, ACNS, concluded, 
that, so long as we are unable (for lack of some novel method) to detect 
submerged Submarines at considerably greater ranges than are at present 
possible, the mere squeezing of the last ounce of usefulness out of our existing 
means of acoustic detection will not by itself provide a sufficient antidote to the fast 
Submarine of the near future. In fact, the present tendency is for the Submarine 
Attack to outstrip the A/S Defence. It therefore becomes necessary to cast around 
and to consider whether there may not be other ways, as yet not fully exploited, of 
contributing to the defeat of the U-boat. 498 
Although the enemy's submarine industry and building yards were more susceptible to 
attacks by air, there was also a contribution that could be made by the Royal Navy by 
attacks on harbours in "Special Operations" using "sneak" craft (i. e. midget 
submarines), saboteurs and Naval cutting-out operations, just has had been done on 
numerous occasions during the war. In addition, investigation into these methods 
would enhance British countermeasures against their use by the enemy. The key was 
that these operations were seen'... as components of the whole A/S problem. ""' 
Submarine Tactical and Technical Development 
By the end of 1947 DTASW produced two further papers. One reviewed past 
enemy submarine tactics and assessing their future progression, and the other paper 
examined submarine technical developments. Both papers reviewed wartime 
submersible operations some detail, since this type was still in use by the post-war 
497 'Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Policy and Plans Sub-Committee held in the 
Admiralty on 7 November 1947, Sub-SAWC 1/14147,13 November 1947, AIR 20/10176. 
498 'A/S Problems of the Future - Attack-at-Source and Harbour Defence, ' G. N. Oliver, Office of 
the Chief of Naval Staff, 8 December 1947, ADM 1/21546. 
499 Minute, G. N. Oliver, 8 December 1947, ADM 1/21546; Minute, D of P, 17 December 1947, 
ADM 1/21546; 'Small Battle Units, ' DTASW, TASW. 4037/48, April 1948, DEFE 2/1660; Richard 
H. Allen, 'The Attack-at-Source and the Development of the British X-Craft Midget Submarine, 
1945-1958'(MA, London, King's College, 2000). 
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Russian Navy. Schnorkel-fitted submersibles and the Type XXI (now designated 
"Intermediate (B)") were also described. As for the Walter Type XXVI boats, now styled 
"Intermediate" submarines, none of these had been completed. 500 The Intermediate (B) 
emphasised submerged mobility. She could sustain speeds of 16 knots for an hour, or 
20 knots in short bursts. At 15 knots, the battery was only half discharged after an hour, 
leaving plenty of power for manoeuvring at slower speeds. 50' At medium speeds the 
Intermediate (B)'s endurance was impressive compared to earlier types. It could 
maintain 12 knots for 4 hours, 8 knots for 10 hours, or 4 knots for 4 days. The snorting 
speed was about 10 knots and, under ideal conditions, could be as much as 15 knots, 
though vibration (and thus periscope vision) was likely to be a problem. 502 In principle, 
the Intermediate (B) could avoid searching A/S vessels, though its use of high speed 
might betray its presence at long range, or confirm a doubtful contact for an escort. 
With its long endurance at medium speeds the Intermediate (B) could close a high 
proportion of its targets. Greatly decreased reloading times meant that a series of 
salvoes could be fired in rapid succession. What was more, the increased performance 
of modern torpedoes, meant that firing ranges were, perhaps, increased by as much as 
three-fold. The chances of hitting would be maintained by improved fire-control, with 
periscope radar and the use of homing and pattern-running. This made the 
Intermediate (B) dangerous enough, but if they could also operate in packs, both to 
improve their chances of locating convoys and to make coordinated, albeit 
unsynchronised, attacks, the situation would become very difficult for A/S forces. 
Provided it was already at high speed the Intermediate (8) would be able to avoid A/S 
attacks, though, if travelling at slow speed, it did not have the acceleration to escape an 
attack pattern. 503 
The Intermediate submarine promised underwater speeds of up to 25 knots for 
five hours. However, these submarines were expensive to run, and their overall 
performance was unremarkable, except during the bursts of high speed. Moreover, 
because of the time taken to accelerate and slow down from its high speed (at which it 
would be practically visually blind and acoustically deaf), the Intermediate submarine 
would have little advantage over the Intermediate (B), although it might close from 
much greater distances on specific intelligence reports. Its great advantage was the 
'ý00 For the nomenclature of submarines at this period see Appendix 9. 
501 This was a slight improvement over the Type XXI performance, see Appendix 7. 
602 Eberhard Rassler, The U-boat The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines, 
tr. Harold Erenberg (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1981), pp. 204 and 273-274; Ships' 
Cover 746/A, Super-Ser-aph (Scotsman), Folio 4, NMM(W). 
r'03 'A Review of Past Submarine Tactics and a Forecast of Probable Future Enemy Submarine 
Tactics, 'DTASW, TASW. 329/47, June 1948, ADM 1/30840, pp. 7-8. 
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ability to outrun A/S escorts after an attack, especially if the sea was rough. As for the 
"True Submarine" very little was known of its characteristics, other than it was likely to 
be a large vessel and nuclear powered. Its high speed endurance was likely to be 
about 30 knots for six months, enough, the Admiralty noted, to circumnavigate round 
the world six times! However, to counter these submarines the Admiralty noted that 
,... no startling advances in its detection equipment are foreseen at present. 9504 The 
Admiralty had come to the view, therefore, that although there had been advances in 
A/S measures and weapons, these tended to lag behind the parallel increase in the 
offensive power of the future submarine. Since it appeared likely a future enemy could 
produce submarines similar in performance to the German Type XXI U-boats within the 
next five years, and before new A/S equipment was available, there was 
... an urgent requirement to establish the best tactics to employ against these 
submarines with existing equipment, and whether any modifications to the latest 
A/S Vessels' equipment ... are essential. 
505 
The JASS View of Defensive and Offensive Operations 
During the spring of 1947 the Joint Anti-Submarine School (JASS) at 
Londonderry were teaching tactics that were heavily based on the methods of the last 
war, modified to cope with the 15-knot submarine. No revolutionary changes had been 
made in these tactics, and none were expected in the near future. During the war it had 
been impossible to defend a convoy solely with surface escorts because there were 
never enough A/S ships to form a continuous asdic screen. Defence in depth was 
found necessary, with aircraft in the deep field, surface support groups at 15-20 miles 
and finally the close escort in the immediate vicinity of the convoy. Even if the outer 
forces were not able to sink U-boats detected, the warning provided the likely direction 
of approach and allowed the close escort (and support groups) time to form a local 
concentration against subsequent attacks. These cues were also combined with 
intelligence from HF/DF bearings of enemy transmissions, as well as tactical estimates 
of likely approach directions based on the prevailing weather conditions and 
operational experience. Ultimately, the torpedoing of a ship could be used to indicate 
the likely position of the firing U-boat. 506 
504'A Review of Past Submarine Tactics..., 'ADM 1/30840, p. 8. 
505'Progress in Tactics: 1947, ADM 239/143, pp. 11-13. 
606 'Joint A/S Warfare - Convoy Defence and Offensive Operations -A General Outline Lecture, ' Lieutenant Commander D. E. B. Field, RN, Wing Commander H. A. S. Disney, RAF, 
Commander A. W. F. Sutton, RN, Joint A/S School, Londonderry, Issued 28 May 1947, Revised 
27 October 1947, File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 1. 
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However, since the development of the Type XXI, now referred to as the 
Intermediate (B) submarine, a number of new factors needed to be considered. 507 
Firstly, aircraft and surface support forces were unlikely to detect submarines which 
approached submerged, even when using their schnorkel. It was also assessed that 
submarines would use of the "Squash" (or burst radio transmission) technology. 
Because these signals could not be intercepted at sea with existing technology, A/S 
ships would no longer be alerted by submanne sighting reports. As an alternative, 
JASS suggested the use of smoke or foxers to force submarines to transmit on radar to 
locate their target, and thereby betray its presence before attacking. Furthermore, an 
Intermediate (B) armed with long-range torpedoes, could fire from outside existing 
screens. With the capability to rapidly reload, these submarine could fire 18 torpedoes 
in the space of 25 minutes. With its higher manoeuvrability, the modem submarine 
could also get under a convoy and remain there while it fired several salvoes. The most 
strenuous effort would be needed to winkle out a "sub-convoy" submarine, for asdic 
conditions were bound to be difficult owing to the presence of the merchant ships. 
Optimistically, JASS wondered if the new "Four Square" (which became the Type 170) 
asdic might solve the problem, because it would be capable of the simultaneous 
measurement of the range, bearing and depth of a submarine target. 508 When a 
submarine was known to be under the convoy, an emergency turn could, it was 
thought, expose the submarine and thereby allow the escorts an opportunity to attack. 
However, the A/S vessels would also be tactically hampered by the risk of collision, 
especially at night, until the submarine moved clear of the convoy. It was best, 
therefore, if the submarine could be prevented from getting close to the convoy. The 
principle of defence in depth now had to be applied to the close screen itself and the 
screening ships had to be stationed further out from the convoy, which would give the 
escort the chance to concentrate at least two AIS ships and then more room to engage 
the submarine-509 Close co-ordination between all the escort forces was needed to 
exploit the fleeting opportunities to destroy attacking submarines. Overall it was 
unacceptable to rely upon a torpedoing as a warning of an attack, for too many ships 
could be hit before A/S countermeasures could be started. Taking these factors 
" See Appendix 9. 'Trade Protection - Defence of Ocean Convoys, ' Group Captain W. E. 
Oulton, Director (RAF) and Captain R. G. Onslow, Director (RN), Joint AIS School, Londonderry, 
No. 725,25 February 1948, Box 102, RG 313, NARA2. 
5m 'The Experimental Four Square Asdic Set, ' HMA/SEE, Fairlie, Internal Report No. 230,9 
November 1945, ADM 259/429, p. 2. 
"'Convoy Defence and Offensive Operations... Lecture, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 
83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 2. 
195 
Chapter 6 
together, JASS concluded that the submarine ought to be destroyed if at all possible 
before it fired at the convoy. 
With all the difficulties that the modern Intermediate (B) type of submarine posed 
for A/S forces, it too suffered from some limitations. By operating submerged their 
search capability was restricted and they were best employed in focal shipping areas 
were targets were more concentrated. This was, however, where AIS forces were likely 
to be strongest. Although the Intermediate (B)'s underwater endurance was greatly 
improved over the wartime U-boats, it was still limited, which meant that A/S actions 
would be short if the submarine was operated continuously at high speed. Like the 
wartime snort-fitted submersibles, the Intermediate (B) could not travel at high speed 
when schnorkelling and was, therefore, unable to make as much ground at a U-boat 
capable of surface travel. The free use of the surface by submarines had been ended 
by A/S aircraft. In their lectures, JASS explored the capabilities and roles of A/S aircraft 
in some detail. Submarines by using their own radar would normally detect 
approaching aircraft before they could attack, as had been shown by intensive trials 
with HM Submarine Viking during the war. 510 With existing weapons an aircraft had a 
reasonable chance of sinking a U-boat if it could attack when the submarine was still 
on the surface, or at most 30 seconds after it had crash dived. Once the submarine 
was submerged the only means of detection was with a sonobuoy pattern. These could 
be used to locate a submarine whose position was already known with reasonable 
certainty, such as would be gained from the swirl in the water after it had dived or from 
a schnorkel sighting. JASS reminded its students that sonobuoys were not suitable for 
searching large areas and, furthermore, A/S aircraft had no reliable method of 
detecting a snort other than visually. However, JASS staff pointed out that: 
Submarine limitations are such that the majority of submarines taking part in an 
attack cannot be placed well ahead on the convoys track. A certain amount of 
submarine movement is therefore necessary. Owing to limitations of snorting 
speed, some of this movement may take place on the surface. 511 
Of course, submarines transiting on the surface presented ideal targets for 
aircraft and ones which could be subjected to lethal attack or at least forced to dive and 
thereby probably miss intercepting the convoy. This was an observation of crucial 
importance in another sense. This passage highlights the vulnerability of submarines 
510 'Report by RAF Observer in HMS Viking during period 24 April -6 May 1944, ' HO No. 19 
Group, 30 May 1944, AIR 15/557; 'The RAF in Maritime War, Vol. IV: The Atlantic and Home 
Waters, The Offensive Phase, February 1943 - May 1944, ' (First Draft) n. d., AIR 41/48, pp. 
477-488 and 488fn 1- 
511 'Convoy Defence and Offensive Operations ... Lecture, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 
83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 4. 
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when forced to move. While the near stationary U-boat, especially in shallow waters, 
was extremely difficult to detect, submarines on the move sooner or later would expose 
some part of their structure above water, or make significant noise underwater. Either 
case gave A/S forces opportunities to locate the enemy. JASS concluded that the value 
of aircraft in the A/S battle was, by their sheer presence, to deny the submarines the 
free use of the surface and to attack any unwary submarine caught on the surface. 
Aircraft could also detect submarines travelling at relatively shallow depth and at high 
speed by using sonobuoys. Thus, relative to a convoy, the A/S aircraft should be used 
to provide patrols on the convoy's bows where they might catch submarines on the 
surface trying to close the convoy's track. They should also conduct patrols closer 
astern to detect submarines trying to overtake the convoy. 
Notwithstanding the technical limitations of aircraft equipment, these air patrols 
on the bows of the convoy could be supplemented by "sono-barriers", consisting of 
lines of sonobuoys laid primarily by Coastal Command aircraft to detect snorting 
submarines closing the convoy's track. The same idea could be used astern of the 
convoy to catch shadowing or overtaking submarines. Lack of equipment consigned 
practically all the tactical experiments into the use of sonobuoys to theoretical games 
on the tactical tables ashore. The first buoys were placed about 6 miles ahead of the 
convoy and 10 miles outside the wing columns. Subsequent buoys were laid to create 
a barrier that stretched some 30 miles ahead of the convoy. More work was needed to 
investigate what was the best angle to lay the barrier relative to the convoy's mean line 
of advance (MLA) but the first games laid the barriers parallel to the MLA. The 
alternative tactics was against the shadowing submarine, when the sonobuoys were 
laid at right angles to the MLA of the convoy in a line extending to 10 miles outside the 
wing columns. There was one case of an actual sonobuoy barrier being laid during a 
1947 A/S exercise where a submarine was detected and subsequently attacked. 512 
If contact was gained on a sonobuoy pattern, the aircraft was to maintain contact 
by laying additional buoys. Surface escorts might then be detached from the close 
escort to hunt for the submarine and destroy it. Meanwhile additional, carrier-based 
aircraft could be employed on searches ahead of the convoy. 11 3 These searches were 
aimed at deterring a submarines lying in wait from freely using its periscopes or radar. 
Of course, slow-moving, submerged submarines which assumed that they were directly 
ahead of the convoy were practically immune from detection by A/S aircraft and 
512 'Progress in Tactics, 1948, 'ADM 239/144, p. 6. 
513 'An Outline of the Conduct of Naval Air A/S Operations in Defence of Traft, Acting 
Commander A. W. F. Sutton, RN, Joint A/S School, Londonderry, 15 September 1947, File S- 
4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, pp. 3-4. 
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countering them rested squarely with the close surface escort. If any of these air 
patrols and searches detected a concentration of submarines, the aircraft could hold 
them down to limit their mobility, while the convoy carried out an evasive turn. It was 
seen as especially important to shake off a shadowing submarine before it could home 
other enemies onto the convoy. If these measures failed and there was an attack on 
the convoy some indication of the position of the attacking submarines might be 
gained, and the escort then had the opportunity to counter-attack using an intensive air 
and sea hunt. The weaknesses of individual A/S units meant that a combination of all 
available air and sea assets was vital to narrow the probability area to be searched and 
to try to retain the initiative. Perhaps the most difficult submarine to counter was one 
that had penetrated the close screen and was sheltering underneath the convoy. 514 
Clearly, large numbers of aircraft would be needed to fulfil such a concept of 
operations and it would not be possible for all convoys to routinely be given this high 
level of air escort. The policy, therefore reflected the provision of surface escorts and 
gave each convoy only a light through escort, which could be reinforced in danger 
areas by support groups. Most A/S aircraft would be used on independent area patrols 
over focal areas or areas of assumed submarine concentrations, and would be 
available to reinforce threatened convoys. Once co-operating with the convoy's escort, 
all aircraft should be under the tactical control of the escort's Senior Officer, who would 
have the best understanding of the tactical picture. 515 This tactical control, the JASS 
Staff taught, might best be conducted through a carrier if one was present with the 
escort. The philosophy was not finally determined, for at the Third A/S Tactical Liaison 
Meeting in May 1947 the JASS representative, while stating the clear need for an 
undivided command of A/S assets round a convoy, thought that'... no firm opinion had 
been formed as to whether this should be the Senior Officer of the Escort or the Aircraft 
Carrier providing the air cover. P516 
The tactical disadvantage of the escorts also suggested that a strategic offensive 
would have to be undertaken against submarine construction facilities, training areas, 
and bases. Indeed, JASS thought this was '-probably the best means of defence. ' 
514 'RAF Staff College: Pr6cis of Lecture on Surface Tactics, ' Lieutenant Commander D. E. B. 
Field, RN, Joint A/S School, Londonderry, File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 
24, NAC. 
515 'Pr6cis: Command and Control of Joint A/S Operations, ' Wing Commander HAS. Disney, 
RAF, n. d., File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC. 
516 'Third A/S Tactical Liaison Meeting held in HMS Vemon on Ist and 2 nd May 1947, ' 




'517 However, this countermeasure was '... rarely possible in the early stages of a war. 
The Naval Staff had long held the idea that a bombing campaign against U-boat bases 
to prevent submarines from putting to sea, was an important A/S measure. 518 What 
was more important, a bombing campaign took some time to have an impact on front 
line forces because of the long work-up time needed to train an operational submarine 
crew. Hence U-boats destroyed in their bases or being built in the factories would not 
have become operational for say 6 months, as DNOR had pointed out during the war 
when faced with the same question. As for the future, when improved sonobuoys 
became available their tactical use would demand close co-operation between ships 
and aircraft. Furthermore, the JASS Staff emphasized that A/S aircraft needed a 
means of attacking fully submerged submarines. The idea of using helicopters with 
towed asdic was already being considered by the Admiralty, though Ormsby had noted 
that this method had been omitted in DPR's review of airborne acoustic detection. 
There was, of course, no suitable helicopter available in mid-1947, but it had been 
decided that some investigation should be continued in tactical games at Osprey and 
JASS. It was soon concluded that the use 
... of helicopters or 
blimps with towed asdic would be of greatest value in providing 
fast escorts with the advantages [of] aircraft to combat the fast submarine. 519 
About a third of the JASS general outline lecture dealing with joint A/S warfare 
was devoted to hunting operations. 'The principle of the offensive, ' the staff asserted, 
$applies to anti-submarine warfare as it does to other forms of warfare. v521 However, just 
as with the direct defence of convoys, the improved performance of the Intermediate 
(B) submarines made offensive operations more difficult. This meant, ASS Staff 
affirmed, that sea and air forces had to be highly trained to take advantage of any 
opportunities that occur from their operations or the mistakes by the enemy. The forces 
available for these operations were shore-based, long-range aircraft, fast A/S 
destroyers and frigates, and escort carrier hunting groups (though none of these were 
in the naval force planning). The latter might, ideally, consist of two CVE's (one of 
which, depending on the area of operations, might carry a complement of fighter 
aircraft). The CVE's were provided with a close escort of four A/S ships and an 
517 'Convoy Defence and Offensive Operations ... Lecture, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 
83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 3. 
5" 'Remarks on Air Staff Paper on the Employment of Heavy Bomber Force against Enemy U- 
boat Organisation. ' [covered by First Lord's note, 15 December 1944], PREM 3/414/1. 
519 -Convoy Defence and Offensive Operations ... Lecture, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 
83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 5; 'Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the Technical Investigation Sub- 
Committee, 8 August 1946, 'Sub-SAWC/11117/46,12 August 1946, ADM 116/5614. 
520 -convoy Defence and Offensive Operations ... Lecture, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 
83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 6. 
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additional "striking force" of 5-6 more A/S ships. If the direction of the enemy was 
known, striking force would operate 10-30 miles ahead of the carrier and her close 
escort, depending on whether radio silence was in force or not. AJrcraft would fly 
intensive patrols on either flank of the force, or a search down HF/DF bearings. 
Otherwise the close escort and the striking force would all be stationed in a ring about 
the carrier, with the A/S ships operating in pairs for mutual support. The aircraft would 
also search all round the force, using a "step-aside diverging" search. These operations 
would be supplemented by shore-based aircraft patrols within boxes ahead of the 
force's track to allow the aircraft to maintain regular observation of the area, and 
presumably re-visiting each part of the area frequently enough to have a reasonable 
chance of detecting a snorting submarine. 
The depth of all these air searches was dependent on the ability of an aircraft to 
hold a submarine contact for long enough to allow the striking force to arrive with a 
reasonable chance of regaining the contact. Shore-based aircraft, with larger crews 
and stocks of sonobuoys were better able to hold contact for longer. The A/S vessels of 
the striking force needed to have a minimum speed of 25 knots and a good endurance. 
This meant that taking into account the time current sonobuoy types could maintain 
contact and the chance of a surface striking force locating the submarine, air searches 
were to be limited to 2-2Y2hours steaming from the striking force, say 50-60 miles . 
521 At 
first sight, this distance seems rather ambitious, given the long endurance of the 
Intermediate (B) submarine at moderate speeds, continuing slow asdic search rate and 
earlier ideas on the matter. 522 In the two hours a surface group might take to arrive at 
the datum, the submarine could be anywhere in an area of, say, 1,800 square miles. 
However, it was hoped that the aircraft could maintain sonobuoy contact for the striking 
force, as the ASS staff pointed out, to have a "warm scent" and therefore only have to 
search a relatively small area. 523 More intensive hunts would be conducted by a carrier 
group using her aircraft and supporting surface striking force, especially when positive 
indication of a submarine was given, say, by an attack on a convoy. Carrier hunting 
forces could also be used to seek out supply submarines or ones acting as a Loran 
radio fixing station. The greatest danger in using carriers in this role was the risk that 
they would be sunk, especially when employed against fast submarines. Over the 
following months the USN wordes on this point increased, because '... in all recent 
521 'An Outline of the Conduct of Naval Air A/S Operations in Defence of Trade, ' File S-4973-30 
Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 6; 'Convoy Defence and Offensive 
Operations ... Lecture, ' File 
S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 7. 522 See Chapter 1- 
523 'RAF Staff College: Pr, -&cis of Lecture on Surface Tactics, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, 
Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC. 
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exercises [fast] Guppy submarines have penetrated the screens and torpedoed the 
carriers. "24 
Land-based aircraft on independent operations would fly either square searches 
or creeping line ahead patrols, whereas carrier-borne aircraft would normally be used 
in daylight on radial searches from the carrier, or in relative searches on the beams of 
the surface striking force. 525 It was hoped that the aircraft would obtain an initial 
sighting. This would be reported immediately to the ships via a "Flash" radio message, 
and the aircraft would then carry out an urgent attack. If contact was lost, or, the attack 
failed, the aircraft would then remain in the vicinity of the submarine (or datum) and 
home the ships. If possible, contact would be maintained by the aircraft using 
sonobuoys in which case the aircraft would remain in tactical control of the situation 
until the ships were able to gain firm contact. Tactical control would then be ceded to 
the Senior Officer of the A/S ships. Of course, the aircraft would only be able to 
maintain sonobuoy contact if the submarine was trying to evade at high speed. If, on 
the other hand, the enemy tried to escape at sub-cavitation speed, the submarine 
would not have travelled far by the time the escorts began their asdic search. A major 
weakness in these tactics was the lack of a homing weapon with which aircraft could 
attack fleeting contacts, or submerged submarines being tracked on sonobuoy data. 
British progress with A/S homing torpedoes was painfully slow and the final 
requirements these weapons had not been laid down, as HM Underwater Detection 
Establishment, Portland (HMUDE) reported. In fact, a considerable amount of 
preliminary investigation and experiment was still to be done. 526 In the meantime A/S 
aircraft were armed with a 250 lb A/S depth-charge which could not be used against 
submarines deeper than schnorkel depth. 527 Improvements, too, were needed in the 
sonobuoys themselves to increase the chances of aircraft gaining and maintaining 
contact on submerged submarines, in a wider variety of circumstances. 
These air and sea operations, mainly in focal areas or on submarine transit 
routes, were primarily designed to limit the enemy's strategic and tactical mobility by 
forcing them to remain submerged and use their snort. 'This, ' it was hoped, 'will have 
the effect of reducing concentrations in operational areas and the weight of attack on 
524 Admiral R. McGrigor, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet to Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser 
of North Cape, First Sea Lord, 24 November 1948, Section 5, ADM 205/70. 
525 'Part IV - The Control and Operations of Aircraft and Surface Vessels in a CVE, April 1945, ' 
in, 'Naval Air Anti-U-Boat Instructions (Short Title: NAUI's), ' AWD 650/45, C804405 (G. B. ), 
Naval Air Warfare and Flying Training Division, April 1945, Box 147, RG 38, NARA2. 
526 'The Asdic and its Associated Weapons, ' DERA, ANA 5971, p. 18. 
527 'RAF Staff College: Pr6cis of Lecture on Anti-Submarine Tactics - Shore Based Aircraft, ' 
Wing Commander H. A. S. Disney, RAF, Instruction Office, Joint A/S School, Londonderry, 12 
September 1947, File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC. 
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individual convoys. ' This seems an expensive allocation of assets for such an ill 
defined result, though as JASS pointed out, advantage would be '... taken of any 
opportunities to take offensive action against the eneMy. '52" Such opportunities were 
likely to be few and far between, unless the enemy was either careless, or under 
pressure to achieve high speed transits to reach their operational areas. By October 
1947 Captain R. G. Onslow and Group Captain W. E. Oulton, the Directors of the Joint 
Anti-Submarine School at Londonderry, submitted a detailed paper on the defence of 
ocean convoys. The paper was produced to fulfil the remit suggested by DTASW and 
D of Ops in their paper of July 1946 and subsequently discussed at the Fourth Meeting 
of the Tactical and Training Sub-Committee of the Sea/Air Warfare Committee on 18 
July 1946 . 
529The JASS paper dealt only with the "short-term" problem. It drew on sea 
exercises and tactical table investigations that had been undertaken at Londonderry 
over the previous 18 months, as well as comments from Headquarters, Coastal 
Command. 530 
At the outset, ASS noted that it was unlikely that the failure of the Germans to 
develop submarine-air co-operation would be lost on the Russians. Although 
considerable investigation of reconnaissance problems remained to be done, it seemed 
that enemy aircraft ought to be able to provide a reasonable picture of shipping 
movements which the enemy could use to home his submarines onto their targets. if 
appeared, therefore, that the value of evasive routeing of convoys would be limited. 
This would be 
... of particular tactical importance if heavy A/S countermeasures had succeeded in driving the submarine patrols away from the focal points into areas of less shipping 
density. 531 
Although, the margin of speed of the fighters over the shadowing aircraft was likely to 
be small, until the sonic barrier was passed with the advent of jet fighters, JASS 
assessed that the reconnaissance aircraft might have some difficulty in shadowing in 
the face of fighter cover, at least by day. This was particularly the case if the fighters 
528 'Convoy Defence and Offensive Operations ... Lecture, ' File S-4973-30 Vol. 1, Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC, p. 6. 
529 'Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Tactical and Training Sub-Committee..., ' ADM 
116/5614; 'Trade Protection - Defence of Ocean Convoys (73/JAS/RAF/S. 100/AIR), Wing 
Commander C. B. Gavin-Robinson, RAF, and Commander J. W. Hale, RN, Sub. SAWC/11/36/48, 
18 February 1948, Box 102, RG 313, NARA2. 
'-10 Reference Sheet, 'Defence of Fleet Units against Submarine Attack, ' C. E. E. Paterson for 
DTASW, TASW. 380/48,19 August 1948, AIR 2/5950; 'Trade Protection - Defence of Ocean 
Convoys, ' Box 102, RG 313, NARA2. 
531 'Trade Protection - Defence of Ocean Convoys, ' Group Captain W. E. Oulton, Director (RAF) 
and Captain R. G. Onslow, Director (RN), Joint A/S School, Londonderry, No. 
73/JAS/RAF/S. 100/AIR, 17 October 1947, Box 102, RG 313, NARA2, p. 1. 
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were well directed from the force protecting the convoy, as had been amply 
demonstrated during battles around Mediterranean convoys. 532 To make best use of 
the location of convoys from their reconnaissance aircraft, it seemed that it was best to 
dispose the submarines in depth to the greatest extent possible, consistent with 
adequate breadth across the convoy's track to give a good chance of gaining a 
detection. 
If interceptions were to be successful, the submarines would have to be equipped 
with accurate navigation systems. They would, however, make least possible use of 
radio transmissions, in order to preserve the element of surprise. When transmission 
was necessary they were likely to make use of the German "Squash" burst- 
transmission communications system, with their messages re-broadcast from ashore 
for the benefit for all other submarines. Once a submarine made contact the remainder 
could either attack as they came into contact, or some attempt could be made to co- 
ordinate the attack by the pack. These attacks would not be simultaneous, however, 
until the advent of the higher performance Walter-powered submarines which were 
expected to have improved sensors and equipment for inter-communication. A 
proportion of the initial attacks might be deliberately directed at the escort. For 
individual attacks submarines could fire their first salvo from outside the escort screen, 
probably using pattern-running torpedoes, or from closer inside the escorts. In the latter 
case, they were likely to attempt to penetrate the screen at slow speed, using normal 
anti-asdic tactics. The second salvo was likely to be fired at close range, and the third 
from beneath the convoy. The submarine's high speed capability would probably only 
be reserved for evasion when detected, or when closing from an unfavourable position. 
The JASS paper did not deal with offensive search, but they assumed that 
... the broad principle will 
be adopted for having a heavy scale of independent air 
patrols reinforced by the surface forces in the focal areas, their objective being to 
drive the submarines into areas of less shi ing density or, at least, to prevent the P50 
enemy using pack tactics in the focal areas. 
JASS also made passing reference to the possibility of using submarines in the 
anti-submarine role for offensive operations. The main direct protection of convoys, 
however, was expected to be provided by "through" surface escort of eight ships, which 
would be reinforced by at least four more, as the convoy passed through danger areas. 
As far as possible, the surface escort should be stationed to maximise the chance of 
asdic contact (since no other warning was likely) and deployed in depth to give sea 
02 M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'Preface, ' in, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys to Malta 
in World War Two (London: Cass, forthcoming). 
533 Trade Protection - Defence of Ocean Convoys, ' Box 102, RG 313, NARA2, Part 11. 
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room for a counter-attack before the submarine could fire. A/S ships would have to be 
constantly aware of the threat of being the target of anti-escort torpedoes. The overall 
coverage of the escort diagram would have to take account of the wide relative 
bearings from which the fast submannes could approach. During the periods of higher 
danger the convoys would also receive light air cover from shore-based or carrier- 
borne aircraft (with the carrier stationed within the convoy or some 10-15 miles distant). 
ASS considered that the balance of air effort should be employed on independent 
patrols in the submarine probability areas, where they would also be available to 
reinforce directly threatened convoys, though there was little the aircraft could do to 
support surface vessels, once the submarines were at close quarters with the convoy. 
The convoys, considering the threat from enemy aircraft, also needed to be provided 
with fighter cover. The multiplicity of A/S assets and the need to respond immediately 
to fleeting contacts of fast submarines, emphasized the importance of team-work and 
the efficient use ships' AlOs. These demands in no way detracted from the need for 
individual ships to act aggressively and on their own initiative. This recipe would have 
seemed very familiar to wartime escort group Senior Officers. 
The Third and Fourth Escort Flotillas 
Much of the impetus in developing the broad range of A/S measures was that 
individual methods were ineffective. The advent of the fast submarine had made it ever 
more difficult to locate and destroy the enemy with any certainty. These views, well- 
founded though they proved to be, were largely theoretical in the immediate aftermath 
of the war, because of the lack of high-speed targets against which to assess the 
actual performance of existing A/S equipment and tactics. During the spring of 1946 
there were a short series of A/S exercises involving the Home Fleet and, although no 
fast submarines were yet available, some elements of the A/S problems could be 
explored. A large number of submarines were employed and they had support from 
aircraft in locating their target, though communications difficulties limited their value. 
Even so, many attacks were made on the Fleet, simulating long-range torpedo fire at 
about 6,500 yards from outside the normal A/S screen. The analysis of the exercise 
noted that if fast submarines were to approach at high speed from the bow or beam 
and fire at these long ranges, then the traditional A/S screen would have to be 
extended, to cover a wider arc and at a greater distance from the main force. This 
meant that the escorts would be stationed further apart and, with the high relative 
closing speed, the asdic coverage of the screen would be at an absolute minimum. 
204 
Chapter 6 
This could only be solved if more A/S vessels were made available . 
534This 
was a 
conundrum which would beset the Admiralty for some time. What to do when one of 
the escorts gained contact was, however, a more tractable problem. 
The potential for high speed evasion by a modern submarine meant that accurate 
and up-to-date tactical information was vital if the submarine's manoeuvres were to be 
quickly appreciated. Thus an effective hunt relied on co-operation between the ships, 
and especially on a close understanding between the ships' Commanding Officers. 
This implied a good NO and faultless inter-ship communications, so that both ships 
kept abreast of the highly dynamic engagement of a 15-knot submarine. The asdic data 
rate was slow and so it was not possible to rely solely on the plot to give adequate 
warning of changes in the submarine's movements. The plot was helpful for identifying 
the best disposition of the hunting team and planning lost contact procedures, but had 
to be combined with the more immediate direct asdic information of changes in 
doppler, or HE, in order to plan individual attacks to best advantage. This meant that 
the asdic operators had to be constantly alert, though their task was not made any 
easier by the interference from the unifoxer, streamed for the ship's protection. 
In the wake of the trials with the 12-knot Seraph in the autumn of 1944 DASW 
had concluded that the existing pair ship tactics remained effective against a fast U- 
boat . 
535 This idea was carded forward into the immediate post-war period. A single ship 
ran a high risk of losing contact, while a third ship could be an embarrassment during 
highly dynamic engagements at relatively short ranges. Even against slow-moving U- 
boats a succession of attacks were often needed to ensure destruction. Therefore, two 
ships should co-operate during the close AIS action, one to attack and the other to 
concentrate on maintaining contact. These ships were stationed 900 apart on either 
quarter of the submarine, which meant that they were less likely to physically obstruct 
each other or cause acoustic interference. Also the submarine was normally beam-on 
to one of the ships (thus giving the strongest echo), and they were ideally placed to 
make use of HE bearings to fix the submarine. These tactics seemed fairly robust 
against 12-knot target, but there was doubt whether they could cope with a faster 
submarine. 536 
Post war thinking recognised that the most difficult part of an A/S hunt was 
gaining initial contact and then its classification. Once in firm contact, the problem was 
"Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1946, 'ADM 239/420, p. 34. 
536 'Minutes of the First Meeting of DASW's Sub-Committee of ACNS(UT)'s U-boat Warfare 
Committee held at the Admiralty on Thursday, 30 November 1944, (Copy)' Folder NSS 1271- 
22, Vol. 8080, RG 24, NAC. 
536'Progress in Tactics: 1947, 'ADM 239/143, pp. 21-22. 
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to maintain that contact. The wartime two-ship close A/S action tactic, however, meant 
that '... the additional ships are not employed to the best advantage' because they were 
held clear of the submarine and could not contribute to maintaining asdic contact. 537 
The more ships that could get into asdic contact, it was felt by 1947, the greater chance 
there was of at least one ship holding contact on a fast submarine. It was with this idea 
in mind that the concept of a "Ring" formation around a submarine had been developed 
by the Fourth Escort Flotilla (4EF) in early 1947. It was designed as a '... co-ordinated 
scheme of A/S action by four or more ships, against the fast U-boat. 9538 During the 
latter part of 1947 the Third Escort Flotilla (3EF), based at Portland and responsible for 
tactical investigations, developed the idea further. Such development work was made 
problematic, because the 3EF ships' operations rooms were equipped with inferior 
Action Information Organization (AIO) facilities, making the control of dynamic tactical 
evolutions more diffiCUlt. 539 The idea of the "Ring" was to place all available AIS vessels 
within asdic range of the submarine. The first ship to gain contact was designated the 
"Attacking Ship" and attacked immediately. As other supporting ships arrived, they 
were disposed '... equidistantly apart on the perimeter of an imaginary circle, the centre 
of which is the submarine, ' and whose diameter was between one and two miles, 
depending on the prevailing asdic conditions. The ships were then manoeuvred by the 
Senior Officer roughly to conform with the course and speed of the submarine, so that 
the submarine was always in the centre of the ring. Individual ships would make minor 
adjustments to maintain themselves in their correct station from the Senior Officer. The 
Attacking Ship would continue to attack until the submarine was destroyed, or she lost 
contact when she would take a station on the ring, and one of the supporting ships 
already in asdic contact would take over the duties of the Attacking Ship. It was thus 
possible to ensure that continuous attacks could be maintained. The theoretical 
advantage of this tactic was that, by surrounding the target, at least one of the A/S 
ships was well placed to take over the attack if the submarine took violent evasive 
action. The key was for all the ships to keep an accurate tactical plot of the other ships 
in the action and the position of the submarine, which was continuously reported by the 
nominated "Asdic Plot Control Ship". Manoeuvring the ring also relied on strict R/T 
discipline amongst the ships to avoid confusion and maintain good communications. 
This level of positive direction was unnecessary if individual ships were able to hold the 
537 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1947, ' DTASW, TASW. 1 16/48, CB04050(47), 8 October 
1948, ADM 239/421, p. 33. 
538 'Third A/S Tactical Liaison Meeting held in HMS Vemon on 1st and 2nd May 1947, ' 
A. 198/3/47,17 May 1947, distributed by Op-32-F-45, n. d., Box 102, RG 313, NARA2, p. 22. 539 'Progress in Tactics, 1948, ' ADM 239/144, p. 28; and more particularly, 'Progress in 
Underwater Warfare, 1947, 'ADM 239/421, p. 33. 
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"Ring" formation by maintaining formation on the submarine's position. Early 
experience, however, showed that close control was '... more suitable for ships with 
little experience and those who have not worked together as a group. "' 
3EF's trials reached only tentative conclusions because these preliminary trials 
had been limited due to other commitments. They had barely touched on the fringe of 
the problem, and there were a number of outstanding questions, which, it was hoped 
would be tackled by further trials at sea by Fleet units or those attached to the training 
schools. Nevertheless, it seemed that the most efficient number of A/S vessels was 
four or five disposed on a circle of 1,500 yards radius. Any more ships and the 
formation became unwieldy. Overall, it was considered '... that this type of A/S action is 
perfectly feasible provided ships have reasonable AIO facilities, ' and 'given reasonably 
good operating conditions it is not difficult to keep the submarine inside the ring. ' 
Indeed, contact keeping was easier when the submarine was going fast because the 
hydrophone effect and pronounced doppler were a great aid. If contact was lost, the 
ships in the ring by carrying out an all-round HE sweep followed by an all-round asdic 
search, could, it was hoped, regain contact. The ring tactic had, however, only been 
tried against the fast uS" Class boats, since no Intermediate (B) submarines were yet 
available. The Admiralty concluded that these preliminary trials 
... indicate that this method of 
A/S action has distinct possibilities in competing 
successfully with the Intermediate (B) submarine. It is considered too that this 
method possesses certain advantages over the more conventional two ship action 
- the chief of these being the reduced likelihood of contact being lost once the 
submarine has been detected. It can be assumed that providing contact is held 
sufficiently long, the ultimate destruction of a submarine is assured. 541 
The Fourth Escort Flotilla and a Fast Submarine 
In the late spring of 1948 USS Tivmpeffish visited Britain at the invitation of the 
Admiralty. 542 She was one of the early "Guppy" conversions which, by streamlining and 
"Greater Underwater Propulsive Power", was capable of submerged speeds of about 
17 knots for an hour. 543 Trumpetrish was thus equivalent to the Type XXI and the 
Intermediate (B). In the waters off Londonderry, she carried out a series of exercises 
with the 4EF under its Senior Officer, Captain E. A. Gibbs, DSO***, who had sunk three 
U-boats (and a Vichy French submarine) during the war. The exercises with 
Trumpetfish began at the end of May and included attack, offensive sea-air hunting and 
640'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1947, 'ADM 239/421, p. 34. 
541 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1947, 'ADM 239/42 1, p. 35. 
542 'Semi-Annual Summary of US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1 April 
1948 -I September 1948, ' Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, to Secretary of the Navy, 14 October 1948, LHCMA, MF 868. 
543 Friedman, U. S. Submarines, p. 242. 
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convoy serials. These exercises, and the longer series that was to follow with the Sixth 
Destroyer Flotilla, were to confirm that defensive operations to protect a force or a 
convoy, and offensive hunting missions had low probabilities of destroying enemy 
submarines. They therefore reinforced the accepted notion that a much wider cocktail 
of A/S measures were needed to effectively counter the modern submarine threat. 
Gibbs' offensive sea-air hunting exercises began with a Coastal Command 
Lancaster gaining sonobuoy contact {Plate 21). The sonobuoys used at this time 
operated on one of twelve different radio frequencies, split into two groups denoted by 
a white or black band. Within each group the six frequencies were indicated by the 
colours purple, orange, blue, red, yellow and green. The standard OPOBRY" sonobuoy 
pattern derived its name from the colour (and hence frequency) sequence in which the 
sonobuoys were laid, i. e. purple on top of the datum, followed by orange, blue, red and 
yellow buoys normally on the cardinal points at 2,500 yards from the purple buoy. This 
method of deploying the pattern took about 5 minutes for naval aircraft and up to 10 
minutes for shore-based aircraft. Attempts were made to speed up the deployment 
speed by laying the red buoy first in an estimated position en route to the datum, and 
the aircraft then flying a "Clover Leaf pattern. -544 Speed was essential, for an 
Intermediate (B) at 15 knots could be on the edge of the pattern by the time the aircraft 
completed laying it. The aircraft would then have to lay an extension pattern in order to 
maintain contact until the surface A/S force could arrive. Extension patterns were made 
up of two or three additional buoys (depending on whether one buoy of the original 
pattern could be used in the extension) laid in equilateral triangles of 2,000 yard sides 
with the apex close to the submarine's estimated position. 545This tactic was employed 
with limited success during the exercises with Trumpetrish with 4EF homed from 30 
miles away. The tactic relied, however, on the submarine maintaining high speed so 
that her HE could be tracked on the sonobuoys. Submarines quickly learned that high 
speed was useful to clear the immediate datum, but thereafter moderate speed allowed 
them to put further distance between themselves and their hunters, while not making 
enough noise to be detected. Such tactics worked equally well against A/S vessels. 
The speed, Gibbs remarked, which most often baffled A/S vessels was about 8-9 
knots, when the submarine would produce barely any HE signature, yet would be able 
to manoeuvre well clear of the ships' asdic sweep, given the relatively long range at 
which the submarine could detect the approaching escorts. 
r '44'Conduct of A/S Operations by Ships and Aircraft, ' Admiralty and Air Ministry, CB04097(1/51) 
and SD 697(1/51), TASW. 196/50,3 October 1951, Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, Part 4, pp. 4349. 545 'Aircraft and Aircraft Carriers, ' Part 4 of 'Conduct of A/S Operations..., ' Box 468, RG 38, 
NARA2, pp. 46-47. 
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Plate 21: Guppy, Fourth Escort Flotilla and Lancaster 
'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948 Edition, ' DTASW, T. A. S. W. 53/49, CB 
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It had been Gibbs intention to use the "Ring" tactic to contain and attack 
Trumpeffish. But even in the more stereotyped serials he found that the manoeuvring 
of the "Ring" in strict formation was something of a strain on personnel during a long 
hunt of a fast submarine. As a result the direct tactical co-ordination of the "Ring" was 
relaxed. The first ship to gain a firm detection of the submarine was designated as the 
"Contact Ship", and was given total freedom of manoeuvre as necessary to maintain 
contact. The rest of the flotilla would then 
... conform by eye and plot to the contact ship's movements, except in rare conditions when the SO found it was necessary to initiate a drastic alteration of 
course or speed by signal. Attacking ships were detailed by the SO, the choice 
failing upon the most suitably placed ship. The hunt was in the main conducted 
from the Bridge, which has the great advantage of immediate realisation of one's 
consorts angle of inclination. The flow of information from the Plot to the Bridge 
was satisfactory and this coupled with the view of plots necessitated only 
infrequent visits to the AIC [or Action Information Centre]. The handling of the 
consorts presented no difficulty and this form of loose *Ring' has the great 
advantage of being not in the least tiring, and the hunt could, ... [Gibbs thought], be 
continued almost indefinitely without undue fatigue. 546 
During the more tactical serials 4EF quickly appreciated a more dramatic 
problem. With the submarine with a full battery and travelling at 14 knots or more, the 
frigates of the hunting force had insufficient speed to overhaul Trumpeffish and form a 
"Ring" around her unless she made a tactical mistake. So the serials degenerated into 
a stern chase, not dissimilar to those experienced during the Seraph trials four years 
earlier, with the frigates clinging onto the submarine's HE bearings. Unable to fix the 
position of Trumpeffish, Gibb's ships became scattered and vulnerable to counter- 
attack by the aggressive submarine not distracted while trying to attack a convoy. In 
one serial, assisted by very poor asdic conditions, Trumpeffish probably succeeded in 
'-sinking all the huntinq vessels in tUM., 547 The A/S ships achieved little recompense 
and Gibbs found the experience '... disastrous and profoundly depressing. ' 
Nevertheless, he was able to salvage a modification to the "Ring" tactic, which he 
termed Operation "Umbrella', as a general chase, in which: 
The ship in contact represents the handle of an opened *Umbrella", and the 
consorts spread evenly in loose formation around the perifory [sic] of the "umbrella" 
astem of the contact ship, the shaft of the *umbrella* pointing through the contact 
ship towards the submarine. Once formed there is no need to signal a new shaft 
and escorts conform to the movements of the contact ship. Wing escorts are well 
placed to intercept if the submarine breaks out to a flank; rear escorts are well 
place if the submarine doubles back under the contact ship and contact is lost; and 
546 'Exercises with USS Trumpetfish, ' Captain E. A. Gibbs, 11 June 1948, Box 96, RG 313, 
NARA2, p. 5. 
547'Exercises with USS Trumpeffish, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 4. [emphasis supplied] 
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all rear escorts are well placed to form a line abreast search for echo contact if the 
submarine slows down and HE contact is lost. 548 
4EF did not have the monopoly on problems. Trumpetfish, too, found great 
difficulty in finding and approaching its target during the convoy serials. She had, 
realistically, been given long distances to make to close the convoy. If she was to arrive 
with a reasonable charge in the battery, she had to snort en route. She was also 
constrained by barriers of sonobuoys laid by Lancasters which forced her to slow down 
to avoid detection, which reduced her overall mobility sufficiently that she was often 
unable to close the convoy. This led the Admiralty to support the use of sonobuoys in 
this way. However, it was noted that when submarines lurked ahead of the convoy, the 
closure problem was greatly eased and they were sometimes able to penetrate the 
screen by going deep at high speed and by attacking the escorts. Trumpeffish also 
used high speed in an attempt to get under the convoy but was frustrated because she 
could not determine when she was in station due to the poor asdic conditions. Overall, 
the Admiralty concluded that although existing '... methods of defence of a convoy 
against a fast submarine appear sound, ... [they] constitute little effective defence 
against long range torpedo aftack. '549 
In reviewing the experiences of these exercises, often in difficult asdic conditions 
and against an aggressive, well-handled submarine, Gibbs remarked on the value of 
an early attack by the first escort gaining contact. Immediate attacks he thought would 
gain the initiative for the escort and possibly inflict some damage on the enemy, both of 
which would limit the submarine's powers of evasion and offence. Moreover, contacts 
were often fleeting, so every opportunity for attack had to be taken, for '... the escort 
Captain who does not take the chance which is given him neither deserves nor gets the 
chance again. ' He also realized that, in war the norm would be for single- or pair-ship 
hunts of a fast submarine, and training of these tactics was just as important as 
exercising the "Ring" formation. In more favourable conditions Captain (D), Third Escort 
Flotilla, 
... found that the ring of ships, and contact with the submarine, was maintained very easily and on one occasion it was possible to follow Trumpeffish with 
confidence until the submarine was forced to reduce speed for lack of am pS. 550 
Such results, when compared to the pessimistic results from the 4EF's exercises, the 
Admiralty pointed out, 'emphasise the caution that must be exercised when assessing 
548'Exercises with USS Trumpefflsh, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2, p. 8. 
549 'Progress in Tactics, 1949, ' DTSD, TSD. 109/49, CB03016(49), 29 September 1949, ADM 
239/565, P. 61. 
1 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948, ' DTASW, TASW. 53/49, CB04050(48), 10 
September 1949, ADM 239/422, p. 40. 
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results from trials carried out under controlled conditionS. '55' These results showed that 
AIS warfare continued to be difficult, so simply waiting on the "defensive" for a 
submarine to approach a convoy would not guarantee its destruction. Nor was there a 
single "panacea" solution. Wider "offensive" remedies also had to be pursued for a 
future A/S campaign to be successful. These placed additional demands on force 
levels, so the requirement for these remedies had to be accorded a high priority amidst 
the many competing demands on naval resources. 
511 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948, 'ADM 239/422, p. 40. 
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Chapter 7: Tactics, Technology and Trident, 1948-1949 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Policy Debate 
The experience of the Second World War highlighted that the primary striking 
power in modern navies were provided by aircraft carrier air groups. During the 
summer of 1948 Captain G. Barnard, the Director of the Royal Naval Tactical School, 
asked for guidance on the roles envisaged for naval aircraft in a war during the next 
five years. The Tactical School was endeavouring '... to swing thought away from 
, 552 massed "carrier slogging matches" of the Pacific War.... He wanted to shift the bias 
to anti-submarine work by carrier support groups, which was to take up a third of the 
course. Time would also be spent on the defence of convoys in a high air threat 
environment, along the lines of Operation "Pedestal", as well as limited attacks at 
source. 553 Captain E. H. Shattock, Director of Air Warfare (DAW), broadly agreed with 
these proposed roles. However, Captain H. G. Dickinson, the Deputy D of P, suggested 
a modification to the list of roles which, he felt, would give a clearer picture of the 
intentions and limitations of naval aviation policy. The primary role of naval aviation, 
Dickinson suggested, was the protection of naval task forces and convoys in open 
waters. In this role the carriers would provide air support either as part of the task force 
or convoy, or acting independently as a patrol group. Their task was to provide 
protection from enemy submarines and to counter his reconnaissance aircraft. In 
enclosed waters, such as the Mediterranean, carriers, as part of a task force would 
provide protection primarily from shore-based air attack. Dickinson supposed that after 
the war had been in progress for eighteen months, the main strength of the carrier 
force would have been built up sufficiently to execute more offensive roles, including 
aftack-at-source. 554 
Whether the Royal Navy should abdicate an offensive role, at least for the first 
eighteen months of a future war, was already being debated within the Naval Staff. in 
mid-July 1948 Captain R. Dick, the Director of the Tactical and Staff Duties Division 
(DTSD), agitated for Board approval over the apparent divergence between the policy 
552 Minute, Captain E. Shattock, DNAW, 14 July 1948, ADM 1/24518. 
'53 'Guidance on Future Tactical Problems for Naval Aircraft, ' Captain G. Barnard, RN, The r 
Director, RN Tactical School, TC No. 1166/1/5,18 June 1948, ADM 1/24518. 
554 Minute, Captain H. G. Dickinson, for D of P, 20 July 1948, ADM 1/24518. 
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which D of P was developing and the actual study and thought of the Naval Staff. 'At 
the risk of over-simplification, ' Dick, 
... would define this policy as yielding to the 
Americans all responsibility for 
offensive maritime operations while accepting for the British Navy the defensive 555 
role of convoy escort., 
Yet, Dick pointed out, inside the Admiralty and in the Fleet, tactical investigations were 
being based on the assumption that the Navy would be used offensively. This 
dichotomy, he thought, might be a suitable topic to be included in the forthcoming 
"Trident" conference. When Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian, Fifth Sea Lord and Deputy 
Chief of Naval Staff (Air) weighed in he suggested that DTSD was raising wider issues. 
Echoing the castigation by several senior officers of what was seen as the "defensive" 
emphasis before the Second World War, Vian wondered if it was right to depart from 
traditional strategy and revert to a defensive policy, because the available forces were 
so small. These comments tended, probably unintentionally, to accentuate the idea that 
Noffensive" and "defensive" measures were alternatives. In the sort of language that, as 
will be seen, worried the Historical Section Vian asked if '... a policy under which you 
are always waiting for the enemy to slog you, and never have him guessing about the 
safety of his own guts, succeedT Surely, he thought, '... however slight our forces, 
should not some proportion be set aside for offensive actionT Vian was personally 
convinced that 
... the very foundations of the Navy and all for which it stands will be undermined if 
we find ourselves at the outbreak of war, and for some years thereafter, having 
surrendered all striking power to other Services and other NavieS. 556 
Somewhat less heatedly, he also pointed out that the draft setting for "Trident", 
for which he was the Directing Officer, did depict the Navy defending by attacking. 
When the new First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, replied 
to Vian he firmly pointed out that: 'Planning can only proceed on something we know 
we must do; escort safely our convoys. '557 Curiously, Fraser was not convinced that it 
was possible, at this stage, to identify suitable Russian targets for offensive action, 
though there seemed to be a role for the air forces in striking at submarine bases. 
Typically, this did not satisfy Vian. 'Before this dog is laid... ' he took another swing at 
the issue. He thought there was a definite role for offensive operations against enemy 
555 'Policy and Fleet Tactical Training, ' R. Dick, DTSD, TSD-4580/48,14 July 1948, ADM 
205/69. 
556 'Maritime Policy as it affects Exercise OTridenf, ' P. L. Vian, Fifth Sea Lord, 10 September 
1948, ADM 205/69. 




airfields on the flanks of convoy routes and for attacks against submarine bases. 
Doubtless, thinking of the difficulties experienced in establishing an offensive role for 
the British Pacific Fleet during the war, he asked if it was possible for more emphasis 
could be put into these operations, even if other Allies then had to shoulder more of the 
"defensive" burden? Perhaps, too, the British experience in the Mediterranean and, 
especially, the Arctic would pay dividends, for it was in these theatres that strikes would 
be most likely. 558 
When Captain T. M. Brownrigg, D of P, entered the debate he made it clear that 
his Division were not believers in defensive warfare, and that they did not agree to all 
offensive operations being undertaken by the AmericanS. 559 Instead his approach was 
one of pragmatism. Possible offensive operation were considered against their value in 
furthering immediate objectives and ultimate British war aims, and taking into account 
whether the British possessed sufficient forces to carry out such operations 
successfully, without prejudicing more important missions. As a result, Brownrigg had 
obtained Board approval for offensive minelaying and an offensive submarine A/S 
policy. Other plans were also being submitted for offensive operations in the Black Sea 
and off the Norwegian Coast if the enemy were to launch a sea borne assault on 
Norway. Thus the difference in opinion was reduced to the air strike policy. The existing 
force of aircraft was barely 170 first line aircraft, which was planned to be expanded to 
300 by 1957. Brownrigg, like Dickinson before him, suggested that the main roles to be 
undertaken with this small force ought to be fighter defence of fleets and convoys, A/S 
operations, and, where possible, strikes should be made on enemy shipping and shore 
installations. He was somewhat optimistic, for the previous First Sea Lord, Admiral J. 
Cunningham, had stated that fighter protection and A/S operations were the top 
priority, so there would be negligible forces left for the strike role. By contrast, the USN 
had concentrated on naval aviation and could deploy about 1,100 carrier borne first-line 
aircraft as opposed to the Royal Navy's 168. Moreover, the Americans thought that a 
strike by less than 200 aircraft would be ineffective - an idea with which Brownrigg 
agreed. He pointed out that if the existing small strike force was used it was likely to be 
decimated, as had happened in Norway in 1940. He considered that the policy for the 
Royal Navy, should war come, was to employ the fighter and A/S aircraft available 
(which would fulfil the minimum requirements), and to use the small strike force as a 
nucleus upon which to build a more effective striking force of about 200 aircraft. 
Ultimately, the front line strength would be expanded to some 600 aircraft by about 20 
558 'Maritime Policy, ' P. L. Vian, Fifth Sea Lord, 15 September 1948, ADM 205/69. 
559 -maritime operations, ' T. M. Brownrigg, D of P, 28 September 1948, ADM 205/69. 
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months into a future war, distributed in 15 squadrons each of A/S, strike and day fighter 
aircraft, and 5 squadrons of night fighters. 560 Fraser, agreed to this policy and 
authorised Brownrigg to discuss it with the Americans in the forthcoming staff talks. 561 
A Second Tranche of Doctrine Papers 
In parallel with this wider debate, by the summer and autumn of 1948 Captain 
C. E. E. Paterson in DTASW had produced a more detailed set of doctrine papers, 
which refined their more philosophical predecessors of 1946-47 discussed in Chapter 
5. Gone was the historical background. Instead the new papers read more like doctrine 
manuals, which, with further expansion over the next three years, is what they became. 
Emphasis was still placed on convoy and fleet protection by surface and air escorts 
and two of the major papers dealt with these aspects. 562 However, the more offensive 
doctrine concepts are now displayed in separately in a paper on the tactical 
employment of patrol groups, operating either independently or in direct support of 
convoys. 563 Copies of these documents were issued widely within British forces, and 
also sent to Canada and America where they were studied by a Joint RN, USN and 
RCN Committee meeting in Washington with the object of standardizing A/S tactical 
doctrine. 564 The papers were originally intended to be applicable to the "short-term" 
problem against the submarine threat up to 1950. This timescale was later extended to 
mid 1951 by the Sea/Air Warfare Committee. 565 
The doctrine papers were based on the foundation work done by Burnett and his 
team in 1946-47, sea exercises and tactical table games at JASS, Fleet exercises and, 
of course, wartime experience. They also contain many echoes of the doctrine 
developed during the interwar period, especially in the overall function of escorts, and 
supporting forces. After a delay of some months, Paterson began by commenting at 
some length on the earlier convoy defence analysis done by JASS. Most of his 
comments concerned JASS's implicit assumptions of the technological capability of A/S 
`60 'The Proposed Policy for Build-up of Naval Aviation after the Outbreak of War, 'Appendix 11 to r 
'Maritime Operations, ' T. M. Brownrigg, D of P, 28 September 1948, ADM 205/69. 
" 'Maritime Policy, ' Fraser, First Sea Lord, 29 September 1948, ADM 205/69. 
562 'Defence of Ocean Convoys against Submarine Attack, ' DTASW, TASW. 397/48, August 
1948, AIR 20/6384; 'Defence of Fleet Units against Submarine Attack, ' DTASW, TASW. 380/48, 
August 1948, AIR 2/5950. 
563 ý 'The Tactical Employment of Patrol Groups, ' Sub-SAWC/11/63/48, [TASW. 404/48], [30 
September 1948], AIR 2/5950. 
664 'Anti-Submarine Tactical Papers, ' Naval Secretary, Naval Service, Department of National 
Defence, NSS 8100-5 (Staff), 3 February 1949, File 8100.5, Vol. 3734, RG 24, NAC. 
ým 'Joint Sea/Air Warfare Committee: Report by the Joint Secretaries of the Joint Sea/Air 
Warfare Sub-Committees on the work carried out since 28 June 1949, ' SAWC/1/50/2,21 July 
1950, AIR 20/6842. 
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forces to counter the Intermediate (B) submarine: including radar interception gear and 
improved asdic. He was more sanguine, than JASS, over the chances of these 
capabilities being available in the near term. On one tactical point, he agreed that once 
a submarine had manoeuvred under a convoy it would be very difficult to counter. 
ASS had suggested the use of a plan called "Parsnip" which involved the convoy 
making an emergency 900 turn, with the idea of uncovering the submarine long enough 
for the escorts to locate and destroy it. 566 Paterson, however, considered the plan of 
'... limited use. 567 Otherwise, Paterson had little of substance to add and the ASS 
work formed the basis for DTASW's own examination of convoy and fleet defence, as 
well as offensive operations. Furthermore, JASS's assessment of the problems 
confronting enemy submarines was reproduced practically verbatim by Paterson. -'6'3 
It was expected that the enemy would try to avoid compromising the position and 
composition of his submarine patrols. Nevertheless, it was hoped that shore station D/F 
of enemy submarine W/T transmissions, as well as sightings by aircraft and surface 
craft, would provide sufficient intelligence of submarine operating areas, to allow at 
least a measure of evasive routeing of both convoys and Fleet units. The Fleet, of 
course, would retain one major advantage over convoys, that of high passage speed 
which would be greater than the submerged speed available to modern submarines. 
This, combined with a random zig zag, would give the Fleet a considerable defensive 
advantage, though it would consume fuel at a high rate, especially amongst the 
screening A/S destroyers. As in the past, the Fleet and its supporting replenishment 
units, would be screened by a force sufficient to provide a reasonably "watertight" A/S 
barrier, capable of detecting any approaching submarine and counter-attacking it. 
There would never be enough escorts to provide such luxury for convoys. But, provided 
there was an adequate level of intelligence to identify threatened convoys, the intention 
was to give each convoy a weak "through" escort, which would be reinforced in danger 
areas by a surface "Patrol Group" (which may include an aircraft carrier). It was even 
hoped that, using the intelligence, some ships could still sail independently through 
areas where the danger was slight, which would speed up the delivery rate, as well as 
saving on escort requirements. It can be seen that these ideas reflected much of the 
experience of the late war. However, whether adequate intelligence would be available 
was a moot point. Little hard evidence has emerged that the British, or the Americans, 
I 'Progress in Tactics: 1947, ADM 239/143, pp. 15-16; 'Trade Protection - Defence of Ocean 
Convoys, ' Box 102, RG 313, NARA2, Appendix VI. 
17 Reference Sheet, 'Defence of Fleet Units against Submarine Attack, ' C. E. E. Paterson for 
DTASW, TASW. 380/48,19 August 1948, AIR 2/5950. 
568'The Problem Confronting Enemy Submarines, ' TASW. 396/48, August 1948, AIR 20/6384. 
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had broken into Russian codes from which special intelligence would be forthcoming to 
assist in a future A/S campaign. Perhaps, more was achieved, at least by the 
Americans, at the end of the decade. 569 
Since the submarines' method of attack was thought to be essentially the same 
as during the war, escort dispositions were fundamentally the same. However, the use 
of submerged tactics meant that there might be little warning of an attack, so the 
surface escort needed to be disposed in such a fashion that it could exploit initial asdic 
contacts quickly. The higher submerged speed of modem submarines meant that in 
order to do this A/S vessels would need to be further out to give them more fighting 
room, and also disposed in depth, so that the detecting ship and a "pouncer" could 
concentrate to counter-attack an approaching submarine. The escorts would also have 
to cover the sector between the wider Limiting Lines of Submerged Approach available 
to the Intermediate (B). Against a convoy, it was even possible for these submarines to 
close submerged from a short distance astern, as had been deduced during the war. 
Even so, it was thought that submarines would still prefer to fire from a position broad 
on the bow of a convoy or Fleet unit. It was concluded, from tactical table modelling at 
JASS, that the minimum escort strength for a 60-ship convoy was eight escorts (about 
125% of the recent wartime provision), rising to 12 in focal or submarine patrol areas. 
For the Fleet containing carriers protection would have to be extended to an all- 
round "circular' screen to allow for the carrier's manoeuvring during flying operations. 
In the past, it was best to avoid adjacent ships having the same asdic frequencies (so 
as to avoid mutual interference), and it was also ideal to widely separate HF/DF fitted 
ships (to provide a long baseline for triangulation). Now, consideration had to be given 
to sensible stationing of ships which would soon start to be fitted with VHF, UHF, and 
centimetric radar D/F equipment. If contact was gained by D/F, or a sighting, the 
papers advised that initially an aircraft should be sent to investigate, unless the contact 
was close and presented an immediate threat. This was especially relevant to the case 
of Fleet defence, where detachments of surface escorts would dilute the screen for a 
considerable time while they regained station after the hunt. Even in the case of the 
slower convoy, it was inadvisable to send a surface force if the contact was more than 
10 miles distant because of '... the great distance that a submarine may cover 
submerged before surface escorts arrive... . 9570 The best policy was felt to be that the 
569 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 
pp. 19-20; 'USSR General Report, ' CX Report 10 October 1945, WO 208/4566; 'Top Secret 
Annex to Study of Undersea Warfare, ' 22 April 1950, Command File, Post 1 Jan 46, CNO 
Studies 1950, Box 475, OA, NHC. 
570 'Defence of Ocean Convoys..., 'AIR 20/6384, p. 4. 
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aircraft should lay a sonobuoys pattern around the datum position and if contact was 
gained then surface escorts could be sent. In any case, a minimum of two escorts were 
to be sent for mutual support. 
As for air support in general, convoys were to be given a light escort from shore- 
based or carrier-bome aircraft in a danger area. It was envisaged that the balance of 
shore-based aircraft would be flown on independent patrols over submarine danger 
areas, from whence they could be diverted to reinforce threatened convoys. These 
tactics were preferred to providing "through" air escort because they would ensure that 
the danger areas were covered comparatively frequently, and this would hinder the 
movement of submarines. Moreover, although the chance of detecting a snort was low, 
it was better to support convoys that were threatened, for submarines would be 
attempting to concentrate against them. Even if the submarines did not risk using 
surface travel, they would probably have to snort, and this would give aircraft a greater 
chance of gaining a detection. These tactics would, however, rely on a reasonable level 
of intelligence to define the danger areas, and those convoys which were threatened. 
Especially, if there were indications that a convoy had been reported, it could be 
assumed that other submarines would begin to concentrate ahead for an attack. The 
priority was for air escorts to locate and, if possible, destroy the contact-keeper and 
then to prevent the other submarines from achieving their concentration. These tasks 
would be made easy if the submarines were discovered on the surface, but this was 
unlikely unless the enemy was a considerable distance from the convoy and unable to 
intercept without surfacing. But even submerged, the enemy would have to move a 
relatively high speed, probably snorting for a considerable proportion of the approach. 
These submarines could be detected by sonobuoy barriers laid either at right angles to 
the convoy's track to catch the shadower, or parallel to the track to detect submarines 
approaching from the beam or broad on the bow. These prophetic tactics were still 
awaiting the development of the technical means, especially of an effective airborne 
weapon capable of being used in an attack on a submerged submarine. 
For the protection of the Fleet, on the other hand, A/S air escort was to be 
continuously provided. Not only would these aircraft have a chance of detecting 
submarines, but would also force others to submerge, which might have reported the 
Fleet. This, in turn, would help to secure knowledge of the planned operation being 
undertaken by the Fleet. The priority for air search was to cover the outer area ahead 
and on the beam, about 20 miles from the Fleet, just on the limit of a submarine's 
hydrophone detection range on the Main Body. Here submarines might be on the 
surface, trying to get into position ahead of the Fleet where they could get contact on 
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their own sensors. Once this patrol was covered, aircraft were to maintain a continuous 
patrol some 3 to 5 miles on the beam and ahead of the Fleet where they could harass 
submarines using their periscope or radar to gain a final fire control solution. Any 
additional aircraft (most likely to be shore-based) could be used for independent patrols 
and searches at a distance from the Fleet. 571 
The enemy was also expected to make heavy use of reconnaissance aircraft to 
locate and shadow Fleet units and convoys. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union 
S. G. Gorshkov wrote in the 1970s that the Germans made '... no small error ... [by] 
waging the struggle virtually only with submarines, without backing them up with other 
kinds of forces, especially aircraft. '572 Mahan would have understood the point, and it 
was equally obvious to the British immediately after the war. 573 This aspect was not, 
however, as simple as it seemed. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee noted in late 
1946, that while the Germans had had many opportunities to modify their strategy early 
on in the war, the increasing power of the Allies soon circumscribed their flexibility. In 
their assessment, the Sub-Committee also noted that DOnitz displayed little aptitude for 
strategic thinking and that the Germans suffered throughout from the poor co-operation 
between the Luftwaffe and the U-boats in the Atlantic. They also pointed out that the 
system had worked somewhat better in the Arctic. 574 The limited reconnaissance 
capability of submerged submarines, meant that they would have to rely more heavily 
on reports from shadowing aircraft. These enemy reconnaissance aircraft were, 
therefore, prime targets for friendly fighters. 
Despite these precautions, attacks were still likely to develop. The most difficult 
decision a Senior Officer would have to make was whether the attack was made from 
outside or inside the screen, or, in the case of a convoy, from beneath the convoy itself. 
Both the defence of convoy and of the Fleet papers emphasized, in the event of a 
surprise attack, the need for pre-arranged search schemes, capable of being put into 
instant operation to cover these contingencies by surface escorts. There was little that 
air escorts could do to help A/S vessels if the submarines were at close quarter with 
the convoy or Fleet. However, aircraft should be used to search the area astern where 
the attack took place, hopefully detecting submarines whose positions are roughly 
571 'Defence of Ocean Convoys..., ' AIR 20/6384, pp. 1-6; 'Defence of Fleet Units..., ' AIR 
2/5950, pp. 1-6. 
5'12S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1976, translated 1979), p. 118. 
" Mahan, influence (c. 1889), p. 196; A. T. Mahan, The Influenceof Sea Powerupon theFrench 
Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, Vol. I (Boston: Little. Brown & Co., 1895). pp. 179-180. " 'German U-boat Strategy in the War, ' Appendix XVIII, to 'Some Weaknesses in German 
Strategy and Organisation, 1933-1945, ' Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 
jic(46)33(Final), 20 October 1946, NHB, pp. 180 and 183. 
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known, and needing to re-charge their batteries, attempting to shadow or assess the 
results of their attack. If surface escorts were also available, it was possible that 
defending forces might inflict casualties during this phase. 575 
By September 1948 Paterson had drafted the paper on "The Tactical 
Employment of Patrol Groups' which, after comment by the Naval Staff, was put before 
the Sea/Air Warfare Committee in mid October. There, after minor amendments, the 
paper was approved for issue to Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief, and authorities 
responsible for training and research in A/S problems. A Patrol Group, DTASW 
thought, should consist of a minimum of a carrier capable of day and night operations 
and at least four A/S vessels able to provide both a screen for the carrier and an 
offensive striking force. It was realized that early on in a war, it was unlikely that 
sufficient numbers of carriers and escorts would be available to meet all Patrol Group 
requirements. Shore-based aircraft of Coastal Command could partly fill the gap, 
though the situation would not be rectified until more ships became available. Patrol 
Groups could be used '... offensively as "Hunter-Yjllerg groups ... or as a reinforcement 
to close escort of convoys passing through submarine probability areas. '576 Their 
purpose was to destroy submarines. To achieve this a Group was to operate on 
enemy's transit routes and in his operational areas, using its aircraft as the means of 
searching over large areas. A proportion of the A/S escort was to be released to form a 
striking force to hunt submarines to destruction when detected by air searches or 
pinpointed by intelligence. 
These offensive operations were divided into two phases: first the gathering of 
intelligence, and then the hunting and destruction of the submarine. Intelligence would 
be gathered from aircraft sightings, reports of attacks on shipping, and from 
interception of electromagnetic transmissions from submarines. This effort would be 
supported by the use of shore-based aircraft flying "bok* patrols within suspected 
submarine areas or over transit routes. The co-ordination between the Patrol Group 
and Coastal Command akcraft would be through the Area Combined Headquarters 
(ACHQ), and, for specific hunts, shore-based aircraft could be put under the direct 
command of the Patrol Group Senior Officer His own carrier4xxne aircraft were to be 
flown on searches, which reflected the practice at the end of the war, The depth of 
these searches should be no more than 40-60 miles, and was regulated by two factors. 
This was the distance which surface escorts could steam in about 2Y2 hours, which was 
575 'Defence of Ocean Convoys..., ' AIR 20/6384, pp. 5-7; 'Defence of Fleet Units..., ' AIR 
2/5950, pp. 5-6. 
576 Tactical Employment of Patrol Groups, 'AIR 215950, p. 1. 
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about as long as an aircraft was likely to hold contact with sonobuoys on a submerged 
submarine. If the escorts arrived later than this, and the aircraft was out of contact, they 
would have little chance of regaining the scent. The "hunt to exhaustion* practiced 
during the war, was unlikely to be watertight against a modem snort-fitted or 
Intermediate (B) submarines. If the aircraft lost contact, it was recommended that a 
containing circle of sonobuoys be dropped, unless a rough direction of escape was 
known, when a sonobuoy barrier could be laid across and ahead of the suspected track 
of the submarine. A maximum air effort was to be mounted to fly patrols spaced around 
the datum, hoping to pick up the submarine snorting, or to follow up surface ship HE 
detections with sonobuoys. 
Co-operating ships from the Patrol Group were to home to the aircraft contact at 
high speed and once at the submarine's furthest-on-circle (FoC) to reduce to search 
speed and carry out a wide zigzag, mindful of the danger of an attack with an anti- 
escort homing torpedo. The Patrol Group would concentrate its search on the most 
probable escape course in the light of available intelligence. This problem had been 
noted during the war when dealing with the snort-fifted U-boats in coastal waters, and 
was exacerbated by the improved performance of the Intermediate (B). The paper also 
examined the problem of a Patrol Group which was operating without a carrier and with 
no shore-based air support. Mathematical modelling (presumably by DNOR) suggested 
that the A/S ships should zigzag in a widely spaced formation to cover as much of the 
suspected area as possible. Consideration was also given to Patrol Groups working in 
Inshore Waters. It seems to have been assumed that in this case, there would be no 
carrier present. The advice given for asdic searching was the same as that provided 
during the war. If all these difficulties were overcome, and the escorts were able to gain 
contact, a co-ordinated AIS action was required '... by up to five ships ... to provide the 
best chance of a kill. P577 
Supporting these papers was work done at JASS at sea and on the tactical 
tables, as well as liaison visits to the USN. Considerable effort was being expended in 
the US on the Hunter-Killer concept, though they recognised that at least two escort 
carriers, with their attendant escorts, were needed to have any chance of holding down 
a single Type XXI U-boat. When Captain Richard Onslow, the RN Director at JASS, 
spoke to the Naval Air Conference in May 1948 he made it clear that convoy remained 
the central pillar of British shipping defence philosophy. But he also reiterated all the 
problems of surface and air escorts in locating and destroying submarines, as well as 
577 7actical Employment of Patrol Groups, 'AIR 215950, p. 3. 
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the enemy's greater power of attack especially if supported by reconnaissance aircraft. 
Onslow reminded his audience of the success of the Biscay and Northern Transit route 
offensives and suggested that similar results could again be achieved. However, as he 
pointed out, an aircrafts' ability to search large areas was severely limited by existing 
sensor technology. Worse, aircraft had no weapon capable of destroying fully 
submerged submarines, even if detected. Aircraft, would therefore have to work in 
conjunction with surface forces who would do the killing. Onslow emphasized that the 
success of the Patrol Groups rested heavily on intelligence of enemy submarine 
operations, and even then, on relatively small search areas. 578 The Americans had 
come to similar conclusions. 579 One of their reports subsequently noted that 
Because of the small chance of hunting down and killing a Type XXI or equivalent 
submarine Wth present Hunter-Killer groups, emphasis should be placed on 
convoy escort coverage by Hunter-Killer groups. 5'80 
Such ideas ran contrary to cherished USN views. Back in 1946 Vice Admiral Sherman, 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, observed that'... the strategic counter to this sort 
of thing is high emphasis on attack at the sources of the trouble. '513' These views - 
undoubtedly instilled by American experience during the Pacific War - were still 
strongly held in 1948. But they also highlight the enduring tension between, on the one 
hand, "offensive" search operations, that are always sensitive to technological 
superiority and (especially) intelligence cueing, and, on the other hand, "defensive* 
convoy operations which are more robust to technical deficiencies. 
A Year of Exercises with Fast Submarines 
While the 4EF was exercising with Trumpetfish, a more extensive set of trials and 
exercises were beginning with ships of Captain Sir Charles E. Madden's Sixth 
Destroyer Flotilla (6DF) {Plate 22). Two of Madden's ships, Battleaxe and Crossbow, 
began by operating against a slow submarine and in the shore aftack-teachers at 
Portland. Even so, they were comparative novices when they started a four-week work- 
'578 'Item 6- The Anti-Submarine Problem, ' Captain R. G. Onslow, DSO, RN, Naval Director of 
the Joint Anti-Submarine School, in 'Minutes of Naval Air Tactical Conference held at RNB, Lee- 
on-Solent 31 May to 3 June 1948, 'AWD. 394/48, n. d., NAA(M): MP1049/5,1874/2/63. 
579 'Fifth Partial Report (Part 1) on Project OpN32/A16-3(17)(Revised): Development of Air and 
Coordinated Surface Tactics for use Against the Medium Speed Deep-Diving Submarines 
(Hunter-Killer Groups), ' R. P. Biscoe, Commander Operational Development Force, 30 June 
1948, Box 96, RG 313, NARA2. 
I 'Composition of Hunter-Killer Groups, 'W. R. Edsall, Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander in 
Chief US Atlantic Fleet, FFI 3/A4-3(00189), 14 December 1949, Box 103, RG 313, NARA2. 
'81 Proceedings of Anti-Submarine Warfare Conference, 17 June 1946, ' Op-34H: jn (SC) A16- 
3(17) Serial: 00012P34, Forrest Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, 25 June 1946, 
Microfiche F3642-1, Sheet 001, OA, NHC, pp. 28-29. 
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up with the 11 -knot Selene in April 1948.582 These practices were intended to prepare 
them for exercises with another Guppy, USS Ambedack off Key West in the Straits of 
Florida in July and August. These were to be followed by serials with HMS Scotsman 
and a third Guppy, USS Dogrish in the waters off Northern Ireland between November 
1948 and March 1949. During these later exercises Madden would be joined by two 
more ships of his flotilla, Scorpion and Broadsword. 583 The whole series was designed 
to investigate the capability of existing A/S equipment to "kill' a submarine which is 
capable of proceeding at up to 18 knots submerged. 
At least without the pressure of wartime operations, the trials were extensive 
enough to reach some statistical validity, though meaningfulness of the results was 
mitigated by the effect of peacetime safety restrictions on tactical realism. -r" The initial 
work-up soon confirmed the effect of submarine speed on the A/S ships' ability to kill a 
submarine. It took, on average, 45 minutes and 2 or 3 attacks for the ships to "kill' the 
-T- Class boat, but took about 1% times longer and I or 2 additional attacks to Mkill" 
Selene. Selene also escaped from the hunting ships on one-third more occasions, than 
the slower -T- Class. 585 The exercises which followed against Ambeilack were very 
different in character. The American submarine was much larger and therefore gave a 
better asdic echo, but the water conditions were difficult and, unless Ambellack 
operated at shallow depth, asdic ranges were short. Capable of 19 knots, she was 
considerably faster than anything the British had operated against to date. Overall 
attack results were worse than against Selene. About 1 in 8 attacks resulted in a Okill", 
though if "surfacing damagen were included the success improved to about 1 in 5 
attacks. The low success rate might seem to be pessimistic. However, the evasion 
manoeuvres carried out by Ambeijack were usually calculated to give the attacking 
582 'Annual Report of TAS Schools, 1948, ' UWD, CB4486(48), UW. 05088/1949, January 1949, 
ADM 189/68, p. 23. 
583 'The First Experience of A/S Actions with Intermediate (B) Submarines, ' in, 'Progress in 
Underwater Warfare, 1949, ' CB04050(49), 17 July 1950, ADM 239/274, pp. 53 and 64. 
*5" Llewellyn-Jones, 'The Pursuit of Realism, ' p. 234. 
58,5 'The First Experiences of AIS Actions with Intermediate (B) Submarines: Addendum to 
CB04050(48) - Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948, ' DTASW, TASW. 312/49, 
CB04050(48)(N), I December 1949, ADM 239/423, p. 6. 
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Plate 22: HMS Broadsword - Sixth Destroyer Flotilla 
(IWM) 
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ship a more difficult attack solution than would be expected, on average, in a wartime 
engagement. 'In unrestricted A/S actions, 'the Admiralty subsequently pointed out, 'it is 
more a matter of chance if the target takes avoiding action at the worst moment for the 
attacking ship. P586 
Much of the difficulty in attacks was due to limitations in the asdic instruments, 
and particularly the bearing recorder, which was unable to cope with the high bearing 
rates experiences during these dynamic engagements. This problem was already 
being addressed with a modification to the Type 144 Asdic, known as the "Ships 
Component Mechanism", designed '... to remove the effect of own ship's motion from 
the bearing recorder trace during an aftack. 'Although trials with a "lash-up, of this gear 
were satisfactorily completed in 1947, the bearing recorder would have had to be 
redesigned if the gear was to be brought into service. Reflecting the policy stated 
earlier by Ashbourne, the scheme was to remain a "sealed design" that could be 
produced at short notice should it be proved that the existing asdic was not capable of 
competing with the 15 knot submarine. It was not, therefore, available to Madden's 
ships, and was eventually introduced when the modified Type 164 Asdic entered 
service in 1950. r87 Madden also rediscovered that the formal "Ring" tactic could not be 
put into practice 
... because each 
A/S action very soon became a stem chase with the submarine 
doing 18 knots having had a few minutes start and the two surface ships pursuing 
at 21 knots. 5811 
The exercises With Ambeilack also highlighted the importance of getting in an 
early attack before the scene of action became "waked-up" by the ships and 
submarine, and the vital role of teamwork. Thus when Madden's ships were joined by 
two USN destroyers the results were poor, with Ambedack tracked only intermittently, 
many reported non-subs and few attacks made. This seemed largely due to the 
differences of equipment between the four ships, and to the short time available for 
working-up as a team. Nevertheless, the two British ships had gained valuable 
experience which could be applied to their next set of exercises in British waters, this 
time against the British submarine, Scotsman, a more extensively modified "S, Class 
capable of 16Y2knots. She had been a long time coming, which probably had more to 
do with the need for extensive trials needed to understand the complex nature of her 
underwater handling characteristics at high speed, rather than the result of financial 
"86 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948, 'ADM 239/422, p. 37. 
587 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1947, 'ADM 239/421, p. 114; Hackmann, Seek & Strike, p. 
338; 'First Commonwealth TAS Liaison Meeting..., ' NAA(M): MP1 185/8,184614/343. 




restrictions. She had not even been able to complete her "First of Class' trials before 
being needed for the exercises with 6DF. 590 Scotsman proved to be a difficult target - 
worse than the earlier conversions, such as Seraph. 59' Asdic conditions in the North 
Channel were poor and Scotsman's echo was normally weaker than the 
reverberations. Often it could only be distinguished from its doppler by operators with 
good pitch discrimination. Close actions against Scotsman once more developed into 
stem chases and attacks were beset by the difficulty of distinguishing the echo from 
her wake. Attacks, overwhelmingly from abeam or astern, were uniformly unsuccessful 
when she was travelling at speeds in excess of 12 knots. 592 
During the two-ship actions greater tactical realism was allowed, for when contact 
was lost Battleaxe and Crossbow were allowed to use search schemes to re-locate the 
submarine, rather than the serial being stopped and then re-started once the 
submarine's position was confirmed as had been the practice previously. This was 
continued when Scorpion and, later, Broadsword also joined Madden's team. Thus on 
losing contact a search scheme was carried out until contact was either regained, or 
the exercise was terminated. 593 The previous experience of Battleaxe and Crossbow 
showed because they were able to keep in continuous contact with Scotsman, on 
average, for just over an hour. Scotsman, like the earlier S-class conversions, was not 
able to charge her battery at sea and so could only maintain 15-17 knots for short 
exercises of, say, 45 minutes. At 12 knots, however, she could manoeuvre 
continuously for up to 4 hours. 594 When contact was lost, it was regained by echo and 
HE on an equal number of occasions. This is hardly surprising, as when attacked 
Scotsman was likely to be travelling at high speed. Any immediate search would 
therefore have the chance of detecting her high echo doppler or HE, depending on the 
relative noise levels. But if an organized search was initiated after contact had been 
lost for longer periods, then when contact was regained it was always by echo, 
m 'Super Seraph - Submerged Control Preliminary Report. Report No. 25/46, ' Superintendent, 
Admiralty Experiment Works, Haslar, to DNC, 11 November 1946, RNSM A1991/098; 'HMS 
Scotsman: Conversion to Fast A/S Target' Section 27, DNC Department, October 1948, RNSM 
Al 991/098. 
590 'HM Submarine Scotsman - First of Class Trials, ' G. Bryant DNC Department to Flag Officer 
(Submarines), [5] November [1948], RNSM A1991/104; 'Scotsman Trials, ' G. Bryant to DNC, 
Memo dated 5 November 1948, RNSM Al 991/104. 
511 'Echo and HE Characteristics of the Submarine Scotsman, ' J. W. McCloy, HM Underwater 
Detection Establishment Report No. 95, October 1951, ADM 259/29, p. 10. 
592 'The First Experience of AIS Actions with Intermediate (B) Submarines, ADM 239/274, p. 54. ' 'AIS Practices of HMS Baffleaxe, Crossbow, Scorpion and Broadsword with HM Submarine 
Scotsman in the North Channel in January and February, 1949, ' in, 'Progress in Underwater 
warfare, 1949, 'CB04050(49), 17 July 1950, ADM 239/274, p. 71. 
594 'HM Submarine Scotsman. Report of First of Class Trials, ' Flag Officer S/M, Fort 
Blockhouse, n-d., RNSM A1991/104- 
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probably because Scotsman had slowed to avoid long-range detection of her HE. By 
now Battleaxe and Crossbow had a year of almost continuous A/S practice against fast 
submarines. Although much less experienced, Scorpion and Broadsword had absorbed 
much of the techniques of the senior ships during their A/S exercises in early 1949. 
Now the four ships embarked on the final set of exercises in this series, this time 
against the Guppy USS Dogrish in the North Channel during February and March 
1949. Dogfish was much larger than Scotsman and proved to be a better asdic target, 
but she was quieter and 2 knots slower than the British boat. 
Of the large number of attacks conducted against Dogfish, 15Y2% were against 
the submarine at speeds up to 6 knots, 84% at speeds between 7-12 knots, and only 
V2% at speeds over 12 knots. This was, by now, a relatively well recognised pattern. 
But some old precepts were also re-established, the main one being that two-ship 
actions were the most economical. Roughly the same number of A/S actions with 2,3 
and 4 ships were carried out. Although during two-ship actions, the interval between 
attacks was longer they were individually 1% times as effective as for actions with 3 or 
4 ships in producing a "kill" or Osurfacing damage". On the other hand, two-ship actions 
were more likely to involve attacks on non-subs or to loose the contact altogether. 5" 
This finding, however, takes no account of the spare ships being used on a containing 
search around the close A/S action, where they might regain contact on the evading 
submarine. Nevertheless, as the Admiralty noted that all the exercises had confirmed 
that in favourable conditions existing British asdic equipment and weapons in the 
hands of a worked-up escort group were able to achieve a killing rate of about 30%, 
'... provided the target's speed [was] less than 12 knots. '596 At higher submarine speeds 
the killing rate fell off to practically zero, perhaps exacerbated by the reputed poor 
handling qualities of the 6DF ships. 597 The A/S gear of these ships had been designed 
to deal with the wartime slow U-boats, and when a check exercise was conducted by 
Battleaxe and Crossbow against the slow HMS Amphion, the two ships achieved a 
100% kill rate. Moreover, the exercises had each been carried out by ships growing in 
experience and confidence, but against different submarines with different 
characteristics, in different water conditions, and with different peacetime safety rules 
imposed. The overall results illustrate the complexity of the interactions between these 
factors: 
695 'A/S Practices of HMS Battleaxe, Crossbow, Scorpion and Broadsword vvith LISS Dogfish in 
the North Channel in February and March, 1949, ' in, 'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1949, ' 
CB04050(49), 17 July 1950, ADM 239/274, pp. 74-75. 
596 'The First Experiences of A/S Actions with Intermediate (13) Submarines..., ' ADM 239/423, p. 
2. [emphasis supplied] 
59-1 Leo Marriott Royal Navy Destroyers since 1945 (London: Ian Allan, 1989), p. 87. 
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These figures also have to be taken in the context of peacetime safety rules. In 
wartime the submarine would be able to shoot back with anti-escort homing torpedoes. 
The exercises with Trumpeffish had demonstrated how an aggressively minded 
submarine could behave, but, on the other hand, the peacetime submarine could afford 
to behave more liberally, when '... the penalty for being detected was one hand 
grenade as opposed to a full pattern of depth-charges [or Squid projectiles]. The 
thought doth make the submariner prudentl'5" The Admiralty pointed out, that during 
the trials off Key West, Ambeilack's battery had been in the fully charged state at the 
beginning of each A/S action, '... a state most unlikely to be met with in war. 1600 
During the long series of trials Captain (D), Sixth Destroyer Flotilla, had 
experimented with a number of tactical ideas for dealing with the Intermediate (B) 
submarine. The trials, the Admiralty concluded, 
... have shown that whilst the rRing] Co-ordinated Action is sound in theory, there 
are many practical difficulties in poor asdic operating conditions, and when wakes 
left by the submarine and AIS vessels are liable to persist A submarine which uses 
high s eed under these conditions is liable to elude the A/S ships forming the 
'ring .. 
ig" 
The highly dynamic tactical engagements with Madden's ships had turned most close 
A/S actions into stern chases, just as had been discovered by Captain Gibbs, Captain 
(D), Fourth Escort Flotilla, and against Seraph five years previously. As a result the 
tactics used were similar. Gibbs had formulated the 'Umbrellaw formation and had 
passed on his thoughts on to Madden, who, largely through extensive practice, was 
able to exploit the tactic to its full advantage (Plate 23). Madden developed the idea 
that the attacking ship would follow roughly astern of the submarine, supported by wing 
ships at about 1,200 yards on either beam. When asdic conditions were poor, the wing 
ships were kept well up on the attacking ship's beam, where they were better able to 
maintain contact. In good asdic conditions the wing ships could afford to drop back a 
little, where it was easier for them to conform to the movements of the attacking ship or 
to take over that role should the need arise. The dynamic tactical situation could 
598 The First Experience of A/S Actions with Intermediate (B) Submarines, 'ADM 239/274, p. 53. 599 Vice Admiral Sir Lancelot Bell Davies, KBE, e-mail, 6 January 2001. 6m'Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948, 'ADM 239/422, p. 41. 601 'Progress in Tactics, 1949, 'ADM 239/565, p. 27. 
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Plate 23: Four ShiD Tactic (Umbrella 
'A/S Action, ' Part 6, in, C. B. 04097 (1/51) and S. D. 697 (1/51), 'Conduct of A/S 
Operations by Ships and Aircraft, ' T. A. S. W. 196/50, Admiralty and Air Ministry, 3 
October 1951, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation& Registered 
Publications Section, Foreign Navy and Related Foreign Military Publications, 
1913-1960, Box 468, RG 38, National Archives and Records Administration 2, 
College Park, Maryland, p. 11. 
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Fig. 3. DISPOSITION OF A/S VESSELS ATTACKING A FAST SUBMARINE 
"Umbrella" (which can be compared with the formation used against Seraph) 
Chapter 7 
change from moment to moment and this formation allowed the duties of the attacking 
ship to be shifted to the best placed A/S vessel. This might happen, Madden had 
discovered, '... a number of times before a particular attack was consummated. 9602 
When a fourth ship was available it was stationed about 2,000 yards astern of the 
leading ships, where it was well placed to cover against the submarine suddenly 
reversing course and breaking back through the lead ships, which Trumpeffish had 
used against 3EF Once the submarine began to run out of ffiamps' and was forced to 
slow down, a loose Ting" formation developed automatically. The highly practiced 6DF 
were even able to execute these tactics at night. Of course, in wartime it would rarely 
be possible for as many ships to be spared to concentrate on a single submarine. 
Tactics for two-, three- and four-ship formations were eventually incorporated into the 
A/S tactical manual. 603 
Madden had also given some thought to search plans which could be used if 
contact was lost during close A/S action. This was often the case after a series of 
attacks, when the manoeuvres of the attacking ships and the violent avoiding action by 
the submarine left the area *waked-up" and plagued with non-sub echoes. The moment 
contact was lost by all ships, the uncertainty in the submarine's position expanded at 
an alarming rate, and an immediate response was essential. This response would 
depend on circumstances. For example, if there were at least two to three ships 
available, Madden instituted an immediate lost-contact procedure initiated by the 
codeword "Cogitate*, and developed from the wartime 'Search Scheme No. I' to take 
account of the acoustic signature of a high-speed submarine. Thus, all A/S ships 
reduced to slow speed and carried out two all-round listening sweeps for HE followed 
by one all-round echo sweep, starting on the side away from the last known position of 
the submarine. Meanwhile, the Senior Officer would be planning the subsequent 
search scheme if contact was not regained. With only two ships close at hand there 
was not time to carry out "Cogitate' and a start had to be made on searching the 
expanding probability area straight away. 
Madden developed an experimental search that became known as Plan "Delta', 
which was a reduced version of the elaborate US Navy ffiBamdance" search. This 
should not be confused with the Plan ODelta' used in the trials with Seraph - that 
602 'The First Experience of A/S Actions with Intermediate (B) Submarines, 'ADM 239/274, p. 56. 60'Conduct of AIS Operations..., ' Box 468, RG 38, NARA2, Part 6, p. 9-12. 
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Plate 24: Plan Delta, 1950 
Plan "Delta", c. 1950, H M. S. Vernon, I. L. No- 659, 'T. A. S. Warfare Springback, ' 
Lieutenant Commander J. H. Adams Royal Navy, Commanding Officer [H. M. S. 
Creole], 1 June 1950, Adams Papers. 
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version had been deleted from the tactics books by the end of 1945. The new Plan 
"Delta' replaced the simpler "Box" Search (Plate 24). Instead of a static square barrier, 
the idea now was that the ships started an outward spiral within 5 minutes of the loss of 
contact and searched along the submarine's FoC expanding at 15 knots. Towards the 
end of the search, the ships turned inwards to search the area nearer the datum, to 
cover the possibility that the submarine was either evading at low speed or by constant 
turns was thus still close to the datum. When three ships were available the more 
elaborate "Lambda' Search was used, still based on the same concept. As more ships 
became available to join the search, so the schemes became more complex but could 
also cover more water and so, theoretically at least, stood more chance of regaining 
contact. 605 These search schemes, somewhat more mathematical in concept, stood in 
contrast to the pragmatic plans described by Burnett and evolved during the war when 
it was deemed more sensible to concentrate the available search team on a selected 
sector of the submarine's probability area. 
Technological Answem? 
The exercises in 194849 with Madden's 6DF had confirmed that A/S ships had, 
as anticipated, only a limited capability against a fast submarine. Tactical methods 
were needed, therefore, to take advantage of every fleeting chance of a kill. As for the 
ships' systems, while the existing Type 144 Asdic and Squid combination was 
reasonably efficient against submarines whose speed was less than 12 knots, against 
faster submarines it would be successful only in favourable circumstances. 6m The main 
limitations of the system were, first, the speed at which ships could effectively operate 
the asdic was too low, second (and directly related to the slow search speed) the rate 
of asdic search was too slow and, finally, the accuracy of the fire-control solution was 
inadequate for the available ATW weapons. The ship's operating speed was critically 
dependent on the level of self-noise, which in turn, was determined by the interference 
from the ship's propellers and the design of the asdic dome. Research was underway 
into improved propeller designs and means of silencing existing propellers, and a new 
experimental asdic dome had already been fitted to HMS Scorpion during 1946, which 
allowed asdic operation at speeds of 25-28 knots (that is, 7-10 knots higher than 
604 'Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations: Part IV, Air and Surface AIS Searches and Striking 
Forces, ' DASW, ASW 3078/43. BR1679(4), June 1944, ADM 234/293; 'TAS Warfare 
Springback, ' Lieutenant Commander J. H. Adams, Royal Navy, Commanding Officer [HMS 
Creole], 1 June 1950, Adams Papers. 
60 'The First Experiences of A/S Actions with Intermediate (B) Submarines..., ' ADM 239/423, 
ER., 19-28. 
Progress in Underwater Warfare, 1948, 'ADM 239/422, pp. 40-4 1. 
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previously). 607 Improving the asdic search rate was partly dependent on the ship's 
speed and partly on the scanning rate of the asdic itself. This had been appreciated for 
some time and work was in hand to develop an all-round scanning asdic, but this would 
not be available for many years due to the technical complexity of the equipment, 
though a set capable of scanning over a sector was expected to be available by 
608 1953. 
During the highly dynamic engagements against a fast submarine, inaccuracies 
were generated in the fire-control solution by the effects of the ship's manoeuvring. 
This error was removed by introducing the Ship's Component Mechanism to existing 
asdic installations. 609 However, errors were still induced by the slow rate of calculating 
the target's bearing with the wartime searchlight asdic sets using the Ocut-on, 
procedure and the necessity of roughly pointing the ship at the target in order to fire an 
Ahead Throwing Weapon (made more difficult by the need to fire at a short, fixed 
range). Research had been underway since the early 1940s into the application of 
radar 'Split-Beam" technology to asdic to produce instantaneous bearing and depth 
measurement. This technique was originally intended to improve the fire-control 
solution against slow, deep U-boats. When the fast submarine threat emerged, it soon 
became apparent that an effective solution consisted of the integrated use of up-to- 
date asdic bearing and depth accuracy with an improved A/S mortar (suggested by 
Prichard in DASW during 1944), capable of all-round training and firing at a variable 
range. These developments became the Type 170 (or OFour-Square') Asdic and the 
Limbo mortar, capable of firing Squid-like projectiles at variable ranges from 400-1,000 
yards, and were experimentally fitted together in Scorpion in 1950. The probability of 
success with Limbo was high, although at the longer ranges against a manoeuvring 
submarine, its fire-control prediction induced errors because it was based on the 
assumption that the submarine was moving on a straight course. 610 
A programme was also underway to develop a ship-launched A/S torpedo, 
capable of homing onto a submarine at long range, though the British remained 
sceptical that the problems of homing in shallow waters could be successfully 
overcome and this torpedo took lower priority than development of these weapons for 
607 'Underwater Detection Establishment - Research and Development - Progress Report 
Number 2, ' DTSR, 17 November 1947, NAA(M): MP1049/5.196812/663; 'Half-Yearly Scientific 
and Technical Progress Report, ' ADM 213/362; 'Fitting of High Speed Dome to Destroyers, ' 
Ship Design Policy Committee, SDPC(49)14,25 May 1949, ADM 116/5632. 
608 ACNS to First Sea Lord, ACNS/263,20 October 1948, ADM 205/69. 
6(*'Fitting of High Speed Dome to Destroyers, 'ADM 116/5632. 610 'HMUDE Summary of Progress, ' 1 December 1948, NAA(M): MP1049/5,19680800. 
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aircraft use. 611 The timings for these technical improvements neatly matched the 
forecast in the Short-Term and Long-Term policy set out by Ashbourne in 1946. The 
major step forward was the integration of this equipment, initially in frigate conversions, 
and later into new ship designS. 612 The detailed requirements for the conversions were 
worked on by Burnett and Ormsby and eventually evolved into the first Type 15 
Frigates, Rocket and Relentless allocated to Third Training Flotilla under Captain Le 
FanU. 613 Even with improved asdics, action information centres, the limbo mortar and 
high ship's speed, exercises with fast submarines were beset with difficulty. The 
number of practices, Le Fanu noted, had '... not been plentiful but we have had some 
duels with Turpin... [but] Turpin won on a technical knockout. M4 
The outlook for aircraft still remained gloomy, though the use of MAD and 
equipment to detect the intra-red or ionised properties of schnorkel gases were at 
various stages of development. 6'5 However, the principle methods of locating 
submarines remained visual or radar detection of the schnorkel head and sonobuoy 
detection of the acoustic signature. Little could be done to improve visual detection, 
other than by providing better sighting positions for the crews in aircraft. British 
research towards the end of the war had concentrated on attempts to use high- 
frequency radars to reduce the effects of sea clutter. 616 In the post-war era, varying 
interest was shown in the US development of high-powered AEW radar to detect 
schnorkels. USN aircraft on tour of Britain in mid-1948 had been able to detect a 
schnorkel at ranges of 17-23 miles in sea states 2-3. However, when the sea state rose 
to 4-5, which was commonplace in British waters, the number of detections was 
considerably reduced by the interfering effects of sea clutter. For the smaller carrier- 
borne aircraft, such as the Avenger, carriage of the heavy AEW radar meant that a 
separate aircraft had to localise and attack any contacts achieved . 
61 " The sonobuoys in 
6" 'Report on 10'h TAS Liaison Meeting - HMS Vemon - 18-20 September 1951, ' Lieutenant 
Commander M. S. Batterham, RANVR, 9 October 1951, NAA(M): M131 04916,5036/32/140. 
612 'Underwater Weapons and Equipment - Research Reports - Summary, ' DTSR, 28 April 
1949, NAA(M): MP1049/5,1968r2/780. 
613 Mosse, 'Half a Lifetime, ' p. 76; 'Joint Anti-Submarine School, Londonderry. Progress Report 
- Summer Term, 1952, 'C-in-C, Plymouth, M. 024475/52, ADM 1/23733, pp. 7-10. 614 'Eleventh TAS Liaison Meeting: Minutes, ' Part 4, 'Evaluation of Fast A/S Frigate 
Conversions, ' paper read by Captain M. Le Fanu, DSC, RN, Captain (D), Third Training 
Spadron, 9-11 September 1952, ADM 189/235, p. 37. 
6' 'Admiralty Research Laboratory and Admiralty Gunnery Establishment Teddington: 
Statement of Work in Hand - August 1945, 'NAA(M): MP1049/5,1968/2/577. 616 Llewellyn-Jones, 'Brifish Responses to the U-boat' p. 17. 
617 'Summary of Operations Aircraft Development Squadron Four Detachment in the United 
Kingdom during the Period 26 May to 17 June 1948, ' F. E. Bardwell, Commanding Officer, 
Aircraft Development Squadron Four, to Chief of Naval Operations, VX-4/A4-3 Serial: 005,1 
September 1948, Box 97, RG 313, NARA2; 'Joint A/S School Exercises, ' The Commanding 
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use were of wartime design and remained limited in range. Their capability would not 
be improved substantially until Very Low Frequency (VLF) acoustic techniques could 
be applied to them, and the technological advances needed would not provide results 
for many years. 6" The provision of homing torpedoes for aircraft attacks on submerged 
submarines struggled against great technical difficulty. 6'9 Even so, work continued 
optimistically to analyse the potential of aircraft used in offensive operations over 
submarine transit routes. It was clear that if any appreciable level of performance was 
to be achieved a wide selection of the sensors and weapons under development would 
have to become operational in the new aircraft, such as the land-based Shackleton and 
carrier-bome Gannet. 62" The first tentative steps with the use of helicopters for A/S 
operations had been made by a joint Anglo-US team in 1943, but had foundered on the 
poor operational performance of the machines. Nevertheless, attention continued to be 
directed (mainly in America) to the development of an A/S helicopter capable of 
carrying a Odunking* asdic. This appeared to show considerable operational benefits, 
though these, too, would not be realized for some considerable time. 621 
British submarines had sunk 17 and 40 U-boats in the First and the Second 
World Wars respectively, but this had not been their primary role. All bar one of these 
successes had been against U-boats operating on the surface. The one exception was 
HMS Venturer in early 1945, which sank U-864 in an engagement during which both 
submarines were submerged throughout. 622 The idea of making A/S warfare the 
primary role of British submarines was initiated in early 1946 by [then] Commander 
A. R. Hezlet, DSO*, DSC, the submariner on DTASW's staff. 623 Burnett followed up the 
idea in his paper on future anti-submarine problems during the following year. British 
submarines, working in the same medium as their prey might be operated to 
advantage, however, they would have 
Officer, 19 Carrier Air Group to The Commanding Officer, HMCS Magnificent, 28 May 1948, File 
S-4973-30 Vol. 1. Vol. 1814, Acc. 83-84/167, RG 24, NAC. 
618 'The Application of Lofar Techniques to Sonobuoys, ' D. A- Hanley, UDE Pamphlet No. 293, 
September 1953, ADM 259/205. 
6'9 'Anti-Submarine Tactics and Training, ' Squadron Leader R. J. Wilcock, RCAF, for Air 
Member, Canadian Joint Staff, London, S25-28 (Armament), 3 April 1951, File S-28-1-4, Vol. 
5270. RG 24, NAC. 
2 6 'o 'Transit Offensives and the Inshore U-boat' I. E. Tweedie, Department of Operational 
Research, Report No. 29, August 1953. ADM 219/607. 
621 R. A. Brie, 'Rotary-wings at Sea, ' The Aerpplan! J6 July 1951), p. 25 'Third A/S Tactical 
Liaison Meeting held in HMS Vernon on lt and 2 May 1947, ' A. 198/3/47,17 May 1947, 
distributed by Op-32-F-45. n. d., Box 102, RG 313, NARA2. 622 'HMS Venturer - Report of Eleventh War Patrol, ' Lieutenant J. S. Launders, RN, No. SC 
4110,15 February 1945, ADM 199/1815. 
m Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, KBE, CB, DSO*, DSC, Telephone Interviews, 22 and 23 




be fitted with a means of detecting and locating submerged submarines. 
Although submarines may prove to be more efficient vehicles for the asdic than 
surface ships, the comparatively short ranges of asdic will limit their usefulness on 
patrols. Also some form of recognition equipment have to be developed before 
624 they can be operated effectively in waters used by other A/S forces. 
These ideas were developed by the end of 1947 into papers on the use of submarines 
as A/S vessels. The idea of using submarines as convoy escorts proved to be stillborn, 
largely due to the problem of mutual recognition between friendly forces. 625 However, 
the more promising idea of their use as part of the forward attack-at-source strategy in 
enemy controlled waters had a strong pedigree and considerable potential for the 
future not only for laying mines off their ports but in direct attacks on their submarines. 
The technical and tactical problems, which took a long time to be solved, were the 
submarine's ability to locate its target at long range (using VLF acoustic techniques), 
and then to close to an attack without alerting its prey (requiring long endurance at a 
high silent speed) and, finally to attack with homing torpedoes which could overcome 
the problem of target depth and evasive manoeuvre. Streamlined, snort-fitted 
submarines were limited by underwater endurance, and, for a while, it was hoped 
better performance could be achieved by adapting the HTP submarine developments 
already in train. 625 Sufficient optimism in the potential of submarines encouraged the 
Admiralty to announce in early 1948 that: 
In war, the primary operational function of our submarines will be the interception 
and destruction of enemy submarines in enemy controlled waters. 627 
The "Iron Curtain" 
Much of this development was conducted against a background of a hardening 
political and military threat from the Soviet Union. The political realization of the 
aggressive extent of this threat had been hesitant. The Americans, in particular, 
greeted Churchill's 'Iron Curtain* speech in March 1946 with little enthusiasm. 623 The 
British, too, wanted to work in harmony with both America and Soviet Russia in the 
immediate post-war era. However, problems soon developed. 'The work of the 
624'Anfi-Submarine Problems of the Future, 'AIR 20/6381, Part 5. 
625 M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'A Flawed Contender The "Fighter' Submarine, 1946-1950, ' in Martin 
Edmonds (ed. ), 100 Years of the Trade. * Royal Navy Submarines Past, Present & Future 
(University of Lancaster Centre for Defence and Internabonal Security Studies, February 2001), 
pg. 58-67. 
'Requirements for an HTP Operational Submarine, ' Flag Officer Submarines 705/S/M. 068 
dated 8 September 1952 with Notes by Admiralty Divisions and Departments, ' [DTSD, 12 
November 1952], ADM 1/23729. 
627 N. Abercrombie to Commanders-in-Chief and Flag Officer (Submarines), etc., 
M. TASW. 289/47,8 January 1948, ADM 1/24407. 
628 Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 60. 
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quadripartite administration in Germany, ' Clement Attlee later wrote, 'was frustrated 
constantly by Russian intransigence, while at [the United Nations Organization] the 
Russian representative soon showed his intention of abusing the Veto. "' The 
Americans soon became disillusioned with their prickly wartime ally, and this had the 
effect of drawing them closer to the British. It was the issue of Marshall Aid in 1947, 
proposed by the US and instantly supported by Britain, but rejected by the Russians, 
that dashed hopes for the integration of Europe. The Russian rejection was one stage 
in the gradual hardening of the political division of Europe over this period and marked 
another hesitant step into the 'Cold War" . 
630 Attlee soon realized that military strength 
was the only factor which impressed the Russians. Even so, war-weariness amongst 
all the wartime allies, including the Soviet Union, as well as the American monopoly of 
the atomic bomb, made all-out war unlikely in the near future. 63' The JIC concluded 
that while the Soviet Union ultimately sought World domination, she would, at least in 
the near term, rely on a nCold War' strategy, short of all-out war . 
632 There was not, 
however, a sudden schism between the wartime German threat and the new Cold War 
Russian menace. By 1948, as Sir Percy Cradock, a one-time chairman of the JIC, 
noted: 
The Berlin blockade is in place. The two superpowers confront one another, each 
with its attendant states and its military and economic groupings. This is the Cold 
War as popularly understood. But as the records show, it was preceded by a more 
fluid and uncertain period, which saw the transformation of Russia from heroic 
wartime ally to principal enemy .... 
633 
Indeed the fledgling Ministry of Defence developed the '5+5 Rule* which assumed that 
the risk of war over the next 5 years was negligible, that is, up to about 1952, but would 
increase thereafter. 634 The Anglo-American political relationship was by no means 
assured, though at the working level of the Naval Staff co-operation with the Americans 
was close, as had been shown by the constant liaison visits by DTASW staff officers 
and the major visit by Admiral Styer in early 1947.635 VCNS had also recently had a 
visit from the USN Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
6"9 C. R. Attlee, As it Happened* His Autobiography (London: Heinemann, 1954), p. 170. 
630 Michael Dockrill, The Cold War, 1945-1963, (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 34-51. 
631 'Certain Assumptions for Planning Purposes, ' Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub- 
Committee, JIC(46)19(0)(Final), 6 March 1946, CAB 81/132. 
02 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 
g. 
318. Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy. - How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World 
(ý. pndon: John Murray, 2002), p. 29. 
634 'Assumptions as to Risk of Future War and Target Date for Re-equipment of the Fleet, ' 1947- 
1948, ADM 116/5966. 
635 Moore, Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, p. 42; A. B. Bimie to M. M. Low, AIM. 01938/46,1 
March 1948, AIR 2/12249. 
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.... who had told him that the 
USN were now giving highest priority to anti- 
submarine problems, and were anxious that there should be complete interchange 
of information with the Royal Navy in such matters. 638 
British and Allied Tactical Doctrine 
The tactical use of these A/S units was enshrined in national and allied tactical 
publications which owe a strong debt to the eadier doctrine developed by Burnett and 
his team in the first days of peace. 637 These ideas were to form the basis of Allied 
doctrine for what can now be seen as modem anti-submarine warfare. The doctrine 
manuals of the 1950s confirmed the integrated offensive and defensive approach to 
A/S warfare formalized by Burnett, his team and their successors in the Admiralty in 
1946-48, which itself had followed the basic precepts developed during the 1930s and 
in the heat of the Second World War. At the strategic level a series of Allied planning 
meetings were held in Washington during October 1949 which produced the revised 
plan 'Galloper' outlining Allied strategy in the event of war with the Russians up to mid- 
1951. By this stage it was assumed that the Russians would have a limited number of 
atomic bombs (as well as limited stocks of chemical and biological weapons). The 
planners realized that Allied strategic alternatives were bounded by their military 
capabilities which, initially, was extremely limited. 633 In broad terms this reduced Allied 
options to the launching of an immediate strategic air offensive (using atomic bombs) 
from land and sea. Vital base areas would also have to be defended, as well as the sea 
and air communications used to support these attacks and to maintain the flow of 
supplies while the Allied strength was being mobilised. The British had already made it 
plain that simply defending sea communications was in itself inadequate and the 
planning had to encompass offensive operations and aftack-at-source in the North 
Atlantic area . 
639 The enemy was expected to make his main assault on Allied sea 
communications by attacking ports and their approaches by mining, inshore submarine 
attack, bombing and sabotage. That said, the primary means of shipping protection at 
sea remained the imposition of convoy to deal with both the submarine and air threat, 
though the linkage of use of convoy against the mine threat was not made. As for the 
submarine threat, this was expected to be strongest in the inshore waters of the 
636 'Joint Sea/Air Warfare Committee: Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Committee held at the 
Admiralty on 27 August 1946, ' SAWC 2/46(12), 27 August 1946. AIR 20/6842. 
637 'Conduct of A/S Operations-, ' Box 468, RG 38, NARA2; 'ATP1 [Allied Naval Maneuvering 
Instructions], Change 1: January 1952, ' Box 4, RG 38, NARA2. 
638 'Plan 'Galloper*, ' Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff, JP(49)134(Final), 1 March 
1950, DEFE 6/11, p. 7. 639 'Strategic Guidance from the Standing Group to the Regional Planning Groups on the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, ' Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff, JP(49)149(Final), 
21 November 1949, DEFE 6/11. 
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western approaches to the United Kingdom. This was the plan which, the Chiefs of 
Staff believed, showed how the Allies would have fought if general war had broken out 
as a result of the conflict in Korea. 640 
At the end of 1948, during a visit to America, Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor, 
Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in a discussion with the Admiral McCormick, US 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, came to the mutually agreed position 
... that provision of escorts 
for convoys should take precedence of formation of 
huntertkiller groups. When it is possible to form these they may initially have to be 
confined to dangerous areas where they can be used in close support of convoys. 
The two Admirals also agreed 
... that the safe and timely arrival of the convoy must still 
be the Escort 
Commander's objective and not the hunting to death of the attacking U-Boat at the 
expense of the convoy.... 641 
This apparently defensive philosophy was agreed against an expectation that a wholly 
inadequate number of escorts would be available in the opening phase of a future war. 
McGrigor's overall view became clear during Fleet exercises. During the early spring of 
1949, amidst appalling weather more characteristic of winter conditions, the Home 
Fleet carried out Exercise OSunrise' in the North Atlantic during which McGrigor put into 
practice the latest A/S doctrine. Notwithstanding the limitations imposed on all the 
players, the C-in-C observed that: 'in spite of the difficulties of locating and destroying 
the modern fast submarines, ... the policy of employing 
hunting groups [wasl... based 
on firm foundations. ' However, he added, that 
Until ... a more efficient form of detection is developed for carriage in aircraft, it is probable that the majority of submarine "kills' will take place in the vicinity of the 
convoy or main body with which the hunting groups are working. 642 
McGrigor's observations were based on the widespread understanding of the inter- 
dependence of the *defensive' and 'offensive' in A/S warfare. The *Patrol" or "Hunting" 
Group was intended to work with, and not independently of, the main body of the Fleet, 
though at some distance ahead. The idea chimed well with Admiralty views and indeed 
echoed the proposals for the employment of Patrol Groups propounded by DTASW at 
this time, and the use of support groups during the war. The practical problem of 
640 Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till, 'Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era of Massive 
Retaliation, 1945-60, ' in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (eds. ), Maritime Strategy and 
the Balance of Power Britain and America in the Twentieth Centuty (Basingstoke, Hants.: 
Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 276. 
641 Admiral R. McGrigor, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet to Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser 
of North Cape, First Sea Lord, 24 November 1948, Section 5, ADM 205170, p. 3. 642 'Remarks by Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet' Enclosure No. 6 to 'Exercise 'Sunrise*, ' 




carrying out these moffensive" tactics was the lack of resources and not any lack of 
aggressive thinking. In spite of the anticipated shortage of A/S vessels and aircraft at 
the beginning of a war, McGrigor believed that, exercises should be carried out to 
perfect the techniques for A/S hunting groups. 
"Sunrise' was also intended to simulate operations against the threat of atomic 
attack, and illustrated the difficulties this would pose. While atomic attack was not a 
serious threat to the Fleet at sea, the threat did require ships to be stationed further 
apart than hitherto, which complicated inter-ship communications and diluted the A/S 
defence. When this was compounded with the problem of long-range torpedo fire from 
enemy submarines, which might be gaining their initial intelligence at a range of some 
20 miles, it is not difficult to see why the stationing of a Patrol Group some 20-25 miles 
ahead and on either bow of the Fleet was attractive, where enemy submarines might 
be exposing their radar mast while trying to locate the Fleet. Exercise "Verity', carried 
out later in that year, included convoy serials, which illustrated the pressure for as 
many ships and aircraft to be involved and to benefit from the training, but it also 
showed the downside by the consequent lack of realism, with too many escorts 
crowded round the convoy. The exercise also saw the use of the French U-2518 
though the level of success by the attacking submarines operating singly was largely 
dependent on the environmental conditionS. 643 
Exercise *Trident*, really a conference, was held at the Royal Naval College, 
GreenvAch, in April 1949. The invitation to the conference announced that it was 
designed to apply the lessons of the Second World War to a possible war in 1956-57, 
taking into account scientific and technical developments. In his forward to the 
conference pack, the First Sea Lord, Lord Fraser, noted that they were in a period of 
transition and that new weapons were the order of the day. When war might occur, and 
what would be the state of weapon development no one could say. 'In such 
circumstances, ' Fraser went on, 
... the task of the Admiralties 
is not a simple one and it is hoped through this 
Exercise to inform the Fleets fully of the lines on which the Naval Staff in London is 
working and thereby establish principles which will assist in the solution of some of 
the problems confronting us. 644 
So, 'Tridento set out to inform and provoke discussion. It was designed to illustrate how 
maritime forces might be operated in 1957 and the importance of offensive action, 
within a defensive maritime strategy was to be emphasized. The likely problems which 
"3'Monthly Intelligence Report July 1949, 'NID, 10 August 1949, DHH. 
"4'Exercise"TridenC, Volume l, 'CB004520, April 1949, ADM 239/489, p. iii. 
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could be encountered in supporting the Army and Air Force were to be covered, but 
particular attention was to be paid to the defence of shipping. All the operations were to 
be compressed, somewhat artificially, within a single strategic setting six months into a 
war with Russia. The British therefore found themselves '... in the throes of the Third 
Battle of the Atlantic. ' Once more a major national effort was focused on the conflict 
which was expected to be as deadly as its two predecessors, mainly because, it was 
assumed, the Russians would be equipped with the latest refinements of submarine 
warfare. This threat had '... temporarily out-run the counter-measures necessary to 
combat it.... 'The Russians would also make extensive use of submarine minelaying. "' 
Commanders Barley and Titterton and Lieutenant Commander Waters in the 
Historical Section of the Naval Staff, had been almost entirely occupied during the first 
three months of 1949 in research work for Operation uTrident". They had produced 
narrative and statistical appreciations of the various aspects of the war, much of which 
was used in the planning of the Exercise. "6 During the first sessions of the Exercise, 
the President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, Vice Admiral G. N. Oliver, 
lectured on the defence of ocean shipping. He was a Gunnery officer with no 
experience of the Battle of the Atlantic, so, before he addressed the conference Oliver 
had obtained a briefing from the Historical Section. He was not entirely uninformed, for 
he had recently relinquished his appointment as ACNS, a post he held while many of 
the anti-submarine doctrine papers were being drafted by the Naval Staff, including the 
comprehensive survey on the mAnti-Submarine Problems of the Future, and the 
subsidiary study on "Aftack-at-Source and Harbour Defence'. In his presentation, 
Oliver argued at some length on '... the absolute value of convoy. ' He also felt it 
necessary to remind the audience that: 'In our very natural zeal for direct action, let it 
not be forgotten that the escorting of shipping in convoy is not merely a defensive and 
negative process. ' With guidance from the Historical Section, Oliver also noted that 
wartime Hunter-Killer group operations had achieved comparatively little, though air 
patrols over the U-boats transit routes had had considerable success. Nevertheless, he 
pointed out, it was the convoy escorts, both surface and air, which destroyed more 
German U-boats '... than any other single means of attack, ' according to figures 
supplied by the Historical Section. 647 
"s'Exercise'Tridenf, 'ADM 239/489, p. xiv. 6" Grove (ed. ), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, p. xvi; 'Historical Section of TSD - Review of Narrator Posts, Roger M. Bellairs, 11 November 1949, T. 27309, NHB. 
647 'The Defence of Ocean Shipping in 1957, 'Vice Admiral G. N. Oliver, CB, DSO, President RN 
College, Greenwich, Item 17, in, 'Exercise 'Trident*, 'ADM 239/490, p. 85. 
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The *Trident* Directing Staff (reflecting Naval Staff opinion) agreed that both 
world wars had proved that '... the most fruitful areas for sinking enemy submarines 
were in the vicinity of convoys, ' adding the proviso, that the escorts had to be 
,... sufficient in numbers to allow detachments for killings. ' However, while the Staff had 
already noted that '-defensive measures for protection of our shipping must be 
maintained and if possible increased, ' but these, the Staff concluded, '-will not 
themselves suffice.... ' This was because the British 
... economic position before the war has not admitted the building up of our 
maritime Escort Forces to the desired strength, nor has the technical and scientific 
advance in our.. equipment run parallel with the progress made in the evolution of 
the submarine. "a 
It was the latter of these problems, which the Directing Staff considered to be most 
significant. By 1957, they pointed out, submarines would still be difficult to locate, 
especially from the air. Consequently, the concept of 'Aftack-at-Source" came into 
greater prominence than before. This was '... a familiar and self explanatory term... ' 
and referred to attacks on enemy ports, naval bases, and so on, by carrier-borne or 
shore-based aircraft, by "sneak' craft, commando raids and so on. These attacks were 
complemented by *Offensive Control" consisting of offensive minelaying, offensive A/S 
air patrols, the interception of submarines on their transit routes by Hunter-Killer 
groups, attacks by our submarines in enemy controlled waters, and attacks on enemy 
surface forces, particularly minesweepers. There remained a requirement for 
"Defensive Control" including the close escort of convoys by surface forces (with 
aircraft carriers), shore-based fighters and AIS aircraft, as well as defensive minefields, 
and so on. 649 These methods were explored further during the Exercise, though the 
"defensive' convoy escort task received more than twice the attention as did the 
a offensive" and *aftack-at-source" tasks together. 650 
The "Trident' Directing Staff also interpreted the Historical Section's data in a 
different way to show that roughly equal numbers of U-boats were sunk by "offensive" 
as "defensive" measures. For reasons which are not entirely clear. The Historical 
Section laboured under the impression that the Naval Staff was led by the 'convoy is 
defensive' school, and were bent on shifting to an all-out *offensive" anti-submarine 
"8'Exercise"Tridenf, 'ADM 239/489, p. xiv. 649 'A Survey of the Tasks of the Maritime Forces in Support of the Three Pillars of Our 
Strategy, ' Item 13, in, 'Exercise *Tridenf, ' ADM 239/489, p. 25. 65 '0 'A Joint Planning Staff Conference before the Outbreak of War, ' Item 28, and The Defence 
of a Convoy against Submarine Attack: Demonstration by the RN Tactical School, ' Item 30, in, 
'Exercise "Tddenr, 'ADM 239/490. 
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strategy. 651 Their staunch advocacy of convoy re-surfaced in a Research Memorandum 
in 1952. The bulk of this work was readily accepted by the Naval Staff, but as Captain 
V. Donaldson, the new DTASW, noted it concentrated too heavily on convoy, failed to 
take account of other measures and, worse, summarily dismissed the period of the 
inshore campaign in 1944-45.652 It was, of course, operations against the schnorkel- 
fifted U-boats and the incipient threat of the fast U-boats which most influenced the 
post-war anti-submarine warfare Staff, and not the convoy baffles of 1942-43 against 
the wolf packs. When the period of these great convoy baffles is compared with the last 
inshore campaign, the proportion of U-boats destroyed by surface escorts fell from 
43% to 17%, and by air escorts from 22% to 9%. Between the same periods, the 
effectiveness of sea patrols increased from 4% to 12%, and bombing rose from 0% to 
over 12%. 653 The Naval Staff concluded - as Fawcett had prophesised - that precision 
killing around convoys would no longer be adequate. Other methods, however 
inefficient, had to be tried. The historians failed to discern this change between the mid- 
war and late-war AIS campaigns. 
It was against the background of "fluid" politics but more assured naval co- 
operation with the Americans, that the Admiralty was drafting its doctrine papers to deal 
with the fast submarine threat -a doctrine which owed its pedigree to the concepts 
developed during the inter-war period and wartime operations. It was the fundamental 
holistic relationship between the defensive and the offensive that was key, rather than 
the idea of these aspects as alternatives. The holistic concept underpinned the 
construction of the *Trident' conference. Convoy was seen as an essential element, 
because it cleared the ocean of multiple targets and complicated the submarines' 
reconnaissance and intercept problems. Submarines could operate in focal areas 
where convoys were easier to locate by individual submarines, but where anti- 
submarine forces would also be concentrated. Otherwise, submarines were faced with 
the problem of finding their prey in the open ocean, and of moving, probably at high 
speed, to intercept convoys. Wherever they operated, fast submarines would be more 
elusive targets than their predecessors, though when moving at speed they presented 
more detection opportunities to anti-submarine forces. The Admiralty's faith in offensive 
operations can, in part, be explained by their early knowledge of the highly secret 
'Corsair' and 'Lofar' Very Low Frequency acoustic systems, which by 1949 could 
651 'The Convoy System: 'Offensive or Defensive7 Commander F. Barley and Lieutenant 
Commander D. W. Waters, Historical Section, Admiralty, December 1954, NHB. 
652 Minute by Captain V. D'A- Donaldson, DTASW, 13 October 1952, ADM 1/24139. 
r'53 'Historical Research Memorandum No. 1: Surface and Air Anti-Submarine Escort of Shipping 
in Convoy, and Anti-Submarine Transit Area Patrols in Two World Wars, ' Historical Section, 
Admiralty, May 1953, ADM 1/24962, Table V. 
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locate submarines at tens, perhaps hundreds of miles. Fixes could be used rather like 
the wartime HFIDF system to vector anti-submarine forces onto enemy submarines . 
654 
Similarly, the greater emphasis on attack-at-source only made sense if it was 
predicated on the acquisition of lightweight atomic bombs and the aircraft to carry 
them. Ultimately, the sheer difficulty of locating and attacking submarines meant that 
every opportunity had to be taken to sink them. Only by destroying enemy submarines 
in sufficient numbers could they be forced to operate so circumspectly, that the safety 
of shipping could be reasonably assured. This meant that *offensive" action was 
needed from the defensive boundary of convoys to the heartland of the enemy and a 
complement to, not a replacement for, udefensivem convoy escort. 
r'54 Norman Friedman, e-mail, 17/05/02 16: 26: 11 GMT; 'Sub-sonic Hydrophone Investigation, ' 
Admiralty Research Laboratory, Teddington, ARUN. 5/95.27/D, 31 August 1949, ADM 
204/2841; 'Long Range Detection of Submarines using VLF Hydrophone Equipment' DTASW, 
20 June 1952, ADM 1/24506. 
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Conclusion: Joining up the Dots, 1944-1949 
The Nature of Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Captain P. W. Burnett, DSO, DSC, arrived at the Admiralty in September 1945, 
and was followed a month later by Commander G. A. G Ormsby, DSO, DSC, and 
Lieutenant Commander J. P. Mosse, DSC. These men were all AIS specialists, who 
brought to the Admiralty extensive wartime operational experience that was invaluable 
in their drafting of the doctrine papers which defined the way in which the British 
intended to deal with the threat of the fast submarine. From the time they completed 
their A/S specialist training and throughout the Second World War, they had studied 
and grown to understand A/S warfare. The submarine had inherently weak defensive 
qualities, and therefore relied on remaining undetected. Stealth was also crucial to its 
chance of making a successful attack with the relatively short-range torpedoes that 
were initially available. Denying the submarine the benefit of stealth was critical in order 
to prevent the submarine from attacking, an piercing the submarine's stealthy shroud 
was a prerequisite to destroying it. Fundamentally, as one experienced A/S practitioner 
had put it, A/S warfare revolved around '... an attempt to sink an invisible enemy by a 
sense which is not in every day use. 655 By this he meant that, unless the submarine 
could be caught on the surface, detection relied on the use of asdic, and that 
equipment relied on the interpretation of complex sounds. There were two ways of 
doing this. In one the asdic was used to listen for the sounds produced by a submarine. 
Given the technology of the 1930s and 1940s, this meant that the main source came 
from the submarine's propeller noise, and was critically dependent, therefore, on the 
submarine's speed being sufficiently high. The most often used alternative was to rely 
on detecting the echo returning from an active transmission by the asdic set. These 
echoes were weak owing to the losses in transmission of the sound and the smallness 
of the submarine's echoing area. Their detection was made even more difficult by the 
reception not only of unwanted echoes from the seabed, wrecks and rocks, the sea 
surface, the body of the water (i. e. reverberations), but also extraneous sounds from 
the A/S ship's own movement through the water (i. e. self-noise). Classification of asdic 
contacts into *submarine" and "non-sub* categories was therefore often difficult and 
time-consuming. 
6-"5 Anti-Submarine Training, 'ADM 205/3. See Appendix 2. 
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Although the early submarine's underwater speed was low (generally less than 5 
knots) the dynamics of an A/S action could nevertheless be high for two interrelated 
reasons. The range of initial detection was usually very short, in the order of half-a- 
mile, which gave the ship very little time before it overran the contact or the ship 
passed outside the detection range. Even at the short range-scales at which the asdic 
was transmitting, the speed of sound (very much lower than radar waves) meant that 
target data arrived in the ship at best at intervals of several seconds. Added to this was 
the intermittency of the received echoes due to the vagaries of the sea's structure and 
interference from reverberations and self-noise. Even when asdic contact was firmly 
established the problems did not abate. Measuring the range to the target was 
relatively straightforward, but establishing its bearing involved a time-consuming "cut- 
on" procedure. Estimating the target's depth was wholly guesswork until the 
introduction of a specialized depth-finding asdic (Type 147B), and even then depth 
measurement was inherently prone to errors because the sound beam was usually 
bent by the ocean's complex temperature structure. 
Attacking the submarine with depth-charges was also fraught with difficulty. 
Initially, attacks required the A/S ship to pass directly over the aiming point, which was 
itself some way ahead of the submarine to allow for the time taken by the depth- 
charges to sink to the target's depth. During the last stages of the attack either contact 
was lost (if the submarine was deep), or the bearing rate accelerated as the ship 
passed ahead of the submarine. In either case, the estimation of the submarine's 
position, course, speed and depth, became less certain and resulted in the need for a 
barrage attack with multiple depth-charges in an attempt to overcome the three- 
dimensional aiming errors. The introduction of ATW, together with an integrated semi- 
automated aiming and firing system, removed many of these limitations. The 
advantages of ATW were, however, severely curtailed by the advances in submarine 
speed from 1944 onwards. 
Before the operational appearance of the fast submarine, the enemy had already 
adopted schnorkel technology which allowed U-boats to operate continuously 
submerged throughout their war patrols. Large area searches by aircraft (for which they 
were uniquely suited) and which relied on detecting U-boats travelling on the surface, 
were instantly nullified. At the same time AIS ships had to revert to asdic as their main 
means of detecting the U-boats, and this forced them rapidly to review their tactical 
countermeasures. The U-boats, too, suffered from considerable limitations as a result 
of their new operating techniques, not the least being their ability to find and close 
targets. Fortunately, the schnorkel-fitted submarine problem bore strong resemblances 
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to the threat posed by submarines at the end of the First World War, the interwar 
period and the opening phases of the Second World War. It was possible, therefore, to 
adapt existing tactical practice (albeit with the much improved equipment available) to 
counter this "new" threat. Against the conventional schnorkel-fitted U-boat at the end of 
the Second World War, a 'blood-and-guts' confirmation (by way of wreckage) of 
success in the *new* procedures was possible, but against the fast submarine the 
British had to rely on trials and exercises whose realism was compromised by safety 
restrictions, even in wartime. Conclusions over the ultimate efficacy of tactical 
measures proposed for defeating fast submarines was therefore problematic. The 
overall difficulty of A/S warfare underpins much of the rationale for decisions over A/S 
developments that were undertaken not only, but especially, between 1944 and 1949. 
The Nature of the Threat 
By 1944, the submarine threat was immediate and (potentially at least) critical. 
This had not always been the case. For much of the interwar period, the threat from the 
German U-boat was meagre and only as war approached did the problem become 
urgent. The Royal Navy therefore adopted a stance of preparedness. This was, in 
many respects, repeated in the immediate post-war era when the potential threat now 
came from the Soviet Union. She had been ravaged by the Second World War and, in 
any case, had no real capacity to mount a submadne campaign against British trade or 
military operations. This threat, which was forecast (fairly accurately) to become 
serous by the late 1950s, would resemble that posed by the nascent threat of the 
German schnorkel-fifted high-speed U-boats which had been preparing for operations 
as the Second World War came to a close. The way in which post-war A/S warfare was 
conceived, therefore, owes more to the operations of the late war inshore campaign, 
than to the great convoy battles of 1942-43 against U-boats operating in packs and 
relying on surface travel for search and concentration around convoys. Because the 
Russian danger, in terms of actual operational capability (if not of political aspiration) 
was only just emerging in 1945-49, the threat against which the Royal Navy prepared 
was a genedc one formed by an amalgam of the physical potential of the ex-German 
Type XXI fast U-boats, together with assumptions regarding corrections of German 
wartime operational mistakes (such as their failure to provide adequate supporting air 
reconnaissance). Nor did the reality of the atomic bomb create much impact, partly 
because the enemy had none, and partly because when they acquired some weapons, 
the numbers and power of the bombs was not initially thought to ensure the destruction 
of the will to fight. On the allied side, the possession of the bomb gave additional 
impetus to considerations of the efficacy of attacking enemy submarines at source. The 
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resultant doctrine flowing from all these reflections seems to have served its purpose, 
since it remained broadly in use for the next two decades. 
Tactics and Technology 
Technological measures to counter either specific submarine developments or to 
overcome difficulties with existing equipment took many years to come to fruition. Thus 
there was no ready technical answer to the fast submarine and the Royal Navy had to 
adapt tactical procedures to maximise the potential of existing equipment in dealing 
with the new threat. Indeed, Burnett concluded that the metric for measuring the Royal 
Navy's and the enemy's operational facility was to match existing British A/S capability 
with that expected of the enemy's submarines 15 years hence. The long development 
cycle for new technologies, meant that they cannot be seen merely as emanating from 
some particular operational requirement. For example, the asdic development (Type 
170) which did much to overcome the problem of accurately locating a fast submarine 
during an attack, began as a means of substantially improving the attack accuracy of 
depth-charge attacks against a slow, deep submarine. In the meantime, tactical 
adaptation led to procedures to overcome the original problem (the Creeping Attack), 
while the combination of existing asdic (Type 144) along with ATWs; gave some 
capability against the emerging fast submarine problem. Tactical adaptation, rather 
than wholly new tactics, made sense because existing tactics were familiar (thus 
reducing the re-training load) and, in any case, were interrelated with the equipment 
which was still to be used. Moreover, the full impact of an enemy's change in 
operations with new equipment did not have an immediate impact at maximum 
effectiveness. If A/S forces stumbled to find solutions (and the British generally did 
better than that), the enemy took time to fully develop their new offensive techniques, 
which gave the British a breathing space to put countermeasures in place. To some 
extent, looking back on the problem, it depends on whether Vice Admiral J. M. 
Mansfield, Flag Officer, Submarines, was right in spring 1947 that: 'We stand ... on the 
threshold of a complete revolution in submarine design and technique, and 
consequently in all types of anti-submarine measures. '656 The alternative view of an 
experienced anti-submarine practitioner, Captain E. A. Gibbs, RN, Captain (D), Fourth 
Escort Flotilla, was that: 'Generally speaking the fast Submarine is not so much a new 
problem as a serious development of the old problem. 9657 The way in which tactical 
doctrine was developed in the Royal Navy over the period 1944-49 suggests that it was 
6-"6'HM Submarine U-1407 - Trials, '23 May 1947, RNSM Al 977/043. 657 'Exercises with USS Thimpetfish, ' Box 96, RG 313, NARA2. 
249 
Conclusion 
Gibbs view which prevailed. Pragmatically, until new equipment became available, the 
Royal Navy could hardly choose another course. 
The "Defensive" and "Offensive" 
Many historians have followed the line that the primary goal of A/S warfare can 
best be articulated in the mantra of the "safe and timely arrival" of trade and that the 
best means of achieving this is to impose convoy. Furthermore, the convoy "defensive" 
escorts are best placed to destroy attacking submarines, whilst the alternative use of 
these A/S forces on "offensive' operations is inefficient. Thus convoy, by this logic, is 
transformed into an moffensive' measure. There is, of course, some measure of 
legitimacy in this view, but it is a caricature and will not do. For a start, it confuses the 
issues and, secondly, it is not how AIS warfare was seen by those who really 
understood it in 1944-49 (or even 1917-49). A/S practitioners realized that the usafe 
and timely arrival' of convoys was only part of the equation. If, at the same time A/S 
forces were not able to destroy sufficient numbers of submarines, their numbers would 
increase and (perhaps more crucially) the expertise and morale of their crews would 
improve. It was not necessary to sink more submarines than the enemy could build (a 
mistaken calculus adopted by the Germans as the principal aim of their anti-shipping 
campaign). It was only necessary to sink enough submarines to "keep their tails down', 
though it was not possible then, or now, to exactly quantify this number. As A/S 
specialists (and others) realized the fundamental difficulties associated with A/S 
warfare, meant that destroying submarines was an inherently inexact and inefficient 
business. The need, therefore, was to capitalize on every opportunity to attack the 
enemy. The question was how best was this to be done? 
Theoretically, engaging submarines in the vicinity of a convoy put A/S forces at 
an advantage by concentrating escorts around the submarine's prey. The Germans 
had attempted to overturn this logic by massing a counter-concentration through their 
U-boat pack-tactic system. However, against a co-ordinated and aggressive defence 
even these enemy tactics failed. It was only when the enemy came up against an 
escort that was weak in numbers, capability and training, that they scored substantial 
success. This was, to simplify the complex argument of this thesis, because the convoy 
system created a number of tactical advantages for A/S forces. Firstly, as had just 
been noted, a convoy's escort formed a concentration of A/S forces. But the imposition 
of convoy, by congregating the ships into a small area, also effectively left wide 
expanses of the ocean bare of targets. This presented the submarine with two 
problems: locating the convoys, which drove the submannes to disperse to search, and 
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then making them move (at relatively high speed) to close the convoy in order to 
attack, or to overtake the convoy so as to attack repeatedly. Submarines moving at 
speed are no longer stealthy, and present A/S forces with opportunities to locate and 
attack them. Up to 1944 this weakness of the U-boat was ruthlessly exploited by A/S 
forces in direct and distant support of convoys. These operations were augmented by 
(albeit often inefficient) operations over U-boat transit routes and attacks at source by 
submarines, direct aircraft attack and mining. Overall, about half the U-boats sunk were 
by the, so called "defensive" forces, and the other half by "offensive" operations. 
The combination of "defensive" and "offensive" A/S operations was a well 
developed doctrine that had originated in the First World War and had survived 
unabated during the interwar years. The Royal Navy entered the Second World War 
fully confident that convoy provided the basic building-block of their A/S strategy. This 
had to be combined with aggressive action close to the convoys, and wider offensive 
operations designed to sink U-boats and, at least, to harass their every moment at sea 
and (ideally) in harbour. Force levels relative to the magnitude of the expanding convoy 
system and the growing power of the U-boats (magnified after the Fall of France) 
meant that a balanced "defensive" and "offensive" strategy had to be held in abeyance 
for a time, for simply finding sufficient resources for the direct defence of convoys 
stretched Allied resources to the limit. At moments of extreme peril this defence was 
largely passive. But as A/S forces grew in numbers and capability, the Royal Navy 
soon resurrected its long-held doctrine as "defensive" escorts became more active and 
aggressive. Sea and air support groups were assigned to threatened convoys, where 
they took the offensive, for they had the time to hunt U-boats to destruction. Gradually, 
too, the means of attack-at-source became more sophisticated with improved bombing 
techniques. Thus when the enemy abandoned the conventional submersible mode of 
operation and reverted to submerged patrols with schnorkel-fitted U-boats, the 
fundamental doctrine for dealing with them was already in use. This doctrine was 
expanded as the basis for countering the incipient threat of the fast U-boats at the end 
of the Second World War. The "offensive" and udefensiven were not entirely equal 
strategic or tactical partners, for if the "offensive" was to be successful, it had to rest on 
a sound "defensive" posture. It could not exist alone, whereas, the "defensive" could at 
least for a time. The fast submarine formed the benchmark of the post-war threat, 
against which the Royal Navy took forward the now well-established A/S warfare 
doctrine based on the holistic, symbiotic relationship between the "defence" and 
aoffence" (Plate 25). 
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Plate 25: Elements of Anti-Submarine Warfare 
('The Development of A/S Warfare, ' Instructional Tactical Lecture, H. M. S. Vernon, 10 June 
1948, Adams Papers. ) 
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Synthesis 
There has been a widespread misunderstanding of application of anti-submarine 
doctrine by the Royal Navy from the First World War to the end of the Second World 
War. This has been caused by a failure to encompass adequate swathes of the primary 
record, and a lack of comprehension of the technical and tactical difficulties of anti- 
submarine warfare. The opening chapters of this thesis has corrected many of these 
errors and, in the remaining chapters has extended the research from the mid-years of 
the Second World War to the beginning of the Cold War. This era has not been 
covered before in the depth presented here. This thesis, focussing on the period 1944- 
49, has established a new interpretation of the Royal Navy's anti-submarine doctrine 
against the threat of the fast submarine and, by extension, against the wartime U-boat. 
Instead of treating "defensive" and "offensive" operations as alternative options, the 
Royal Navy took a holistic approach to the problem and the "defensive" and *offensive" 
were seen as interrelated, symbiotic partners. This, seemingly obvious, point provides 
a significantly different departure when assessing the performance of the Royal Navy 
(and the Admiralty in particular) in pursuing doctrinal development. 
The thesis has also shown that the Admiralty, in particular, made accurate and 
sensible decisions over tactical policy, given the intelligence at hand and the limitations 
of the operational equipment available. Far from being conservative and ponderous, 
the Admiralty proved to be a flexible and responsive organisation. Furthermore, it 
learned from the lessons of earlier and ongoing operations. The anti-submarine division 
in the Admiralty by the end of the Second World War and in the immediate post-war 
years, was manned by long-service, professional naval officers, of whom the key 
personnel were also anti-submarine specialists. They brought their inter-war and 
wartime experience and knowledge to bear on what was, in many ways, the new anti- 
submarine problem of the fast submarine. These men were intelligent, pragmatic 
experts who did not allow practical doctrine to be swamped by theory. They also set in 
place the revised doctrine in a remarkably short span between 1946-48 - and one 
which was to remain a robust solution for several decades. At the same time, whatever 
the intrinsic case for seeing the new submarines as representing a "revolutionary" 
technological advance, the Royal Navy responded with largely tactical solutions 
designed to optimise existing equipment while simultaneously looking forward to 
improved technical solutions. It was realised that this new equipment would not be 
available for a considerable time and, even when operational, would not alter the 
fundamental combined *defensive" and "offensive" tactical posture. This presents an 
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The Historical Section's View of the "Offensive" and "Defensive", 1955 68 
Historical Section, 
Admiralty, 
15 October 1955 
A"New Look' at 
*Offence" and 'Defence" 
The Anti-U-boat Campaim 
1939-1945 
A Brief Statement of Facts 
In a speech on 14 December 1954, on the role of the Royal Navy in war, widely 
reported in the press, the First Lord said, "I can at least, I hope, give some answers 
to those who profess to think that the inventions of today have relegated Navies to 
the defensive role of which the convoy system was the expression in the last two 
wars". 
2. This view, that the convoy system is the embodiment of the defensive, is not 
substantiated by the facts of war ascertained by rigorous historical research. On 
the contrary, the facts show convoy to be the embodiment of the offensive. 
3. In this scientific age methods of historical research for he naval staff are 
scientific. By the systematic collation of scrupulously verified facts and figures 
historical research is able to present statistical data for critical analysis and 
evaluation. By these methods of historical research it is possible, for instance, to 
determine with a high degree of certainty the relative efficacy of various measures 
taken to destroy or neutralise enemy forces and to preserve and employ our 
shipping most effectively. Thus through historical research the facts relating to the 
defeat of the enemy at sea in the last two wars reveal that, of all the measures we 
adopted, the convoy system alone provided the means for waging unremitting and 
highly remunerative offensive action: that like any sound system of offence, the 
convoy system consistently provided the means for effectually countering all 
enemy counter-attacks: and, moreover, that of all the methods we adopted this 
advantage was a feature of the convoy system alone. 
In short, historical research refutes the contention that the convoy system is "the 
embodiment of the defensive" and confirms the opinion expressed by Admiral 
Simms, USN, in 1917, that "convoy is a purely offensive measures. " 
4. In the Second World War U-boats sank 69% of all Allied shipping destroyed by 
the enemy. They achieved 80% of these sinkings in the Atlantic - Home Waters 
theatre. In order to substantiate the contentions in paragraph 2 above will, 
therefore, suffice to confine the facts to the salient ones relating to the U-boat anti- 
shipping and the Allied anti-submarine operations in that theatre. 
5. In May 1943 the U-boats were decisively defeated at sea. They did not recover 
from that defeat. On no occasion after May 1943 did they inflict significant losses 
upon our shipping in convoy (Atlantic convoy losses amounted to twelve ships in 
the last two years of the war) although they continued to attack convoys and, as a 
consequence, suffered themselves very heavy losses. 
6. Up to May 1943 we had used five principal means of attacking U-boats. Four of 
these were invariably referred to as 'offensive". These four were intended to 
protect from attack primarily ships sailing independently. The protection was to be 
m'A uNew Look' at"Offence' and 'Defencew, 'NHB. (emphasis supplied] 
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afforded solely by the destruction of U-boats not directly threatening ships but 
which, if not destroyed, might at some future date encounter and sink defenceless 
ships. 
7. The four "offensive" means were as follows: 
(1) uOffensive" hunting patrols of surface and aircraft. 
(2) "Offensive" patrols of aircraft in U-boat transit areas north of Scotland and in 
the Bay of Biscay. 
(3) "Offensive" mining of U-boat bases and of U-boat training and trials areas, 
chiefly by aircraft. 
(4) "Offensive" bombing of U-boat bases, building yards and assembly plants. 
8. The object of these operations as typically defined as "the protection of our sea- 
lines of communication by offensive action". But, as stated above, it was in fact, to 
attempt to protect ships solely by attempting to destroy U-boats not directly 
threatening ships. These operations necessarily involved the dispersal of our AIS 
forces in attempts to seek out and attack U-boats in positions dictated by the 
enemy - the U-boat non-operational areas, and powerfully defended "sources". 
Furthermore these operations were necessarily unco-ordinated with the 
multitudinous movements of the defenceless independent ships at sea which they 
were intended to protect. As a consequence failure to destroy U-boats left the U- 
boats free to select where and when they would sink defenceless ships. In short, 
these inherently unsystematic and defensive operations endowed the U-boats with 
the initiative, rendering our ships vulnerable to attack and our A/S forces powerless 
to intervene when and where ships were attacked. 
9. The results of the four "offensive" operations up to the defeat of the U-boats in 
May 1943 are revealing. 
(1) U-boats destroyed by hunting patrols of surface and aircraft 
... ... ... ... 21 or 9.4% 
(2) U-boats destroyed by moffensive' patrols of aircraft in U-boat transit areas 
... ... ... ... 24 or 10.6% 
(3) U-boats destroyed by 'offensive' mining ... ... ... ... 6or3% 
(4) U-boats destroyed by moffensive" bombing of bases, etc. 
... ... ... ... Nil. 
Total of U-boats clestroved bv *offensive* methods of all U-boats 
destroyed in this period ... ... ... ... 51 or 23% 
The number of ships sunk by U-boats while clevending on these means 
for their protection: 
Sailing independently ... ... ... ... 1,363 
Stragglers from convoys ... ... ... ... 208 
Total ... ... ... ... 1,571 ships or 72% 
10. These lost shigs amounted to 72% of the 2.191 shiDS sunk by U-boats in the 
Atlantic - Home Waters theatre in this Deriod. Their loss rate, that is, the number of 
ships sunk our of the number sailed, ranged between 3% and 25% according to 
their speed category; loss rates far beyond our building replacement rate. 
11. The fifth means adopted of attacking U-boats - invariably referred to in Allied 
circles as "purely defensive" - was convoy. This system can be defined - but never 
is - as, the system of concentrating A/S forces into attack groups and sailing them 
with groups of merchant ships in accordance with pre-planned movements. Unlike 
the four "offensive' operation convoy operations are systematic. They are also 
aggressive. Unlike the forces employed for the "offensive" measures the convoy 
attack forces are concentrated at pre-selected times and at pre-selected positions 
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in accordance with the movements of our grouped ships, and are disposed so as to 
discharge concurrently two aggressive activities - to sink U-boats and to save 
ships under threat of attack. In fact the convoy attack forces dictate to the U-boats 
the time and place and tactical conditions of their attacks, for failure to attack 
convoys denies U-boats the opportunity of achieving their object to sink ships. 
Seen from this point of view, which is the enemy's, the convoy system endows our 
A/S forces with the initiative in defence and in attack. It is essentially a scientific 
system of aggressive A/S operations. 
12. This statement is substantiated by the results of convoy up to June 1943. 
These were: 
(1) U-boats destroyed by convoy escort and support forces 
... ... ... ... ... 150 or 65% of all destroyed 
(fn. 14 U-boats (6%) were also lost 'cause unknown" and 
14 more (6%) destroyed by various other means) 
(2) Number of ships sunk in convoy by U-boat while under escort of surface 
forces ... ... ... ... ... 604 
Number of ships sunk in convoy by U-boat while under combined surface 
and air escort ... ... ... 16 
Total convoy losses ... ... ... 620 or 28% 
13. These lost shigs amounted to 28% of all shigs sunk by U-boats in the theatre, 
the loss rage being under 1%. (0.9% of the 69,500 ships sailed in ocean convoy, 
discounting the 128,000 ships convoyed in U Coastal convoys without loss). A loss 
rate well within the UK building replacement capacity. 
14. Thus, moffensive" means cost us 72% of our shipping losses but inflicting only 
23% of the enemys losses. 
In contrast convoy, the so-called "purely defensive' system, while involving only 
28% of our shipping losses inflicted 65% of the enemy's losses. 
15. This seeming paradox, that udefence" is the best means of attack as well as of 
defence and that "offensive* is the worst means of both, arises from the dogma - 
which is not based upon ascertained facts - that convoy is *a purely defensive 
measure". It is, indeed, a matter of mistaken identities. The error has arisen from 
two mutually contributory causes; the late nineteenth and twentieth century habit of 
discussing warfare in abstract and circumlocutory terms and failure to define the 
object of maritime forces with precision. 
16. Thus the object of the enemy is currently defined as "to threaten our sea-lines 
of communications" or "our sea-communications", and the object of our maritime 
forces is defined as "to protect our sea lines of communication", or "sea- 
communications". This loose and abstract phraseology immediately conjectures up 
before the mind's eye vast stretches of sea in which an enemy may be lurking 
ready to strike at any time and in a diversity of places of his choosing. This is 
fantasy. The objects so defined are, in fact neither the enemy's nor our own; nor 
does the initiative lie with the enemy. Both objects can be stated quite simply and 
in concrete terms. The enemys object in war is to stop us using ships - to sink our 
ships. This was the U-boat's object - to sink ships. Our object in war is to ensure 
the sage regular and frequent passage of our ships across the seas - in a phrase, 
to use our ships as we wish despite enemy opposition. The object of our A/S forces 
was to prevent the U-boats from sinking our ships. 
17. These simply expressed and precisely defined objects deal with actualities, 
ships; the others, despite their high-sounding phraseology do not deal with 
realities. They deal with abstractions. Unlike them the simple and concrete 
definitions show clearly that it is we who hold the initiative for they reveal that the 
submarines could achieve their object in one way only, by sinking ships; that we, in 
contrast, could attain our object in three ways; by sinking submarines, by 
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frustrating submarines attacking ships, and by avoiding submarines. That, in fact it 
was we who could choose where and when and in what strength our forces should 
operate because we could and can control the movements of the ships the enemy 
is seeking to sink. In fact, so long as we co-operate the dispositions and operations 
of our anti-submarine forces with the movements of our ships we hold the initiative. 
18. Convoy enables us to do just this thing. It gives us the initiative in anti- 
submarine operations and it gives us the advantage of time and place. And this 
advantage, when related to the object, to prevent submarines from sinking ships, 
is, as Drake expressed it "half a victory, which being lost is irrecoverable". That 
aphorism in itself goes far toward explaining both the success of convoy as a 
means of saving ships and of sinking submarines and the failure of other 
0offensive' means to save ships and to inflict significant losses upon the 
submarines. The means called uoffensive" forfeited in attack the advantages of 
time and place. The forces used were neither able to save ships directly threatened 
by U-boats, nor to sink submarines preoccupied with attempting to sink ships, 
advantages inherent in the convoy system of warfare. 
19. But convoy has other inherent advantages. It is a fundamentally aggressive, 
scientific system. It is scientific because it deals with ascertained facts - ships, 
numbers of ships, and their intended movements. It is systematic because it 
embodies the planned movement of grouped merchant ships made in accordance 
with their numbers, steaming abilities and destinations, the availability of A/S craft 
and the anticipated numbers of enemy submarines. 
It is aggressive for it dictates the movements of the U-boats because, if they are 
not to remain ineffectual the U-boats must endeavour to find and attempt to attack 
convoys with A/S forces ready and seeking to destroy them. The convoy system 
thus enables us to plan, to execute and to sustain aggressive anti-submarine 
operations; for the A/S craft accompanying the ships in every convoy are task 
forces over udisposed to attack" the enemy bold enough to risk the inevitable 
attack. It is the embodiment of the offensive spirit, of the scientifically calculated 
risk, but leaves very little to chance. Had this been more widely known - and it 
began to be appreciated in 1943 - some tens of the hundreds of bombers thrown 
away in the abortive offensive operations designed to destroy U-boats at source 
would no doubt have been made available for the lucrative convoy operations from 
which they were withheld on the grounds that convoy was purely defensive. 
20. To conclude, on the enemys own admission and as demonstrated by 
scientifically collated facts the convoy system twice decisively defeated the enemy. 
To inculcate into Statesmen, the Nation and the Services that the one successful 
inherently offensive, scientific and systematic method of warfare is defensive is to 
invite defeat. Actions are prompted by beliefs and desires. If the belief is wrong the 
action taken to realise the desire will be wrong. On this, History of war is adamant 
F. Barley 




Submarine Location: Notes in Reply to First Sea Lord's Enquiry, October 1929 
The following are extracts from notes which were used to brief the First Sea Lord: 
Note by A. B. Woods, Admiralty Research Laboratory, 9 November 1929 659 
Introduction 
A very large number of methods gave been proposed from time to time to detect 




(3) Electromagnetic - Induction (AC etc. ) 
- Radiation - visible 
- infra-red 
-W/T 
(4) Mechanical (acoustic)- regarding the S/M as a source of sound 
- Echo methods - High frequency sound (Asdics) 
- Impulse 
All these methods make use of some physical characteristics of the submarine, 
regarding the latter as a hollow metal body immersed in an extended electrically 
conducing fluid medium. 
To deal with the above methods adequately would involve and extremely lengthy 
report. It may be stated, however, that in the light of our present knowledge 
methods (1), (2) and (3) can only be applied to submarine detection at relatively 
short ranges (of the order of a few hundred feet). This limitation of range is due to 
the fact that sea water is a conducting medium and all electrical and electro- 
magnetic effects (except of extremel low frequency, (1 or 2 pps. ) are rapidly 
absorbed, whilst direct magnetic effects involve the inverse cube law of distance. 
This leaves the mechanical (acoustic) method as the only long range method at 
our disposal. Here we may, under some circumstances, regard the submarine as a 
source of mechanical vibration (sound) which is transmitted through the sea. This 
vibration may be detected is transmitted through the sea. This vibration may be 
detected by means of numerous forms of hydrophone receivers. Apart from the 
"Asdie (used as a hydrophone)none of these receivers can be used for submarine 
detection when the hunting ship is in motion at moderate speeds (above 10 knots). 
Again the submarine may be cruising at its usilent speed" (4 or 5 knots or so) or 
may be at rest on the sea bed. In such cases it emits little or no sound and all 
forms of hydrophone are useless. 
Under such conditions the only method which has hitherto given reasonable 
promise of success is the Echo Method which makes use of the reflection of a high 
frequency sound beam from the submarine (whether at rest or in motion). We shall 
therefore now consider the limitations and prospects of improvement in this 
method. 
659 'Report on Methods of Submarine Location (Draft notes for reply to 10 Sea Lord enquiry 




The Echo or mAsdic" Method. Limitations. 
Details of this method are given in HMS Ospreys report A quartz oscillator (about 
15" diameter) emits a narrow primary beam surrounded by a succession of 
secondary beams of diminishing intensity. This complex beam is reflected from the 
surface and bottom of the sea, form waves, and form strata of different density, 
salinity and temperature containing varying quantities of air in suspension. A 
distant submarine contributes a small reflection which is superimposed on this 
multitude of undesirable reflections (viz. reverberations). It is the object of the Asdic 
operator to discriminate between the feeble submarine echo and these 
reverberations. A further confusion arises, when wrecks, rocks or isolated masses 
of air bubbles give echoes resembling that from a submarine. The distinction 
between the real and false echo is often very subtle and requires a skilled operator 
to detect. 
In addition to reverberation and false echoes, a further difficulty arises due to the 
motion of the Asdic transmitter (or rather the dome which encloses it) through the 
sea. At speeds above 12 knots the "speed noise" as it is called may become very 
serious and may limit considerably the range of echo detection. Again, masses of 
air bubbles, carried down beneath the ship from the bows often suppress the 
transmission and result in what is called Nquenching% no echo, or reverberation, 
can be expected under these conditions. 
With the existing Asdic system [in 1929], therefore, there are two serious factors 
tending to reduce the range and certainty of detection of the echo, viz.: - 
(1) Reverberation, and 
(2) Dome noise (or"speed" noise) and uquenching". 
The possibility of improvement of the echo method therefore lies primarily in the 
reduction of reverberation and speed noise relative to the echo. ... 
Note by B. S. Smith, HMS Osprey, 14 August 1929 660 
With reference to your Reference sheet of 8 July [1929] enclosing a not on "A 
Method for Obtaining a Rotatable Supersonic Beam from a Fixed Transmitter', I 
am fully in agreement with Dr. Drysdale that it is most desirable that new work in 
connection with Asdic transmitters should be concentrated on methods which give 
some promise of overcoming the limitations of the present oscillators rather than 
dealing with devices, which at their best, can only equal the performance of the 
existing gear. 
it may be helpful in getting a clear idea of the present position to review what I 
consider to be the real limitations in the performance of the existing apparatus - 
(a) Range of Detection of Lange Targets. The echoes from a "large target* e. g. a 
beam-on submarine are stronger than the reverberations at all ranges. The 
minimum receivable strength of echo is fixed by the disturbances that are 
present at the receiver. At slow speed the final limit is set by sea and ship's 
noises which vary from day to day, while at high speed a much greater 
limitation is imposed by 'speed noises", which are due to the disturbances at 
the dome and on the hull. 
The increase in range obtainable by increased power is fixed by the 
transmission factor of the water. At a frequency of 20,000 cycles/second under 
average conditions a four-fold increase in power gives an increase of between 
200 and 800 yards in the range, while at lower frequencies, e. g. 10,000 the 
transmission factors are more favourable. A 15" asdic oscillator at 20,000 
6w B. S. Smith, HMS Osprey, to Director, Scientific Research & Experimental Department 
Admiralty, 14 August 1929, ADM 218/273. 
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cycles with an output of 50 watts may be expected to give a range of the order 
of 6,000 yards on a beam-on submarine when the transmission factor is about 
500 yards. These ranges may be doubled if the transmission factor is specially 
favourable and the target is very large, e. g. Nab Tower. There is no reason to 
doubt that the average range on "large targets" can be increased very 
materially by increased power, but a very large increase in output is necessary 
to double the average range. For example, to increase the range on a beam-on 
submarine under the conditions quoted above, the poser of the oscillator would 
have to be increased (4 000)2 times! 
(b) Range on Small Targets. With an end-on submarine the echo strengths at 
moderate ranges are almost equal to the strength of the reverberations. 
With the submarine stopped the echo may be rendered inaudible by the nose 
produced by the reverberations, but when the submarine is moving, the slight 
difference in pitch between the echo and reverberation makes detection 
possible. Under these conditions increases in power do not improve the 
audibility if the echo as both the reverberation and the echo are increased in 
intensity. 
The ratio of echo to reverberation strength is the most important factor in the 
detection of a usmall target7, and measurements of the arc over which such 
echoes are detectable show that the ratio improves very slowly a the range is 
reduced. For example, if the maximum range at which reverberations are 
heard is, say, 4,000 yards, the echo may only be detected over a an arc of 111, 
while at 2,500 yards the arc may be increased to say 511. The effect of training 
the oscillator 2Y20 off the direction of the target is to reduce the echo strength 
6% while the strength of the reverberations is unchanged. This small reduction 
is enough to render the echo inaudible even at moderate ranges. 
In all existing oscillators the energy concentrated na cone of 2x2Y2* along the 
axis is only a very small fraction of the total energy. At moderate ranges only 
this small fraction assists in the detection of the small target while the bulk of 
the energy, emitted at greater angles increases the strength of the 
reverberations which tend to mask the echoes. 
If a greater proportion of the total energy could be concentrated in a small 
cone, it is reasonable to assume that the audibility of the echo would be 
improved. Such an improvement would undoubtedly add greatly to the 
certainty of detection of a small target by asdics. 
(c) Non-Submarine Echoes. Although the elimination of all types of non-submarine 
echoes cannot by regarded as possible, many of the false reports which are 
made during sweeping exercises are possible to eliminate with improved 
apparatus. For example, in deep water echoes from ranges approximating to 
the depth are frequently reported and there can be no doubt that they are 
caused by energy, outside the main beam of the oscillator, being reflected from 
the bottom. It is also a fact that echoes are obtained from secondary emission 
under certain conditions. Although a fairly simple procedure enables an 
operator to class such echoes as "non-submarine" valuable time is lost in 
carrying out the necessary tests, and it would be a great advantage in practice 
if these non-submarine echoes were eliminated by suppressing secondary 
emission. 
(d) Detection of Submarine by Sweeving. When searching for a submarine, it is 
necessary to "sweep" s wide a lane as possible at speeds up to 20 knots. 
At slow speeds the width of the lane swept by each ship is nearly twice the 
maximum range at which the submarine can be detected with certainty over an 
arc of 50 when approaching bows-on. This range (termed the working range) is 
very much less than the maximum range at which a similar target may be 
detected over an arc of I or 2 degrees. 
261 
Appendix 2 
At 20 knots the time taken to sweep in steps of 511 reduces the width of the lane 
that is effectively covered by the sweep, and in practice the width of the lane 
may be less than the working range. 
Another factor which reduces the width of the lane is the delays which are 
caused [by] substantiating echoes to test whether they are from a submarine or 
not. 
In all these cases the area swept would be materially increased if it were 
possible to increase the arc of detection at the maximum range. It is 
reasonable to assume that such an increase would be attained if a larger 
proportion of the output of the oscillator were concentrated in the main beam. 
To sum up these considerations: - 
(1) While increase in output of the transmitters are not to be despised there is 
little prospect of increasing range materially by this means. 
(2) When using asdics as a detector, the area that can be swept in a give time, 
rather than the maximum range of detection, is the true measure of its 
performance. 
(3) A material increase in the are swept may be expected if the arc of 
detection can be increased by improving the beam characteristics. 
(4) Improvements in the beam characteristics may be expected to render 
detection of the bows-on submarine more certain and also assist in the 
elimination of non-submarine echoes. 
As far as I can see at present the ideal beam for detection would be one having 
constant intensity over a small angle, say 1011, with the minimum energy over the 
remaining 350". 
1 have no data at present with regard to the ideal characteristics in the vertical 
plane, but experiments we are making with strip oscillators may throw some light 
on this 
For locating the submarine, it would be advantageous to be able to concentrate the 
beam over a smaller angle. 
I think it is generally agreed that the limitation of the diameter of the oscillator to 
15", or even 24', leaves little scope for making radical improvements in the 
characteristics and concentration of the beam and that oscillators of very large 
diameter are impracticable. ... 
Anti-Submarine Training, 1939 661 
The following note was provided by Admiralty D. Pound, First Sea Lord, to Admiral A. B. 
Cunningham, Comma nder-in-Chief, Mediterranean in June 1939: 
A/S is unlike any other form of attack. It is an attempt to sink an invisible enemy by 
a sense which is not in every day use. A/S efficiency depends on the appreciation 
of the quality of a sound. It is very much harder to distinguish between two notes of 
the same pitch played by different instruments, than to appreciate that a note is 
being struck. 
In the case of Gunnery of Torpedo it is a comparatively simple job to teach officers 
and men on watch to commence the attack, and the full ship's company can 
probably be closed up before the full attack develops even with air attacks, but with 
submarines the range at which information is obtained is so close and the 
differentiation between non-sub echoes and the real thing so near that time will not 
66' 'Anti-Submarine Training, 'ADM 205/3. 
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always permit for anyone but the Officer of the Watch and the operators on watch 
to take part in the attack. 
It is obvious that the Commanding Officer and AIS Control Officer cannot 
permanently be on the bridge throughout the 24 hours of a perhaps ten to fourteen 
days' patrol, and therefore all officers must be trained to control and complete 
confidence must be gained in the operators. For this reason all ratings who are 
qualified must be kept in constant training so that depth-charges are not wasted on 
non-sub echoes or in carrying out bad attacks. 
2. The Asdic operator has to keep in mind what a submarine echo may sound like 
under all conditions and so distinguish it from other almost exactly similar sounds. 
Once he can do this with certainty he has overcome ninety per cent of the difficult 
Once he has distinguished his target, strict attention to his procedure drill will 
enable him to keep in contact provided the ship is manoeuvred correctly. The 
efficiency of the ship depends therefore firstly on the training of the operator and 
secondly on the training of the officer conducting the attack. 
3. Four points require particular attention in the training of the operators and the 
officers. 
ELstly. The operators must have frequent practice at sea, once they have achieved 
the standard of being able to distinguish between echoes. Without this practice 
they very soon forget the sound of a submarine echo, as a sound is very much 
more difficult to memorise than something that can be seen or felt. It is emphasised 
that the operator must be able to distinguish echoes under ALL circumstances and 
so must operate in bad conditions as well as good. 
Secondl . As concentration is such a large factor in assisting the operator to distinguish the target, disturbing noises should be reduced to a minimum and 
attention paid to the operators comfort The control officer should reduce his 
remarks to a minimum and make every effort to get them heard first time. 
Thirdly. The state of efficiency of the material must be most strictly maintained. 
Minor interference due to low insulation or dirt in such placed as the connector, the 
S/R key or the control training unit causes extra noise and must be removed. 
Fourthl . Although with the recorder and the plot the officers require less practice in 
carrying out an attack, they should be practiced at the same time as the ratings. 
Training should not be confined only to AIS Control Officers, but all watchkeeping 
officers should be included. The new attack teacher in HMS Woolwich is of great 
value to officers, but owing to the unrealistic echo is not so useful to operators. 
4. Every moment of a practice should be utilised. If a tactical hunt has been 
decided on and conditions are bad, it should be turned into a training hunt People 
should not be intimidated into fear of not producing enough tactical hunts per 
quarter - efficiency of ratings is far more important than paper returns. 
S. Two nucleus crew destroyers at Home Ports and Bases abroad with attendant 
submarine, in which A/S personnel from ships refitting or otherwise engaged could 
be sent to sea for practice would be invaluable in helping to keep continuity of 
training. 
6. Attached to this paper is a proposed programme for carrying out training, The 
results of any technical practices should be analysed without delay and exhibited 
prominently. 
New Commanding Officers, new A/S Control Officers and new operators joining a 
ship should all be practiced in non tactical exercises until confidence has been 
established. These should also take place when a month or so had elapsed since 
the last practice. 
This programme should be used as a guide only. Hard and fast rules cannot be 
made as the only guide is the efficiency of the operator. The Flotilla A/S officers 
and instructors should go to sea in each ship of the flotilla to watch the progress of 
all operator and so judge the standard achieved. This is of the utmost importance 
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in deciding what exercises a ship requires to bring her up to standard. All 
operators, good or bad, should be given practice. If bad operators are concentrated 
on, the good ones will deteriorate. 
Where few opportunities for practice occur it is considered that greater value could 
be obtained by increasing the number of phones which can be connected to the 
amplifier, in order to give more ratings the opportunity of hearing the echo. 
7. The following remarks on Fleet Exercises are also forwarded: - 
Certain peace restrictions have to be observed which unless property considered 
are liable to give false conclusions to AIS vessels and submarines. In view of the 
necessity of exercising both arms, some exercises are produced which allow the 
submarine to be at periscope depth when attacking a screened fleet until they have 
fired a torpedo. This in effect gives the AIS personnel a wrong impression of how to 
counter-aftack as they are not allowed to go within 1,200 yards of a periscope, and 
also gives the submarine officers a wrong impression of the action of a screen on 
obtaining contact. 
Screens should be sufficiently far ahead to allow of investigation before the 
submarine is a menace (fn I do not consider that a submarine firing an outfit of six 
torpedoes at 8,000 yards is a menace. A destroyer flotilla with 72 torpedoes would 
endeavour to obtain closer range. ) to the fleet (about 4,000 yards). Be allowed to 
drop back and continue attacking until the fleet is no longer endangered and then 
rejoin at once, as one cannot afford to deplete the screen for longer than 
necessary. In this connection unless spare destroyers are available, after the first 
counter-attack one destroyer only should fall back as it is essential to keep the 
screen as complete as possible. The length of time to rejoin a high speed fleet is 
considerable especially in bad weather. 
If the number of screening vessels is insufficient, they should act as a close screen 
making as much use as possible of their A/S but not waiting to confirm. In this case 
a certain number of false reports must be expected and a full pattern not used 
unless periscope or other confirmation is obtained. 
8. If it is desired to exercise submarines using their periscope to fire torpedoes, 
screen should take no action except to note the time and position of first contact 
and holding contact. 
9. Unless an A/S officer is bome on the staff, the senior officer being screened 
should if possible consult the senior officer of screening force as the best screen to 
form with [the] forces available. 
10. Whilst healthy rivalry between submarines and anti-submarines is of good 
value, loyal co-operation between the two services is essential to obtain the best 
training for personnel of both branches. 
Anti-Submarine Traininq - Aivendix 
Instructional Programme for New Flotilla 
(ASP's are described in CB 4000. ) 
Dailv in Harbou 
Procedure Drill. Care and Maintenance. Records. 
This can be done in half-hour per day during clean guns. 
Workinq up at Sea 
First Week Second Week Third Week Fourth Week 
Lecture to explain 
procedure 
ASP6 ASP6 ASP6 ASP7 
Six hours per ship Four hours Four hours Two hours 
ASP7 ASP7 ASP9 
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ASP7 ASP16 or ASP17 and 
Two hours fleet screening with 
ASP9 counter-attacking if 






In many of these exercises additional practice can be obtained by carrying out 




Tactics in the Battle of the Atlantic, December 1943 and January 1945 
Hush Most Secret Cypher Message 662 
Battle of the Atlantic 
Recent Changes in Enemy Tactics 
[December 1943] 
... following review is promulgated for the guidance of Senior Officers of Escort Groups. 
2. Experience during the last few weeks has shown that U-boats are now rarely on 
the surface by day. This implies a very marked change of tactics which calls for a 
corresponding change in our counter-measures. 
3. By remaining submerged by day the enemy reduces the risk of detection and 
counter-attack but at the same time denies himself the following advantages of his 
previous policy. 
(a) Surface reconnaissance and immediate receipt of sighting reports by consorts. 
(b) Subsequent shadowing and homing of consorts. 
(c) The ability to trail a convoy and carry out a series of attacks extending over a 
number of days. 
(d) The mobility which enables the more distant U-boats to intercept a reported 
convoy. 
4. Such tactics have already greatly promoted the safe and timely anival of the 
convoys, but they must inevitably give us fewer opportunities to destroy the enemy. 
It is my intention now to take full advantage of the enemys weakened offensive by 
neglecting no opportunity to destroy him whenever contact is made. 
5. To this end orders may be expected under certain circumstances for Support 
Groups, and even a proportion of the Close Escort, in the aftermath of a batde to 
leave the convoy and return to the battle area for mopping up. 
6.1 desire that Commanding Officers should henceforward use more care and 
deliberation in the execution of their attacks on U-boats which are not an 
immediate threat to the convoy. It has become increasingly clear that the old 
methods of depth-charge attack which, provide such ample warning of their 
approach, are not effective against a deep and highly manoeuvrable U-boat 
7. In the Hedgehog and in the Squid are combined the two attributes of precision 
and surprise which ensure its effectiveness in a deliberate attack. For a U-boat 
which is too deep for the Hedgehog, the "Creeping Attack% which has the same 
attributes, has recently proved on three occasions its deadly day accuracy. 
8. It is my view that, when Escorts are hunting in pairs, the delivery of the standard 
depth-charge attacks on a deep submarine are no longer justified except for the 
purpose [of] driving it deeper for a "Creeping Attack". 
TOO 142141A December 1943, CSO(M), C-in-C, WA 
662 This extract was provided by Norman Goodwin, Archivist of the Castle Class Corvette 
Association, 8 August 2003, and is taken from the draft extract of F. N. Goodwin, Castle class 
Corvettes (Frigates): An Account of the Service of the Ships and their Ships' Companies (Castle 
Class Corvette (Frigate) Association (forthcoming)), which drew on 'HMS Helmsdale: Report of 




Enemy Anti-Asdic Tactics [January 1945] 663 
(It is emphasised that the following information is the result of questioning of one 
officer only. It refers, of course, to existing U-boats, * the Type XXI and Type XXIII 
would presumably rely for evasion on their high underwater speed and endurance. 
The tactics described here are sound and confirm generally our own views. ) 
Deep water 
Standard recommended practice is to dive at once to about 650 ft (previous reports 
gave 560 ft). This operation takes about four minutes and, at least in the early 
stages, half-speed is used. A line of SBT targets should then be laid as nearly as 
possible at right angles to the approach course of the attacking vessel. SBT laying 
is normally commenced at about 525 ft and either three or four are ejected. Time 
required for re-loading is 20 to 30 seconds, but up to three pills can be fired at once 
if required. Normally, this Prisoner of War would reckon on laying either three or 
four SBTs in 100 seconds at a depth about 80 ft shallower than that in which he 
subsequently intended to operate. 
At about 590 ft the motors are reduced to silent speed and the U-boat attempts to 
shelter behind the SBTs just laid. ("Silent" speed for a particular boat is ascertained 
during trials; it is usually about 90 revs., something under three knots. ) As soon as 
the attacking vessel is heard to increase speed on the run in, it is usual to put the 
wheel hard over one way or the other, but not to increase to more than half-speed. 
Working the motors to increase rate of turn is not recommended on account of 
extra noise. 
The Prisoner of War considers it preferable, at night or in low visibility, to remain on 
the surface or at periscope depth and fire a "Gnat' at any vessel which looks like 
coming in to attack. He suggested that the majority of seasoned U-boat captains 
would now adopt these tactics rather than dive deep. In good visibility, resulting in 
a greater range of sighting, he would probably dive. 
Shallow Water 
The general opinion is that SBT is comparatively useless in shallow water and may 
even lead to betrayal of the U-boat's whereabouts. In areas such as the Channel 
the standard practice is to seek the shallowest possible (sic) water and there to lie 
on the bottom. If possible the U-boat selects a depression in the sea-bed in 
otherwise shallow water. The experiences of Commanding Officers in shallow 
water are being collated by the enemy and though, as yet no instructions or 
special charts have been produced, boats sailing for the Channel have, amongst 
their sailing orders, all possible information as to the exact positions where 
previous U-boats have laid undetected when hunted. 
To bottom in, say, 160 ft of water takes about 4 minutes, on the average, to 
accomplish. The echo-sounder must be used repeatedly when bottoming. The 
Prisoner of War did not know the frequency of the echo-sounder used, but 
described it as the "Atlas Echolot" (sonic; 1% or 3 Kc/s). 
Great use is made of water-layering whenever possible; this is almost invariably 
detected by the depth-keeping behaviour of the boat. If sudden falls or rises occur, 
the Commanding Officer at once attempts to go a little deeper in the same area 
and to remain under the point where the layering has been observed. 
663 'Enemy Anti-Asdic Tactics, ' Section 5, 'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report January 1945, ' AnU- 




Some Statistics of Ant! -U-Boat Operations, 1943 and 1945 
Aircraft Depth-charge Attacks in 1943 
Number of DC attacks in 1943 Proportion of Proportion of 
lethal attacks damaging attacks 
January-March 143 8% 16% 
April-June 237 10% 10% 
July-September 80 27% 15% 
October-November 40 28% 10% 
Weapons used in Attacks on U-boat during Last Half of 1943 "5 
Weapon Last half of 1943 
DC (Ship) 11 21% 
Hedgehog 4 7Y2% 
Ram 1 2% 
RP 3 5Y2% 
DC (Aircraft) 32 60% 
A/S Bomb 2 4% 
Total 53 100% 
Inshore Campaign against U-Boat Operations, 1945 1566 
This analysis contains the following data on the inshore U-boat campaign from 
July 1944 to May 1945: 
The phases were divided as follows: 
Phase I July to mid September 1944 
Phase 2 mid September to mid December 1944 
Phase 3 mid December 1944 to mid February 1945 
Phase 4 mid February to May 1945 
I 'Note on Depth Charge Attacks by Aircraft, ' [L. Solomon], CAOR, 17 February 1944, CCAC, 
FWCT 2/4/5. 
665'Monthly Anti-Submarine Report, September 1944, 'ADM 199/2061. 
666 'Survey of AM Operations..., 'ADM 1/17653. 
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T d d 
By Ships By 
ft 
Total torp. Per U- ( avenge ) orpe oe After Others aircra boat 
torpedoing sunk 
1.80 days 23 (13%) 26 3 8 1 12 2.2 
11.90 days 3 (0%) 3 0 2 1 3 1.0 
Ill. 60 days 18 (17%) 23 3 1 1 5 4.6 
IV. 80 days 31 (26%) 35 8 12 6 26 1.3 
Total 75 (19%) 87 14 23 9 46 1.9 
The duty of the escorts at the time of U-boat sinkings were: 
Duty Escorting or 
Supporting Convoy 
Patrolling Total 
U-boats sunk after 6 8 14 
torpedoing ship 
No ship torpedoed 5 18 23 




Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Division, 1945 
Office Memorandum No. 394 is reproduced below: 
On 10 September 1945, a new Division of the Naval Staff was set up to deal with 
Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare. It was formed by the amalgamation of 
DASW, the Torpedo Section of DTSD, and DDOD(M), and is to be known as the 
Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Division (short title TASW). 
2. The following appointments have been made to the TASW Division: - 
DTASW Captain Lord Ashbourne, DSO, RN 
Assistant Director Captain J. Hext Lewes, OBE, RN 
(Torpedo) 
Assistant Director Captain P. W. Burnett, DSO, DSC, RN 
(Anti-Submarine) 
Assistant Director Captain V. DA. Donaldson, RN 
(Mine Warfare) 
Assistant Director Captain F. M. Mason, RN 
3.... 
4. A new series of registered papers will be instituted, which will be numbered in 
the TASW series. 
5. Instructions will be promulgated in due course. 
6. In consequence of the formation of the new Division, the Director of Tactical, 
Torpedo and Staff Duties Division will in future be known as the Director of Tactical 
and Staff Duties Division (his short title, DTSD, will remain unchanged). 
7. DASW ceases to exist as a separate Staff Division. 
Office Memorandum No. 147 is reproduced below: 
Instructions for the Director of Torpedo. Anti-Submarine 
and Mine Warfare Division 
The Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Division is responsible 
to the Board for the efficient performance of the duties of his Division. He works 
under the superintendence of the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Weapons). 
Torpedo 
2. He is responsible for advising on: - 
(a) the influence of torpedo development on strategy and tactics; 
(b) torpedo aspects of planning an operations; 
(c) tactical countermeasures against all forms of torpedo attack. 
3. He is responsible for Staff Requirements for the following items: - 
(a) torpedo armament of HM Ships generally; 
66" 'Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Division - Institution, ' H. V. Markham, office 
Memorandum No. 394, CE. 58514/45,24 September 1945, ADM 1/17743. 
6" 'Instructions for the Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Division, ' Office 
Memorandum No. 147, CE. 58776/45,29 March 1946, ADM 1/17743. 
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(b) new torpedoes and their components (e. g. pistol, homing devices, etc. ); 
(C) torpedo discharge gear in ships, MTB's and S/M's; 
(d) torpedo control gear in ships MTB's and SIM's; 
(e) allocation of torpedo reserves, including the staff aspect of the periodical 
review of quantitative requirements of torpedoes; 
(f) material countermeasures against all forms of torpedo attack, excluding AIT 
nets. 
4. He is responsible for torpedo analysis of actions and practices, and 
promulgation of lessons learnt, and for the preparation of an annual summary of 
torpedoes fired in action and practice. 
5. He is responsible for the staff aspect of diving. 
6. He is responsible for Admiralty publications dealing with torpedo control policy, 
tactics, practices and exercises. 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
7. He is responsible for advising on all matters affecting the conduct of anti- 
submarine operations, and in particular on: - 
(a) policy for conduct of A/S operations; 
(b) planning of AIS operations; 
(c) AIS tactics in so far as they affect convoys, fleet protection, offensive 
operations, A/S weapons, underwater detecting devices and harbour defence; 
(d) disposition of A/S vessels and aircraft; 
(e) the application of A/S requirements to the development of air policy and tactics. 
(Q air/sea co-operation in relation to A/S Warfare. 
B. He is responsible for Staff Requirements of A/S vessels and A/S Staff 
Requirements HM Ships and (in consultation with D of LD) defended harbours 
generally and in particular for the Staff Requirements for- 
(a) AIS weapons and equipment of all descriptions; 
(b) A/S control and detection gear including hydrophones and other underwater 
listening devices; 
(c) A/S application of echo-sounding hear, 
(d) subsidiary acoustic devices (e. g. SBT, sonobuoys, etc. ); 
(e) anti-asdic and anti-hydrophone equipment and devices; 
allocation of reserves of AIS weapons, including the Staff aspect of the 
periodical review of quantitative requirements for the production of ammunition 
for A/S weapons; 
(g) underwater detecting systems used in Harbour Defence; 
(h) equipment of Admiralty Cable Ships and boats designed for laying loops; 
(i) equipment of shore and ship bome control stations for indicator loops and 
miniature loops. 
9. He is responsible for analysis of AIS actions and practices and promulgation of 
lessons leamt, for instruction and training in A/S subjects, and for the co-ordination 
of sea-going A/S training of A/S vessels and aircraft. 
10. He is responsible for Admiralty publications dealing with AIS warfare, history, 
policy and tactics. 
11. He is responsible for framing policy in regard to Admiralty Cable Ships, their 





12. He is responsible for Staff Requirements for: - 
(a) mines of all descriptions and their components; 
(b) minelayers and minelaying equipment; 
(c) demolition explosives and gear; 
(d) reserves of mines, minelaying equipment and demolition stores, including the 
staff aspect of the periodical review of quantitative requirements for the 
production of mines and demolition stores; 
(e) mine dep6ts and bases and mine issuing ships; 
(f) controlled minefields (L), (0) and (A), (in consultation with D of LD); 
(g) equipment of control stations and observation minefields. 
13. He is responsible for minelaying policy, for the planning of minelaying 
operations, for the allocation of mines, and for records and analyses of all 
minelaying operations, and promulgating lessons leamt. 
14. He is responsible for mining charts of British and Allied mines and for providing 
the Hydrographer with the relevant information for promulgation. 
15. He is responsible for the preparation pf statistics and for Admiralty publications 
dealing with minelaying policy, tactics and history. 
(B) Minesweeping 
16. He is responsible for Staff Requirements for: - 
(a) minesweepers and minesweeping gear of all descriptions, including mine 
location, paravanes and TSDS; 
(b) anti-mining gear other than sweeps, e. g. DG gear; 
(c) scale of production, reserves, and distribution of minesweeping gear of all 
descriptions, and also GD gear. 
17. He is responsible for. - 
(a) minesweeping, minewatching and aerial spotting policy; 
(b) the analysis of operations and exercises; 
(c) records and statistics of minesweeping; 
(d) advice on minesweeping training at sea; 
(e) advice on the disposition of M/S Vessels. 
18. He is responsible for supplying information concerning details of searched 
channels and the positions of enemy minefields to the Hydrographer for 
promulgation. 
19. He is responsible for the preparation of manuals on minesweeping, except for 
those already the responsibility of technical departments. 
Personnel 
20. He is required to advise on: - 
(a) the policy in regard to the technical training and practical use of all weapons, 
devices and equipment connected with Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine 
Warfare; 
(b) questions concerning the application of approved principles of TAS training; 
(c) syllabuses for all TAS courses. 
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21. He is responsible for: - 
(a) framing the policy in regard to TAS and M/S training schools in the UK and 
overseas, wherever they are an RN commitment. He is responsible for 
maintaining a close liaison with these schools, and also with those in the 
Dominions and India, on all matters concerning instruction, instructional 
appliances, synthetic training devices, films, etc. - DUW, however, is 
responsible for instruction being sufficient to cover the correct preparation and 
maintenance of the weapons employed. 
(b) Arranging TAS courses for foreign officers and ratings; 
(c) The preparation and revision of the TAS Training Manual. 
22. He is to maintain close touch with: - 
(a) DUW on matters of training in so far as it affects the functioning of material. 
(b) DUW on matters of complement and Quarter Bills for which DUW is 
responsible. 
(c) DTSD on matters concerning the entry and technical training of officers and 
men to meet projected new requirements. 
(d) HMS Vemon. HMS Osprey and HMS Lochinvar in the preparation of all 
syl1abuses for courses. 
23. In these duties, and all other matters affecting officers and ratings of the TAS 
Branch, he is to maintain a close liaison with Second Sea Lord's departments. 
24. He is responsible for maintaining liaison with the Air Ministry, through the 
appropriate Air Divisions of the Naval Staff, on matters concerning the training of 
RAF personnel in TAS subjects. 
Bases 
25. He is responsible for advising the Divisions and Departments concerned on the 
broad requirements of bases intended for use of Minesweeping, Minelaying and 
Anti-Submarine forces. 
Committees 
26. He is a member of the following Committees: - 
(1) Torpedo 
(a) Torpedo control Committee. 
(b) Aircraft Torpedo Requirements Committee. 
(c) Aircraft Torpedo Allocation Committee. 
(d) Gnat Panel (Counter-measures to Homing Torpedo). 
(e) Torpedo Design Committee. 
(0 Torpedo Tube Design Committee. 
(g) Aircraft Torpedo Control Committee. 
(2) Anti-Submarine 
(a) A/S Warfare Committee (Secretary) 
(b) Anti-U-Boat Warfare Committee. 
(c) Training Devices Committee. 
(d) Gnat Panel. 
(3) Personnel 
(a) DNT's Training Committee. 




27. He may sign correspondence with Dockyard and other Admiralty 
establishments at home and abroad, with individual officers of HM Navy or Civil 
Service on matters dealing exclusively with the duties of his Division, but all 
correspondence communication Board decisions, or concerning important 
questions of principle, or affecting other Departments, is to be in the name of the 




Assumed Performance of U-boats, 1946 669 
In 1946 the assumed performance of U-boats was-. 
Submarine Type VIIC Type IXC Type XXI Type XXIII 
Tonnage 500 tons 740 tons 1600 tons 230 tons 
(standard) 
Length 218 feet 252 feet 251% feet 113% feet 
Beam 20 feet 22 feet 21% feet 10 feet 
Draught 15 feet 14% feet 201/2 feet 12 feet 
Test Diving - -ý-30-fee`t-' 330 feet' 393 feet" 330 feet 
Depth 
Diesels 2310 hp 4400 hp 4000 hp 575 hp 
Motors 750 hp 1000 hp 5000 hp 580 hp 
Speed: 
Surface 17.9 knots 18.3 knots 15.6 knots 9.75 knots 
Submerged 8 knots 7.3 knots 16 knots 12.5 
knotS3 
Oil Fuel 113 tons 208 tons 250 tons 18 tons 
Battery Capacity 9160 amp hrs 1130 amp hrs 30000 amp hrs 5400 amp hrs 
Torpedoes 14 (4 bow and 1 22 (4 bow, 2 20 (6 bow) 2 (2 bow) 
(tubes) stern) stern) 
Max Endurance: 
Surfaced 9700 miles 16300 miles 15500 miles 4300 miles 
Submerged 130 128 365 at 5 knots 175 at 4 knots 
110at 10 knots 43 at 10 knots 
Complement 44 48 57 14 
Guns 1-37 mm 1-37 mm 2-twin 30 mm none 
2-twin 20 mm 2-twin 20 mm 
' The maximum diving depth was up to 21/2 times deeper. 
2 British trials indicated that the hull would fail at about 800 feet. 
3 British trials achieved only 9.5 knots. 
Submarine Type XXI Type XXVI IN Type XVII B 
Tonnage 
(standard) 
1600 tons 730 tons 313 tons 
Length 251% feet 184% feet 136 feet 
Beam 21% feet 18 feet 11 feet 
Draught 20'/2 feet 19% feet 14 feet 
Test Diving 
Depth 






















Oil Fuel 250 tons 65 tons 20 tons 




20 (6 bow) 10 (4 bow, 6 
lateral stern) 












10 (4 bow, 6 
lateral stern) 
66' 'Performance of U-boats, ' Appendix I and Appendix 11 to TASW. 021/46, Revised, 4 May 
1946, ADM 1/20960. 
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Max Endurance: 
Surfaced 15500 miles 7300 miles 3000 miles 
Submerged 365 at 5 knots 158 at 24 knots' 123 at 20 knots' 300 at 24 knots 
110 at 10 knots 224 at 15 knots' 150 at 15 knots' 500 at 15 knots 
100 at 5 knots 76 at 2 knots on 4000 at 5 knots 
)n battery battery I 
Complement 57 27 19 127 
'These endurance figures will be significantly lower for deep submarines. 
Notes on Walter Turbine or Closed Cycle Engines for Submerged Propulsion 670 
For submerged propulsion oxygen had to be carried in the U-boat, either in the form of 
compressed, liquid oxygen or as Ingolin (HTP or hydrogen-peroxide, i. e. H202). 'Of 
these Ingolin is more economical, and convenient. ' Liquid oxygen is very bulky and the 
bottles are very heavy. Ingolin is better in this respect, for it can be stowed in plastic 
tanks on the outside of the pressure hull. Ingolin is about 80% H202 and is stable at 
normal temperatures, provided it does not come into contact with a catalyst. It was very 
expensive, about E170 per ton. A Type XXVI would use about 16 tons per hour at high 
speed. 
Walter Turbine. The Walter turbine at present is a geared gas and steam turbine 
driven by the combustion products of fuel (sulphur free) and oxygen obtained from 
Ingolin. The Ingolin is decomposed into steam and oxygen by passing over a 
catalyst, sufficient heat being evolved to heat the mixture to 450 degrees C. The 
steam and oxygen are led to a combustion chamber where fuel is injected and 
combined with the oxygen, more water is added to keep the temperature down and 
the resulting products of combustion and steam drive the turbine. The exhaust is 
steam and carbon dioxide. The steam is condensed and the C02 is dissolved in the 
sea, being trackless when the submarine is below 60 feet. Arrangements have to 
be made to prevent leaks of carbon dioxide into the submarine. The turbine room 
is, therefore, isolated by a bulkhead from the rest of the submarine and the 
pressure is kept lower. The overall efficiency is, in any case, low (17 per cent) and 
falls off with depth. At present the turbine is not worth using below 300 feet and 
cannot be used at all below 500 feet. (In the Type XXVI the turbine is only 12% 
efficient at 300 feet. ) 
Closed Cycle Engines. In the closed cycle engine, generally of diesel type, the 
exhaust is cooled, mixed with a proportion of oxygen and introduced into the 
engine again. The excess gasses are pumped overboard; being mostly carbon 
dioxide the exhaust is soluble in water. It is difficult to prevent an oil track with a 
reciprocating type engine, but the efficiency should be higher than the Walter 
turbine (30 per cent). At the end of the war, the Germans had made considerable 
progress in experiments with recycled engines. No U-boats were fifted with these 
engines, but the designs for alternative propulsion for the Type XVII had been 
produced. 
670 'Notes on Walter Turbine or Closed Cycle Engines for Submerged Propulsion, ' Appendix III 




The German View of the Employment of the Type XXI U-Boat, 1944 671 
In December 1945 the Director of the Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine 
Warfare Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty issued a precis of an article by D6nitz on the 
planned employment of the Type XXI U-boats. The pr6cis is reproduced verbatim here, 
along with the introductory comments by DTASW. 
Editorial Introduction [by DTASWJ 
A document was issued to all Senior Officers in the U-boat Command on 10 July 
1944, when the building programme of the Type XXI had reached a sufficiently 
advanced stage for the German Naval Staff to take stock of the methods to be 
used by these U-boats for their attacks on trade. Consisting of some 40 pages, it 
set out the broad principles on which it was proposed these boats should operate. 
This book is of great interest, written as it is by the leader of the biggest U-boat 
fleet in the world, and a digest of it is included in the pages that follow. The balance 
of the book is somewhat upset by this compression. But the main impression given 
is that the German methods proposed are sound, though they do not take sufficient 
account of the density of our air patrols, and the consequent difficulty for these 
boats to operate for any length of time on the surface. 
The trend towards underwater warfare in which submarines operate wholly 
submerged can be clearly seen. Events would have proved to the Germans that 
the change to mass production of the Type XXVI must be made as soon as 
possible. Nevertheless, the permanent submersion of the enemy U-boats would 
have rendered most difficult their main task of finding the convoys, on which Donitz 
lays so much stress, and it is interesting to speculate how this difficulty could have 
been overcome, without aid from a large number of reconnaissance aircraft. 
The defensive tactics show the comparative ignorance of the German U-boat 
Command of the efficiency of our anti-submarine weapons and asdic sets. A U- 
boat 'crawling" at 5 knots under attack would provide a fairly simple target 
The book does not pretend to include exact orders of the operation of the type XXI 
U-boats. Precise details would have followed later when operational experience 
had been gained by the first boats to go to sea. 
671 'Considerations Regarding the Operation of Type XXI, Pr6cis of Text' Grand Admiral Danitz, 
[10 July 1944], Section 111, 'The Anti-Submarine Report, September, October, November and 
December 1945, ' DTASW, CB04050145(7), 19 December 1945, NHB, pp. 13-19. The full text 
can be found in: 'Operation of U-boat Type XXI (Document issued by Admiral Donitz from Naval 
Staff Headquarters on 10 July 1944), ' Department of Research Programmes and Planning, 
Admiralty, ACSIL Translation No. 542 (PGA 8487), March 1952, FDS, Box 269, NHB. 
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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE OPERATION OF TYPE XXI 
Pr6cis of Text 
PREFACE 
With this boat and other types, it will be possible to begin a new and successful U- 
boat war. This publication deals with the theoretical considerations regarding the 
operation of the type XXI boat in convoy attacks in the North Atlantic, and as a long 
range fighting boat in the Southern operational areas, 
SECTION I- TYPE XXI ON PASSAGE 
Strongly Air Patrolled Areas 
Proceed submerged as a basic principle. Only surface to charge if it is impossible 
to Schnorkel. 
(Here follows calculations of day's run at various states of charging of battery, and 
at various hours run on the surface. ) 
Average day's run (5 hours on surface) - about 150 miles. 
Average day's run 21 hours Schnorkelling and crawling, 3 hours on surface - 114 
miles. 
Weakly Air Patrolled Areas 
Average day's run (surfaced 11 hours) about 180 miles. 
When to Schnorkel 
(a) When no anti-submarine surface patrol is expected, Schnorkel at night All 
round listening with hydrophones every 20 minutes. Use periscope by night to 
detect aircraft searchlights. 
(b) Where surface anti-submarine patrol is expected, Schnorkel by day in good 
weather with periscope up. All round listening with hydrophones every 20 
minutes. When periscope does not give sufficient safety, Schnorkel at night. 
When Discovered by Aircraft 
Radical alteration of course (at least 600) from course last seen by enemy aircraft 
or from course assumed by enemy. 
If arrival of anti-submarine groups is expected, make off at high underwater speed 
according to state of batteries. 
Basic principle: Gain as large a distance as possible from last known position 
marked by the enemy. Remain submerged for a long time. 
SECTION 11 - TYPE XXI AS A FIGHTING BOAT IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
Preface 
The type XXI has six torpedo tubes, which can be re-loaded in a short time. (The 
second salvo can be fired after five minutes, the third after 20 minutes. ) Its fighting 
power is adequate to destroy powerful surface forces, but it has not sufficient 
strength to fight its way on the surface, and it must, therefore, sneak up to its target 
unobserved. 
In the heyday of U-boat warfare, only a small number of sinkings was achieved 
despite many U-boats at sea, because the enemy located them and avoided our 
dispositions with his convoys. 
The basic principle is, therefore: Remain unobserved at all costs In your 
operational area prior to attack. This you can do with the Type XXI. 
Situation 
U-boats must operate in the open sea, as it is impossible for a number of boats to 
wait at the starting point of the convoy routes owing to the good opportunities for 
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countermeasures. When convoys are scattered in this way, the lack of aerial 
reconnaissance and the small visual range of the U-boat makes the finding of the 
enemy the most difficult problem. It is, therefore, correct to speak of our problems 
as being the expanse of the Atlantic. 
The countermeasures, the quickness of their appearance, the number and 
excellence of available aircraft and ships and of their equipment mean that for the 
enemy there is no such thing as the expanse of the Ocean. For him it is merely a 
pond. 
(a) TYPE XXI AS A SINGLE FIGHTING BOAT IN THE ATLANTIC 
Each Type XXI represents a more serious threat to the enemy than any earlier U- 
boat. Each boat has to be intensively attacked and, therefore, causes a much 
greater splitting up of enemy defence forces. The struggle for mere existence is the 
operational area will be much easier than in comparison with present affairs. 
Disposition 
Attacking area will be ordered by operational control. It will be a large patrol area in 
which the boat is to proceed to and fro. 
General Conduct 
For maintaining the requirement for remaining unobserved, the boat is to surface or 
submerge by day or night, as required. 
In general, in winter or in bad flying weather, surfacing may be allowed if FuMB 
(GSR) is available to five sufficient warning by day or night. FuMO ([Hohentwiel] 
radar) may only be used when the boat is detected and forced to remain on the 
surface owing to the state of the batteries and breakdown of the Schnorkel. 
Conduct on Locating Enemy Aircraft 
Increased air activity means the approach of a convoy. By day, therefore, dive and 
start Schnorkelling in anticipation of the chance of an attack. 
By night, remain on the surface to charge, for on the surface the presence of the 
enemy may be more easily detected. 
Conduct on Coming into Contact with the Enemy 
(a) By day, submerged, on obtaining a hydrophone contact. Surface, if nothing 
sighted, and proceed along the last bearing, to conserve battery power. 
Dive if aircraft approach, but otherwise continue on surface. When enemy R/T 
is heard, determine roughly course of the convoy and fetch a course to bring 
boat ahead of the convoy, at top speed. If necessary, submerge and proceed 
at top speed to gain bearing. If enemy aircraft are sighted, remain submerged 
and operate along presumed mean course of enemy. As soon as you are 
within visibility range, come to periscope depth. 
(b) By day, surfaced - (Exceptional case). Dive at once and on obtaining 
hydrophone contact proceed submerged, to the attack. 
(c) By night, when surfaced - (GSR warning). If it is aircraft, dive for a short while, 
otherwise remain on surface. Switch on own radar. Carry out all round HE 
sweep. Obtain picture by HE indications. Approach on the surface until the 
enemy is sighted. By night, as a basic principle, remain on the surface as long 
as possible. By skilful use of GSR, Balkon, hydrophones and MF/DF, surface 
attacks will frequently be possible. 
(d) By night when boat is submerged - Indication by HE. Surface as necessary or 
remain submerged and carry out blind approach by HE and Nibelung gear. In 
general, after judging the weather and hydrophone listening conditions, CO 




(b) TYPE XXI AS SINGLE FIGHTING BOAT UNDER THE COAST 
In these areas, a constant and effective anti-submarine hunt can be easily 
arranged by the enemy at small expenditure of sea and air forces. Even more 
applicable is the basic principle. 
Be sure to remain unobserved until you carry out your first attack. Targets are 
frequent in a traffic bottleneck, and, therefore, a good target can be selected. 
Long endurance underwater and robust construction to withstand depth charging is 
necessary near the coast. Type XXI outstandingly fulfils these requirements. 
Approach 
Unobserved submerged as a basic principle, charging only with Schnorkel except 
in rough weather unsuitable for flying. 
Conduct in Operational Areas 
Only attack which chanced of firing are certain. If possible, charge through the 
Schnorkel under the protection of cliffs. 
Continuous passage underwater brings in its train navigational difficulties, so seize 
every chance of fixing your position by periscope observation. Do not rely on being 
allowed to surface, for shore radar sets will be certain to pick you up. 
SECTION III - TYPE XXI AS FIGHTING BOATS IN CONVOY ATTACKS 
Basic Principles 
The massing of the defences (escort of convoys) must be countered by a massing 
of the attackers. As long as the U-boats have to find the convoys themselves and 
thus solve the "problem of finding* themselves, a massing of the attackers is hardly 
possible. With Type XXI boats it will be possible to take up new dispositions, 
especially near the convoy departure points, unobserved and at a fair speed by 
Schnorkelling. By these means a certain depth of disposition will be possible, for 
avoiding tactics in there areas are scarcely possible. U-boats in these areas must 
remain unobserved. 
(A) DISPOSITION IN GROUPS TO DISCOVER THE CONVOYS 
Disposition at Points were the Traffic Converges 
Scheme (a) -A disposition of many boats drawn up in a chess board pattern in the 
traffic bottleneck. Convoy sightings may not be passed on - use Kurier procedure. 
Only those boats directly approached by the convoys will be able to attack. 
Scheme (b) -A disposition of several boats in the bottleneck as spies, with one or 
more groups just off the bottleneck, submerged. The spies are to report the 
convoys by W/T or Kurier to Operational Control. On receipt of the report from 
Control the groups shift to a position off the mouth of the bottleneck. 
Disposition in Groups (Patrol Lines) In the Open Sea Area 
(a) Finding without being led on to the target by aircraft beacons. It is assumed 
that we shall have air reconnaissance available. But though convoys can be 
discovered, they cannot be re-discovered, and beacon signals cannot be sent 
owing to strong fighter countermeasures. Procedure in 1942-43. Patrol lines 
across likely course of convoys. This was thwarted in 1943 by the enemy's 
location of our surfaced submarines and his avoidance of the patrol lines. The 
Type XXI has the advantage of the unobserved approach to the patrol line, so 
avoiding measures will be less effective. 
Disadvantage - Information of convoys is unreliable, and our dispositions have 
to be correspondingly broad. Only a few boats can get in contact with a 
convoy, and the remainder will not be able, as in 1943, to proceed ahead of the 
convoy on the surface. 
280 
Appendix 7 
(b) Being led on to the target by beacon signals from aircraft. Constant aircraft 
reconnaissance, as carried out in 1943, may not be possible, but if it is, the 
speedy and unobserved disposition of the patrol line by Type XXI and a 
reconnaissance over several days by aircraft will enable the patrol line to be 
shortened quickly and the distances between boats speedily reduced. 
Carpet Disposition 
Scheme - Disposition of the boats in carpets in a certain depth and breadth along 
the convoys route. On receipt of an aircraft report, boats move off singly ahead of 
the convoy or form separate small patrol lines of 2-5 boats in order to increase the 
chance of finding the convoy abreast of the previous U-boat disposition ahead of 
the enemys course. All this is done submerged, contact with convoy being 
obtained by hydrophone bearings only. 
(B) CONDUCT FO THE BOAT IN THE DISPOSITION 
Approach and Waiting in the Patrol Lines 
Approach passage is to be carried out submerged as a basic principle, charging 
being done when Schnorkelling. 
Waiting time is to be spent submerged, surfacing only when ordered, or when 
enemy is reported (as far as this is necessary). 
Strict W/T discipline on the very long wave will be necessary. 
Conduct on coming into Contact with the Enemy 
(a) By day, when submerged - Report by Kurier, if possible, before attacking. If an 
attack is not possible, the boat's most important task is sending the report. If 
necessary, the boat must surface to do this. In the bottleneck disposition, 
attack first, then try to report. 
(b) By night, when submerged - Except in the bottleneck, surface after 
observation, and report by Kurier. 
Conduct of Remaining Boats on Receiving Enemy Report on Very Long Wave 
(a) By day - If enemy can thus be reached, remain submerged using batteries 
economically, so as to sufficient capacity for the attack. Maintain contact by 
hydrophone gear. 
If enemy cannot be reached submerged, surface and try to get ahead until 
enemy aircraft become too dangerous. In the bottleneck, do not surface, and if 
necessary let the enemy go. 
(b) By night - Do not surface in the bottleneck, and let the enemy go if necessary. 
In all other dispositions, surface and operate on the surface as long as 
possible. 
SECTION IV - TYPE XXI AS A LONG RANGE FIGHTING BOAT 
(Southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean) 
Situation 
The enemy relies on the import of raw materials from South America, South Africa 
and India. The routes are enormous, but the enemy has contrived protection for his 
convoys to a large extent. 
Traffic - Convoys and independents proceed fast and are routed to avoid U-boat 
areas. 
Countermeasures - Air cover is widely given. New air bases have been built in 
great numbers. Surface forces, on the other hand, are comparatively weak, so their 
effectiveness is, therefore, slight. 
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Suitability of Type XXI as a Long Range Fighting Boat 
Long Radius of Action 
Endurances 
Surfaced 
6 knots... ... 19,000 miles 11 
knots ... ... 11,700 miles 
7 knots ... ... 18,000 miles 
12 knots ... ... 9,500 miles 
8 knots ... ... 17,000 miles 
13 knots... ... 7,700 miles 
9 knots ... ... 15,000 miles 
14 knots ... ... 5,000 miles 
10 knots ... ... 14,000 miles 
Submerged 
With Electric Crawling Motors 
5.5 knots ... ... 320 miles 
5 knots ... ... 360 miles 
Endurance increases at low speeds 
With Main Motors 
6 knots ... ... 280 miles 
12 knots ... ... 60 miles 
7 knots ... ... 21 
D miles 13 knots... ... 50 miles 
8 knots ... ... 160 miles 
14 knots ... ... 40 miles 
9 knots ... ... 135 miles 
15 knots ... ... 30 miles 
10 knots ... ... I 
10 miles 16 knots ... 25 miles 
11 knots ... ... 80 miles 
Short Times Required for Outward and Return Passages 
Type IXC Boat 
Lorient to 20OW (70 miles) at day's run of 140 miles 12 days 
20OW to Panama (3,800 miles) at day's run of 168 miles 38 days 
50 days 
Type XXI Boat 
Lorient to 20OW (70 miles) at day's run of 140 miles 5 days 
20PW to Panama (3,800 miles) at day's run of 168 miles 23 days 
28 days 
To operational areas within 6,000 miles, therefore, a day's run of 160-170 miles will 
normally be possible on passage in the open sea. 
Long Stay In Operational Area 
Improved Living Conditions for the Crew, and less nervous strain, because new 
equipment, speed, strength and endurance of the boat makes an anti-submarine 
hunt less likely and less destructive. 
It is possible to operate in areas that are strongly patrolled by aircraft. 
Good Prospects to Success owing to High Underwater Speed 
Summary 
The short time required for the outward passage, good living conditions and 
adequate stocks of fuel and victuals permit the boat's torpedo fighting power to be 
utilised to the full. High underwater endurance using Schnorkel permits the boat to 
be used in heavily air-patrolled areas and ability to fire by means of her echo- 
ranging installation without using her periscope permit advantage to be taken of all 
chances of attack that offer. 
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SECTION V- THE BOAT ENGAGED IN ATTACKING 
Basic Principles 
(a) Type XXI is not a submersible but a submarine proper. On the surface it has 
poor fighting qualities; therefore, if an enemy has been discovered and can be 
reached in one underwater approach run, even if it means a reckless 
expenditure of battery capacity, do not hesitate to attack in one approach run 
and force a way through, if necessary. Even if you fire with a battery capacity 
of only 20 per cent of the total, that is sufficient to last you through a long 
period of depth-charging. 
(b) As you are unable to tell whether you will have a second chance of attaining an 
attacking position, you must hit with your first attack, by day or night. 
(c) In spite of long range and LuT torpedoes, you must get as close as possible. 
The shorter the range, the more Legs-legs and the less chance of avoiding 
action. Balkon and Nibelung gear enable you to discover the enemy from a 
greater depth and attack him. But your eyes provide the best view. 
(d) If you can carry out your attack as a surfaced attack by night or a periscope 
attack by day, try one of these methods first You can always change to an 
attack with your technical eyes later. 
(a) Day Attack 
Attacks on independent are not considered though opportunities of them will be 
increased. 
Unobserved Attack from Outside the Close Escort - Outer Attack 
Firing position 3 to 5 miles distant for the heart of the convoy. Fire only from ahead 
to the beam. Aim at firing from directly ahead, for from there the best effect will be 
obtained by use of a LuT torpedo. 
Slip through the remote escort unobserved, crawling being the best method from 
the point of view of HE. Attack by means of periscope shot or shot using Nibelung 
(this latter will not always be possible owing to the great range). 
Long shots will be heard in hydrophones by surface vessels and result in avoiding 
action. 
Conduct after Attack 
Re-load immediately and fire a second 'fan' after the first. If this cannot be done 
from the outer position proceed as follows: - 
If you have been observed: - 
(a) If your battery capacity permits, make for convoy at high speed, dive under the 
escorts and carry out a forced attack, using, Nibelung from the flank or inside 
the convoy. Proceed with the convoy, re-load and fire again. 
(b) If your battery does not permit you to make for the convoy at high speed, go 
down to a considerable depth and fetch ahead by crawling under the convoy. 
(c) If your battery capacity is low and it is not possible to run under the convoy, 
proceed ahead laterally to the convoy at crawling speed, in order to lose as 
little leeway as possible. 
Assessment of Attacking Shot from Outside the Escort 
Comparatively slight chances of hitting because- 
(a) Firing data inaccurate. 
(b) Few effective LuT legs. 
(c) Avoiding action by enemy will be effective. 
Prospects of hitting will increase when 40 knot, 12,000 metre torpedo is produced. 
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Unobserved Attack from Within the Escort 
(a) Carrying out an attack at periscope depth, unobserved - The same conditions 
will apply as earlier boats, but the Type XXI is a larger asdic-target On the 
other hand, her silent speed "crawling" is 5 knots, and there fore she makes 
less noise. 
(b) Carrying out an attack from average depth by means of echo ranging 
installation. Unobserved attack without periscope - First, survey the situation 
through the periscope. Approach run at 50 metres or deeper (using best depth 
for avoiding location), using HE gear chiefly, but also making slight use of 
Nibelung. Fire from depths of 30-50 metres as soon as you are in the best 
position (right ahead). When transmitting on Nibelung, remember that impulses 
must be as few and as weak as possible, to avoid betraying the boaf s position. 
This does not apply when you are inside the screen. 
(c) Conduct after attack - Re-load immediately and carry out a second attack, 
unless observed. 
(d) Comparison of echo ranging attack with periscope attack. 
Disadvantages - Les seen during approach run, uncertainty as to whether the 
boat has been discovered by the enemy. 
Advantages - The boat is harder to discover and there is no chance of 
ramming. 
(e) Comparison between Type XXI and eaffier boats when carrying our 
unobserved attack. 
Advantages - Boat can change position quickly, undetected by own HE, and 
she has a high turning speed. If discovered, she can quickly reach a safe 
depth quickly. Attacks are possible in heavy weather, when before they were 
not, and the enemies' defences are restricted in such conditions. 
Underwater Attack as Forced Attack 
Can only be carried out if battery capacity allows you to force your way through the 
enemy at high speed (12-15 knots). 
Execution - Aim to dive under the outer screen unobserved, so that, after 
observation by the enemy, countermeasures do not start too early in the stretch 
between the outer and inner screens (which is a long stretch). Approach as close 
as possible to the close escort at Olowest high speed" required to get into a firing 
position. (It is necessary to determine your own noise ranges at various speeds. 
Noise tables for varying hydrophone conditions will have to be drawn up for each 
boat. ) 
As soon as you are observed, break through the screen at high speed, paying no 
attention to pursuit or depth charging. 
If possible fire on your approach run. If it is not possible to get under the convoy 
and attack from below. 
Shark Attack. Attack from Underneath the Convoy 
Attack from underneath the convoy whilst you are under the protection of the 
merchant vessels. Attacking position ahead of astern, firing from a depth of 30 to 
50 metres. 
Your own high underwater speed enables you to keep up with the convoy, even at 
a convoy speed of 10 knots, for a long time, so that several attacks are possible. 
Danger from sinking ships is slight. 
Conduct After Last Attack 
After your last successful attack, proceed with the convoy for a few miles, then go down to a considerable depth and crawl. Then turn about and move off laterally 
astern of the convoy. Steer clear of the "after sweepers' by means of your 
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Nibelung and hydrophone gear. Chances of detection are slight, for their speed will 
be high and the after screen will be rescuing survivors. Surface as soon as 
possible and send your report. 
(a) NightAttacks 
Surfaced Attacks 
It is assumed that the boat is in the vicinity of and ahead of the convoy. Stop 
periodically, carry out all-round listening with Balkon group then use Nibelung. 
Make use of the HE of the Nibelung. Take bearings of the locations you receive 
and use your Hohentwiel (radar) if necessary. Make use of bearings on convoy R/T 
wave, for the enemy is unable to forego using it. Plot locations on chart You may 
be able to plot the disposition of the escort and even place the convoy. 
Use Aphrodite. 
Advantage of Type XXI 
All-round listening is possible. 
Ability to ascertain direction of location by the new Flieger. 
Ability to ascertain type and location by subsequent operation of the Hohentwiel. 
Greater degree of security and, therefore, freer operation, for not time is wasted in 
defensive dives. 
If it is possible to carry out a surfaced attack in the old style, do so. If a destroyer 
makes for you, obtain firing data from Hohentwiel and if necessary, dive. If the boat 
is able to get away on the surface after the attack, try to do so. If discovered and 
pursuit is expected, dive, proceed beneath the convoy and attack again. 
Submerged Attack at Night 
If the boat is discovered during her approach run on the surface, of if she is certain 
to be forced under by the escort, she should remain on the surface for as long as 
possible to obtain a clear picture of the position. This is of great importance for the 
execution of a submerged attack at night. 
The forced night attack is the ideal night attack. By night, owing to poor visibility 
and danger of ramming each other, it is practically impossible for the close escort 
ships to follow a boat which is approaching underwater at high speed, to attack her 
with depth-charges or to synchronise their alterations of course with hers. 
Underneath the convoy, the boat is as safe as if she were in a concrete shelter. 
SECTION VI - TYPE XXI DURING DEPTH CHARGING 
How Have Losses Due to Depth Charging Occurred so Far? 
The cause, from information from returning prisoners, was as follows: - 
(a) The boat was crawling at great depth. It was pursued for a long time with 
repeated depth-charges. The water penetrating through the pressure hull 
glands reached such proportions that it was not possible to Pump it out with 
bilge pumps or compressed air. Water inside moved, and altered the trim, so 
that air had constantly to be used to regain trim. The penetration of the water 
into the battery released chlorine gas. The Commanding Officer had to surface 
before he ran out of air. 
(b) The boat was crawling at great depth. She was subjected to a very long pursuit 
until both battery capacity and supply of compressed air were exhausted and 
she was forced to surrender. 
(c) Owing to depth charging at great depth the pressure hull was penetrated (very 
rare). 
(d) After long depth charging, the boat surfaced and found waiting escorts. 
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Comparison Between Powers of Resistance of Type XXII and Previous Types 
Advantages - Able to seek greater depths (135 metres by 2% safety factor). 
High crawling speed. 
High underwater speed makes it possible to control greater 
alternations in trim and in weight. 
Large battery capacity makes it practically impossible to starve 
the boat out. 
More water can be pumped out, for the boat is equipped with 
two depth bilge pumps. 
Extremely good hydrophone gear and Nibelung permits a better 
check on movements of escorts. 
Conduct During Depth Charging 
(a) Passive defence - Seek great depth, roughly 300 metres, so that you can go 
still deeper if necessary. Make off at your high crawling speed on a mean course 
(making slight "zigs') in order to gain space. (The maximum range of asdic is 5,000 
metres. ) 
If you are force to go at a higher speed, and thus allow the enemy to hear you, 
carry out large scale avoiding movements. 
Alter course again at the very moment you change for high speed to crawling. 
If you cannot shake off the enemy, use all means of evasion, i. e., alterations of 
speed, course and depth and eject Bolde and Sieglinde (new SBT). 
Active Defence 
The days of sitting impotently in the cellar are past and gone. By use of high 
speed, Bolde and big alterations of course, you may throw ships off the scent, and 
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Possible Lines of Development of Submarine Tactics 
In this appreciation a submarine of the following type and capabilities is envisaged. 
Schnorkel fitted and diesel driven with normal electric submerged assisted by 
Walter propulsion. 
Endurance (a) 150 miles at 24 knots Walter Gear 
(b) 220 miles at 15 knots Walter Gear 
(c) 150 miles at 3 knots Battery 
(d) 7,000 miles at 8-10 knots Schnorkel Diesel 
(a) and (c) or (b) and (c) will be the limit of its endurance completely submerged 
and without the use of Schnorkel. 
2. Is torpedo armament will be the equivalent of existing types by the torpedo 
armament will improve by 150% on existing torpedoes, that is to say capable of 50 
knots for 10,000 yards or 40 knots for 20,000 yards. It is most improbable that any 
new armament will be fitted but its communications, detecting devices and torpedo 
control will be greatly improved. It is also possible that some form of short period 
transmission underwater telegraphy may be fitted. 
3. In contemplating any change in tactics that such submarine may employ their 
potentialities must be reviewed alongside those of 1944 submersibles; the 
following features stand out: - 
(a) Greatly increased tactical speed. 
(b) Effective hitting from a markedly increased range. 
(c) Ability to fire torpedoes from greater depths. 
(d) Increased diving depth. 
(e) Increased protection from attack. 
(f) Increased screening against echo, sound or magnetic detection. 
(g) Unsuitability for surface operations. 
(h) Reduced strategical speed. 
(i) Reduced radius of action. 
4. The great increase in tactical speed can only be made by the sacrifice of 
endurance, surface speed and surface sea keeping qualities. 
5. In view of the extensive air and radar over in the future these submarines will 
have to live nearly all their time at sea under water, coming to the surface only in 
exceptional circumstances. The mental effect of this on the submarine crews is 
likely to be such that it will be desirable to reduce the length of patrol below the two 
months that was normally undertaken in the past 
6. Their speed on passage will be low compared with the war time submersible. If 
paragraph 5 is found to be true the result will be an appreciable reduction in 
operational radius. 
7. It is likely therefore that the submarine will tend to operate nearer to focal points 
and avoid the open oceans where its strategical speed will be insufficient for long 
672 'Possible Lines of Development of Submarine Tactics, ' TASW. 816/46, 'Appendix W to 'Joint 
Paper on ... Convoy Defence", ' P. W. Bumett, for DTASW, and F. J. Finnigan, Director of operations, Sub-SAWC/11 C. 30414/D of Ops, [July 1946], Box 96, RG 313, NARA2. 
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range interception. This probability is supported by the fact that its increased power 
of evading detection and destruction will encourage it to operate in the face of a 
stronger opposition, particularly when the chances of success are great. 
8. As in the past the submarine will have to find its targets in the same way, by 
observation, listening, radar, intelligence and enemy reports (principally from co- 
operating aircraft). No new factor can at the moment be foreseen. 
(a) Observation 
This can only be carried out on the surface or at periscope depth. As the future 
submarine will not attempt to keep on the surface, and periscope watch gives a 
poor lookout in any but good weather its powers of observation will be in no 
way superior to its predecessors. 
(b) Its powers of listening will improve but in view of the possible progress in 
silencing ships the net result is unlikely to show any great gain for the 
submarine. 
(C) Radar and Search Receiver 
It is only reasonable to assume that in any future war the opponent of the 
submarine will be at least as well equipped in radar as we are likely to be. The 
user of radar from a submarine is an inherent risk in disclosing the submarine 
position, or at least its presence. It cannot be assumed that the submarine will 
use radar before the risk of its detection will not materially affect attack, that is 
to say only in the very late stages of the attack it is likely to be used. A Search 
receiver in the submarine may be of value, but the extent of this value will 
depend on the use of radar by surface ships. 
(d) Intelligence is an incalculable factor but there appear no grounds for belief that 
it will be either better or worse than in the past. 
(e) Enemy reports are likely to be at least as comprehensive as in the past but to 
receive these reports (unless transmitted by another submarine by underwater 
signals) the recipient must be at periscope depth or on the surface. In order to 
keep W/T watch the submarine on patrol will therefore generally be within 
range of magnetic detection from aircraft if it intends to use these reports. To 
avoid this danger of detection the only answer will be to go deep. Such a policy 
combined with its poor strategical speed must lead to the submarine patrolling 
where the targets come to her rather than seeking the targets. This again 
implies a tendency to concentrate in focal areas. 
9. In summarising the above it appears that the submarine must rely primarily on 
observation and listening. If a good periscope lookout is kept she should be able to 
go deep in good time to avoid magnetic detection from the air. 
10. The foregoing attempts to show the strategical situation of the future 
submarine. The factors already quoted also effect its tactical employment 
11. In the tactical field the following new course of action lie open to the 
submarine: - 
(a) Use of its underwater speed for approach and attack 
(b) Use of its underwater speed for evasion after attack 
(c) Use of increased hitting range. 
(a) Use of underwater sDeed in aporoach and aftack 
For a submerged submarine of the old type to achieve a close attack it had to 
start within an arc of 200 of either bow of the target The use of Schnorkel 
cruising speed will rather more that double this arc. 
If very strong air cover prevents the use of Schnorkel, the same results can be 
achieved by the discrete use of Walter propulsion, though the submarine must 
of course retain a margin of high speed for evasion after the attack. 
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Whether or not submarines will use high speed to pass through the screen 
must remain unanswered until more is known about its chances of detection 
through the use of speed. An important factor in this question is that throughout 
its attack, if operating alone or if directing other submarines, it must keep itself 
informed as well as possible of the latest movements of the target and screen. 
The surest and safest way to do this is undoubtedly by visual observation 
through the periscope. This must be done at slow speed if detection is to be 
avoided. The other methods of getting the required information, i. e., by radar, 
asdic or listening inevitable risk disclosing the submarine's presence or 
obtaining doubfful or confused information. 
It therefore appears likely that the passage through the screen and the final 
stages of the attack must be directed, at least, from a submarine at or close to 
periscope depth and proceeding at slow speed. If the submarine is operating 
as a single unit of is the directing submarine in the case of divisional attack; it 
may use brief bursts of high speed or great depth or both solely for the purpose 
of evasion of the screen. 
(b) The use of high speed for evasion after attack 
It seems certain that this will be used extensively as with intelligent use 
everything is to be gained and nothing lost. For example, if an A/S vessel is in 
contact with a submarine and heading away from the submarine at 15 knots, a 
two minute burst of 24 knots by the submarine will put it out of asdic range, and 
the search will have to start again. In view of the fact that in the immediate 
future Walter propulsion cannot be used safely near the surface (owing to the 
track it leaves), or at all at great depths, it appears likely that the submarine 
underwater evasive tactics will consist of bursts of high speed at depths of 
about 150 feet on Walter propulsion, interspaced with periods of slow speed 
electric propulsion at varying depths between periscope depth and maximum 
diving depth (1,000 feet). In the event of a divisional attack it appears likely that 
in the subsequent escape, submarines will spread at high speed in pre- 
determined sectors if only to enlarge the area in which the escorts must make 
their search. 
(c) The use of increased hifting range 
The principle that the closer one is to the target the better the chance of hitting 
must always hold good but as with the progress from the arrow to the shell and 
so to the long range guided missile, so will increased hitting range be made 
use of by the submarine where it pays to do so. 
The future long range pattern running or homing torpedo will increase the 
chances of success at the previous maximum range by at least 150%. It will 
also allow a good chance of hitting at a range of 50% more than the previous 
maximum. 
If this long range is used it must mean extending the screen to a greater 
distance from the target and unless a far greater number of escorts are used it 
will decrease the chance of the submarine being detected before or after the 
attack. This must be a highly tempting proposition for the submarine. Against 
the use of long range is one powerful factor, the submarine will be unable to 
get accurate enough information on which to stage a successful attack. 
Periscope visibility or radar worked from a transmitter just above the surface 
cannot give useful information at ranges appreciably beyond 7 miles. This can 
only be overcome by close range tactical direction of the submarine. 
12. All interested nations in the past have experimented with the pack or divisional 
attack. Chiefly because of inadequate inter-submarine communications little use of 
them has been made. Though the Germans attacked in numbers their attacks were 
not cohesive and were only tactically directed to a small extent. 
13. Advantages of the divisional attack: - 
(1) Concentration of firepower 
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(2) Initial detection and confusion of the enemy's AIS effort 
(3) In the later sates of a war with the quality of submarine CO's 
begins to decline all effort can be directed by a competent 
leader. 
Disadvantage of the divisional attack: - 
A failure in the control of the division may result in a failure of all 
the submarines in the division. 
14. Improved methods of inter-submarine communication will make the divisional 
attack possible in the future. The factors mentioned in paragraph 13 combined with 
a desire to sue increased hitting range appear to indicate that the divisional attack 
will become a practice in the future, not necessarily habitual but to be used as the 
situation demands. 
The ability to fire torpedoes from greatly increased depth will be a material factor in 
the divisional attack. It is possible to visualise a scheme where submarines patrol 
in groups of two or three stationed in a vertical plane, one beneath the other, say at 
periscope depth, 150 feet and 300 feet, with the tope one directing the division and 
communication with the leader of a similar division up to 15 miles away. 
In this way directional underwater sound-telegraphy would be received by all 
members of the division together and an attack could be directed accurately even if 
the leader of one division was out of sight but within torpedo range of the target 
Should such a division be detected by the escort considerable confusion would be 
caused to the escort owing tot the multiplicity of echoes. If detection took place 
before the attack two out of three submarines would almost certainly get away to 
pursuer their attack unmolested. If after their attack, their chances of evasion by 
the use of high speed would be enhanced. 
Whether submarines are operated in close tactical formation or not the directed 
attack from a submarine outside its own visibility range of the target, remains very 
much a possibility. 
16. The use of high underwater speed to continue the attack 
After one attack, submarines will be able to maintain contact with the target while 
reloading. It is clear that they will do so unless driven off. The question as to what 
tactics they will employ is these circumstances must cause consideration to be 
given to their attempting to remain under the convoy. The chief advantages of this 
are that they should be undetectable and will be close to a convenient firing 
position after reloading. Against this is the fact that station-keeping would be 
difficult if not impossible and the fear of a towed or intermittently dropped barrage 
would be a powerful deterrent. Opinion on this question is likely to be strongly 
divided and different lines of action will be pursued by different submarines. 
17. To sum up, it appears that the following innovations will be brought about: - 
(a) Use of high underwater speed for evasion 
(b) Use of high underwater speed for gaining contact 
(c) Attack at long range 
(d) Attack on concentration where suitable 
(e) Avoid the use of radar and thus attack principally by day, patrolling deep at 
night to avoid magnetic detection 
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Confidential Admiralty Fleet Order 312/47 is reproduced below: 
In order to avoid confusion between the different types of submarine at present in 
being or contemplated, the names in Column I of the table given below are in 
future to be used. 
2. The term 'submarine'will remain the generic title for all types. 
Type Name Meaning Existing Submarines of this 
Type 
'True Submarine' A submarine which will require no No vessels of this type 
connection with the atmosphere exist. 
while at sea and will be driven by 
some form of closed cycle 
propulsion, possibly atomic 
energy. It will never need to 
surface or use a snort. 
'Intermediate The submarine of high submerged HMS Meteorite (ex U- 
Submarine' speed driven by HTP or closed 1407). Projected German 
cycle propulsion. Has to use a Type XXVI. 
snort periodically, but need never 
surface. 
'Intermediate The submarine of high-submerged German Type XXI. Fast'S' 
Submarine (B)' speed driven by batteries. Has to conversions represent this 
use a snort periodically but need type in submerged speed 
never surface. but not other qualities. 
'Submersible (Snort The present submarine of slow All German operational 
fitted)' underwater speed but fitted with types at the end of the war, 
the snort. Need never surface but (Types VIIC, IXC 
will gain considerable mobility by principally) British A and T 
doing so. classes fitted with snorL 
HMS Sirdar. 
'Submersible' Vessels with similar characteristics All other British 
to those that have up to the submarines of A, T and S 
present been called 'submarines'. classes. 
Need to surface to charge. 
673 'CAFO 312 - Submarines - Nomenclature, ' TSD. 61/47,26 September 1947, NHB; 
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original sources, except where - occasionally - odd spellings were used, or where, for 
example, dates are expressed in different formats, these have been silently corrected. 
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